POLITICAL IDENTITY BUILDING AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT : THEORETICAL APPROACH AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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

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Political Identity Building and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

Theoretical Approach and Empirical Analysis

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Abstract

This thesis develops a general theoretical approach to political identity building under emerging conditions of globalisation. This theoretical approach is used to analyse political developments in Israeli and Palestinian societies since the start of the Oslo process in 1993. Combining Rosenau's concepts of 'frontiers' and 'fragmegration' with Wendt's analysis of identity in international relations, a three level model for political identity building is developed. It argues that political identity is formed on the substate, state and the supra-state level. Although the state level is maintained as an important location for political identity, it is argued that the concept of 'national identity' is too limited a variable under emerging conditions of globalisation. Six main significators of political identity are analysed: territory, ethnicity, history, language, religion and gender. These cut across all three levels. The case studies use a series of in-depth interviews with political actors on all three levels. It is shown that both societies are currently experiencing a deep identity crisis. Different political identity groups have developed which lack common ground in their conceptions of what kind of states Israel or Palestine should be. Israeli society is increasingly fragmenting on all three levels of political interaction. In consequence, the state level is turning into a battleground for particular political identities and is increasingly unable to establish societal cohesion. Palestinian society experiences an increasing isolation of the state level. This is due to the autocratic and neo-patrimonial structure of the Palestinian Authority which marginalised the substate and the supra-state level from political decision making. Therefore, here too, societal cohesion cannot be generated on the state level. In consequence, opposition to the Palestinian Authority and the peace process in general is strengthened.

Content

Introduction

The question of identity formation and its influence on policy decisions has become of increasing interest for scholars in International Relations. "The world-wide upsurge in identity politics in the past three decades and the re-awakening of long-suppressed expressions of identity in the post-Cold War world have forced International Relations to put the question of identity onto its research agenda in recent years"[1].

This thesis takes political identity building[2] as its central analytical variable. It tries to develop a general theoretical approach to political identity building and uses this approach to analyse political developments in Israeli and Palestinian society since the start of the Oslo process in 1993.

To put political identity at the centre of theoretical analysis challenges the 'orthodoxy' in International Relations theories, namely the Neorealist-Neoliberal theories. Looking at concepts of identity formation questions the assumption that political identity can be equated with national identity and is an unproblematic variable, since the prime bearer of political identity is the sovereign nation state.

> *"Neorealism is not interested in individual or sub-state levels of activity, except perhaps where these activities would have a direct and immediate impact upon the capability of a state for international interaction [...] It accepts as unproblematic that the prime identity of those who inhabit a state*

[1] Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick. "Introduction" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) "*Identities in International Relations*" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. XIII.
[2] I use the concept 'political identity building' throughout the thesis. With this concept I refer to the transformation and change in political identities under the emerging conditions of globalisation.

is provided by that state itself, therefore, there is no need to move 'below the level of the state"[3].

The assumption of the 'state as a unitary actor' in the international system and the theoretical consequence to locate meaningful and effective political identity at the state level in form of 'national identity' rests on specific modern notions about the structure and workings of the international system. "The paradigm of nationalism which was so widely accepted until recently is that of *classical modernism.* This is the conception that nations and nationalisms are intrinsic to the nature of the modern world and to the revolution of modernity"[4]. At the heart of this notion of nationalism and national identity lie the assumptions that, at least in principle, the state has exclusive control over its territory and exclusive sovereignty over its citizens. However, in the last two decades changes have occurred in the international system that question these assumptions. These changes have been summarised by analysts under the term 'globalisation'. Changes in the structure as well as in the workings of the international system have been observed.

"Not only [...] the operating structures have changed - with world politics no longer defined as essentially by an ideological military struggle between the two dominant centres of power controlled respectively by two 'superpowers' [...] but also that 'agenda' of world politics has been transformed [...] The international community is now preoccupied with other issues such as the search for a 'New World Order', the disparities in wealth between developed and less developed countries (LDCs), and environmental/ecological issues"[5].

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[3] Tooze, Roger. "Prologue" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) "*Identities in International Relations*" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. XIX.
[4] Smith, Anthony D. *"Nationalism and Modernity"* (London: Routledge, 1998): p. 3.
[5] White, Brian, Richard Little and Michael Smith. "Issues in World Politics" in White, Brian, Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds) *"Issues in World Politics"* (London: Macmillan Press 1997): p. 3.

In addition, the impact of new information technologies, is seen as crucial, since they enhance communication between distant locations. These changes on the macro level of the international system are complemented by and cause, as Rosenau would argue, an increase in the analytical skills of individuals to cope with the complexities of world politics.

> *"In the last decades of the twentieth century, the abilities of individuals to connect to world politics and cope with its complexity have reached new heights [...] to an increasing degree, world politics are being shaped by powerful and restless people who can discern their remoteness from the centers of decision, who have the skills with which to do something about their situation, who are questioning the authority, and who are willing to accept the fast-paced cascade of events that mark the decentralized structures of the postindustrial world"*[6].

One important question and the central one for the analysis in this thesis, is the impact of these changes on the state. There are two general positions that analysts have been taking regarding this issue. On the one hand, analysts in the modern theoretical tradition argue that these changes will have some impact on the state but that the state will adapt and continue to be the primary actor in international relations. In consequence, "the ideal of nationhood today continues to exert its hold over the political imagination; it continues to be reproduced as the cause worth more than individual life; and it frames the practice of political democracy"[7]. On the other hand, writers that use a postmodern framework of analysis perceive the influence of these developments to be so fundamental, that they see the state level on the demise and no longer having an important influence on political identity. The concept of the 'state'

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[6] Rosenau, James N. *"Turbulence in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990): p. 335.

has been replaced by a much wider and analytically amorphous concept of 'community'.

> *"We can see how community has in fact become a key concern of some of the more recent postmodernist approaches [...] These approaches provide us with a means of seeing how community today can be seen as what Benedict Anderson terms an 'imagined community' but one which is always self-consciously incomplete"*[8].

However, it will be argued in this thesis that, while the modern approach does not appreciate the impact of these changes enough, postmodern approaches go too far in assuming the complete demise of the state as an analytical variable. Identity in postmodern thinking is a complex web formed by a potentially unlimited amount of social interactions. This can hardly be used for an empirical analysis of political identity building. In addition, it will be pointed out that these postmodern approaches do not appreciate enough the uneven spread of globalisation. In the theoretical approach developed here, insights of modern and postmodern approaches will be combined to allow a more comprehensive understanding of political identity building in international relations under conditions of globalisation. In this way it should be possible to create a theoretical framework which can be used to better explain and predict policy outcomes.

The case studies to which this theoretical approach will be applied are the Israeli and Palestinian societies since the Oslo process. These cases are of particular interest for a 'testing' of this theoretical approach for two reasons. Firstly, the Middle East, one can argue, is in the early stages of globalisation. Due to the limited access to information technologies, the effects and changes on the level of the individual

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[7] Billig, Michael. *"Banal Nationalism"* (London: Sage, 1995): p. 177.
[8] Delanty, Gerard. *"Modernity and Postmodernity"* (London: Sage, 2000): p. 114f.

have not yet reached as dramatic heights as in Europe or North America for example. However, the beginning impact of these technologies can be seen. For example, not only the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority have opened web pages but also different political groups in Israeli and Palestinian society begin to amend their political activities with world wide campaigns over the internet.[9] Therefore the analysis of both Israeli and Palestinian societies presents an adequate case for a theoretical approach to political identity under conditions of globalisation. If under the emerging conditions of globalisation the theoretical approach has analytical force then the impact of these changes on the process of political identity building has been judged correctly.

The second reason why these particular cases have been chosen is the fact that one can argue identity politics have reached unprecedented importance in both societies since the beginning of the Oslo process. This is because the process itself concerns negotiations about one of the basic elements of political identity: territory.[10] The negotiations are complicated by the fact that, since the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories after 1967, both societies are living in a complex entangled infrastructure which is not easy to separate.

However, not only the negotiations about territory make political identity building a central issue in both societies. The very fact that the negotiations exist bring problems of political identity to the forefront. Until the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1993 both societies by and large employed a discourse that described the 'other' as the enemy whose aim it is to destroy and annihilate the 'self'.

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[9] Israeli government: http://www.israel.gov.il; Palestinian National Authority: http://www.pna.net/; A few examples of political groups: Hebron settler community: http://wwsw.hebron.org.il; Peace Now/Shalom Achshav: http://www.peacenow.org.il; Hamas: http://www.palestine-info.net/hamas/index.htm; LAW The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment: http://www.lawsociety.org

Both sides perceived each other as a danger to their individual and collective existence. The negotiations challenge this exclusionary discourse because now the 'enemy' is the partner in negotiations with whom a modus vivendi has to be found.

The combination of these two factors led to a crisis of political identity in both societies. That this crisis is not just an intellectual problem but can have serious violent consequences can be seen in the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 and the violence between the Palestinian Authority and supporters of Hamas in 1994 respectively. Therefore an analysis of political identity building in both societies is crucial if one wants to understand the political realities of the Oslo process and assess the possible future implications of this situation for the process as a whole.

Before an overview of the different chapters is given, a few general remarks about the aims and the structure of this thesis are necessary. The thesis tries to develop a general theoretical approach to political identity building and then assess the explanatory force of this approach for the Israeli and Palestinian societies. It does not aim at a simple theoretically informed discussion of the cases. Therefore, the theoretical approach will be developed first, then the cases will be presented and afterwards the implications of the cases for the theoretical approach will be outlined.

Both modern and postmodern approaches to the problem of political identity have produced a wealth of literature. It cannot be attempted in the limited space of this thesis to review all of this literature. The decision about what to include and what not to include was made according to two criteria: Firstly, literature has been selected which is representative of the thinking within the modern and postmodern paradigms. Secondly, literature was chosen which could be combined without ending up with an

[10] For a discussion of this point see: Sucharov, Mira. "Regional Identity and the Sovereignty Principle: Explaining Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking" in Newman, David (ed) "*Boundaries, Territory and*

argument that is based on completely opposing analytical and philosophical assumptions.

Furthermore, the aim of this approach is to analyse political identity building. When we speak of political identity building we are concerned with the ideas, motivations, convictions and identifications of actors (individuals and groups) that translate directly into political action. This thesis does not (and because of the spacial limits it cannot) attempt to analyse all aspects of identity in general. While personal identity is to a certain extent covered by this theoretical approach, the theory cannot claim to be a comprehensive analysis of identity. An additional reason for this limitation of the analysis is that during the case studies it will be attempted to explain and predict policy outcomes on the basis of the political identity of actors. In order to focus the argument it is necessary to concentrate on the political aspects of identity building.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The theoretical approach is developed in the two first chapters. The first one will review the literature on political identity building in International Relations and argue for a multilevel approach. This chapter centres on modern and postmodern attempts to theorise political identity building. It will be shown how the classical theories of International Relations, namely Neorealism and Neoliberalism are based on the 'state as the unitary actor model' which in turn is based on specifically modern notions of 'territoriality', 'sovereignty' and 'state'. It will be argued that these assumptions are now challenged by the different analyses of the effects of globalisation. Moreover it will be demonstrated that modern approaches to globalisation undervalue the effects of these changes and postmodern approaches go too far in this respect. Therefore, an alternative approach will be suggested. Based on Rosenau's concept of frontiers and Alexander Wendt's

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Postmodernity" (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

work on the role of identity, a new model of political identity building will be developed: the three level model of political identity building.

The second chapter will look at the ontological breadth and depth of political identity. It will explore the process of political identity building on three levels of political and social interaction: substate (individual/group) level, state level, and supra-state level. The ontological depth of political identity will be analysed by a discussion of six central variables: 'sense of ethnicity', 'sense of territoriality', 'sense of history', 'sense of religion', 'sense of language', and 'gender'. It will be argued that these variables cut across all three levels of political identity building.

The third and fourth chapter will look at the historical developments and the structures of political identity building in Israeli and Palestinian societies respectively. In the analysis of Israeli society the cleavages that have been developing since the yishuv and became prevalent during the Oslo negotiations are going to be examined. During the analysis of Palestinian society special attention will be paid to the constraints on free development of political identity building that have been put in place by the Oslo agreements and by the internal structure of the Palestinian Authority.

The fifth chapter will bring the empirical and theoretical discussion together. Here, an analysis of the main political identity groups on all three levels will be attempted. The political identity of the different groups will be outlined according to the six significators identified in the theoretical model. In a comparative fashion it will be shown that the identity groups have developed conceptions of what kind of state Israel or Palestine should be which lack common ground. It will become clear that the state level in both societies remains an important location for political identity building. The concept of a 'state', of 'having a state of one's own' is crucial for the political identities of all groups in both societies. Nevertheless, the state elites

have increasing difficulties in establishing societal cohesion. The basic societal consensus of what it means to be an Israeli or a Palestinian and in consequence what kind of states Israel or Palestine should be is in the process of breaking down. Groups on the substate and the supra-state level try to put pressure on the state level of both societies to make their demands heard. This increases the fragmentation of both societies and makes the negotiations between them increasingly difficult.

In the conclusion the implications of the case studies for the three level model of political identity will be analysed. In addition, the influence of the emerging globalisation on both societies will be discussed. It will be argued that the effects of globalisation and the prevalence of identity politics in Israeli and Palestinian societies have two different effects. In Israeli society, the state level is facing increasing fragmentation due to the growing influence of diverging political identity groups. In Palestinian society, the cohesion of the state level is maintained due to the weakness of the opposition and the autocratic and neo-patrimonial structure of the Palestinian Authority. However this isolates the state level and its elites from Palestinian society at large and increases opposition to the peace process in general and the Palestinian Authority in particular.

The central aim of this study is to show that political identity building under the emerging conditions of globalisation can no longer be analysed by looking at the concept of 'national identity' only. All three levels of political interaction, the substate level, the state level and the supra-state level have to be taken into account.

Theoretical Approach to Political Identity in International Relations

This chapter centres on modern and postmodern attempts to theorise political identity building. The modern approach to political identity building is especially important as a theoretical approach in International Relations, since it has been directly translated into the 'state as unitary actor' model of the 'classic' theories of International Relations, Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The modern and the postmodern approaches to political identity building offer directly opposed epistemological and analytical answers to this issue. While the modern approach situates political identity building uniquely on the level of the state, the postmodern approach sees identity building as a complex web of loyalties and affiliations below and above the state. In addition to this the postmodern assumptions about political identity are based on epistemological assumptions that reject any possibility of knowledge. This will be made clear along the three central concepts on which the modern conception of political identity building is based: 'territoriality', 'sovereignty' and 'the concept of the modern state'. These concepts translate then into the modern concept of 'national identity' which will be analysed in the second chapter. The modern assumptions of each concept will be outlined first, then they will be opposed by the postmodern criticism. This will enable the reader to see exactly which modern assumptions are attacked directly by postmodernism and how postmodernism completely undermines these modern concepts. However it will become equally clear that the postmodern alternatives pose serious problems if they would be introduced into a theoretical framework for an empirical analysis. Because of this it will be necessary to introduce a new set of analytical approaches. Based on

Rosenau's concept of frontiers and Alexander Wendt's work on the role of identity, a new model of political identity building will be developed, combining the two approaches: the three level model of identity building.

The chapter consists of five major parts. The first part is a discussion of the idea of political identity building in the 'classic' theories of International Relations: Realism, Neorealism, Neoliberalism. It will become clear that these theories see the issue of political identity building not as an analytical problem. They see political identity building as simply resting on the state level. Waltz's theory of international relations is the most radical example of this line of thinking. This is why it will be dealt with in some detail. The classical Realism of Morgenthau, Neoliberalists and more recent Neorealists will only be treated in passing to point out that they follow the same set of assumptions. This will lead to the question of how these assumptions are justified.

The second part of the chapter will try to answer this question. The three basic concepts which justify the modern thinking about political identity are examined: territoriality, sovereignty and the modern concept of the state. The modern assumptions will be outlined. The analysis will move from the most basic concept which is used to justify modern political identity: territoriality, to look at the legal expression of the modern sense of territoriality, sovereignty and will finally look at the concept of the state which translates these assumptions into a political framework

In the third part the influence of globalisation on the role of the state will be discussed. Here modern and postmodern attempts to grasp these changes will be analysed. It will become clear that modern approaches see the state adjusting to these changes and remain the prime political unit. The postmodern approaches see the changes that the process of globalisation introduces into the international political realm as fundamental, so that a reconceptualisation of the concepts of territoriality

and sovereignty is necessary. As a consequence of this the modern concept of the state can no longer be used in the analysis of political phenomena. However, the complex web of social relations in an ever changing environment poses severe problems if it is going to be used for an empirical analysis. Therefore a new conceptualisation is needed.

The fourth part of the chapter looks at Rosenau's alternative conceptualisation of international relations which tries to include postmodernism's idea of the flow of information, goods and people which erode state boundaries and at the same time tries to put this complex web of interactions into an intelligible framework. The basic structures of this conceptualisation will be outlined and critically analysed. Although Rosenau's approach cannot be completely accepted as a basis for theoretical approach to political identity building, it points in the right direction.

The fifth part of the chapter is a first attempt to develop a new approach to political identity building. Based on Wendt's structuralism and constructivist approach to state identity, a three level model of political identity building is proposed. This model narrows the complex structure of political identity down to three levels: substate level (individual/group), state level and supra-state level. This approach is therefore analytically capable of serving as a basis for empirical research. The three level model will only be introduced in this chapter. The second chapter will look in more detail at the relationships inside and between the three levels. The main 'signifiers' of political identity building (perception of territory, perception of history, perception of ethnicity, language, religion, and gender) will also be analysed.

We now turn to the analysis to the modern conceptions of political identity based on the 'state as actor model' in international relations.

I. Questioning the 'State as actor Model' - Opening up the 'Black Box' of the State

The 'classical' theories of International Relations, namely Neorealism and Neoliberalism are based on the 'state as unitary actor' model. They see the international realm as a system of states, the stuctures of which are forming the states' political identities. Domestic influences are therefore not important for the analysis of political decision making. In consequence meaningfull political identity is existing solely on the state level.

This line of argument can be seen most clearly in the work of Kenneth Waltz and Robert O. Keohane.[11] In Kenneth Waltz's work one can observe a significant change away from a theory which could have taken a more in-depth and differentiated discussion of identity formation into account. While in '*Man the State and War*' Waltz was still arguing for a connection between what he called the 'first, second and third image' (namely the individual, the state and the system level)[12], by the time he published '*Theory of International Politics*' Waltz had arrived at a purely systemic theory. Approaches other than on the systemic level were labelled 'reductionist' and disregarded in the light of the new systemic theory. In a second step, the international political system was separated from other international systems (like the economic sphere). "We concluded [...] that international politics does not fit

[11] The work of Keohane shows similarities to the work of Waltz on the basic theoretical assumptions. The author does not imply that Keohane's Neoliberalism is to be seen as similar to Waltz's Neorealism.

[12] "The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to asses their importance or predict their results." See: Waltz, Kenneth "*Man, the State, and War*" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959): p. 238.

the model closely enough to make the model useful and that only through some sort of systems theory can international politics be understood."[13]

At this stage of theorising, identity formation can no longer be taken into account. Waltz arrived at a purely statist model, which assumes that states are the unproblematic unit of the international system. This becomes very clear if one looks at Waltz's theory of international relations more closely. The basic question Waltz answers in his theory of international politics is: why do states with different internal structures implement similar foreign policies?[14] Waltz's basic answer to this question is that the structure of the international system constrains the choices a state has in foreign policy. Therefore Waltz emphasises "the need for a systems approach."[15] Only by concentrating on the functions of the system and by an attempt to explain its constraining nature can international politics be fully explained. The international structure is characterised by three main features:

> *"by the fact that it is anarchic, in the sense that there is no higher authority, that there is no differentiation of function between units, i.e. all states perform roughly the same functions; and by an unequal distribution of capacities, i.e. the distinction between great and small powers."*[16]

The anarchic structure is the ordering principle of the international system. Because there is no higher authority, the system is characterised by a self help environment.[17] This anarchical structure came into existence through the interaction among states: "International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains

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[13] Waltz, Kenneth "*Theory of International Politics*" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979): p. 79.
[14] See: Waltz (1979) *op .cit.*: p. 65.
[15] Ibid: p. 68.
[16] Halliday, Fred *"Rethinking International Relations"* (London: Macmillan, 1994): p. 33.
[17] "To achieve their objectives, and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy [...] must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves." Waltz (1979) *op. cit.*: p. 111.

them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others."[18] The structure of the system constrains the units in two different ways: through socialisation and through competition. Socialisation changes the behaviour of states while they interact: "Consider the process of socialisation in the simplest case of a pair of [...] states. A influences B. B, made different by A's influence, influences A."[19] The behaviour of the pair, so Waltz states, cannot be explained by a unilateral view of either member. It is also impossible to look at socialisation only as a two way relation, because "each element of behaviour that contributes to the interaction is itself shaped by their being a pair."[20] The two states are part of a system which deeply changes their being. Although each reacts to the actions of the other, they are both influenced by being part of the system. Socialisation therefore reduces variety among the units, the states.

The second way in which the system constrains the units is through competition. "Competition generates an order, the units of which adjust their relations through their autonomous decisions and acts."[21] If a state doesn't adopt the behaviour which is required by the system it risks self-destruction. As an analogy Waltz cites competitive behaviour in economics. If a firm does not take part in the competition according to the rules of the market, it will fail. This is what Waltz calls the "rationality of the more successful competitors"[22] A state has to adjust its behaviour to the self help environment of the international system in order to be able to survive.

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[18] Waltz, Kenneth "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory" in: Kegley, Charles W. Jr. "*Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*" (New York: St Martins Press, 1995): p. 74.
[19] Waltz (1979) *op. cit.*: p. 74.
[20] Ibid: p. 75.
[21] Ibid: p. 76.
[22] Ibid: p. 76.

The units in Waltz's view of the international system are the states. These, as Waltz explains, are assumed to act as unitary actors (state-as-actor system). Differences in the internal structures of the states do not make for different functions and behaviour within the system. "The units of the system are not formally differentiated with distinct functions specified as are the parts of hierarchic orders."[23] The difference between the states is based on the distribution of capabilities (difference between small and great powers). There is a constantly shifting distribution of power within the system. The capabilities a state has (in Waltz's terms capabilities are means to secure one's own security and in the ultimate sense, to wage war against another state) defines its placement within the system.[24] Therefore the distribution of power within the system is a key to understanding the position of a state. "Great powers are marked off from others by the combined capabilities (or power) they command. When their number changes consequentially, the calculations and behaviours of states, and the outcomes their interactions produce, vary."[25]

Waltz sees hardly any possibility for a change of the international structure. The advantage of a stable and persisting structure is that the structural effects can be observed more easily. Therefore "what continues and repeats is surely not less important than what changes."[26] Structural change can only come in the form of revolution, a change to a different type of anarchic structure. Different anarchical structures would be a shift from a bipolar (two great powers) to a multi-polar (three or more great powers) system. Because this change gives rise to new expectations it will alter the outcomes of the units interactions. These outcomes change, because the position of the units within the structure changes. They increase or decrease their

[23] Ibid: p. 75.
[24] All states face a security dilemma. The more power they accumulate in order to ensure their security, the more other states will accumulate power to ensure their security. Therefore it becomes increasingly difficult for a state to ensure its own security needs.
[25] Ibid: p. 74.

capabilities and power. A change of the ordering principle (anarchy) is not possible as Waltz states.[27] The basic systemic constraints on the individual units remain the same. More recent work of Neo-Realists, like that of Stephen Walt and Mearsheimer has tried to engage in a theoretical discussion with 'critical' approaches in International Relations. However, they failed to go beyond the 'state-as actor' model.[28]

Neoliberalism argues along similar lines. The anarchic self-help environment is supplemented by agreed norms which can limit the power struggle and give rise to institutionalised regimes. However these only reflect the intent and relative power of the states. The states' interests are taken as given. In addition systemic theory is opened up to economic questions, the state (now seen more as a penetrable collective) remains as the core unit of analysis. The state is the unit in the international system whose behaviour has to be explained. "The concept of international regimes has fostered research on the evolution of rules and institutions in world politics, and, to some extent, on the impact of rules and institutions on state behaviour [emphasis added]."[29] The number of actors in the international system is increased in comparison with Neorealism. It includes international corporations and other non-state actors, but "nation states continue to be important international actors."[30] Issues of identity and identity formation can not be explained by this model. They remain within the idea of the 'state as actor model', other groups within the states are not dismissed as unimportant rather as irrelevant. "In sum, both

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[26] Ibid: p. 70.
[27] See: Ibid: p. 70.
[28] See: Walt, Stepehen M. "*Revolution and War*" (London: Cornell University Press, 1996) and Mearsheimer, J. "The False Promise of International Institutions" in *International Security* 19 1995.
[29] Keohane, Robert O and Joseph S. Nye. "*Power and Interdependence*" (Harper Collins, 1989): p. 267.
[30] Holsti, Ole R. "Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its Challengers" in Kegley, Charles W. Jr. "*Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*" (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995): p. 43.

orthodox theories treat the boundaries of the state as 'preordinated facts' rather than as the temporary outcome of strategies of social struggle necessary to problematise identity."[31]

The approach of 'classical' Realism, namely that of Morgenthau seems to offer more promising insights into the issue of identity building. Morgenthau bases his insights into political behaviour on an understanding of human nature. "Human nature, however imperfect, is fixed and ought to be accepted for what it is rather than what it might be."[32] Morgenthau sees human nature as basically malevolent, exhibiting a lust for power. This concentration on human nature would have opened up a possibility to develop a theory of identity. Also Morgenthau's remarks on the state as not being the only possible expression could have opened up the possibility of moving away from the state as actor model. In 1970 he wrote that the forces of globalisation would challenge the nation state's prime role in international politics. "The sovereign nation-state is in the process of becoming obsolete."[33] However Morgenthau never developed these assumptions. In contrast to this, Morgenthau argued that the national interest would be fixed, regardless of changes in a state's domestic structure. The struggle for power, which is part of human nature has, according to Morgenthau, to be taken into account. Therefore the struggle for power, defined as interest, is the only rational course of action. "The aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics, as of all politics, international politics is of necessity power politics."[34] Therefore the domestic structure of the state cannot play any significant role in international politics. As

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[31] Tooze *op.cit.:* p. XIX.
[32] Burchill, Scott. "Realism and Neo-Realism" in Burchill, Scott and Andrew Linklater (eds) "*Theories of International Relations*" (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996): p. 76.
[33] Morgenthau, Hans "The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory" in Der Derian, James (ed) "*International Theory. Critical Investigations*" (London: Macmillan Press, 1995): p. 50.
[34] Morgenthau, Hans J. "*Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*" brief edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993): p. 35.

Burchill argues, Morgenthau assumes that the "nation state is a unitary actor but is completely uninterested in its internal nature, including composition of its commercial and state elites."[35] As can be seen, Morgenthau follows as well the 'state as actor' model.

It has become obvious that the 'classic' theories of International Relations (Realism, Neorealism and Neoliberalism) treat the state as the prime unit of international relations. Therefore political identity as such does not present itself as a analytical problem. Since the state is the prime unit of analysis, it is seen as the prime bearer of political identity. Identity is assumed to be limited to an interest in survival and possibly domination. The international system, as conceived by Waltz does not allow any significant and meaningful political identity above or below the level of the state. Realists like Morgenthau and more recent Neorealists like Stephen Walt and Mearsheimer follow the same basic line of argument as Waltz, although they attribute slightly less importance to the system. Neoliberalists like Keohane and Nye allow additional actors in the system in addition to nation states. However as far as the question of political identity is concerned, the state remains in its privileged position. In order to fully understand the limits of this approach to international relations and political identity it is necessary to look at the underlying assumptions and concepts of the 'state as actor' approach: the notion of territoriality, sovereignty, and the resulting modern conception of the state.

[35] Burchill *op. cit.*: p. 78.

II. 'Modern' IR Theory and the Concept of the 'State'

II.I. The Concept of Territoriality

The first conceptual pillar on which the modern conception of the state rests is the concept of exclusive control over territory. In order to understand the importance of the concepts of territoriality in modern political thinking it is necessary to look at the most important features that separate modernity from pre-modern conceptions. Modernity, according to Giddens can be characterised by three features: 1) separation of time and space, 2) disembedding of social systems, and 3) reflexive ordering and reordering of social life according to impacts of knowledge.[36] The most important feature for the argument presented here is the first one: separation of time and space. Giddens argues, that in pre-modern conceptions time and space were always connected: "'when' was almost universally connected with 'were' or identified by regular natural occurrences."[37] The day was structured according to sunrise and sunset, the year was structured according to the seasons. This conception changed with the invention of the mechanical clock and its widespread distribution. Now for the first time, an exact measurement of time was possible without reference to socio-spatial markers. Giddens calls this the invention of 'empty time'. This was paralleled by the uniformity of social organisation, as it was now possible to divide time into zones, the 'working day' for example. "The 'emptying of time' is in large part the precondition for the 'emptying of space' and thus has causal priority over it."[38] The 'emptying of time' allowed connections between a distant other apart from face to face relations. This development allowed social institutions to function independently from time and space. A co-ordination across time and space was possible, which

[36] See: Giddens, Anthony "*The Consequences of Modernity*" (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990): p. 16f.
[37] Ibid: p. 17.
[38] Ibid: p. 18.

allowed a rationalised organisation of social institutions and interaction. Social relations became 'disembedded', they were lifted out of particular space-time connections by the creation of symbolic tokens (money) and the establishment of expert systems. By expert systems Giddens means "systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organise large areas of the material and social environments in which we live."[39]

Based on the changing conceptions of time and space, the idea of the modern state and the modern state system began to emerge. The most distinguishing feature of the modern state system is a new conception of territoriality. "The distinctive signature of the modern - homogenous - variant of structuring territorial space is the familiar world of territoriality disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar sovereign states."[40] This new conception allowed the distinction between an internal and an external realm. The internal characterised by order imposed by central authority and the external by anarchy and the states ability to wage war to resolve conflicts. Two factors influenced this transformation: the change in material environment and doctrinal development. The material environment in the 13th century was favourable to dynamics which would in consequence erode the organisation of political space based on personal relationships. Favourable environmental conditions allowed a growth in population, this in turn allowed an economic development. The increasing monetization of economic relationships enabled taxation which financed standing armies and allowed internal pacification. The economic growth reaches institutional limits in the late 13th and early 14th century. Among the institutional limits was the feudal structure of agricultural economics. Therefore in order to overcome the constrains of the feudal structure,

[39] Ibid: p. 27.

economic and political importance turned towards the towns. These were less involved in this structure.[41] The external shocks of the 14th century (plague, economic decline) strained the existing social order and created a new matrix of constraints and opportunities for social actors by further weakening the feudal structure which was based on personalised relationships. This changed situation was reflected in the develoment in doctrine. On the doctrinal level, the concept of sovereignty was developed, signifying a more impersonal way of governance. The doctrine of sovereignty developed in stages from the 'cuius regio eius religio' doctrine (subjects have to have the same confession, Protestant or Catholic, as the ruler) of the Peace of Augusburg 1555, to the 'rex in regno sua es Imperator regni sui' (ruler has exclusive sovereignty over his/her subjects) in the peace of Westphalia in 1648. These concepts, in connection with the rediscovery of absolute and exclusive property rights from the Roman law, aided in the development of the notion of absolute and exclusive sovereignty. From the perspective of social totalities, domestic and international "private property rights and sovereignty may be viewed as being analogous concepts in three respects. First, they differentiate among units in terms of possession of self and exclusion of others. Second, because any mode of differentiation inherently entails a corresponding form of sociality, private property rights and sovereignty also establish systems of social relations among their respective units. [...] Third, the most successful theorists of the two realms [...] developed an autonomous legitimation of the political order based simply on the minimalist social needs of its component units"[42]. As Ruggie shows there are three levels on which this new concept of the world had to be put into action: 1) the

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[40] Ruggie, John Gerard "Territrotialy and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations" in *International Organization.* 47, 1 1993: p. 151.
[41] Ibid: p. 155.
[42] Ruggie, John Gerard. "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity" in. Keohane, Robert O. (ed) "*Neorealism and its Critics*" (New York: Columbia Universtiy Press, 1986): p. 145.

domestic, social structure, 2) the territorial formation, and 3) the collectivity of territorial units.[43]

Excursus: Gidden's Notion of 'Administrative Power'

Having established the basis on which the modern state and the modern state system emerged, it is now helpful to look at Gidden's notion of 'administrative power' to explain which forces enabled this new conception of political organisation to become the dominant one. The notion of 'administrative power' rests on two premises: 1) that states use surveillance i.e. the collection of information and then use of this information in the supervision of human beings and 2) that the surveillance is backed up by sanctions. The combination of surveillance and sanctions is what Giddens calls 'administrative power'. "Organizations of all types develop legal rules of some sort. All forms of law, in turn, involve sanctions administered in one way or another via officials. Such administration is backed, in a direct or more indirect manner, by the threat of the use of violence."[44] The state therefore is characterised by 1) its territoriality, 2) the ability to enforce a code of conduct beyond its own apparatus and 3) the dominant capacity of violent sanctions. According to Giddens, the shift from a traditional to a modern state and the traditional to the modern states system was based on an intensification of these three capabilities and the enhancement of administrative power. This is a very complex development. The resolution of the three problems influence and interact with each other.[45] The basis of this development is the domestic pacification joined with the emergence of a clear definition of legality and illegality and the backing up of this system by an

[43] Ruggie (1993) *op. cit.*: p. 160.
[44] Giddens, Anthony "*The Nation-State and Violence. Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*" (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985): p. 16.
[45] For the argument see: Rosenberg, Justin "A Non-Realist Theory of Sovereignty?: Giddens' the Nation-State and Violence" in *Millenium. Journal of International Studies*. 19, 2 1990: pp. 249-259.

appropriate sanctioning apparatus. This enabled the emergence of exact borders in contrast to the pre-modern frontiers (which can be characterised as blurring zones in which the state power was weak). Once this was established the emergent states had to find ways to interact with each other. The first step was to establish a mutual recognition of exclusive sovereignty for the respective territories. It is to this concept that we turn now.

II.II. Concept of Sovereignty

After having looked at the basic analytical concept of modern International Relation's theory: territoriality, it is now time to look at the concept which is its legal expression: sovereignty. This part will consist of two major lines of argument. First the social construction of sovereignty will be outlined. It will be argued that the concept of sovereignty, if seen as analytically unproblematic and ahistorical is severely limiting. It will be shown that sovereignty has to be seen as socially constructed and in the process of constant renegotiation.

Traditionally state sovereignty has been seen as the mutually recognised basic rule between states in the system they constitute. It is seen as an analytical category that is beyond time, ideology and politics. One example should suffice:

> *"Hegelianwise, we can not avoid the temptation that bids us make our State a unity. It is to be all-absorptive. All groups are to be but the ministrants to its life; their reality is the outcome of its sovereignty."*[46]

However sovereignty is an ambiguous concept, since it is enmeshed in the social system of relations between states. Following the conceptualisation of Biersteker, it

[46] Laski, Harold J. "*Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty*" (George Allen and Unwin, 1968): p. 1.

is easier to separate the concepts of state and sovereignty.[47] State, as Biersteker defines it, is a "geographically constituted structure whose agents can claim ultimate political authority within their domain."[48] Sovereignty then is the "externally recognised right to exercise final authority"[49]. As can be seen, the concept of sovereignty has an internal and an external dimension. Both of them are socially constructed. The most important aspects of sovereignty understood in this sense are: territory, authority, and population. "However we contend that each of these components of state sovereignty is also socially constructed, as is the modern state system."[50] Biersteker is rather vague on the specific practices that construct these elements and state sovereignty as a whole. He argues that the "meaning of sovereignty is negotiated out of interactions within intersubjectively identifiable communities"[51]. His main argument is that sovereignty is constantly renegotiated by interactions between states as far as the external realm is concerned. The basic variable is 'recognition'. "The components of state sovereignty are intimately tied up with the construction, reconstruction, and negotiation of boundaries."[52] These political practices are, as Biersteker points out, involved in the production of domestic communities. Based on the modern notions of territoriality and its legal and doctrinal expression of sovereignty the modern conceptualisation of the state as the prime political unit emerged. It is to the analysis of this concept that we turn now.

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[47] See: Biersteker, Thomas J. and Cynthia Weber "The Social Construction of State Sovereignty" in Biersteker, Thomas J. and Cynthia Weber (eds) "*State Sovereignty as Social Construct*" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): p. 2.
[48] Ibid: p. 2.
[49] Ibid: p. 2.
[50] Ibid: p. 3.
[51] Ibid: p. 11.
[52] Ibid: p. 13.

II.III. Modern Definitions of the 'State' (Hoffman and Pierson)

The analytical concept of the 'state' as a modern concept is a very complex phenomenon. It is difficult to grasp in the form of a definition. It has even been argued that the whole concept is nothing more than an illusion and should be replaced by the term 'political system' which is supposed to be more analytically concise.[53] Hoffman argues that "while the state is certainly a complex and elusive institution, it can and must be defined"[54]. The most famous definition is that of Max Weber. His definition of the state as the holder of the monopoly of legitimate violence in a specific territory is used here as the basis for definition.[55] All four elements of the Weberian approach: monopoly, territory, legitimacy, and force need to be included. They create an interrelated totality so that it is impossible to define the state with one of the four elements missing. The definition has also an internal structure with force as the structuring element.

> *"Force is however not only an attribute which contributes to a coherent definition. It is the dimension which gives the Weberian definition its structure. A coherent definition must be a structured definition since the interrelationships which constitute it need to be linked together in a way which is not indeterminate"*[56].

Therefore one can speak of a 'state' only when the force which is exercised is legitimated, monopolised, and focused territorially. There are obvious problems with this definition, for example: what does legitimate force mean? When is it legitimate?

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[53] See: Easton, David. *"The Political System"* 2nd edition (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1971). However it can be easily shown that the concept of 'political system' suffers from the same analytical problems as the concept of 'state'. See: Hoffman, John. *"Beyond the State. An Introductory Critique"* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995): pp. 22ff.
[54] Hoffman: p. 19.
[55] See: Ibid: p. 35.

When is a monopoly reached? How does legitimate force relate to the force of organised crime? Hoffman argues that these elements: legitimacy, monopoly, and focused territorially are ambiguous. The state aspires to reach these elements however it never reaches its goal. It is in a constant process of working towards them. "All states assert a monopoly which they do not and cannot possess, and this contradictory identity manifests itself in all the attributes enumerated in the Weberian definition"[57].

Pierson, also following Weber's definition, identifies nine mechanisms of the state: monopoly control of the means of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, constitutionality, impersonal power, public bureaucracy, authority/legitimacy, citizenship, and taxation.[58] Pierson's approach is less structured than that of Hoffman. However if one looks through his explanation of the nine state mechanisms, it is possible to construct a concise description of the state.

-Monopoly control of the means of violence:

Like Hoffman, Pierson sees the problem of 'monopoly of violence'. The state can never attain a complete monopoly. However "the more effectively is the use of force *monopolised* by the state, the less frequent may be the actual resort to violence"[59].

-Territoriality:

The state has to claim the exclusive rights to one particular part of the globe. "States may also lay claim not just to jurisdiction over a particular tract of land, but also to the minerals that lie beneath it, to the waters that surround it (and to their economic product), to the airspace above it, and, most importantly to the people who inhabit it"[60].

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[56] Ibid: p. 36.
[57] Ibid: p. 62.
[58] See Pierson, Christopher. *"The Modern State"* (London: Routledge, 1996).
[59] Ibid: p. 10.
[60] Ibid: p. 12.

-Sovereignty:

Pierson describes the idea of sovereignty as the claim by a state to the final and absolute authority in the political community.

-Constitutionality:

Constitutionality refers to the fact that in many polities there is a document or a set of documents that lay out and often at the same time justifies the state's basic political arrangements.

-Rule of Law and the Exercise of Impersonal Power:

This refers to the classic idea that the state should not be ruled by the subjective and arbitrary will of particular men (or women for that matter) but by the objective determination of general and public laws.

-The Public Bureaucracy:

Here Pierson follows Weber's characterisation closely.[61] He identifies four major characteristics: 1) Bureaucratic administration is conducted according to fixed rules and procedures within a clearly-established hierarchy and in line with clearly demarcated official responsibilities. 2) Access to employment is based on special examinations and its effective operation is dependent upon knowledge of its special administrative procedures. 3) Bureaucracies management is based upon a knowledge of written documents (the files) and upon the impartial application of general rules to particular cases. 4) The civil servant acts not in a personal capacity, but as the occupier of a particular public office.

[61] See: Weber, Max. "*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziology*" 4th edition (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1980): pp.128ff.

-Authority and Legitimacy:

"Authority and legitimacy imply that, under normal circumstances and for most people, the actions of the state and its demands upon its population will be accepted or, at least, not be actively resisted"[62].

-Citizenship:

Citizenship is a very complex concept. "In essence, the citizen is one who is entitled to participate in the life of the political community. Citizen status in the modern world typically denotes a mixture of entitlements or rights of participation and a series of attendant obligations or duties"[63]. As Pierson points out, citizenship involves a mechanism of exclusion. Citizenship rights apply only to those who have the status of citizens in a political community, not to others.

-Taxation:

Taxation is one of the central elements of the modern state. It creates the resources without which the modern state could not operate. "Taxation (and the apparatus required to collect it) is one of the most basic constitutents of the modern state helping to mark it off from its 'feudal' predecessor"[64].

A useful distinction that Pierson's definition enables us to make is between the state and civil society.

> *"The real point is that society cannot be coterminous with the nation-state; that the boundaries of most societies are not as clearly demarcated as those that surround these states; that we are all members of multiple societies, some of which are much smaller and others larger than nation-states; and*

[62] Pierson *op. cit.*: p. 22.
[63] Ibid: p. 27.
[64] Ibid: p. 31.

that all societies exist not as free-standing social systems, but within the context of a range of other overlapping and abutting societies"[65].

The definitions of the concept of the 'state' presented here are distinctly modern. They use modern conceptualisations of 'territoriality' and 'sovereignty' which have already been discussed. The concept of the 'state' is seen as an unchanging political unit which is striving to hold sway over political power and in consequence political identity. However the recent changes in the international realm, summarised in the term 'globalisation' make this assumption highly problematic. It is to the question of the changing role of the state under the conditions of globalisation that we turn now.

III. Withering Away of the State under Globalisation?

III.I. Modern and Postmodern Conceptualisations of Globalisation

"Globalisation has, over the past decade, become a major feature of commentaries on contemporary social life"[66]. The current changes in the international system: technological revolution, spread of education, and the rise of supra-national as well as subnational actors enhanced the skills and capabilities of the individuals. This had two main effects: First of all, there is an increase in the abilities of the individuals to form and mobilise political groups and movements. Secondly, individuals feel interconnected on a world-wide scale. During the case studies we will see that while the first effect can be clearly observed in Israeli and Palestinian society, the second feature is not as strong in both societies. Therefore we will talk about the 'emerging effects or preliminary stages of globalisation' in Israeli and Palestinian society. These

[65] Ibid: p. 65.
[66] Holton, Robert J. *"Globalisation and the Nation-State"* (London: Macmillan Press, 1998): p. 1.

changes in the international system as a whole spurred the discussion about the changing role of the state. "The most frequently discussed - and most vigorously disputed - question in respect to globalization and governance concerns the role of the state"[67]. Modern as well as postmodern approaches analyse what they see as the major changes in the international system. We will see that the modern approaches go to great lengths to deny the current changes in the international system any fundamental transformative power. This is done in order to save the concept of the 'nation-state' as the primary analytical variable.

By contrast, postmodern approaches to the problem of globalisation attribute radical transformative power to the changes in the international system. This goes so far that reality is replaced completely by simulation and identity becomes radically fluid. It will be pointed out that there are two major drawbacks in these approaches. The first one is a methodological problem. These approaches can not be used as a basis for an empirical analysis as it is attempted in this thesis. The second drawback is that postmodern approaches do not pay enough attention to the unevenness of the process of globalisation. They assume the changes to be evenly distributed all over the globe, which is clearly not the case. The uneven character of the process of globalisation will be shown. In the conclusion the consequences of this new approach for the process of political identity building will be pointed out.

III.I.I. Modern Approaches to Globalisation

Globalisation "has become part of the established conceptual vocabulary for addressing social relations on a global scale"[68]. The emphasis is put on the growing

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[67] Scholte, Jan Aart. *"Globalization. A Critical Introduction"* (London: Macmillan, 2000): p. 132.
[68] Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs. "Introduction: Globalization - The Second Wave" In. Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds). *"Globalization. Theory and Practice"* (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 1.

economic interconnection, aided by the revolutionary developments in technology and communication. These, so the argument goes are transforming spatiality. According to Kofman and Youngs, "we need to link our considerations of the nature of political and economic relations more strongly to our interpretation of spatiality"[69]. Different modern attempts to theorise the changes will be presented here. Each one acknowledges more fundamental changes than the preceding one to the nature of the nation-state in a globalised world. It will be shown how these approaches argue for these changes and then go through great difficulties to maintain 'the state' as the central analytical category.

Scholte argues, that because of the increase in the volume and speed of communication, the world is perceived to have become a single space.

> *"In the globalized world of today people can by various means relate with one another irrespective of their longitudinal and latitudinal position, as it were on a 'supraterritorial' plane. Global events can - via telecommunications, digital computers, audio-visual media rocketry and the like - occur almost simultaneously anywhere and everywhere in the world"*[70].

This new sense of spatiality is then perceived to translate into a new form of social relations. The importance of the boundaries of the nation state are seen to become penetrated and loose importance. However having said this, substantial qualifications are immediately introduced:

> *"It is not claimed here that globalization has touched every person, location and sphere of activity on the planet, or each to the same extent; nor that globalization is a linear and irreversible process, even if it has often appeared to have a juggernaut quality; nor, in reductionist fashion, that*

[69] Ibid: p. 4

globalization constitutes the sole or primary motor of contemporary history; nor that territory, place and distance have lost all significance; nor that state and geopolitical boundaries have ceased to be important; nor that everyone enjoys equal access to, an equal voice in, and equal benefits from the supraterritorial realm; nor that globalization entails homogenization and an erasure of cultural differences; nor that it heralds the birth of a world community with perpetual peace"[71].

One can agree with the point about the uneven character of the process of globalisation. However, these qualifications bring one to wonder what Scholte sees as the new quality of social relations introduced by globalisation. It is not entirely clear with these qualifications who is left to experience the effects of globalisation.

In a similar fashion Marc Williams defends the central importance of the state. He argues on the one hand that "globalization must signify more than interdependence. One way of thinking about this is to define interdependence as interconnectedness which erodes the effectiveness of national policy and threatens national autonomy"[72]. On the other hand at the end of his argument, William concludes that "globalization is a multi-faceted process and, as such, not all tendencies point to the growing irrelevance of the state. Sovereignty provides a perspective on the world but has never been a fixed concept. It will remain important as territorial actors seek to enhance their capabilities"[73].

Phillip G. Cerny goes down the same avenue. He goes to great lengths to argue that the state is being transformed by the process of globalisation. Cerny points

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[70] Scholte, Jan Aart. "Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization" in Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) *"Globalization. Theory and Practice"* (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 46.
[71] Ibid: p. 47.
[72] Williams, Marc. "Rethinking Sovereignty" in Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) *"Globalization. Theory and Practice"* (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 116.
[73] Ibid: p. 120.

out that the capacities of the nation-state have been undermined in all three of the principal categories of traditional public goods - regulatory, productive/distributive and redistributive - by the growing global economy. He also points out that the sovereign inclusive character of the state is being eroded. The nation-state is fundamentally changed in its character as a civil association. This, according to Cerny, has severe consequences for the analyst: "globalization profoundly challenges our understanding of such central concerns as security, collective choice, political obligation, citizenship, legality, democracy and justice"[74]. However after having acknowledged all these profound changes to the character of the state he is still unwilling to see the state loose its importance as a analytical category. Cerny argues that the state is adapting to its new role.

> *"The state is increasingly being transformed into a complex mix of civil enterprise and association - the 'residual state' rooted in the competition state. The state retains a certain hold over national consciousness and constitutional legitimacy, and its residual functions (the 'competition state') are still central both to the globalisation process and to carrying out a range of crucial political, economic and social tasks"*[75].

Cerny displays a strong attachment to the state as an analytical category. The beginning and the end of this quotation stand diametrically opposed. On the one hand Cerny describes a fundamental change in the nature of the state, on the other hand he is not willing or not able to see that this must have necessarily transformative effects on the 'national consciousness'.

It has become clear that modern approaches to the problem of the growing relevance of the international sphere are inherently state centric and try to defend the

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[74] Cerny, Phillip G. "What Next for the State" in Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) *"Globalization. Theory and Practice"* (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 121.

analytical category of the state at all costs. They theorise the international sphere as an inter*national* sphere in which the states still occupy the central role. They maintain 'the state' as the central analytical category and it follows that the category of 'national identity' remains the overriding level of political identity building.

Some modern approaches, however, try to find alternative political structures that emerge in consequence of the changing conditions of globalisation. Chris Farrands argues that a new form of regionalism is emerging. He argues that a dual process is characterising the international system: globalisation and regionalisation. "Regionalism is in part a condition, in part an identity, in part a focus, an ontological choice on the part of the user of the word [...] One facet of regionalisation involves the creation of regional identities"[76]. In Farrands view, the account of regions as inclusive and exclusively boundaried is wrong. Instead of this he argues for a view that sees regions as more inclusive and overlapping.

> *"Regions nest with each other [...] they overlap; they represent different functions or different kinds of identity, they represent different imagined geographies and spatialities. Regional identities arise from differing practices which oppose different logics in a discursive power structure. Regions are constituted out of particular language and particular narrative performances in specific contexts which give them meaning and force"*[77].

Farrands explains that regions comprise spaces but not necessarily territories. By territories Farrands refers to something physical and defined; space on the other hand is not necessarily physical or indeed tangible. "It follows from this distinction that we can talk about the deterritorialisation of space, and about competing geographies

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[75] Ibid: 136.
[76] Farrands, Chris. *"Regionalisation, Globalisation and the Re-imagining of Post Cold War International Relations"* Paper Presented at the Conference 'The 350th Anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia' Enshede, 16th-19th of July 1998: p. 4.
[77] Ibid: p. 5.

which construct space rather than recognise it 'out there'"[78]. Farrands distinguishes two ideas of regionalism: The first is defined as marginal, outside the core of the state and cutting across boundaries of nation states. Nevertheless these regions are meaningful to those within them which are those that act out its identity as a region. One example Farrands mentions is the region between Rhone-Alpes, Liguria and Italian Savoy and the French and Italian speaking areas of Switzerland. The second idea of region is different in the sense that "identities and interests are constructed in terms of 'ancient conflicts' especially between Russian and Turk, Armenian and Azeri, Iranian and almost everyone else"[79]. International business also forms regions with an impact which can be compared to nation-states. Farrands points towards the special importance of the communication media.

Hobsbawn, seeing similar changes in the international system that Farrands does, points toward the changes this situation has on the forces of nationalism and national identity as unifying forces. "Nationalism, however inescapable is simply no longer the historical force it was in the era between the French Revolution and the end of the imperialist colonisation after World War II"[80]. In Hobsbawn's view, the importance of the 'national' economies is declining which leads him to speculate that regional associations might be more rational sub-units of large economic entities like the European Union. Because of the apparent loss of importance of the nation-state for the 'politics of identities', a new search to find firm monopolithic identities, at the substate level is taking shape. "Monolithic aspirations of this kind are already leading to automist and separatist aspirations of threatened minorities within such nationalist entities, and to something better described as Lebanization than Balkanization"[81].

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[78] Ibid: p. 10.
[79] Ibid: p. 14.
[80] Hobsbawn, E. J. *"Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality"* new and revised edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): p. 169.
[81] Ibid: p. 186.

Therefore Hobsbawn sees a possible decline in nationalism and the importance of national identities in parallel with the decline of the nation state.

Anthony H. Richmond foresaw the emergence of ethnic nationalism more than a decade ago. In his analysis the emergence of substate ethnic rationalism is linked to the changes from the industrial and the postindustrial society.[82] In his opinion postindustrialism is characterised by the emergence of a global economy and a technological revolution, especially in communications technologies. These influence the character of the political community. Richmond calls this new type of society 'Verbindungsnetzschaft'. However "the complex social and communication networks, the Verbindungsnetzschaft that are characteristic of postindustrial societies will not entirely replace territorial communities or formal organizations. However, relationships based upon interpersonal, interorganizational, international and mass communication networks, will be the characteristic mode of social interaction in the future"[83]. Because of the increased capabilities to communicate across nation-state boundaries, ethnic nationalism can now act not only within the nation-state but also be organised across national boundaries by dispersed ethnic groupings. "The maintenance of ethnic identity will become less dependent upon either a territorial base or formal organizations. It will be possible for ethnic links to be maintained with others of similar language and cultural background throughout the world"[84].

An argument supporting this transfer of authority and legitimacy from the state level to the subnational and transnational level can be found in Huangs analysis.[85] He argues that the changing conditions of a global economy and the

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[82] See: Richmond, Anthony H. "Ethnic Nationalism and Postindustrialism" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies.* 7, 1 1984.
[83] Ibid: p. 11.
[84] Ibid: p. 15.
[85] Huang, Xiaoming. *"First Man, Last Governor and the Logic of Human Collectivity"* Paper Presented at the Conference 'The 350th Anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia' Enshede, 16th-19th of July 1998.

advances in technology as outlined above have changed the conditions so drastically that the institution of the state has problems to adapt. The existing emotional attachments that are still felt towards the nation-state are increasingly felt as limiting. In difference to the previous arguments for a decline in the capabilities of the state, Huang sees an uneven development. In his view it depends which institutional arrangement the state has chosen. In a liberal environment the state is marginalised. It is here where the concerns about the shrinking space for the state are the strongest. In an authoritarian environment, the limits of the state tend to be overstretched. In the corporatist environment (like Austria for example) the boundaries of the state are blurred with other arrangements. "When the question of vitality of the state is placed in this context, one can see that the problem is not just one of territorial boundary or exclusive authority. It is an issue of functions and capacity"[86]. Huang sees a distinct possibility that the state as an institution can survive if it can adapt. However if it survives as a primary institution for the organisation of human collectives, then its functions will have to change. "The nation-state is yielding back its over-expanded authority and returning to itself as a vital option rather than a self imposed necessity"[87].

This part of the chapter has made clear that the state can no longer easily be seen as the primary source of political identity. It has become a contested concept. Under the term 'globalisation' arguments have been put forward that the international realm is of increasing importance. The next part will present postmodern approaches to the problem of the increased importance of the international sphere. These present a diametrically opposed argument to the modern attempts of theorisation. Postmodern approaches see a complete withering away of the category of the state.

[86] Ibid: p. 30.
[87] Ibid: p. 32.

Identity becomes radically fluid and unstructured. The next part will point out the rather sweeping assumptions of the postmodern approaches, especially as far as the breadth and depth of the globalisation process is concerned.

III.I.II. Postmodern Approaches to Globalisation

Postmodern approaches theorise the rise of the international realm in a distinctly different way than the modern approaches which were discussed. The emphasis here is on the phenomenon of radical space-time compression. "We have been experiencing [...] an intense phase of time-space compression that has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon the cultural and social life"[88]. One of the most prominent postmodern works on this problem is Harvey's *'The Postmodern Condition'*. Harvey argues that through the developments in technology and communication, the speed of production, consumption and flow of capital has been increased. Because of this "the annihilation of space through time has radically changed the commodity mix that enters into daily reproduction"[89]. This has major social consequences. The first one is an accentuation of the volatility and ephemerality of fashions, products, production techniques, labour processes, ideas and ideologies, values and established practices. "The sense that 'all that is solid melts into air' has rarely been more pervasive"[90]. This has, in Harvey's view, a profound impact on political life. Politics is now driven and performed through the media and here especially the electronic media. The political and intellectual leaders try to give the illusion of stability of common values as part of their power base. They have to project this illusion against the reality of fluidity in everyday life.

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[88] Harvey, David. *"The Condition of Postmodernity"* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990): p. 284.
[89] Ibid: p. 299.

"This becomes in effect, the fleeting, superficial, and illusory means whereby an individualistic society of transients sets forth nostalgia for common values. The production and marketing of such images of permanence and power require considerable sophistication, because the continuity and stability of the image have to be retained while stressing the adaptability, flexibility, and dynamism of whoever or whatever is being imaged"[91].

The image becomes more important than reality, or even replaces reality as hyperreality. Harvey uses the term 'simulacrum' to describe this tendency. By 'simulacrum' Harvey refers to the state of such complete replication that the difference between the replicate and the original is impossible to spot. This has profound consequences for political identity building. "Insofar as identity is increasingly dependent upon images, this means that the serial and recursive replications of identities (individual, corporate, institutional, and political) becomes a very real possibility and problem. We can certainly see it at work in the realm of politics as the image makers and the media assume a more powerful role in the shaping of political identities"[92]. It becomes obvious that identity is no longer bound by any level (neither sub-national, national or international). It becomes a free floating ever changing activity which can easily be manipulated by those who have access to image production.

In order to understand the implications of Harvey's argument fully it will be helpful to examine the analysis of 'simulations' by Jean Beaudrillard. The term 'simulation'; plays a major role in his analysis. In his opinion the 'real', or the reality principle, no longer exists. It has been completely replaced by the simulation. The

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[90] Ibid: p. 285f.
[91] Ibid: p. 288.
[92] Ibid: p. 289.

simulation is being invoked in order to make people believe that the real is still existing.

> *"When the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of origin and signs of reality; of second hand truth, objectivity and authenticity [...] there is a panic-stricken production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production: this is how simulation appears [...] a strategy of the real, neo-real and hyperreal whose universal double is a strategy of deterrence"*[93].

This complicated argument can best be explained by the use of one of Beaudrillards examples: Disneyland. First, it is a play of illusions and phantasms: Pirates, the Frontier, Future World. On a second level, however, it is presented as the "miniaturised and religious revelling in real America, in its delights and drawbacks"[94]. Disneyland simulates the 'real' America. Its values are presented here in a miniaturised and comic strip form. Therefore Disneyland serves as a deterrence against the fact and realisation that these values are themselves a simulation. The argument goes like this: Because our society is based on the reality principle, we assume that every simulation must have its 'real' counterpart. The simulation of 'real' values in Disneyland, however, do not correspond to any 'real' values, they have no 'real' counterpart. Because they are simulated however one assumes that these values exist.

> *"Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simulation. It is no*

[93] Beaudrillard, Jean. *"Simulations"* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983): p. 12.
[94] Ibid: p. 23.

longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle. The Disneyland imaginary is neither true nor false; it is a deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real".[95]

Truth becomes then a product of several simulation models. No set of values is more 'real' than the next because all are simulated. This argument forms the basis for a new view on society and social relationships. Steven Best summarises Beaudrillard's take on this: "With Beaudrillard we move to a whole new era of social development [...] we enter the society of the simularcum, an abstract non-society, devoid of cohesive relations, social meaning, and collective representation"[96]. This has obvious consequences for the question of political identity. Firstly 'identity' in any shape or form is radically atomised. The individual is alone, group identity is no longer possible since social relations have lost their meaning. Secondly, identity building does not happen on any particular level. It happens everywhere and at the same time. To speak of levels of political identity building is meaningless. Thirdly, political identity is no longer real. It is a product of simulation models and radically open for manipulation.

William Connolly analyses some ways of thinking about postmodern political identity. Connolly speaks of the "enigma of identity in its relations to the other"[97]. Using the example of the dealings of the Spanish with the 'other' discovered in America in 1492, Connolly shows how the Spanish identity depended on the 'other',

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[95] Ibid: p. 25.
[96] Best, Steven. "The Commodification of Reality and the Reality of Commodification: Beaudrillard, Debord, and Postmodern Theory" in. Kellner Douglas (ed). *"Beaudrillard. A Critical Reader"* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995): p. 51.
[97] Connolly, William E. "Identity and Difference in Global Politics" in: Der Deriam, James and Michael J. Shapiro (eds) *"International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings of World Politics"* (New York: Lexington Books, 1989): p. 325.

the Indios, which were perceived as subhuman and therefore subject to extinction or as human but in need of assimilation.

> *"When you remain within the established field of identity and difference, you become a bearer of strategies to protect identity through devaluation of the other; but if you transcend the field of identities through which the other is constituted, you loose the identity and standing needed to communicate with those you sought to inform. Identity and difference are bound together. It is impossible to reconstitute the relation to the second without confounding the experience of the first"*[98].

According to Connolly, the postmodern identity by contrast assumes an ironic stance to what it is, even while affirming itself in its identity. This means that in the postmodern conception identity no longer takes an absolute stand. It recognises that there are other possible conceptions of identity which cannot be judged by 'good or bad', 'right or wrong' standards. At the same time in order to maintain ontological security and cohesiveness, postmodern identity has to affirm its own position in relation to the 'other' but still always recognising the legitimacy of difference.

In contrast to the modernist who thinks in categories of coherence and consistency of the discourse, the Postmodernist tries to think in the category of the paradox. He/she accepts difference as part of this paradox and does not try to bring the paradox into coherence. "Only attentiveness to paradox can loosen the hold monotonic standards of identity hold over life in the late-modern age"[99]. The consequence of this postmodern analysis of the changes in the international realm is that the modern conceptions of territoriality and sovereignty also need to be radically transformed. Postmodern thinkers transform and replace both concepts and see them

[98] Ibid: p. 329.
[99] Ibid: p. 339.

largely as irrelevant. This can be seen most clearly in the writings of Der Derian, Ashley and Walker.

III.II. Postmodern Reconceptualisation of Territoriality and Sovereignty

III.II.I. Postmodern Concepts of Territoriality: Der Derian's Concept of Accelerated Time: The Replacement of Space by Pace

Der Derian questions the concept of the separation of time and place, with its primacy of place on which, as shown above, the modern concept of territoriality and sovereignty rest. The factors which enabled the modern concept of territoriality and sovereignty to emerge are at the same time transcending these concepts. The concept of extraterritorial space is one of the most important one. As will be shown below, the growing importance of these extraterritorial spaces as well as the growing porosity of national borders which follows directly from the penetration of these extraterritorial spaces aides the demise of the utility of the modern concepts of territoriality.

According to Der Derian, "the new techniques of power are transparent and pervasive, more 'real' in time than in space, produced and sustained through the exchange of signs rather than goods."[100] Der Derian shows that in a postmodern condition, speed is more important than space. He uses the example of intelligence work, terrorism and war to show how the speed of information becomes more important than the occupation of a particular geostrategic place. He calls the sphere in which postmodern politics are made and postmodern wars are fought

[100] Der Derain, James "*Antidiplomacy. Spies, Terror, Speed, and War*" (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992): p. 3.

'hyperreality'. In this sphere "the model of the real becomes more real than the reality it models."[101] The new force in postmodern industrialist societies is speed. He breaks with the modern conception of time-space differentiation, which implies a logical connection of time and space[102] and replaces it with accelerated time (speed). His proposition is "that international relations is shifting from a realm defined by sovereign places, impermeable borders and rigid geopolitics, to a site of accelerating flows, contested borders, and fluid chronopolitics. In short, pace displacing space"[103]. The increase in speed not only contests national borders but at the same time limits the influence of national governments on the control of their territory. Following Virilio's concept of speed and politics, Der Derian argues that all "realities are generated, mediated, simulated by technological means of reproduction; hence 'truth' becomes an instrument and product of perception"[104]. After this attack on the very basis on which the modern conceptions of territoriality stands, the concept must collapse. A new view of the state system is required. The alternative, however, is a postmodern web of complicated relationships which are very difficult to grasp and even more difficult to work with in an empirical study. The next part will look at the postmodern criticism of the concept of sovereignty. It will be shown that the concept will also collapse under this criticism and that the alternative postmodern conception of sovereignty is too complex and vague to be usefully introduced in an alternative approach. This becomes particularly clear if one looks at the writings of Ashley and Walker.

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[101] Ibid: p. 5.
[102] To construct a binary opposition on modern terms always requires a pair of two signifiers which stand in opposition: internal/external, hierarchic/anarchic, space/time. In these binary oppositions the first is always given a primacy over the second, signifying the ideal from which the second deviates.
[103] Ibid: p. 129f.
[104] Ibid: p. 133.

III.II.II. Postmodern Criticism of State Sovereignty

The postmodern discourse on the modern concept of state sovereignty is criticising this concept as an arbitrary historical construction and a political practice which serves the interests of power and is exclusionary. This approach can be illustrated by the analysis of state sovereignty of Ashley and Walker.

Ashley's analysis of state sovereignty argues that the modern discourse uses what he calls the 'heroic practice'. "A heroic practice is a 'double -voiced' practice [...] it turns on a dichotomy. It turns on a hierarchical opposition of sovereignty versus anarchy, where the former term is privileged as a regulative ideal."[105] Sovereignty is seen as the transcendental origin of power, since it is the timeless and universal source of meaning and truth in history. It rests in the already present domestic society. In the domestic realm all conflicts can be decided, power is always grounded in truth. Anarchy however is a danger. It is full of ambiguity, contingency, and chance. Here conflicts of interpretation are intrinsically undecidable. All conduct is a matter of arbitrary power. "A heroic practice thus invokes anarchic dangers that must be excluded from the time and place of the domestic being."[106]

This process is a political process, a construction that is both historically specific and arbitrary. The modern discourse originated at the juncture between the late medieval and the early modern period. The heroic practice justifies in the name of reason the authority of a centralised state over its inhabitants. "It disciplines the change, contingency, and ambiguity of historical doing in the domestication of modern being."[107] It sets specific limits on possibilities of political community. It can only be located at the state level. These limits are repeated in modern theories of

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[105] Ashley, Richard K. "The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life" in Der Derian, James (ed) "*International Theory. Critical Investigations*" (London: Macmillan, 1995): p. 103.
[106] Ibid: p. 104.

international relations. As Walker puts it "They [these theories, HJS] express authoritative reservations about how far and under what conditions this particular account [i. e. the modern discourse, HJS] of political identity and community can be sustained in either space or time"[108]. State sovereignty is seen as the locus of authentic politics inside the state and the sphere of mere relations outside the state. Walker calls this a spatial-temporal resolution, Ashley talks about 'domestication' of global life. Global life has a certain order, anarchy, outside the sovereign states. The core idea here is that the concept of sovereignty tries to make sense of the ambiguity of life. The heroic practice is what Ashley calls the deep structure of this process.

> *"It announces an intention to regard global life as a place and time potentially subordinated to the ideal of a sovereign presence, a universal rational principle of interpretation and conduct. It also explains and excuses a turn to statism by announcing an intention to regard this turn not as an end in itself but as part of a story of the emergence of a universal centre or principle - a monologically interpretable regime, say - that might negate anarchy's dangers."*[109]

One is confronted with a paradox: On the one hand the concept of sovereignty does not exist outside the temporality of events. It is a functional concept, which is continuously fabricated in history through practice. It exists only to the extent that it is working in history and practice (by disciplining, excluding deviating interpretations). On the other hand to be effective it must be regarded as unproblematic, given for all time, beyond criticism and independent of politics. "It must be recognised as something transcendental and foundational within man -

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[107] Ibid: p. 104.
[108] Walker, R. B. J. "*Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): p. 15.
[109] Ashley, Richard K. "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique" in *Millenium. Journal of International Studies*. 17, 2 1988: p. 241.

something that is always and everywhere already there, prior to the heroic practices which invoke it".[110] Sovereignty can only work if it is not problematised. As soon as one starts to treat sovereignty no longer as a natural condition of political life, one is challenging its foundations.

The situation becomes even more paradoxical if one allows for the introduction of non-state actors into the analysis. These non-state actors threaten the representation of the state as a well-bounded sovereign actor. It becomes impossible to decide where a state begins and where it ends. For the heroic practice to work, the state has to fulfil this bare minimum. "The state must be represented as an entity having a coherent set of interests and possessing some set of means that it is able to deploy in the service of these interests. This in turn requires that the state be represented as an entity having absolute boundaries unambiguously demarcating a domestic 'inside' and setting it off from an international 'outside'"[111]. If the stable representation of the state is no longer possible, the heroic practice collapses. Now state sovereignty is recognisable for what it is: an arbitrary political representation, which helps to control and suppress deviating representations.[112] It expresses in an authoritarian manner "the decisive demarcation between inside and outside, between self and other, identity and difference, community and anarchy that is constitutive of our modern understanding of political space".[113]

This situation results in a severe epistemological problem. One is left with the choice of being either inside or outside the discourse. Either to accept the privileging of the 'Reasoning Man' and the arbitrary heroic practice or to refute it. If one decides to

[110] Ashley (1995) *op. cit.*: p. 117.
[111] Ashley (1988) *op. cit.*: p. 248.
[112] The notion of a 'social contract' does not really acknowledge this. A contract must be voluntary entered by both parties in order to work. However in the modern conceptualisation of sovereignty it is seen as a 'natural' development of political life. If one assumes such an evolutionary development, there can have been no free choice between the partners of the contract.

refute the modern discourse one has also to accept the impossibility of certain knowledge and orientation because every claim to knowledge is automatically excluding other possible interpretations. Here the postmodern argument turns against itself. On the one hand, one says that there cannot be any certain knowledge and interpretation while on the other hand, this claim itself is seen as a true statement.

It has become clear in this section that the postmodern view of the effects of the changing conditions of globalisation is far more fundamental than the modern conceptions of the problem. The postmodern approaches see in the developments of technology and communication not only a new importance of the international realm to which the state will adjust (like the modern conceptions suggest). The postmodern arguments assume that these developments have a fundamentally transformative power which will change (and in some cases already has changed) social relations. The modern concepts of territoriality and sovereignty are seen as overtaken by speed and pace on the one hand and criticised as part of an exclusionary political practice on the other. Consequently identity is becoming radically fluid, a simulation no longer meaningful, no longer completely 'real'.

It has become clear that this way of theorising identity building has its merits (especially the argument for the openness of discourse and the acceptance of difference). However such an approach has methodological problems if one wants to base an empirical study on this way of theorising. It is simply not possible to do this. The postmodern argument about the death of reality and the resulting death of truth is inherently contradictory. On the one hand, one can argue against truth whilst at the same time treating this argument against truth as a true statement. Therefore one argues against truth whilst assuming truth. If one would neglect this paradox and

[113] Walker, R. B. J. "State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time" in *Millenium. Journal of International Studies*. 20, 3 1991: p. 456.

assume the death of truth one would have to stop the analysis at this point. There would be no way to make meaningful statements of this kind, let alone putting this analytical assumption as the basis of an empirical study. If truth is dead then political analysis is dead. Another problem is that the developments in technology and communication which postmodern approaches see as the motors of transformation, are not evenly spread in breadth and depth around the globe. The dimension of uneven globalisation is completely missing in the postmodern approaches. What is needed is an approach which argues for the transformative character of the new developments in technology and communication, while rendering these changes intelligible and acknowledging their uneven spread around the globe.

III.III. Uneven Globalisation

The process of globalisation is not an even global process. It has been argued in the preceding sections that the process depends to a large extent on developments in technology and communication. The logical point which follows from this is that people, communities and societies must have access to these new technologies. Although one can argue that nearly everybody on the globe is affected by these changes, the effect is different in breadth and depth for different societies.

"The extent to which we can all participate in cultural production and consumption clearly varies historically and between societies. It also varies between groups within societies, as almost all societies and social entities possess groups of specialists who engage in the production and dissemination of culture (priests, artists, intellectuals, educators, teachers, academics, cultural intermediaries etc.)"[114]. Featherstone argues that the process of globalisation is a two fold process. It is not

[114] Featherstone, Mike. *"Undoing Culture. Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity"* (London: Sage, 1997): p. 3.

only an extension of a certain culture (information culture for example) to the limits of the globe. It is also the pilling up of cultures on top of each other. Therefore globalisation cannot be equated with homogenisation. "This destroys the unitary clean and coherent images of modernity that have been projected out of the Western centers"[115]. Featherstone suggests we should speak of 'global modernities' rather than of 'global modernity'. Different societies react differently to the process of globalisation. In some the influence is direct and strong in others it is rather weak. "Not only can we see a series of different entry-points into modernity [...], but a series of different projects were also developed as well as demands for selective appropriation of the institutional parameters"[116]. The West and the rest enter into a dialogue, according to Featherstone, that is no longer controlled by the West. The rest is 'talking back' to the West and the West starts to listen. A similar point is made by David Slater. Slater analyses the different responses to the process of globalisation between the 'North' and the 'South'. He sees that the globalisation process "is constituted by a continuance of the North's will to gain geopolitical power over the South, and neoliberalism [Slater refers here to the neoliberal economic theory] is a key reflection of this will"[117]. Globalisation, so the argument goes, is a process from 'above', a new form of imperialism. This situation arises because the West is realising its diminishing importance.

> *"The current era is also marked by a sense of Western unease. New questions of politcal identity and difference haunt the traditional landscapes of Western privilege and the clash over the cannon in the literary domain, as well as*

[115] Ibid: p. 11.
[116] Ibid: p. 146.
[117] Slater, David. "Other Contexts of the Global: A Critical Geopolitics of North-South Relations" in Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) *"Globalization. Theory and Practice"* (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 281.

more broadly the multi-cultural thematic, point to a climate of contestation and change"[118].

Slater criticises that 'Southern' voices are not heard in the discussion about the global changes. He argues that wide parts of the discussion of global changes display a "sense of superiority which endows the West with the presumed ability to provide a solution to the problems of other societies"[119]. It has become obvious that the process of globalisation cannot be treated as an unproblematic concept which can be evenly applied to the entire globe. One has to decide for every country or geographical/cultural region under examination how far the process of globalisation has developed and what reaction this has evoked. This is not a problem which can be analytically resolved.

One can argue that the two cases analysed in the thesis, Israeli and Palestinian societies are at the preliminary stages of globalisation. The state level, as we will see during the empirical analysis, is increasingly under pressure in both societies from above (supra-state level) and below (substate level). Generating societal cohesion is becoming difficult for the elites on the state level. On the other hand, the concept of the 'state' of having a state, is still a central issue and point of political identification. The identification with being Israeli or Palestinian is still very strong, although the agreement what it means concretely to be an Israeli or a Palestinian is fragmenting in both societies. The different political identity groups in both societies are loosing common ground for their conceptions of what kind of state Israel and Palestine should be. Both societies are on the brink of loosing their basic political consensus.

[118] Ibid: p. 284.
[119] Ibid: p. 282.

This part of the chapter analysed the influence of globalisation on the role of the state. Two major approaches have been opposed in the analysis. The first one was the modern approaches to the problem. It has been shown that these approaches are inherently state centric. They acknowledge the fact that international realm is changing and as a result is growing in importance. However they do not see a fundamental change that would threaten the role of the concept of the 'state' as the central analytical category. The argument is that the state will adjust to these changes and will continue to play the role of the principal actor in international relations. Therefore the problem of political identity is still reduced to the question of national identity. The second set of theories were those of postmodern orientation. Postmodern conseptualisations see the changes that result from the process of globalisation as so fundamental that they undermine severely the political capabilities of the state. The two basic concepts on which the state rests, territoriality and sovereignty, can no longer serve as a firm basis on which to rest the concept of a state as a political actor. Here the problem was that while the fundamental character of the changes in the international system is correctly recognised, the underlying assumption that these changes are evenly affecting all parts of the globe is flawed. In addition to this, these approaches present a methodological problem as they theorise identity as radically fluid and constantly changing. Such a conception cannot be integrated into an empirical study of political identity building as it is attempted in this thesis.

Another problem is that the growing importance of the international realm for the issue of political identity building is not an even, global process. For each region which is under consideration it has to be empirically decided how far the process of globalisation is developed and how far it is affecting the process of political identity building. While one can assume that every part of the globe is affected to a certain

extent by this fundamental transformation, there are important differences in breadth and depth of this development which cannot be ignored if one wants to talk seriously about political identity building. Therefore an alternative approach is needed which acknowledges the shortcomings of both the modern and postmodern conceptions of the change in the international realm. One alternative is offered by Rosenau's concept of frontiers to which we turn now.

IV. Rosenau's Concept of 'Frontiers': A Critique

As shown above, the modern concept of sovereign territoriality and its political expression the modern concept of the state collapse under the assumed conditions of postmodern approaches. We have argued that because of the uneven character of the changes that globalisation introduces, this cannot be generally assumed. One way to acknowledge these changes and to avoid falling into a maze of constant flows and changing patterns which render themselves unintelligible for a theoretical grasp is to redefine the domestic/international border. Here it is not seen as a sphere of exact, mutually exclusive borderlines but Rosenau's concept of frontiers is used. As he argues, the way ahead would be to replace "'a boundary that isn't there' with 'a new and wide political space' - here called the Frontier, with a capital 'F' to stress its centrality."[120] The Frontier is seen as an ever widening political space in which world affairs unfold, domestic and international issues converge and become next to indistinguishable. The concept of Frontiers is not a return to the modern conception of territoriality, since the political space of the Frontier is itself a representation and not a reality. It is a mere instrument to grasp the complex reality of accelerated time

[120] Rosenau, James N. "*Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*". (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): p. 4.

and to bring the web of flows of international politics under the emerging conditions of globalisation into a structure that can be grasped.

IV.I. Newly Emerging Structures in International Relations

Rosenau's 'Frontier' is not a geographical space but a space of political issues. It is what he calls a 'terra incognita', a multitude of places. The issue boundaries of this Frontier are constantly shifting and so widening or narrowing this 'space'. "A map of the world that highlights the Frontier would depict a wide, contested domain in which governance is highly desegregated even as many of its spheres are overlapping."[121] The world in Rosenau's view is highly turbulent and disorderly. It is characterised by an ever growing fluidity and uncertainty. Therefore, he argues, a new approach to international relations has to be developed. Rosenau points out the importance of being able to recognise change. Anomalies, he argues, may be indicators of a change in the underlying patterns of international politics. At present Rosenau sees three different changes taking place in the international system that amounts to a difference in kind.

1) A change in the structures that sustain the politics of the Frontier: multiple systems of transaction link people in highly complex ways and render territorial boundaries virtually useless. New political uncertainties are created.
2) A change in the structures of globalized world economy: New technologies render national markets too 'small' for competition. They are no longer the principal entities. Furthermore the global economy is integrated through information systems and information technology which allow postmodern global networks to emerge.

[121] Ibid: p. 10.

3) A change in the timeframe in which events unfold. Here Rosenau is very close to Der Derian's analysis of pace replacing space in international relations. Rosenau argues that the processes of aggregation and disaggregation occur rapidly, to the point of simultaneity. Rosenau calls for a "new understanding of the temporal dimensions of politics."[122]

Nevertheless he argues that states still perform crucial functions whereby the collective needs of their peoples are enhanced, preserved, or otherwise met. However, states are no longer the primary actors and face challenges from above and below.

> *"The combination of internal and external dynamics at work in all societies generates simultaneous tendencies toward globalization and localization, toward more extensive integration across national boundaries and more pervasive fragmentation within national boundaries, toward a relocation of authority 'outward' to transnational entities and 'inward' to subnational groups"*[123].

He can see a marked decline in the ability of states to perform their historical tasks. The boundaries of the state can no longer keep those forces out since they are not territorially dependent. Rosenau sees that in most states this situation has led to an internal authority crisis "in which the legitimacy and governing powers of political leaders are being challenged, thwarted, or otherwise questioned by organized subgroups, social movements, issue publics, and individual citizens"[124]. This results in a proliferation of challenging subgroups and transnational actors. These undermine the authority of the state by showing that they can cope with issues and problems that the traditional nation-state seems unable to tackle.

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[122] Ibid: p. 24.
[123] Ibid: p. 350.

IV.II. A new Approach to International Relations

On the basis of these changes Rosenau wants to develop a new 'worldview' of international relations. A worldview, according to Rosenau, consists of an ontology, paradigms and theories. This new worldview should recast the relevance of territoriality, highlight the porosity of boundaries, see the spatial and temporal dimensions of governance as equally important, point out the importance of networking organisations and the shifts of authority from the national to subnational, transnational and non-governmental levels. Rosenau calls his worldview: 'fragmegration' to highlight the equally important forces of integration and fragmentation. In the ontology used here, boundaries are seen as porous, transgressed by actors and issues. Rosenau argues that there is an ever growing number of issues and problems that can not be efficiently be dealt with by the 'classic' actors (i.e. nation-states). This gives rise to new forms of governance in newly developed spheres of authority (SOA). States are only seen as one possible SOA, and not as having a privileged position within the international system. "What enables one actor to obtain compliance from another actor in a disaggregated world is an interdependent convergence of needs and not a constitutional specification that assigns the highest authority exclusively to states and national governments."[125]

Based on this ontology Rosenau looks at the different developments in what he calls the turbulence model:

1) The skills of individuals: He argues that through the spread of information technology the skills of individuals have greatly enhanced. "The turbulence model posits a world of individuals who cannot be easily deceived and who can

[124] Ibid: p. 355.
[125] Ibid: p. 41.

readily be mobilised on behalf of goals they comprehend and means they approve."[126]

2) The relocation of authority: Rosenau argues that because the skills of individuals have been increased the nature of legitimacy has changed. The shift is from a traditional acceptance of legitimacy and authority of the state, to a performance oriented approach to them. The 'old' SOA (nation-states) face an authority crisis, because they cannot cope with substantial issues (it is interesting that Rosenau uses here the example of Israel, since it coincides with the analysis of Israeli society that is presented in this study). This crisis widens the Frontier and reinforces the tension between the centralising and decentralising forces, which then in turn undermines national sovereignty.

3) The bifurcation of the international system: Rosenau refers with this term to the proliferation of actors within the international system. Non-state, non-governmental, transnational and international actors play an ever growing role next to the state system. Rosenau talks of a three way relocation of authority away form the state: a) inwards (to subnational groups), b) sidewards (to social movements, NGOs), and c) outwards (to transnational, supranational organisations). Governance is therefore no longer hierarchical. Rosenau sees a dispersion of sites at which authority can be obtained and compliance generated.

The model of fragmegration is made more explicit in *Figure 1* It consists of three streams:

1) globalising tendencies: These are defined as processes that are not hindered or prevented by territorial or jurisdictional boundaries. They impel actors to act in more encompassing and coherent processes.

[126] Ibid: p. 61.

2) dynamics of localisation, decentralisation: These lead actors to narrow their horizons and withdraw to less encompassing processes, organisations or systems.
3) the middle stream is the turbulence model, outlined above, which affects 1) or 2) depending on the situation.

The feedback processes (shown as arrows) sustain fragmegration and show that the three streams are interlinked and act rapidly and simultaneously. The most important factor influencing this new system is the rise of dynamic technologies. The most important is the nuclear revolution and the revolution in communication technologies. The nuclear revolution reduced the occurrence of wars and therefore deprived the nation states of their prime instrument to regulate their conflicts. It effectively limits state action. The emergence of communication technology made the transmission of information faster, therefore territorial borders more porous. With the emergence of simultaneous events and reactions, they represent an ever present stimuli for action to the publics. It also enables leaders of non-state actors to mobilise their followers quickly and efficiently.

"Unilateral, multilateral, subgroup, and transnational activities are all conceived to be operative in SOAs along the Frontier, sometimes reinforcing each other, sometimes negating each other, but all the times at work in one part of the world or another."[127] Rosenau argues that the process of fragmegration is an uneven, unlinear process. Governance along the Frontier is more an emergent, chaotic pattern than a fixed arrangement. Fragmegration is nonlinear, uneven in its evolution, uneven in its intensity, uneven in its scope and uneven in its direction.[128] However, Rosenau argues that the fragmegration ontology takes into account a radical change in the underpinnings of the world system, the actions and outcomes within the system

[127] Ibid: p. 51.
[128] See: Ibid: p. 52

depend on the mental-emotional dynamics of the actors which are only changing slowly. Therefore it will take time before the concrete actions which the actors take will reflect the change in the underpinnings.

Figure 1[129]



[129] See Ibid: p. 46.

IV.III. Criticism of Rosenau's Approach

Rosenau's model seems to be useful as a base for the theoretical approach of political identity formation presented in this study. However, there are several points of criticism: the generality of the model which make it difficult to narrow it down to a specific case study, the technological determinism on which the model of fragmegration is based, and the unspecified relationships between the different elements of the system.

Generality of Rosenau's Model:

The model presented above is based on very general and only loosely defined terms. The prime example of this are 'globalisation' and 'localisation'. These terms, which are basic to the model as a whole, are defined in a common sensual way. They are described by their outcomes and their influences on the actors. This implies their influence in their definition: globalising processes are all those that have the possibility of being global and localising processes are those which are local. What would be needed are definitions which show what makes global processes global and what are the underlying dynamics of these processes and vice versa what makes localisation processes local. Because of these general definitions it would be very hard to use Rosenau's model in an empirical study, without amending it.

Technological Determinism:

The model of fragmegration is based on the argument that the nuclear and the communication revolution influence the world political system to the point of substantial transformation. This narrows the causes of this transformation down to one single variable. It seems that this argument is rather deterministic. First of all, it would constrict the model only to the developed world and societies in which the flow of information is freely permitted. Rosenau admits that fragmegration is uneven

in different parts of the world. However he fails to say what the concrete differences are between the different regions of the world and how fragmegration works in less developed societies and in societies with restricted freedom of information. Secondly, the model does not take into account how the mental capacity of publics change - the influence of a change in perceptions of authority, for example - and how these processes interact with the state system (an increase in information if not met by an increase in the state's capacity to use this information).

Unspecified Relationships within the Model:

The model presented in *Figure 1* shows a complex web of interactions between the three streams of globalisation, localisation and the turbulence model. At no point in his description of the model, however, does Rosenau specify these relationships. He talks about feedback processes without saying what these feedback processes are and how they work. The model of turbulence is even more general since, as Rosenau, puts it the processes are "essential neutral in the sense [of] depending on situational determinants."[130] Rosenau does not give any examples in which situations the turbulence model is influencing either of the two streams. Therefore if one would like to base an empirical study on the model one would have tremendous problems defining what situational determinants are of important for the two tendencies.

What is Rosenau's model useful for?

As the criticism showed in a very general way, it would be next to impossible to use Rosenau's fragmegration model directly for an empirical study. What it will be used here is a basis from which a theory of political identity building will be developed. The different elements outlined in the model can be used to describe the forces which render political identity building more complex. It has been argued that even when one does not follow the postmodern approaches to the international system, one has

to acknowledge that the emerging conditions of globalisation do have an effect on political structures in the international system, mainly state structure. Therefore, one has to argue that because of the changes in the underpinnings of the 'classical' state centric international system, political identity can no longer exclusively or primarily rest at the state level. The state level is now only one level of political identity building next to the supra-state level and the substate (group/individual) level. The state level is challenged from both below (fragmentation) and above (integration). Rosenau's conceptualisation was presented here as a 'middle ground' between modern and postmodern assumptions about the effects of the emerging conditions of globalisation. He describes the general forces which underlay this change, but his model needs to be specified in a theoretical approach to identity building in order to be useful for the argument presented here. This will be attempted in the next part. A model is proposed, which identifies three levels of political identity building, the substate level, the state level and the supra-state level. Political identity building is conceived to be happening on all three levels and at the same time. It will be argued that only if all three levels are taken into account can political identity be fully understood. Based on a combination of Rosenau's concepts of 'Frontiers' and 'fragmegration' and Wendt's constructivist approach to political identity building, this model presents a viable alternative to both the modern and the postmodern standpoint towards political identity building by combining both approaches. It will transcend the limitations of the modern conception, which is only based on the state level, and will make the complex approach of postmodernism more intelligible by taking away its radical and epistemologically as well as methodologically problematic assumptions.

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[130] Ibid: p. 47.

V. The Three Level Model of Political Identity Building

The three level model of political identity building is based on the assumption that identity formation is a social construct rather than a preordinated fact. "It seems clear that personal identity is experienced as a rich arena of meanings. [...] Identity is also structured. It is clear that identity has many aspects which derive from certain sources and find expression in particular social contexts. Identity is not a single homogenous stock of traits, images and habits."[131] The three level model of political identity formation takes this thought one step further and disputes that there is one supreme level of identity formation which rests in the personal or the national arena for example. It points out that identity formation is constructed on a wide range of levels. In order to bring structure in this complex web of social interactions, the model points out three levels: the substate (individual and group) level, the state level and the supra-state level. On all these levels identity is constructed in a two fold way. First through exclusion of others, which then helps to create a 'we' feeling, an identification with the social group to which one belongs. It is necessary to create a social 'outside' to be able to identify with a social 'inside'.[132] Secondly, the interaction on these three levels does not only function horizontally but also vertically. The social construction of the outside is therefore also possible between the supra-state level and the substate (personal/group) level and between the state and the supra-state level. How these social constructions function is best explained by Wendt. He focuses on the international level, but the structures he describes can also be transferred to the substate (individual/group) level and the state level.

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[131] Preston, P. W. *"Political/Cultural Identity. Citizens and Nations in a Global Era"* (London: Sage, 1997): p. 4.
[132] See: Walker (1993) *op. cit.*

V.I. Wendt's Structurationism

In order to build up a theoretical approach to the influence of political identity building on policy making, it is necessary to see how political identity, once it is formed, influences the decision making process. One helpful approach is Alexander Wendt's constructivist approach to the influence of state identity on state behaviour in particular and the supra-state level[133] in general.

Wendt's ontological starting point tries to find a middle way between a structuralist approach on the one hand and an individualist approach on the other. He tries to connect what he calls the two "truisms" of social life A) human beings are purposeful actors and their actions and organisations shape the society they live in and B) the structures of the social relationships within a society influence the interactions between the purposeful actors. "Taken together these truisms suggest that human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities."[134] His conclusion is that both structures and agents are relevant to the explanation of social behaviour. As far as the explanation of international politics is concerned, this implies that neither state agents nor the domestic and international system structures which 'constitute' them as agents[135] can be treated as given or primitive units. "Theories of international relations should be capable of providing explanatory leverage on both."[136]

To give a firm philosophical foundation to his argument, Wendt discusses the empiricist discourse of the social sciences and argues, in contrast to empiricists, that entities which are not directly observable can be treated as 'real' as long as they have

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[133] The expression 'international system' is used here to indicate the international political sphere. The term does not indicate any systemic approach to the problem of international politics.
[134] Wendt, Alexander. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory" *International Organization.* 41, 3 (1987): p. 338.
[135] Wendt sees the states as the main actors in international politics. His discussion of the agent-structure problematique refers to the state-international system relationship.
[136] Ibid: p. 349.

observable effects or if their manipulation permits one to intervene in the observable world with effect. Wendt calls this philosophical starting point 'scientific realism'. "As long as they have observable effects or are manipulable by human agents, we can, in principle, speak meaningfully about the 'reality' of unobservable social structures. 'Generative structure', in other words, is a (potentially) scientific rather than metaphysical concept."[137] The way to proceed from this assumption is to emphasise explanatory enquiry into the underlying causal mechanisms of these unobservable structures rather than just on generalisations about observable regularities. It is important to show how these observable regularities work. "Answers to why-questions require answers to how- and what-questions."[138] From this philosophical base, Wendt builds his theory. This structurationist approach argues that structure in generative terms is a set of internally related elements. Because these elements are interrelated they cannot be conceived outside the structure they are part of. In terms of International Relations theory, this implies that, on the one hand, states are part of the international structure and cannot be identified as states outside this structure; on the other hand that these international structures have no independent existence without the actions of the states which are their building blocks. "The deep structure of the state system, for example exists only in virtue of the recognition of certain rules and the performances of certain practices by states [...] Social structures, then, are ontologically dependent upon (although they are not reducible to) their elements in a way that natural structures are not."[139]

The second assumption is that social structures are not independent from their agents' conceptions of what they are doing. "In other words, social structures have an inherently *discursive* dimension in the sense that they are inseparable from reasons

[137] Ibid: p. 352.
[138] Ibid: p. 354.

and self-understanding that agents bring to their actions."[140] On the other hand the self-understanding, interests and powers of the agents are shaped by the structures they are operating in. In addition to the external structures in which the agents operate, their internal organisational structures are important to their interests and powers. These internal structures give the agents (in terms of international structures: states) three capacities: "1) to have a theoretical understanding (however inaccurate) of its activities, in the sense that it could supply reasons for its behaviour. 2) to reflexively monitor and potentially adapts its behaviour; and 3) to make decisions."[141] The influence of these internal structures then are again only examinable in the context of the external structures in which states operate, therefore social structures are co-determined. Agents and structures are mutually constitutive.

V.II. Identity and Interest as Dependent Variables

Wendt's structurationist starting points leads him to argue for bringing identity and interest-formation into the scope of international relations theory. His three main assumptions are: "(1) states are the principal actors in the system; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in large part constructed by those structures, rather than being determined exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics."[142] These assumptions lead to two main arguments. 1) Wendt argues for a "cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are

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[139] Ibid: p. 359.
[140] Ibid: p. 359.
[141] Ibid: p. 359.
[142] Wendt, Alexander "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" in Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds) "*The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*" (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996): p. 48.

endogenous to interaction."[143] Wendt sees identity and interests of states as the outcome of the interactions among states. 2) Wendt argues that the international structures are formed and sustained by the process of interaction among states. The self-help system of the international structure is not a given institution (as assumed in Neorealism and Neoliberalism) but due to process. "The distribution of power may always affect states' calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the 'distribution of knowledge', that constitute their conceptions of self and other."[144] The established collective meanings about the self and the other (here the other states) that constitute structures are those which organise state behaviour. The actors (states) acquire relatively stable identities in relation and in interaction with other actors. "Each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world."[145] These identities lay the ground for the roles a state plays in the international system and therefore defines the state's interests. The absence or failure of roles complicates the assessment of a situation for an actor and "identity confusion may result."[146] States in the international system construct norms and rules and therefore their identities through a continuing process of signalling to other actors and interpreting and responding to signals from other actors (see *Figure 2*). "The sovereign state is an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that somehow exists apart from practice."[147] This practice establishes certain expectations of a given state's behaviour in the international system and these expectations

[143] Wendt, Alexander "Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics" in Der Derian, James (ed) "*International Theory. Critical Investigations*" (London: Macmillan Press, 1995): p. 132.
[144] Ibid: p. 135.
[145] Ibid: p. 135f.
[146] Ibid: p. 136.
[147] Ibid: p. 151.

translate into norms. These norms in turn have an effect on a state's behaviour. "The effects are 'constitutive' because norms in theses instances specify the actions that will cause relevant others to recognize and validate a particular identity and to respond to it appropriately. In other instances, norms are 'regulative' in their effect. They operate as standards for the proper enactment or deployment of a defined identity."[148]

[148] Jepperson, Ronald L., Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security" in Katzenstein, Peter J "*The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*" New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): p. 54.

Figure 2: The Co-determination of Institutions and Process[149]



[149] See: Wendt, Alexander "Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics" in Der Derian, James (ed) "*International Theory. Critical Investigations*" (London: Macmillan Press, 1995): p. 143

In this environment of expectations and norms, states assess their identities and the expectations presupposed by the other actors in the system to define their identities and interests. This corporate identity of a state leads to four main state interests: 1) physical security; 2) ontological security (predictability of social relationships) which requires relative stable social identities; 3) recognition as an actor in the system: 4) development (meeting the human aspiration for a better life).[150]

It becomes clear, therefore, that one of Wendt's main variables is state identity. Wendt's constructivism is based on a state centred view of international relations. This approach is signalled in his most recent writings. "I shall be concerned here with [...] the constitution of states as 'unitary actors', which is the starting point for theorizing about the international system"[151]. This identity is formed within the international system through interaction with other states. The state itself as a variable is not problematized. The domestic structure of a state and its influence on the formation of a state's identity or better of the multiple identities a state can have in the international system is excluded by definition. This is where Wendt's theory falls short. It ignores the political subject and its influence on states' behaviour. The link between the individual, the state and the international system is distorted towards the latter of the three. The next section tries to reverse this distortion and establish a theoretical approach in which identity formation on each level (individual, state, international system) is taken into account and the influence of identity formation across levels is appropriately accounted for.

[150] See: Wendt (1996) *op.cit.*: p. 51.
[151] Wendt, Alexander *"Social Theory of International Relations"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): p. 195.

V.III. Theoretical Approach to the Influence of Identity Formation[152]: Theorising from the 'Bottom up'

Alexander Wendt's approach to the influence of state identity serves as the starting point to this new theoretical approach. But Wendt's picture remains incomplete since he remains firmly within the state as unitary actor approach. Wendt does not give any reason why he excludes by definition identity formation on the domestic level. To remain on the international level only is to construct new (or renew) old boundaries of understanding. As Gillian Young observes, the state as actor approach has two consequences:

> *"The first is that a high level of abstraction [...] of the state as actor approach, allows for ahistorical universalisations. [for example that the emergence of the state is a 'necessary' evolutionary development rather than the outcome of a complex political process, HJS] The second is that spatio-temporal definitions are themselves political, that is, representative of certain interests triumphing over other competing but less powerful interests."*[153]

Young argues that an emphasis on political subjectivity is needed to bring these problems to a resolution. Only if the influence of the political subjects (individuals, members of states) is taken into account, can the problems be overcome. Young argues that states secure their identity by appealing to notions of security. These notions of security strongly associate identity with notions of 'inside/outside', state/international, order/anarchy and that these oppositions are used to reach a

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[152] The theoretical approach presented is not a full sized theory that wants to provide a theoretical explanation for every or for even the most important observable political events. It is only an approach with the aim to guide the empirical investigation of this thesis. Never the less the approach hopes to give new theoretical insights into the matter of identity formation. The aim is to develop a theoretical explanation for identity formation on all three levels of political action: the supra state level, the state and the substate (individual/group) level with which an individual is affiliated.

[153] Youngs, Gillian "Beyond the 'Inside/Outside' Divide" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) "*Identities in International Relations*" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 26.

unified and secure state identity. To take these processes properly into account, it is crucial to "emphasise the direct involvement which individual subjects have in those processes and the ways in which these integrate questions of secure individual identity with secure state identity."[154] Following Walkers account, the argument here is for a connection between political theory and theory of International Relations.[155]

Taking these assumptions into account it seems more appropriate to extend Wendt's theory from a state level approach to an approach which takes all levels of political activity into account. *Figure 2* would then be transferred to a three dimensional picture. The first and highest level would be the supra-state level. Groups on this level would be having an influence on the state from above. The second would be the domestic level of state identity formation, conceptualised as a state elite that struggles to construct a coherent, meaningful and generally accepted identity for the wider society The third level would be the substate (individual/group) level of identity formation. Here the principal actors would be domestic groups (parties, pressure groups etc.). The second adjustment has to do with the way identity formation works. Wendt presents a horizontal picture of identity formation (state to state; state leader to state leader), which excludes vertical processes. The theoretical approach presented here allows for vertical processes (state leaders to substate public; substate public to supra-state groups; and state leaders to suprastate groups and vice versa). The three levels of identity formation are mutually reinforcing. That these vertical influences exist, is convincingly shown by Scholte's account of the influences of global processes on identity formation.[156] *Figure 3* shows a simplified abstraction of this new theoretical approach. Each level contains the processes shown in *Figure 2*.

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[154] Ibid: p. 27.
[155] See: Walker (1993) *op.cit.*: p. 25.

Figure 3: Three Levels of Political Identity Formation[157]



[156] Scholte, Jan Aart "Globalisation and Collective Identities" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) "*Identities in International Relations*" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): pp. 38-78.
[157] Figure created by author

In this diagram the arrows signify the vertical processes, which function similarly to the horizontal processes. All levels are interconnected and mutually constitutive. States appear now as transistors between the individual and the international system. Following Giddens' approach[158], the international system is seen as an interconnected network of individuals. These individuals are constantly interacting with each other and with the structures their interactions create (domestic structures and international structures alike). In these interactions the individuals build up and reassess their personal identities as well as the identities of groups they belong to and ultimately the state they live in. To take an example from the natural sciences, the international system can be seen as a molecule of different atoms. The atoms are concentrations of electrons, protons and neutrons. These basic building blocks represent the individuals of a state, the atoms represent state structures. Each individual is a necessary part of the whole molecule but it also cannot exist without the atom. Individuals, state structures and the international system are therefore mutually constitutive and can only be properly understood as an organic whole. The argument here is for a bottom up understanding of the international system, not a top to bottom understanding. It turns the neorealist and neoliberalist assumptions on its head.

Based on these assumptions the argument turns now to identify the important elements of political identity building on an individual as well as on a collective substate level, the state level and the supra-state level. This list of elements is meant to highlight important elements of identity building but is by no means exhaustive. In addition to this, the relative importance of the elements in relation to each other cannot be generalised, since identity building is highly historical. The relative

[158] See: Giddens, Anthony (1990) *op. cit.*

importance of these elements is an empirical rather than a theoretical question and has to be assessed for each individual case.

This chapter looked at the problem of political identity building. It was shown that the 'classical' theories of International Relations, Neorealism and Neoliberalism see the issue of political identity building not as an analytical problem. Following the 'modern' approach, they treat political identity building as resting solely on the state level. It was shown that they deny that there are any politically meaningful identities below or above the state level. The international system, as conceptualised by these theories is based on the 'state as unitary actor' model. This can be most clearly seen in the approach of Kenneth Waltz. Neoliberalism, Morgenthau's classical Realism, and more recent Neorealists embody the same idea. Although Neoliberalism accounts for more than just state actors it still conceives political identity building as a state bound phenomenon.

It was shown that this state-centred approach to political identity building is based on the specific modern conceptions of territoriality, sovereignty and the state. A detailed analysis of these concepts showed their inherent limitations. The modern concept of territoriality rested on a conceptualisation which separated time and space and tried to 'empty' time and space. Both were disconnected from socio-spatial markers. This development allowed the independent functioning of social institutions, which allowed the modern conception of the state. Political space was now equated with the state, which was defined as the absolute and exclusive control over a certain territory. Sovereignty is the legal expression of the modern conception of territoriality. It was argued that it is conceptualised as inherently socially constructed. However it is treated as an inherently unproblematic and unpolitical in the modern political and theoretical analysis and discourse.

The recent changes in the international realm, summarised in the term globalisation are changing the role of the state as an actor. Modern analyses of the effects, however, assume that the state will be able to adjust to the changing circumstances. They remain within the state-centric thinking of the classical IR theories. Postmodern analyses see the changes as far reaching and fundamental. Their analyses see the state as a concept and as a political actor withering away. The concepts that lie at the basis of the state, territoriality and sovereignty are reconceptualised and replaced. The postmodern criticism of this concept of territoriality argues that the modern concept of separated time and space is replaced. Pace is replacing space, the nonterritorial functional political spaces become increasingly important, eroding the modern conception of territoriality. The alternative is a complex web of interactions on an indefinite amount of possible levels. The postmodern criticism of sovereignty shows that the concept is used to legitimise exclusionary practices and serves to marginalise dissident approaches and opinions. However the postmodern criticism does not offer any alternative and is based on very radical epistemological assumptions. These deny the possibility of knowledge since each attempt to 'know' is in itself an exclusionary practice.

Postmodern approaches see the 'state' as being replaced by a complex and ever changing web of social interactions and constructions. This approach is correct in analysing the nature of the changes in the international realm. However it does not appreciate that these changes are not equally forceful and are do not have the same impact in all regions. Therefore the concept of 'unequal globalisation' is central for a discussion of the nature of political identity.

As has become clear, neither the modern nor the postmodern concepts of political identity offer viable and useful theoretical bases for an empirical study. The modern approach seems to be too limiting, while the postmodern approach outlines a

complex web of interaction on a limitless number of levels. This approach it was argued cannot be included in a theoretical framework for an empirical study since it would be impossible to identify any 'signifiers' or levels for an empirical study. In addition to this it has been pointed out in passing that the epistemological assumptions of postmodernism are radically denying the possibility of knowledge.

On the analytical level, the modern and postmodern approaches need to be modified. Rosenau's conceptualisation of the international system was introduced as a first step in this direction. Rosenau sees the international system as characterised by forces of integration and fragmentation at the same time. He calls this 'fragmegration'. Political boundaries are transformed into more porous and wider 'Frontiers'. The territorial dimensions of politics are transformed. The 'Frontier' is along issues, not along geographical spaces. Although it was argued that this conceptualisation of the international system cannot be completely accepted since it has a certain technological determinism, it can serve as an analytical guideline.

Based on this, a new theoretical approach to political identity building was introduced: the 'three level model'. It identifies three major levels of identity formation: the substate level, the state level and the supra-state level. Using the constructivist approach to state identity building of Alexander Wendt, this new model treats identity and interests as dependent variables. It argues for 'theorising from the bottom up' and for seeing identity building as an outgrowth of interaction among the different units on the three levels.

The aim of this chapter was to argue for a rethinking of the problem of political identity building. It analysed the two major 'schools' of thinking on this problem: the modern and the postmodern approaches. It tried to outline the limitations of both approaches. It concluded that a middle ground between the modern and the postmodern thinking was required in order to take into account the

changes in the international system and the change in the territorially bound nation state without slipping into the 'radical' standpoint of postmodernism. The 'three level model' of political identity building has been introduced. The new model is only outlined in this chapter. It will be treated in more detail in the second chapter of the thesis. The interaction and the interconnection of the three levels will be more specified and the 'signifiers' of political identity building (perception of territoriality, perception of history, perception of ethnicity, religion, language and gender) will be introduced into the model.

Political Identity:

Three Levels and Six Significators

The first chapter of the thesis argued that the process of political identity building has to be located on three analytical levels: the substate level, the state level and the supra-state level. In this chapter the issue of political identity building is analysed more closely. There are two more distinctions which are important to make. Identity can vary in two different dimensions: breadth and depth. As far as breadth is concerned identity can vary from assumptions of an identity for the whole of humanity (Christian identity makes this theoretical claim for example) to the creation of identity of one individual. As far as depth is concerned, it can have three basic forms. As Connolly describes it:

> *"An identity might have ontological depth because it construes itself to be the bearer of a fundamental truth and look forward to a day when the faith is translated into knowledge; it might conclude that it must always be founded on a contestable faith in its truth; or it might conclude that it is both crucial to its individual and collective bearers but historically contingent in its formation and ungrounded ontologically in its truth - ungrounded, not because it alone in the world of identities has no ground, but because it treats as true the proposition that no identity is grounded in ontological truth; no identity is the true identity because every identity is particular and contingent."*[159]

Here both aspects of identity are analysed. The breadth of political identity will be shown during an analysis of the three levels: substate (individual/group), state level,

and supra-state level. In the first three parts of this chapter each level will be analysed separately. As far as the substate (individual/group) level is concerned, it will be argued that the process of political identity building is an individual phenomenon. The individual actor defines him- or herself in contrast to others in social interactions. On the second, the state level it will be shown that political identity building is an elite led phenomenon The concepts of 'nation', 'nationalism' and 'national identity' will be analysed in some detail. It has already been pointed out during the discussion on the emerging conditions of globalisation that the third level, the supra-state level is of growing importance. Groups on this level can be expected to try to influence the decision making on the state level as well. However keeping in mind that the area of the case study is the Middle East and keeping equally in mind that the conditions of globalisation are not as advanced in this area as in Europe or North America, it can be assumed that this level does not have as strong an influence on the state level as does the substate level. The process of political identity building on this level is shown to be a mixture of individual differentiation and elite led mechanisms. Following Rosenau's argument in the preceding chapter, the relationship between the three levels of political identity building can be conceptualised as an increasing challenge of the substate and the supra state level to the state level. It has been argued in the preceding chapter that the formation of the elite led political identity on the state level becomes increasingly difficult under the changing conditions of globalisation and that the state level is under pressure both from below and from above through the parallel forces of fragmentation and integration.

The last part of the chapter looks at the ontological depth of political identity. Here six basic building blocks of political identity are analysed. To try to identify all

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[159] Connolly *op. cit.*: p. 331.

of the most basic building blocks for the formation of identity is an almost impossible task. Identity is based on a multitude of interrelated factors. However it is important to have some theoretical guideline for an empirical enquiry. As Chris Farrands argues

> *"explanations of the origins and character of identity based on single factors are at best incomplete [...] Identities are always historically, socially and materially grounded, but they cannot be reduced to these elements. They retain distinctive features of which the most important [...] are the links between political, cultural and social processes and the importance of the historical specificity and particular experience of identities in particular cases and situations."*[160]

Political identity tries to locate the individual in the universe and answers a number of crucial questions: Who are we? Where do we belong? Where do we come from? What are we? 'What is our position in the community?' Along the lines of these questions, one can allocate crucial elements of political identity formation: 'sense of ethnicity' (who are we?), 'sense of territoriality' (where do we belong?), 'sense of history' (where do we come from?), 'sense of language' and 'sense of religion' (what are we?), 'gender' (what is our position in the community?). Each of these variables will be analysed separately. It will be argued that all these variables cut across the three levels of political identity building. However, they are not all necessarily found on each level. The interconnections between and the relative weight of these variables within and across the three levels cannot be determined analytically. This is an empirical question. If one would try to define these structures, one would limit the theoretical approach presented here to just one specific case study. Since the aim of

[160] Farands, Chris. "Society, Modernity and Social Change" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) *"Identities in International Relations"* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 19f.

this approach is to be a general theoretical approach to political identity building, these structures will not be described here. They will be highlighted during the discussion of political identity building in the Israeli and Palestinian society.

I. Level One: Self and Group-Identity

I.I. Social Science: Neglect of the Individual in Favour of Structure

Social sciences in the post-Second World War period have been dominated by a theoretical approach that puts the social structure before the individual. The individual was seen as largely formed by these structures, without the possibility to influence or resist this 'socialisation' process. The emergence and successive importance of Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism can be seen as the translation of this view into the theories of International Relations. As outlined already in the previous chapter the 'agent-structure' problem will be seen in a different way: following Wendt's approach agent and structure will be seen as mutually constitutive. The emphasis here will be on the individual. It will be shown that to start out with an emphasis on the individual's identity is an important step, since only with an adequate theoretical grasp of this phenomenon will it be possible to formulate a theoretical approach to political identity building. "In treating individual's either explicitly or by default as merely socially or culturally driven, ignoring the authorical or '*self*-driven' aspects of behaviour, is to render them at best partially, and, perhaps more often, as fictitious ciphers of the anthropologist's [or in our case social scientist's, HJS] invention"[161].

[161] Cohen, Anthony P. "*Self Conciousness. An Alternative Anthropology of Identity*" (London: Routledge, 1994): p. 7.

As it was argued in the previous chapter, it is necessary to theorise from the 'bottom-up'. The emphasis on the individual offers in turn a better view of the social structures. "If we regard social groups as a collection of complex selves (complex, because any individual must be regarded as a cluster of selves or as a multi-dimensional self) we are clearly acknowledging that they are more complicated and require more subtle and sensitive description and explanation than if we treat them simply as a combination of roles"[162].

This first section of the chapter consists of three major parts. The first part will look at the 'classical' conception of the individual in the tradition of the Enlightenment. The individual will be seen as a coherent unified rational self. The second part presents a radical challenge to this conception: postmodernism. Starting out from philosophical criticisms of the unified self by Nietzsche, Husserl, Lacan and Foucault, it will then look at the 'postmodern-individual', a fluid multitudity of selves which are inherently incoherent. It will be shown that this view of the individual presents serious problems for a social science, which takes the individual as its primary concern. The third part of this section is concerned with an approach that acknowledges the criticism of postmodernism without dissmissing the notion of a coherent individual as the starting point of the inquiry. Following the approaches of Giddens, Rosenau and Preston, a theoretical approach of individual and group-identity building under emerging conditions of globalisation is explicated

I.II. The 'Classical' Notion of the Self in Enlightenment

The modern concept of the 'subject' stands in contrast to the premodern understanding. The premodern understanding of the individual was not

[162] Ibid: p. 7.

differentiating between the subject and his or her 'core' group, such as the family, the clan, or the tribe. The subject was defined by his or her connection to this core group. The Enlightenment changed this situation. It argued for the independence of the rational self, the individual. The individualised, rational subject was in turn seen to belong to a wider political community, the nation. This group was seen as the rational reaction to the need for protection and security. This community was either created by a *Leviathan* in the Hobbesian sense or by a rational social contract in the sense of Rousseau. The modern concept of the subject is best summarised by Pauline Rosenau. The modern subject is seen as

> *"a hardworking, personally disciplined and responsible personality. S/he is constrained by 'effort' and has a self image of 'trying hard' and doing his/her 'best'. S/he has no personal idiosyncrasies, or at least s/he does not dwell on such issues. S/he plans ahead, is organized, and defers gratification. The modern subject may become committed to political projects and work for goals of an ideological character. S/he may believe in free will and personal autonomy, but s/he will follow majority opinion (or the party line) once the vote has been taken and a decision is made. The modern subject is, in other words, willing to subordinate her/his own interests for the good of the collective. S/he respects rational rules, the general will, social conventions, fixed standards that seem fair. S/he searches, in good faith, for truth and expects that ultimately such quest will not be fruitless. This means the modern subject has confidence in reason, rationality, and science and puts all these ahead of emotion. S/he is optimistic about the future of mankind and the*

possibility of progress [...] S/he claims to be a knowledgeable human agent, and s/he has a distinct, set personal identity."[163]

One of the basic outcomes of this view is the creation of the subject/object dichotomy. Both sides of this dichotomy are dependent on each other. They are mutually constitutive. This view of the individual is implicit in several studies concerning the identity of the individual. To take only one example, we look at Laing's study *"Self and Other"*[164]. Laing's study looks at the interaction between people and the dependency of the self on the other. He argues that the individual can only 'realise' him/herself with the help of the 'other'. "The other person's collusion is required to 'complement' the identity self feels impelled to sustain"[165]. The self is realised or destroyed by its interaction with the 'other' who is treated as an 'objectified' subject. In consequence, identity also develops in contrast to the other. "A person's 'own' identity cannot be completely abstracted from his identity-for-others. His identity-for-himself; the identity others ascribe to him; the identities he thinks he attributes to them; the identity or identities he thinks they atrribute to him; what he thinks they think he thinks they think..."[166]. Laing points out that the sense of self-identity can be destroyed and lead to psychological problems, if the identities ascribed to the self by others is permanently inconsistent or contradictory.

"The others tell one who one is. Later one endorses, or tries to discard, the ways the others have defined one. It is difficult not to accept their story. One may try not to be what one knows' one is, in one's heart of hearts. One may try to [...] create by one's own actions an identity for oneself, which one tries

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[163] Rosneau, Pauline Marie. *"Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences. Insights, Inroads and Intrusions"* (Princetown: Princetown University Press, 1992): p. 43.
[164] See: Laing, R. D. *"Self and Other"* (London: Renguin Books, 1990).
[165] Ibid: p. 111.
[166] Ibid: p. 86.

to force others to confirm. Whatever its particular subsequent vicissitudes, however, one's first social identity is conferred on one"[167].

The definition of the self by the 'other' is done by confirmation and disconfirmation. This process transcends language, as an identity can be confirmed or disconfirmed by body language, behaviour and conversation. However, what Laing seems to underemphasise is the fact of self-awareness, self consciousness. The importance of an established and stable awareness of the self is pointed out by Cohen. In order to cope with the different demands made to the self on different levels of social interaction, it is necessary to have an established awareness of self-identity. "It seems to me remarkable that as individuals, we generally manage to cope with these many incompatible claims on our allegiance without cracking under the strain. It is little short of a triumph that we do so while also preserving a reasonable sense of loyalty to our own sense of self, that is, to our individuality"[168]. The sense of reflexitivity in the construction of self identity is seen by Giddens as one of the prime features of modern identity. "In the context of a post-traditional order, the self becomes a *reflexive* project [...] In the settings of modernity, [...] the altered self has to be explored and constructed as part of a reflexive process of connecting personal and social change"[169].

I.III. The Postmodern Criticism of the Rational, Coherent and Unified Self

This modern subject is a focal point of criticism in postmodern approaches. Postmodernism rejects the modern notion of the self as coherent, rational and unified.

[167] Ibid: p. 94f.
[168] Cohen: p. 9.

This theoretical standpoint originated with the philosophical criticisms in the late 19th and early 20th century. Husserl for example detected a crisis in European philosophy. "The 'crisis' could [...] become clear as the 'seeming collapse of rationalism'"[170]. He saw a new philosophical thinking about the ego. "The ego is no longer an isolated thing alongside other such things as the given world. The serious problem of personal egos external to or alongside each other comes to an end in favour of an intimate relation of beings in each other and for each other"[171]. Perhaps the most critical analysis of the modern self is the approach taken by Nietsche. He argues that the unified subject, the self, is a fiction. "After Nietzsche and Freud [...], it would seem difficult to take the existence of the self as a priori as firmly established."[172] Nietzsche argues that the idea of the unified self is a fiction, produced to make human life possible. He shows that the self cannot be unified. Essential to this is the idea that the fundamental activity of the mind is an activity of interpretation. Since all interpretation is false interpretation the activity of the mind is seen as an "aberrant reading dependent on simplifying, schematizing, omitting, a making equal of things which are not equal."[173] Thinking, so Nietzsche describes, does not occur, it is a fiction. Therefore the thinker, the self does not exist either. The thinking spirit, as in the Cartesian 'cogito ergo sum' does not exist. "There exists neither 'spirit' nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions that are of no use. There is no question of 'subject' and 'object', but of a particular species of animal that can prosper only through a certain relative rightness; above all,

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[169] Giddens, Anthony. "*Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*" (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991): p. 33.
[170] Husserl, Edmund. "*Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*" Translated by Quentin Lauer (London: Harper Torchbooks, 1965): p. 191.
[171] Ibid: p. 190.
[172] Miller, Hills J. "The Disarticulation of the Self in Nietzsche" *In the Monist. An International Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry.* 64, 2 1981: p. 247.
[173] Ibid: p. 249.

regularity of its perceptions."[174] The end of this disarticulation of the self is that there is not one self in one body but multiple selves. In consequence, there is not only one identity but multiple identities in each person.

Based on these philosophical assumptions, Lacan developed his psychoanalytic approach to the self. However, in contrast to the modern approach of Laing, Lacan argues against a unified, stable rational self and self-identity. "Lacan says that we are never going to get a stable image. We try to interpret our relation to others but there is always the possibility of misinterpretation. There is always a gap, a misrecognition. We can never be certain of the meaning of the other's response. We have an idea of our identity, but it does not correspond with reality [...] In his view the stable ego is illusory"[175]. Lacan argues that there is no reality outside representations. Since representations always have to be interpreted, there will always be a factor of unstability as far as the identity of the self is concerned. In addition to this, identity always depends on the recognition by the other: "full mutual recognition is not possible partly because of the ambiguity of signifiers. There is a gulf between saying and meaning"[176]. Therefore a stable unified, rational and secure self is impossible. We are always searching for our true identity with the impossibility of reaching it.

Foucault developed his approach to the modern subject in a similar way. Foucault's aim is to show how the subject is objectified and therefore dehumanised under modern conditions. "My objective [...] has been to create a history of different modes by which in our culture, human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt

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[174] Nietzsche, Friedrich. "*The Will to Power*" Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. (New York: Vintage Books, 1968): p. 266.
[175] Sarup, Madan. "*An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism*" (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993): p. 12.
[176] Ibid: p. 13.

with three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects"[177]. In the *Order of Things,* Foucault tries to show how the human being became the object of science and therefore became dehumanised. "Michel Foucault sought to write not the general theory [...] of an archaeology of knowledge, but its application to the human sciences, and [...] he set out to show when and how man could have become an object for science, as nature had been in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries"[178]. Foucault denies the fixed character of the modern subject, which resulted in the assumption that the identity is unified and unchangable. Instead of this Foucault proposes the radical fluidity of self-identity.

The dissolution of the self in postmodernism provides special problems for the social sciences. Is there a possibility of a social science analysis without the subject in any form? The modern subject is rejected as 1) a product of modernity, 2) a focus on the modern subject assumes the correctness of a humanist philosophy, 3) a subject requires automatically an object, which leads to the rejected subject-object dichotomy. The possibility of an analysis without a subject in any form however is impossible. Nevertheless the notion of the unified modern subject has to be displaced from the centre of analysis. It is no longer possible to see the subject as having a coherent, unified and rationally ordered self. It has to be understood that the individual 'carries' multiple selves and therefore multiple identities. In addition the subject can not be understood outside its social relations. Its multiple selves and multiple identities are dependent on its social relationships. But the social relationships cannot be understood without a notion of the subject. Both have to be seen as mutually constitutive. Changes in the social structures will introduce changes in the individual self and vice versa.

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[177] Foucault, Michel. "The Subject and Power" in Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow. "*Michel Foucault. Beyond Strucutralism and Hermeneutics*" (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982): p. 208.

The introduction of the postmodern subject into the social sciences is a problem. The assumptions of postmodernism assume a highly developed society, which is globally integrated and has highly developed communication networks. As Gibbins and Reimer argue, these characteristics only apply for the most developed countries.[179] Therefore the introduction of the postmodern individual into a general theoretical approach of political identity building would limit the approach only to highly developed states. However neither Israeli nor Palestinian societies belong to this category A different notion of the self has to be developed which acknowledges that the individual will carry multiple identities while at the same time does not go as far as the postmodern approaches in arguing the radical destruction of the notion of the self. James Rosenau's, Gidden's and Preston's approaches seem to be helpful.

I.IV. A New Approach to Self-Identity under Conditions of Globalisation

It has become clear in the preceding parts of this section that a new approach to self-identity has to be developed. This new approach has to take into account of the changes in the structures of society under conditions of globalisation on the one hand and the changes in the individual's capacities on the other hand which result and run parallel from the changes in the structures as we have seen in the preceeding chapter. In order to explain this, three approaches that of Giddens, Rosenau and Preston will be used. All three approaches shed light on different aspects of the problem of self-identity. Once the new approach is developed the new role of group membership in the process of political identity building will be outlined.

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[178] Canguilhem, George. "The Death of Man, or Exhaustion of the Cogito?" in Gutting, Gary (ed) *"The Cambridge Companion to Foucault"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): p. 85.

According to Giddens, "transformations in self-identity and globalisation [...] are two poles of the dialectic of the local and the global in conditions of high modernity [...] the self becomes a reflexive project"[180]. The individual is confronted with a wide range of diverse opportunities. At the same time, because high-modernity (the term by which Giddens describes the changing conditions of globalisation) offers no foundation to enable the individual to make a choice, therefore the concept of lifestyles becomes important. "A lifestyle can be defined as a more or less integrated set of practices which an individual embraces [...] they give material form to a particular narrative of self-identity"[181]. The changes in the social fabric of society have profound impact on the self-identity building. Under the conditions of high-modernity, Giddens identifies ten major characteristics of self-identity building. 1) The self is seen as a reflexive project. The building and rebuilding of a coherent and rewarding sense of identity is a fundamental aim. 2) The self forms a trajectory of development from the past to the anticipated future. 3) The reflexivity of the self is continuous as well as all-pervasive. 4) "It is made clear that self-identity, as a coherent phenomenon, presumes a narrative: the narrative of the self is made explicit"[182]. 5) Self-actualisation implies the control of time, the primacy is given to personal time. The future is to be ordered by exactly those active processes of temporal control and active interaction on which the integration of the self's narrative depends. 6) The reflexivity of the self extends to the body, which is seen as part of an action system rather than merely a passive object. "Body awareness is [...] as a means of construction a differentiated self"[183]. 7) Self actualisation is seen as a balance

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[179] See: Gibbins, John R. and Bo Reimer. *"The Politics of Postmodernity. An Introduction to Contemporary Politics and Culture"* (London: Sage, 1999).
[180] Giddens, Anthony. *"Modernity and Self Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age"* (Cambridge Polity Press, 1991): p. 32.
[181] Ibid: p. 81.
[182] Ibid: p. 76.
[183] Ibid: p. 77.

between opportunities and risk. 8) "The moral threat of self-actualisation is one of authenticity [...] 'being true to oneself"[184]. 9) The course of life is seen as a series of passages. "Such traditions are drawn into, and surmounted by means of , the reflexively mobilised trajectory of self-actualisation"[185]. 10) The line of develpment of the self is internally referential. "Personal integrity, as the achievement of an authentic self, comes from integrating life experiences within the narrative of self-development"[186].

As becomes obvious from this outline of Gidden's approach, it is very structure centred. It analyses correctly the structural changes that the individual has to cope with. However, following the argument that structures and agents are mutually constitutive, these changes in the structures must trigger changes in the agent's capacities. Rosenau's approach on the other hand acknowledges these changes in the individual's capacities.

Rosenau pays special attention to what he calls the 'skill revolution'. Skill revolutions refers to the spread of education and information among the individuals of a society which enables them to cope with the increasing structural changes. Rosenau makes three major arguments. 1) Citizens have become more analytically and emotionally skillfull. 2) "This skill revolution at the micro level matters [...] through perceptual and aggregative processes citizens are shaping macro outcomes more extensively than they have in the past"[187]. 3) The macro system of the world has entered a stage of rapid change, which makes it more vulnerable to micro inputs. The skill revolution "resulted in individuals around the world being increasingly able

[184] Ibid: p. 78.
[185] Ibid: p. 79.
[186] Ibid: p. 80.
[187] Rosenau (1997) *op. cit*: p. 280.

to grasp the global nature of their circumstances and to collectively demand they be heard and heeded by their leaders"[188].

These processes have a profound effect on political identity building. "The inner need to maintain macro attachments and political identities persists, but the foci of the attachments and identities have been increasingly obscured by transformative events. There are no moorings on to which people can readily latch"[189]. This makes the problem of identity building more complicated. The dynamics of change, according to Rosenau, alters constantly the boundaries, norms and goals through which the individuals relate to their fellow citizens. "They cannot act or remain passive without somehow seeing themselves in relation to their surroundings. Such judgements tend to be constant as long as continuity and stability mark the course of events, but they are subject to transformation in a period of turbulence"[190]. Similar to Giddens notion of lifestyles, which centred on the individual's orientation towards his or her personal identity, Rosenau introduces the notion of 'self-environment orientation'. This notion centres on the individual's orientation within the wider community. "By self-environment orientation is meant the appraisal people make of the relative worth of themselves and their most relevant macro collectives [...] self-environment orientations can never be more than subjective appraisals developed through personal experience, society's socialization processes, and the class, economic, political, and other objective circumstances that prevail at any moment in time"[191]. A shift in these self-environment orientations will have deep impacts on the formation of political identities. In order to understand these processes, an approach is needed which looks closely at the individual. In order to develop such an approach a closer look at Preston's argument is necessary.

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[188] Ibid: p. 278.
[189] Ibid: p. 297.

Preston analyses political-cultural identity. "The idea of political-cultural identity expresses the relationship of individual selves to the community considered as an ordered body of persons"[192]. He argues that an identity is always learned. "The shift from the self of modernity to the self of high modernity can be constructed as an exercise in learning"[193]. In addition identity is always multi-layered and multi-centred. Preston argues that a political cultural identity can take a series of broad forms.

> *"First person-centered (how an individual construes their relationship to the community they inhabit); second, group-centered (how persons lodge themselves in groups and thereafter how a grouping of persons construe their relationship to other groups within the community); and third, nation-centered (how persons ordered as groups thereafter construe themselves in relation to other separate groups). At the present time it is clear that there is change along all these axies"*[194].

The new approach presented here is combining the three approaches of Giddens, Rosenau and Preston. Following the premise of the first chapter, structures and agents are seen to be mutually constitutive. Giddens approach is useful to highlight the deep structural changes that occur in late- or high-modernity. Giddens highlights the new challenges that are imposed on the individual. The social structures changed towards a greater openness and more opportunity for the individual, which in turn creates more choices with less foundations to orient the individual. Rosenau's approach highlights the individual's increased ability to cope with these structural changes and the new demands on him or her. The 'skill revolution', the spread of

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[190] Ibid: p. 283.
[191] Ibid: p. 283ff.
[192] Preston *op. cit.*: p. 9.
[193] Ibid: p. 171.
[194] Ibid: p. 177.

education and information enables the individual to cope with the new structural demands and to place him- or herself in the new environment. Preston points towards the fact, that identity is always learned. In addition he highlights the multi-layeredness and multi-levelness of political-cultural identity.

After having outlined a theoretical approach for self-identity, it is now necessary to look at the consequences this approach has for group identity.

I.V. Group Identity

The change in self-identity building has also a deep impact on the process of group identity building. The new reflexive self, with his or her increased education and capabilities, can be expected to form more effective political groups and try to influence the political decision making on the state level. As Rosenau points out, since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the spontaneous, unorganised uprising of publics has increased. "The communist parties of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were not toppled by well and highly organized opposition parties. Rather, the prime movers were instantaneous coalitions of citizens facilitated by rudimentary instruments of mobilization"[195]. Because of the coinciding structural changes and the 'skill revolution' which enhanced the capacities of the individual, the character of group identities changed. "Once the micro-level shifts began, alterations in the status of states, governments, and subgroups were bound to follow as people became receptive to the decentralizing consequences inherent in their growing capacity to locate their own interests more clearly in the flow of events"[196]. Rosenau argues that the fact that these uprisings were spontaneous, can be used as an argument that the capacities of individuals increased, since they both see and

[195] Rosenau (1997) *op. cit.*: p. 300.
[196] Ibid: p. 302.

contribute to the opportunities that offer themselves to them. As Rosenau points out, the individual must not only see the opportunites but also must trust that enough of his or her fellow citizens will act in the same way in order to ensure that these micro sentiments are translated into macro outcomes. These spontaneous uprisings are evidence "of relocated authority, of decentralizing tendencies having combined with newly refined skills of citizenship to produce a greater readiness to become involved in collective action"[197]. Rosenau points out that subgroups also have increasing support and present a serious challenge to the authority of states. "The decentralizing surge, in other words, is inherent in the emergent structures of world politics as each subgroup's success feeds on itself and fosters tendencies toward further fragmentation [...] the result is a restructuring of authority relationships and an intensified potential for local and regional conflicts capable of globally cascading along the fault lines of subgroupism"[198]. This tendency is translated into a rapidly rising organisational explosion of groups on a worldwide scale. This development is based on the establishment of wide networks of communication, aided by the development in electronic communication media, like the internet and the fax machine.

As will be shown in the case study of the thesis, identity groups have become increasingly important in Israeli as well as Palestinian society. Although in both societies the state level is an important and central point of identification (to be an Israeli and to be a Palestinian is a central aspect of political identities), the state elites have more and more difficulties in maintaining a coherent widely accepted political identity. What it means to be Israeli or Palestinian is increasingly contested. Groups on the substate level offer alternative political identity conceptions. Interestingly, in

[197] Ibid: p. 308.
[198] Ibid: p. 312f.

both societies radical religious groups, which offer antagonistic political identity conceptions, are among those whose political identity increasingly influences policy choices on the state level.

In this section a new approach to self-identity was attempted. The modern and postmodern approaches towards this issue were presented. The modern approach sees the individual as having a rational, unified and stable self. This approach is highly criticised by postmodern analysis. The postmodern approaches argue for a decentered, fluid self on a multitude of levels. However, these analyses which go as far as denying the usefulness of a notion of a self at all, present special problems for social science which has the individual at its centre. In addition to this, the postmodern approaches require a highly decentralised, globally integrated society which presents no problems for communication. Therefore, a new approach had to be developed. In order to do this the analyses of Giddens, Rosenau and Preston were combined. Each outlines several aspects which are important for self-identity under the conditions of globalisation. Giddens outlines the structural changes which are encountered by the individual. New opportunities and choices are combined with less foundations to make judgements by. Rosenau clarifies the 'skill revolution' which enables the individual to cope with these challenges. Preston shows that political identity is formed on different levels and that it is a learned identity. This new approach follows the premise that agents and structures are mutually constitutive as outlined in the first chapter. Finally the emergent importance of group identity has been presented. Following from the new opportunities that the conditions of globalisation and structural changes offer to the individual, coupled with the increased skills and education of the individual, subgroups and spontaneous public uprisings become more and more important. This goes so far that one can argue that

these subgroups are filling in the 'need-gaps' which governments under the emerging conditions of globalisation can no longer fill. This argument on the co-existence and mutual dependency of the substate and the state level leads to the second section of this chapter.

In the next two sections of this chapter, the analysis shifts from the agent to the structure of Wendt's agent-structure problematique. The second and third level of political identity building will be analysed. In the following section the second level of identity building will be at the centre of the analysis: the state level. It will be shown that the state level remains an important level of political identity building even under conditions of globalisation. However it will be argued that this level is no longer the only or even primary level of identity building, since it is connected with and influenced by the substate (individual/group) level as well as the supra-state level. The state level has to be put into a theoretical system of political identity building which accounts for all three levels. Of prime importance for the argument in the second section of this chapter will be the changes in the conception of political community which occur under conditions of globalisation.

II. Level Two: State Level

This part of the chapter is concerned with the analysis of the second level of political identity building, the state level. The 'classical' concepts used to describe identity building on this level are 'nation', 'nationalism', and 'national identity'. Therefore it is necessary to analyse these concepts in some detail. It will become clear that these concepts are the logical outcome of a state-centred approach to identity building. They assume that the individual has as one stable, overriding political identity: national identity. However, as the discussion in the previous chapter has shown, the

overriding importance of the state level is questionable under the conditions of globalisation. However here it will be shown that although the state has lost its function as the overriding political identity (as assumed in the traditional conceptions of 'national identity') it is going too far to assume that the nation will become completely irrelevant. A new concept of national identity will be developed showing in which directions it has changed its character. It will be argued that the state will still be an important level of political identity building and that it can adapt and further the development of the political community.

II.I. Concepts of 'Nation', 'Nationalism' and 'National Identity"

Questions of Definition

The 'state as actor' model in International Relations theory saw the international arena populated first of all by states. Therefore identity is equated with national identity. "The main received idea of identity in International Relations has been nationalism and the linkages between the nation and the state."[199] This question inspired a large amount of literature.[200]

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[199] Farrands (1996) *op. cit.*: p. 2.

[200] A few examples of the wide range of literature are: A) *On the concept itself*: Black, Antony "Nation and Community in the International Order" *Review of International Studies* 19 (1993): pp. 81-89; Daimond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner (eds) *"Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy"* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Kellas, James G *"The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity"* (London: Macmillan, 1991); Mayall, James *"Nationalism and International Society"* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Pfaff, William *"The Wrath of Nations. Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism"* (London: Simon&Schuster, 1993); Periwal, Sukumar *"Notions of Nationalism"* (Central European University Press, 1995). *On national identity:* Bloom, William *"Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). *Critical Approaches to the concept:* Horseman, Mathew and Andrew Marshall *"After the Nation-State. Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Order"* (London: Harper Collins, 1995); Pingrose, Majorie and Adam J. Lerner (eds) *"Reimagining the Nation"* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993).

The first step in discussing the problem of nationalism and national identity is to define what is meant if we use the term 'nation'. This problem has evoked a whole range of different definitions. The basic problem is to decide what distinguishes a 'nation' from a 'state' since these two concepts are often used interchangeably. Ernest Renan's definition is one of the most prominent ones. Renan defines the concept of 'nation' as a moral, spiritual principle, that combines the past with the present. "Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common"[201]. Renan stresses the point of national sufferings because, "national sorrows are more significant than triumphs because they impose obligations and demand a common effort"[202]. The importance of suffering in the conception of political identities in both Israeli and Palestinian society is central. While Israeli society has the holocaust and the centuries of persecution of Jews worldwide as its central justification, Palestinian society remembers the war of 1948/49, 'the catastrophe' (*al-nakhbar*, as it is termed) as well as the subsequent Israeli occupation, including the first and second intifada. Renan argues that because of its will to community, the 'nation' establishes a moral conscience, because the individual feels obliged to put the good of the community over his or her personal gain. "A great aggregation of men with a healthy spirit and warmth of heart, creates a moral conscience which is called a nation"[203]. This definition, although intuitively right has a serious flaw in the fact that it does not explain how the group of people who identify with the past form a community in the first place. The definition is, to use a metaphor; a head without a body.

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[201] Renan, Ernest. "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1994): p. 17.

Karl Deutsch tries to give a functional definition of the concept of 'nation'. He defines nationality as based on the ability to communicate. "Membership in a people essentially consists in a wide complementary of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively over a wider range of subjects, with members of a large group than with outsiders"[204]. This ability to communicate is based on their ethnic complementarity. This ethnic complementary is relatively wide in range and is therefore distinguishable from other vocational complementarities such as members of the same profession have for example. The use of a common system of symbols, a language, enables the communication. Therefore his definition of 'nation' is: "In the political and social struggles of the modern age, nationality, then means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse, both indirectly from link to link and directly with the center"[205]. The creation of modern Hebrew *(Ivrit)* as the central communications tool in Israeli society is one example of this. According to Deutsch national aspirations turn into nations when they have the power to back up their aspirations, i.e. form a state. When the nation has a state as a political apparatus of communication it has become a sovereign nation-state. Deutsch's definition has the merit of making a clear distinction between the concepts of 'nation' and 'state'. However he does not explain how this system of symbols, this language (which need not, as Deutsch points out, be the same spoken language as in the case of the Swiss nation) came into being. Deutsch is, without explicitly saying it, basing his definition on a territorially united community. Therefore he cannot take into account nations

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[202] Ibid: p. 17.
[203] Ibid: p. 18.
[204] Deutsch, Karl. "Nationalism and Social Communication" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1994): p. 27.
[205] Ibid: p. 28.

without a territory, as the Palestinians were from 1948-1994 and the Jewish community from antiquity until 1948.

Clifford Geertz tries to solve this problem by pointing out that the concept of 'nation' has two components; an ethnic and a civic. The ethnic component, primordial attachments, as Geertz calls them, are mostly assumed givens, which nevertheless are a social existence of the individual: "immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices"[206]. The second element, the civic allegiance to a state, is equally important. "To an increasing degree national unity is maintained not only by calls to blood and land but by a vague, intermittent, and routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police powers and ideological exhortation"[207]. Geertz's elements certainly do represent important components of the concept of 'nation'; however he fails to show how these elements are working together to create a nation. His analysis is, as it was the case with Deutsch's, based on a community bounded together by a territory and an administrative and political system, a state. Therefore Geertz also has problems dealing with nations without a territory.

Anderson's definition of the concept of 'nation' is the most useful so far. "It is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[208] It is imagined, so Anderson states, because the members of even the smallest nation will never be able to know or even meet most of their fellow citizens. This does not necessarily prevent a community from being established, since "in fact,

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[206] Geertz, Clifford. "Primordial and Civic Ties" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 31.
[207] Ibid: p. 31.
[208] Anderson, Benedict *"Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism"* (London: Verso, 1983): p. 6.

all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined."[209] At the same time the nation is limited, because even the largest of them has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nations. These boundaries are essential to the formation of nations. "No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind."[210] The nation is imagined being sovereign.

To achieve more clarity between the concepts of 'state' and 'nation' it is useful to look at the definition, which Connor offers. He agrees with Anderson's argument about the 'imagining' of the nation. While discussing ethnicity as one of the core elements of 'nation', he argues that ethnic origins and ethnic connections between people of one nation are in most cases not based on actual facts. However, "what ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is [...] This is a matter which is known intuitively and unquestionably, a matter of attitude and not of fact"[211]. Therefore a nation, in contrast to an ethnic group, is not other-defined, but self defined. For Connor, the ethnic origins of a 'nation' are paramount. He drops the connection between nationhood and territory which was prominent in the definitions discussed above. His definition is very simple: "a nation is a self-aware ethnic group"[212]. As long as an ethic group does not define itself as different from other ethnic groups and as a 'nation' it cannot be conceptualized as one. Connor argues that this short definition gives a conceptual advantage over other definitions, which lump the concepts of 'state' and 'nation' together. "Employing ethnic group or ethnicity in relationship to several types of identities therefore beclouds the relationship between the ethnic group and the nation and also deprives scholarship of

[209] Ibid: p. 6.
[210] Ibid: p. 7.
[211] Connor, Walker "A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a ..." in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 1, 4 1978: p. 380.
[212] Ibid: p. 388.

an excellent term for referring to both nations and potential nations"[213]. Palestinian and Jewish societies can be seen as prime examples of imagined communities. The Jewish community preserved their sense of belonging over nearly 1800 years. This feeling of belonging enabled the Zionist movement in the 19th century to develop a secular, national ideology. The majority of Palestinian society is living in the diaspora since 1949. However this has not weakened their sense of a common fate and belonging.

The discussion of different definitions of the concept of 'nation' has shown that there are a whole range of different possible definitions. However the definitions of Anderson and Connor seem to be the most workable ones. Their definitions offer categories which can be applied to nations which do not have a state as their political expressions. Their argument about the importance of the 'imagining' of a 'nation' points towards the importance of myths in nation-building. Before an analysis of the role of myths in nation-building and nationalism is attempted it is important to look at some possible explanations for the development of the notion of 'nationalism' and why this phenomenon has such a high importance in political thinking and policy making.

Nationalism

Nationalism as a concept is of enormous importance. It has provoked a wide range of attempts at explanation. Most writers agree that 'nationalism' is a modern phenomenon. However the concrete point of origin of nations and nationalism is highly controversial. Walker Connor points to this problem. "Given that nationalism is a mass, not an elite phenomenon, the contemporary nations of Europe emerged far

[213] Ibid: p. 388.

more recently than has generally been recognised"[214]. His study shows that peasants, for example, were not until recently cognisant members in the nations to which nationalist writers and outsiders assigned them. The problem is, according to Connor, at which point a sufficient proportion of the population has internalised the ideas of a national identity in order for it to be an effective force of mobilisation. He argues that democratic institutions are not a prerequisite for a nation. "However if a society describes itself as a democracy, then the refusal to permit large sections of the populace to participate in the political process may be viewed as tantamount to declaring that those who are disenfranchised are not members of the nation"[215]. Nation-building is a process not a phenomenon, as Connor points out. His analysis shows that any claim for any nation existing before the 19th century should be treated cautiously. Both Palestinian and Israeli 'national' identity conceptions were developed in the 19th century as the ideas of Enlightenment and modernity penetrated the Middle East and Eastern Europe respectively.

If one accepts the argument about the recent origin of nationalism, it still remains obvious that the concept was based on earlier feelings of solidarity, which were transformed into the concept of nationalism. This transformation did not occur evenly, but was dependent on a range of social, economic, and political factors. Because these factors developed differently in different communities, the concept of 'nationalism' spread unevenly. Hugh Seton-Watson distinguishes two different types of nations: old nations and new nations. 'Old nations' are "those which had acquired national identity or national consciousness before the formation of the doctrine of nationalism"[216], like the English, Scots and French. The 'new nations' are "those for whom the two processes developed simultaneously: the formation of national

[214] Connor, Walker. "When is a nation?" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 13, 1 1990: p.95.
[215] Ibid: 98.

consciousness and the creation of nationalist movements. Both processes were the work of small educated elites"[217]; these nations include the German and the Italian nations, also the Palestinian and Israeli 'nations' could be included in this category. For the 'old nations', the process of the formation of national consciousness was an incremental event, according to Seton-Watson. It was not planed or willed by anyone. The main factors were the identification of the sovereign (the monarch in this case) with the community as a whole, the social differentiation of the masses, the spread of education and communication and above all the spread of monarchic power. This spread of power "determined the boundaries within which the sense of community should develop"[218]. For the 'new nations', so Seton-Watson says, the main factor in the creation of national consciousness was language. Because of this and the spread of modern means of communication, nationalist elites were able to recruit the masses, which were discontented with the political and social conditions. "This discontent was directed by the nationalist elites into nationalist movement rather than towards economic change"[219]. The reoccurring forces for the forming of national consciousness are: state power, religion, language, social discontents, economic pressures and elite leadership.

The importance of premodern solidarity of a community for the development of the concept of 'nationalism' is of central importance, as Van Den Berghe explains when he talks about kinship solidarity: "The kinship was real often enough to become the basis of these powerful sentiments we call nationalism, tribalism, racism, and ethnocentrism"[220]. One could even argue, as John Armstrong does, that

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[216] Seton-Watson, Hugh. "Old and New Nations" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 134.
[217] Ibid: p. 134.
[218] Ibid: p. 138.
[219] Ibid: p. 136.
[220] Van Den Berghe. "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies.* 1, 4 1978: p. 404.

'nationalism' itself is part of a cycle of ethnic conciousness over a *long duréé.* "A longer look suggests that widespread intense ethnic identification although expressed in other forms is recurrent"[221]. This shows, according to Armstrong the fundamental but shifting significance of boundaries for human identity. However Armstrong argues that there is nothing predetermined about the boundaries that distinguish an ethnic collectivity. Central to the maintenance of these boundaries are boundary mechanisms such as symbols, communication and myths. "In their origins and in their most fundamental effects, ethnic boundary mechanisms exist in the minds of their subjects rather than as lines on a map or norms in a rule book"[222]. These mechanisms work over a long period of time, tying past experience to the present. This point will be elaborated in the discussion of the role of myths later on. "Over a long period of time, the legitimising power of individual mythic structures tends to be enhanced by fusion with other myths in a *mythomoteur* defining identity in relation to a specific polity"[223]. The myths like *Massada* for Israeli society and the glorious past of the Arab nation for Palestinian society are central elements of their respective political identities.

Apart from the question of when did a community achieve its status as a nation, if it is an 'old' or a 'new nation', a further important question is how did a community achieve this status. Anthony D Smith points towards different ways in which communities achieved the status of nations. Smith' s distinction describes the different ways in which the status of nationhood was achieved. Smith argues that there are two different types of ethnic groups which achieved nationhood: lateral ethnies (aristocratic, lacks social depth) and vertical or demotic ethnies (socially diffused, greater degree of popular mobilization and fervour). "Taking the lateral

[221] Armstrong, John. "Nations before Nationalism" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 141.

route first, we find that aristocratic ethnies have the potential for self-perpetuation, provided they can incorporate other strata of the population"[224]. In addition to this prerequisite the aristocracy had to develop an administrative apparatus "which could be used to provide cultural regulation and thereby define a new and wider cultural identity"[225]. Smith calls this 'bureaucratic incorporation'. Here the state was used to form the nation. "The 'state' formed the matrix of the new population-unit's format, the 'nation'. It aided the type of compact, unified, standardised and culturally homogenised unit and format that the nation exemplifies"[226]. In difference to this, vertical or demotic ethnies were only indirectly affected by the state and its administration. "The funds of cultural myths, symbols, memories and values was transmitted not only from generation to generation, but also throughout the territory occupied by the community or its enclaves, and down the social scale"[227]. The chief mechanism of nation-building was organised religion, which transformed into an ethnic religion: the myths, symbols of decent and election, the ritual and the sacred texts helped to perpetuate traditions and social bonds of the community. All that was left was to obtain an independent state for the community. Israeli society is an example of this process (although the territorial link was missing for nearly two millennia). Here organised religion was the basis on which Zionist nationalism could build.

It becomes clear now that the origin of the concepts of 'nation' and 'nationalism' have to be located around the 19th century if one wants to maintain the notion of 'nationalism' as a mass phenomenon. It has been shown that nation-building is a long, complex process that depended more or less on elite guidance.

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[222] Ibid: p. 144.
[223] Ibid: p. 145.
[224] Smith, Anthony D. "The Origins of Nations" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies.* 12, 3 1989: p. 349.
[225] Ibid: p. 350.
[226] Ibid: p. 352.

Therefore the notion of a necessary and unavoidable development of nationalism must be rejected for any case ('old' or 'new nations', lateral or vertical ethnies). Although nationalism in some cases built on premodern feelings of solidarity within a community, it still remained an elite dominated phenomenon and was used by the elites to achieve political aims. The boundaries of 'nations' as was argued by Armstrong were the result of monarchic power policy and, although helpful for the formation of political identity to the individual, were not geographically inevitable. The notion of 'nationalism' as a political concept, formed, implemented and instrumentalised by the elites will become even clearer if one looks at some explanations for the concept of 'nationalism'.

The theme of elite domination of the concept of nationalism is further developed by Hobsbawn. The concept of 'nation' is, according to Hobesbawn, a "recent historical innovation, [...] with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation state, national symbols, histories [...] All these rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation"[228]. The state forms the nation through a standardised administration and education which constitute citizenship. State and society converged through public education, public ceremonies and the state's production of mass monuments. Paul Brass argues along the same lines. "The leaders of ethnic movements invariably select from traditional cultures only those aspects that they think will serve to unite the groups and that will be useful in promoting the interests of the group as they define them"[229]. The importance of the pioneer

[227] Ibid: p. 353.
[228] Hobsbawn, Eric. "The Nation as Invented Tradition" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 76.
[229] Brass, Paul R. "Elite Competition and Nation-Formation" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 87.

generation in Israeli society and the PLO elite in Palestinian society will be shown in the case study.

Benedict Anderson analyses the conditions under which the concept of 'nation' became imaginable for the masses. Three fundamental changes occurred which made this possible: 1) a particular script language did no longer offer privileged and exclusive access to ontological truth 2) society was no longer organised around and under high centres 3) the conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable was rejected. Economic change and scientific discoveries separated cosmology and history. This development was aided by what Anderson calls 'print-capitalism', the spread of modern means of communication. "The revolutionary vernacularizing thrust of capitalism was given further impetus by three extraneous factors, two of which contributed directly to the rise of national consciousness"[230]. The first was the change in character of Latin, which returned to the classic Ciceronian routes in its usage which made it more difficult. It acquired an esoteric quality. Therefore it spurred the use of vernaculars. The second was the impact of the reformation, which challenged the authority of the Roman Church and mobilised the masses for religious purposes. The third was the "slow, geographically uneven, spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralisation by certain well-positioned would-be absolutist monarchs"[231]. The spread of these vernaculars was, as Anderson emphasises, not based on nationalist feelings. "Nothing suggests that any deep seated ideological, let alone proto-national, impulses underlay this vernacularization where it occurred [...] what [...] made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortudious, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations

[230] Anderson *op. cit.*: p. 36.
[231] Ibid: p. 40.

(capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity"[232]. Capitalism created a way of distributing information through print-languages which in turn helped the creation of national consciousness. It created a united field of exchange and communications. It gave a new flexibility to language, which in the long run helped to built that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation. In turn this created 'languages of power' different from the older administrative vernaculars. At this point the 'nation' became imaginable. However, "the concrete formation of contemporary nation-states is by no means isomorphic with the determinate reach of particular print-languages"[233].

Anthony Smith describes three main responses elites could take in the face of these transformations. Close to Anderson's arguments, Smith describes the impact of rationalism and science. Due to these changes a new confidence in human capacities arose. "This meant that the quest for scientific truths necessarily took on the nature of a crusade on behalf of freedom of enquiry and the superiority of human reason to divine revelation"[234]. This caused a grave danger for the social fabric, as one of the legitimising factors for society was challenged. In addition to this, the social context of these transformations was characterised by the emergence of powerful centralised governments. However the absolutist territorial states were in competition with each other. "Interstate competition bred therefore not only [a] new 'national' sentiment [...], but also those drives for scientific and technical modernisation which became so characteristic of western bureaucratic states"[235]. This crisis of legitimisation for the state transferred the question of meaning from the spiritual to material and social planes. Religion became a private matter. However, as Smiths makes clear, "there

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[232] Ibid: p. 41ff.
[233] Ibid: p. 46.
[234] Smith, Anthony D. *"The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): p. 93.
[235] Ibid: p. 94.

was nothing inevitable, either, about the process itself, or about its trajectory"[236]. The basic choice that presented itself was whether the social structure would be dominated by religious authority or by 'rational-legal' authority. The first possible response to this problem was 'neo-traditionalism'. This position tries to accept the achievements of rationalism and science without taking on the underlying assumptions. It is a kind of "modernised religion and politicised tradition"[237]. The link between this standpoint and nationalism is made by giving the religious community a history and turning it increasingly into an ethnic community. The second possible standpoint is called 'reformist'. Proponents of this standpoint accept science and its modes of critical reflection. However it does not completely reject religious authority. It proposes a dual legitimisation: divine order and scientific state. "In the still-meaningful traditions and beliefs of the community, the reformist discerns the 'essence' of a modern faith"[238]. The true religion in this view can only be realised within the national community. The third position is that of the assimilationsists, which "saw their task as that of assimilating themselves and their communities to the norms and lifestyles of the one global civilisation"[239]. The scientific state was seen as a universal construct. However as these cosmopolitan aspirations were shattered the assimilationists transferred their ideas to their particular political community. Smith points out that all three possible responses have in common that they "concede the twin premises of [...] historians, that entities have origins and purposes in time, and possess identities and boundaries in space, in a world of analogous entities"[240]. The case study will show that all three ways of

[236] Ibid: p. 96.
[237] Ibid: p. 97.
[238] Ibid: p. 103.
[239] Ibid: p. 99.
[240] Ibid: p. 103.

conceptualising the relationship between the political and the religious can be found in Palestinian and in Israeli society.

Ernest Gellner points towards the importance of education in the process of modern nation-building. "The minimal requirement for full citizenship, for effective moral membership of a modern community, is literacy"[241]. Similar to Smith he sees the impact of modernity as a problem for the question of legitimacy. The impact of modernity was characterised by an increase in literacy, the transformation of economic life, greater mobility, the emergence of an industrial proletariat, a language of modern organisations and the erosion of local structures. These changes however occur unevenly. Therefore in the early stages of this process, the redrawing of loyalities is possible. "Essentially, nationalism is a phenomenon connected not so much with industrialisation's and modernisation as such, but with its uneven diffusion"[242]. This results in a sharp social stratification which is unhallowed by custom, unprotected by social mechanism and which seems redeemable by 'national' secession. Tom Nairn follows the same line of argument. He sees the phenomenon as an outcome of capitalism's uneven spread. "The most notoriously subjective and ideal historical phenomenon is in fact a by-product of the most brutally and hopelessly material side of the history of the last two centuries"[243]. Gellner explains that the phenomenon of 'nationalism' is based on a new social organisation "based on deeply internalised, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state"[244]. Gellner points out that 'nationalism' selects elements for its high-culture from older folk cultures. "A modern, streamlined, on-wheels high culture celebrates

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[241] Gellner, Ernest "Nationalism and Modernization" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 55.
[242] Ibid: p. 61
[243] Nairn, Tom "The Maladies of Development" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Nationalism"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 72.
[244] Gellner, Ernest *"Nations and Nationalism. New Perspectives on the Past"* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997): p. 48.

itself in song and dance, which it borrows (stylising it in the process) from a folk culture which it fondly believes itself to be perpetuating, defending, reaffirming"[245]. This can be clearly seen in the creation of the Zionist symbolism and mythical constructions which combine religious traditions and symbols, historical events and some elements of the culture of the *shtetl* in Eastern Europe.

John Hutchinson introduces another important distinction of the phenomenon of 'nationalism': political and cultural nationalism. Both share an antipathy towards a bureaucratic state. However political nationalism is essentially modernist. The political nationalist believes that "because the world is divided into a multiplicity of political communities, they are forced to work within a specific territorial homeland in order to secure a state that will embody their aspirations"[246]. The political nationalists' goal is the achievement of a nation state with uniform rights and duties for the citizens. In cultural nationalism the state is accidental, the "essence of a nation is its distinctive civilisation"[247]. Cultural nationalism has an integrative objective; it tries to morally regenerate the nation by re-uniting the different aspects of the nation. In their view "an authentic national politics derives not from rationalist constitutions, but from a united community shaped by its history, belief, customs, industries and habitat"[248]. The nation in this view is not a static project but one that is constantly evolving and transforming itself. "Cultural nationalists regard the nation as a spontaneous solidarity that from its foundations is continuously evolving through cycles of achievement and decline"[249].

Elie Kedourie and John Breuillly both show the importance of historiography in the process of nation-building. Kedourie argues that "when nationalist

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[245] Ibid: p. 58.
[246] Hutchinson, John *"The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism"* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987): p. 12f.
[247] Ibid: p. 13.
[248] Ibid: p. 16.

historiography applies itself to the European past, it produces a picture of nations slowly emerging and asserting themselves in territorial states"[250]. The general aim of this historiography was to show that nations, nationalism and nation-states were natural ordering principles of humanity. However, as Kedourie argues, this was an invention: "whatever ethnological or philological doctrine may be fashionable for the moment, there is no convincing reason why the fact that people speak the same language or belong to the same race should by itself, entitle them to enjoy a government exclusively their own"[251]. John Breuilly explains how history was used in the doctrine of nationalism to create a notion of distinctiveness (by arguing for a cultural distinctiveness following Herder's historicism) and to promote the return to the 'spirit' of the past. "The notion of a return to the spirit of the past was often accompanied by an historical perspective which read the appropriate trends into events. Figures in the past became instruments of the national destiny or obstacles in its path"[252]. The creation of Palestinian identity by combining elements of Arab history with the specific tragic history of the Palestinians is a good example of this.

It has been shown in this discussion that the concept of 'nationalism' is an elite dominated phenomena which is based on fundamental economic, social and political changes that marked the rise of modernity. However it has become equally obvious that the concept of 'nationalism' was not an inevitable solution to the challenges and the crisis of legitimisation. The importance of education and a distinct notion of history are central to the phenomenon of 'nationalism' (cultural and political nationalism alike). The importance of history, or more correct the

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[249] Ibid: p. 32.
[250] Kedourie, Elie. *"Nationalism"* Fourth Expanded Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998): p. 71f.
[251] Ibid: p. 74.
[252] Breuilly, John. *"Nationalism and the State"* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993): p. 61.

importance of the production of history in order to help the nationalist cause, points towards the significance of national myths.

Myths and Nationhood: The Importance of History

"Myth is one of the ways in which collectives - in this context, more specially nations - establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own systems of morality and values. In this sense, therefore, myth is a set of beliefs, usually put forth as a narrative, held by a community about itself"[253]. As Schöpflin points out, these myths are about perceptions rather than historical validated truth. They are used to bring order into chaos and ambivalence. "The language of symbols, rituals, myths and so on is, consequently, a part of the web of communication shared by any community and is, incidentally, more significant than language itself"[254]. Myths have a variety of functions. They are an instrument of self-definition, identity transfer, and means of communication; they delimit the cognitive field and therefore simplify complexity. In politics, myths are "a significant factor in conditioning the limits of the possible, in establishing the cognitive field and in underpinning the rule-boundeness which makes politics work"[255]. They offer explanations for the fate of the community (glory or failure), help in the maintenance of memory, and structure the cultural system of a society. Because of this central importance of myths for 'nations' and 'nationalism', they are elite controlled. "A political élite deploys myth in order to preserve its power by erecting barriers to comprehension, by stressing myth to ensure that its actions cannot be challenged"[256]. Schöpflin identifies nine major types of myths: myths of territory, of redemption and suffering, of unjust

[253] Schöpflin, George "The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths" in Hosking, Geoffrey and George Schöpflin (eds) *"Myths and Nationhood"* (London: Hurst 1997): p. 19.
[254] Ibid: p. 20.
[255] Ibid: p. 24.
[256] Ibid: p. 26.

treatment, of election, of military valour, of rebirth and renewal, of foundation, of ethnogenesis and antiquity and of kinship and shared descent. "Precisely because the function of the myth - one of its functions - is to construct coherence, different myths receive emphasis at different times to cope with different challenges. Their underlying function is the same, though: to ensure that the integrity of the group is safeguarded, that cultural reproduction is not prejudiced, and that the collective world made simple by myth remains, so that individuals may construct their identities as individuals and simultaneously as members of a community"[257].

Anthony Smith looks at the prerequisites myths have to fulfil to be 'usable' as such a controlling mechanism. He singles out three major elements, which a usable myths must include: authenticity, inspiration and the capacity for reinterpretation. Authenticity: "It can refer to the reapproriation of a communal possession, to the representativeness of shared cultural elements, to their indigenous and original qualities and to their correspondence with 'objective' truth"[258]. A myth must be demonstrably 'our' (the communities) myth. Inspiration: A myth must be able to inspire the inspiration of large parts of the population and not only of elite intellectuals. "They must be applicable to all citizens of the nation and must strike a chord in the hearts of the common people as well as the élites. Capacity of reinterpretation: Myths must be selected in the light of present social needs (the present shapes the past), the special qualities of the past (the past shapes the future), and its transmission in records and through oral memories. However the invention, or fabrication of these myths must keep within certain limits. It must relate to the individuals of the nations directly. "Pure 'invention of tradition' is ineffective"[259].

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[257] Ibid: p. 35.
[258] Smith, Anthony D. "The 'Golden Age' and National Renewal" in Hosking, Geoffrey and George Schöpflin (eds). *"Myths and Nationhood"* (London: Hurst 1997): p. 56.
[259] Ibid: p. 59.

As has been briefly shown, myths are a central element of the concepts of 'nation' and nationalism. They are the tools with which elites can control the populations of a society. They can have different functions, but generally they are a "source of continual inspiration, establishing the authenticity and continuity of the community's culture and conferring dignity on nations-to-be and well-established nations alike"[260]. The centrality of historical myths in both the Palestinian as well as the Israeli society will become clear in the case study.

The Modern Concept of 'National identity'

Nationalism was the basis on which national identities where constructed. Through the construction of powerful inside/outside divides between the order inside and the anarchy outside the nation state, national identity was constructed and reinforced. Boundaries between territories but also between citizens and foreigners played a major role in this process. Miller points out what distinguishes national identity form other forms of personal identity. It is a community "1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, 2) extended in history, 3) active in character, 4) connected to a particular territory, and 5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture"[261]. Nationalism was not only a political policy but a social movement. As Craig Calhoun describes it, "it is used to shape and legitimate state policies, secessionist movements, and attempts to join existing states. It is the most prominent rhetoric for constituting or arguing over the 'selves' at stake in political self-determination."[262] Calhoun argues that from the very beginning the discourse of nationalism was linked to the creation of political publics (several public spheres). This had influence on the identity formation of citizens. "The identities of members

[260] Ibid: p. 59.
[261] Miller, David. *"On Nationality"* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997): p. 27.

were formed and revised partly through their participation in the public sphere, not settled in advance."[263] This had the effect that varying identities became suppressed (since the national identities were fixed by a definition of what belonged to the public spheres). In his eyes it is necessary to overcome this situation by critically reassessing the categories of nation and people. Postmodernism, by contrast, is not only critical of the notion of a national identity, it rejects it as an exclusionary practice.

II.II. Postmodern Criticism of the Concept of the State, Nation, Nationalism and National Identity

Much of the postmodern criticism of the concept of the 'state' has already been stated in the first chapter. It is not necessary to rehearse the entire argument here. Only the major points will be summarised. It has been pointed out that under the assumed postmodern conditions, 'territoriality' is loosing its primary importance as an analytical tool. Speed and pace are new factors. The speed of the transmission of information and capital is becoming more important than the possession of territorial space. It has equally been shown that postmodern approaches see the concept of 'sovereignty' has having severe analytical problems. It is argued that the concept is based on arbitrary analytical assumptions presented as universal and timeless and apolitical truths. 'Sovereignty', 'state', and 'territoriality', postmodern writers argue, while treated as universal truths are in fact arbitrary historical constructions. Following Derrida, Ashley shows that the logocentric procedure (logocentrism always needs one universal and firm standpoint of truth from which to argue) "disposes participants in the regime of modernity to effect an antihistorical

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[262] Calhoun, Craig. "*Critical Social Theory. Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference*" (Cambridge Ma: Blackwell, 1995): p. 233.
[263] Ibid: p. 273

closure"[264]. Ashley argues for the "radical undecidability of history"[265]. He shows how modern statecraft could be seen as mancraft since it shapes the expectations of its subjects. One should focus the analysis "upon modern statecraft as modern mancraft, the art of constructing a paradigmatic figure of sovereign man at the centre of modern narratives of state and society through the representation of dangers that man will know to fear and desire to control"[266]. Therefore the nation-state can be seen as a specific invention in history and not a necessary condition of human political community. The concept of 'nation' can been seen as limiting. It is supported by a sharp exclusionary mechanism which defines inside and outside, excludes and marginalises foreigners and outsiders. Bhabha argues for a concentration on the analysis of outsiders, like immigrants, in order to show the arbitrary power structures that sustain the concept of 'nation' and 'nationalism'. "Nations like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realise their horizons in the mind's eye"[267]. The concepts of 'nation' and 'nationalism' are constructed through myths and are 'imagined' rather than objectively real. Bhabha shifts the focus of his analysis to the narrations of 'nation' and of 'nationalism'. He concentrates on the narrative character of the *mythomoteurs* of the nation in order to be able to show how they are based on an ambivalent concept of knowledge. "To encounter the nation as it is written displays a temporality of culture and social consciousness more in tune with the partial, overdetermined process by which textual meaning is produced through the articulation of difference in language; more in keeping with the problem of closure which plays enigmally in the discourse of the

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[264] Ashley, Richard. "Living On Border Lines. Man, Poststructuralism and War" in Der Derian, James and Michael Shapiro (eds) *"International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings of World Politics"* (New York: Lexington Books, 1989): p. 262.
[265] Ibid: p. 272.
[266] Ibid: p. 312.
[267] Bhabha, Homi K. "Introduction Narrating the Nation" in Bhabha, Homi K. (ed) *"Nation and Narration"* (London: Routledge, 1990): p. 1.

sign"[268]. What Bhabha criticises is the mechanism of exclusion and marginalisation, which go hand in hand with the process of nation building. "These imaginative geographies that spanned countries and empires are changing, those imagined communities that played on the unisonant boundaries of the nations are singing with different voices"[269]. Bhabha argues against the process of cultural homogenisation that the modern nation needs to implement in order to unify its subjects. He criticises the regulative character of the myths of nations, which by their very nature have to exclude and marginalise deviant interpretations of history. "The nation as a form of cultural *elaboration* [...] is an agency of *ambivalent* narration that holds culture at its most productive position, as a force for 'subordination', fracturing, diffusing, reproducing, as much as producing, creating, forcing, guiding"[270]. Bhabha also criticises the questionless acceptance of the boundaries of the nation, which serve, like myths, as a mechanism of exclusion and marginalisation. Bhabha labels the boundaries as 'Janus-faced', since they offer security for the price of limited political options. Bhabha emphasis that the inside/outside divide, created by these boundaries does not work effectively, since "the other is never outside or beyond us; it emerges forcefully within cultural discourse, when we *think* we speak most intimately and indigenously 'between ourselves'"[271].

As can be seen, Bhabha conceptualises 'nation' and 'nationalism' as exclusivistic modern concepts that serve the political interests of those in power. From this standpoint it can be argued that it is necessary to free oneself from the heavy baggage of these concepts and to look for different concepts of political identity. As becomes clear form this, a postmodern approach to the concepts of

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[268] Ibid: p. 2.
[269] Bhabha, Homi K. "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation" in Bhabha, Homi K. (ed) *"Nation and Narration"* (London: Routledge, 1990): p. 319.
[270] Ibid: p. 3f.
[271] Ibid: p. 4.

'nation' will lead to a very vague analytical concept, not a useful alternative for an empirical study of political identity. It can be seen that the postmodern criticism of the concepts of 'state', 'nation', 'nationalism' and 'national identity' leave no room for a political identity on this level of social interaction. However as has already been argued in the first chapter, such a radical approach overestimates the depth and breadth of the changes that occur under the conditions of globalisation. Therefore an alternative concept of 'national identity' is needed which combines the insights from modern and postmodern approaches .

II.III. 'National Identity' under Conditions of Globalisation?

An Attempt at a Redefinition of 'National Identity'

It has become clear that the position of state as the primary political community is under attack. This will directly affect the influence of national identity as a form of political identity. It is argued here that 'national identity' is no longer the primary source of political identification. However the assumption that it will disappear completely, that political identification will shift completely away from the state level is going to far. Smith points towards the continuing importance of national identification for the individual. He argues that identities are not only situational (defined by the social situations in which the individual finds him- or herself) but also persuasive.

> *"At the collective level, it is not the options and feelings of individuals that matter, but the nature of the collective bonds. Through socialization, communications and sometimes coercion, we find ourselves bound by particular identities from birth. We may seek to resist their power, but our*

efforts may prove unavailing. This is frequently the case which ethnic and national bonds"[272].

These bonds exert, according to Smith, a powerful influence on the lives of individuals and remain durable and resilient forces of identification. He offers four arguments why national identification is unlikely to disappear completely: 1) It is politically necessary. It has enlarged and humanised the political order of the interstate system by basing it on cultural and historical criteria (based on the prior existence of historic culture-community). 2) "National identity as opposed to other kinds of collective identity, is pre-eminently functional for modernity, being suited to the needs of a wide variety of social groups and individuals in the modern epoch"[273]. 3) Smith sees national identities as historically embedded in earlier existing ethnic identities. He sees it as the modern heir and transformation of these earlier loyalties. "Nationalism can be regarded as a 'religion surrogate' and the nation as a continuation, but also a transformation, of pre-modern ethno-religious community"[274]. 4) To identify with the nation offers personal rewards. "It is to be offered personal renewal and dignity in and through national regeneration. It is to become part of a political 'super-family'"[275]. It connects the individual to the wider political community.

Andrew Linklater, although more sceptic about the long term future of the idea of national identity, does not predict the demise of the state level. "State structures have been able to mobilise sufficient power to prevent the reconstruction

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[272] Smith, Anthony D. *"Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era"* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995): p. 124.
[273] Ibid: p. 155. One could counter this argument with pointing out that central aspects of modernity are changing and therefore national-identity will continue to loose on importance.
[274] Ibid: p. 159.
[275] Smith, Anthony D. *"National Identity"* (London: Penguin, 1991): p. 161.

of political community"[276]. He sees the continuing political significance of the state level and predicts its adjustment to the new conditions under postmodernity. "This is not to advance the unlikely proposition that conventional state structures either will or should disappear, but rather to suggest that states should assume a number of responsibilities which have usually been avoided in the past"[277]. The state, in Linklater's view will mediate between conflicting identities within its population . This would not change if the state would share authority with substate and supra-state actors.

> *"The need for political institutions which perform this task could not cease to exist just because national societies had become more responsive to cosmopolitan morality or more sympathetic to claims for the public recognition or cultural differences, nor would it end were states to share authority with institutions in their domestic regions and international organisations"*[278].

Linklater even sees the state as helping the transformation and opening up of society in order to adjust it to the new and changed circumstances under postmodern conditions. "The rational state eschews the totalizing project, encouraged the emergence of new forms of political community in which the potential for higher levels of universality and difference is realised and, in doing so, transcends the limitations of the Westphalian era"[279].

In the analysis of the second level of political identity building, it has been argued that the 'state level' is still an important bearer of political identity, although it has

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[276] Linklater, Andrew. *"The Transformation of Political Community. Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era"* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998): p. 27.
[277] Ibid: p. 44.
[278] Ibid: p. 45.
[279] Ibid: p. 45.

lost its overriding importance under the conditions of globalisation. Here the main question was how important the state level is in the process of political identity building under conditions of globalisation. It has been argued that the state level is challenged from below (substate level) and above (supra-state level) since these groups can solve certain problems within society more effectively. However it has equally been shown that to argue that the state is completely withering away is going analytically too far. A strong argument has been made for retaining the state level as one possible bearer of political identity. Even under the increasing changes of society in a postmodern direction (larger fluidity of political identity building), the state can adapt and retain an important role in the process of political identity building. Identity building on the state level can be expected to be an elite led phenomenon. Elites on the state level hold the access to and power over institutions of education and information. These can be used to reinforce a sense of group identity on a state wide level. The importance that myths, political memory and a sense of history play will be pointed out in the discussion of the six significators in the last part of this chapter.

The challenge to the state level from above, from the supra-national level will be analysed in the next part of this chapter. It will be shown that the supra-state level is becoming an important level of political identity building under the conditions of globalisation.

III. Level Three: Globalisation and the Locations of Political Identity

The growing importance of the international realm under the emerging conditions of globalisation has become a common place in analysis of international relations. As

has been shown in the first chapter of this thesis, modern as well as postmodern approaches analyse what they see as the major changes in the international system. Because of this, the third level of political identity building can no longer be ignored in any serious analysis of political identity. The main aim of this part of the chapter will be to show where possible locations for the process of political identity building are. In order to develop a model of the third level of identity building which sees the supra-state level as independent from the state level it is important to point out four possible locations where identity building can occur: economy, politics, culture/media and the diaspora. In these locations, political identity on the supra-state level can be found. These locations will now be examined independently.

The first location, the economy can best be grasped through the introduction of the term 'social forces'. Particularly helpful here is the use of the concept by Cox.

> *"Social forces are not to be thought of as existing exclusively within states. Particular social forces may overflow state boundaries, and world structures can be described in terms of social forces [...] The world can be represented as a pattern of interacting social forces in which states play an intermediate role between the global structure of social forces and local configurations of social forces within particular countries [...] power is seen as emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of accumulated material capabilities"*[280].

Cox analyses an 'internationalisation of the state' through those social forces which are no longer bound by or dependent on state boundaries. This internationalisation, this integration of the national economy in to the world system results in a shift of

political emphasis towards economic issues. Production becomes internationalised and expands through direct investment. At the same time a "new informal corporative structure"[281] is emerging. One part of this new structure is a transnational managerial class. This could be one possible location for a process of identity building on the third level. Castells argues for a profound transformation of the international economic systems towards a network society.

> *"As an historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the Information Age are increasingly organised around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture"*[282].

These networks are globally integrated constantly changing organisations of firms and individuals that come together to fulfil certain business tasks. The idea of the creation of a third, transnational level (in addition to the individual and the state level) by social forces and international production is further developed by Ruggie's analysis of the transformative powers of 'multilateralism'.[283] Ruggie's analysis shows the location of political identity building in the political sphere. Ruggie's argument is that multilateralism is not only a co-ordination of action between three or more states, but a new quality of relations between these states.

> *"Multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct - that*

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[280] Cox, Robert W. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" in Keohane, Robert O. (ed) *"Neorealism and its Critics"* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): p. 225.
[281] Ibid: p. 232.
[282] Castells, Manuel. *"The Rise of the Network Society"* (London: Blackwell, 2000): p. 500.
[283] See: Ruggie, John Gerard. "Multilateralism at Century's End" in: Ruggie, John Gerard. *"Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International Institutionalization"* (London: Routledge, 1998). Ruggie distinguishes between nominative/formal and qualitative/substantive multilaterism. Here the emphasis is on the qualitative or substantive multilateralism. This means the emphasis is on

is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for classes of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence"[284].

Ruggie shows that multilateral institutions, like the EU or the UN are robust and can adapt to change. In addition they can develop a life of their own, independent of the founding states. This is what distinguishes this concept from that of regimes. Regimes are dependent on the states that created them. For multilateral institutions in the sense Ruggie is arguing, this is less the case. They adapt to changes by themselves. "Much of the institutional inventiveness within mulitlateral arrangements today comes from the institutions themselves, from platforms that arguably represent or at least speak for the collectives at hand"[285]. Based on this it can be argued that these multilateral institutions are possible locations of political identity. At the very least, they can not be discounted as factors playing into the process of political identity building.

Rosenau's argument describes the sphere of non-governmental organisations. This is the second aspect of the political realm (next to governmental, multilateral arrangements) in which political identity is formed in the international sphere. Rosenau's analysis is that "globalization, the skill revolution, and the advent of pervasive authority crises have all contributed to an explosive transformation of the private world"[286]. This revolution resulted in an explosive increase in number and importance of non-governmental organisations (NGO) in the international realm. These NGOs undergo a transformation from elite to mass organisations. Rosenau, sees the innovations in technology and communication as the basis for the increase in

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the kin of relations that the parties have with each other and not only on the number of parties involved (although there need to be more than two in order for the term 'multilateralism' to make sense).

[284] Ibid: p. 109.

[285] Ibid: p. 129.

[286] Rosenau (1997) *op. cit.*: p. 330.

influence of these organisations. Because of these technological innovations it has become easier for these organisations to communicate, plan and exercise their actions.

> *"The fax machine and Internet not only facilitate relationships between local and national or transnational organizations, but they also make it possible to build networks and alliances among like-minded organizations"*[287].

The growing role of the NGO's can also be seen in the fact that they no longer only serve in the role of outside lobbyists in the international sphere (the consulting status of NGOs in the UN is only one example). Rosenau sees an emerging partnership between governmental organisations (of the multilateral form), national governments and NGOs. "NGOs and other non-governmental actors [...] are playing roles, meeting expectations, and filling gaps that national governments cannot fill on their own"[288]. These organisations open up a new space for political identity building. Their influence on this process should not be underestimated. The third location of possible political identity building in the international sphere is the cultural realm which is transmitted through media. In order to explore this aspect, the analysis of Morley and Robins is particularly helpful.

Morley and Robins argue that the new developments in the media make national boundaries seem arbitrary and irrational. They present obstacles to the reorganisation of media business strategies. What they invisage is the emergence of 'television without frontiers': A new media landscape which shapes identity not on the state but on the supra-state level (the regional as well as the global sphere). "What we are moving towards is a fundamental delocalised world order articulated around a small number of concentrated centres for production for knowledge and storage of

[287] Ibid: p. 333.
[288] Ibid: p. 338.

information as well as centres for emission of images and information"[289]. Morely and Robins argue, (see first chapter) that a parallel process of horizontal integration and vertical disintegration is emerging. "What is in fact emerging is a certain displacement of national frameworks in favour of perspectives and agendas appropriate to both supra-national and sub-national dynamics"[290]. In this process, a space for identities in the international realm is opening up. Castells also points to the increasing importance of the media, especially the new media, such as the internet, for the political process. "The new power lies in the codes of information and in the images of representation around which societies organize their institutions, and people build their lives and decide their behaviour. The sites of this power are people's minds"[291]. However the impact of the media and the new media on the political process must not be overestimated. While it certainly has a tranformative effect, this cannot assumed to be equally so all over the globe. It certainly has changed the political process in the more technologically advanced countries. However, these changes have yet to show their full potential.[292]

Nevertheless contemporary cultural identities have a distinctly international aspect. "Contemporary cultural identities must also be about internationalism in a direct sense about our positions in transnational space"[293]. Morley and Robin give the examples of the francophone identities, or the 'latin audiovisual space'. A particular role in the construction of these identity spaces is attributed to the film and television media. They play a particularly important role in the reorganising of the 'stories of the past' which help to construct our identities of the present. This is of particular

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[289] Morley, David and Kevin Robins. *"Spaces of Identity. Global Media. Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries"* (London: Routledge, 1997): p. 29.
[290] Ibid: p. 34.
[291] Castells, Manuel. *"The Power of Identity"* (London: Balckwell, 1997): p. 359.
[292] See the studies in: Axford, Barry and Richard Huggins (eds). *"New Media and Politics"* (London: Sage, 2001).
[293] Morley and Robins *op. cit.*: p. 41.

importance since the old stable identities of the past, grounded in the idea of the 'Heimat', the homeland and its historical myths and stories have become unsettled.

> *"There can be no recovery of an authentic cultural homeland. In a world that is increasingly characterised by exile, migration and diaspora, with all the consequences of unsettling and hybridisation, there can be no place for such absolutism of the pure and the authentic. In this world, there is no longer any place like Heimat"*[294].

The place of the diaspora is the fourth and final location of a political identity on the supra state level. The diaspora is a different kind of identity (compared to the other identities on the supra-state level) since their members political identity is closely connected to their 'homeland'. This location is the most important one for the case study on this level of political identity building since the majority of Jewish and Palestinian community live in the diaspora. In addition, as Rapport has shown, even immigration to Israel, for example, does not necessarily mean that diaspora identities are changed or revoked.[295] Diaspora as a location of identity and political identity is a long standing feature in international politics although its definition is somewhat sketchy. Cohen gives a fairly detailed definition of a diaspora.[296] There are ten central features which characterise a diaspora: 1) A diaspora, or their ancestors have been dispersed from an original homeland, often accompanied by the memory of a single traumatic event 2) they retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their homeland 3) they believe that they are not and never will be fully integrated in their host societies 4) their home country is idealised and either they or their descendants should return 5) they believe all members should be committed to the maintenance,

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[294] Ibid: p. 103f.
[295] See: Rapport, Nigel. "Coming Home to a Dream: A Study of the Immigrant Discourse of 'Anglo-Saxons' in Israel" in Rapport, Nigel and Andrew Dawson (eds) *"Migrants of Identity. Perceptions of Home in a World of Movement"* (Oxford: Berg, 1998).
[296] See: Cohen, Robin. *"Global Diasporas. An Introduction"* (London: UCL Press, 1997): p. 23ff.

restoration or even creation of their homeland 6) they continue to relate to that homeland and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are in an important way defined by the existence of such a relationship. 7) a disapora can also consist of groups that scatter for aggressive or voluntaristic reasons (colonisation) 8) some time has to pass before a group is really a diaspora (if it does not integrate into the host society) 9) there also are some positive virtues of retaining a diasporic identity, such are increased scientific and cultural achievements 10) member of a diaspora are not only characterised by a collective identity in their place of settlement, and their relationship to their homeland (real or imagined), but also by a common identity with co-ethnic members in other countries.

Globalisation has an impact on diasporas. They are not only able to take advantage of the increased possibilities of communication but they are also able to exploit these processes to their advantage, in international trade for example. "Deteriorialized, multilingual and capable of bridging the gap between global and local tendencies, diasporas are able to take advantage of the economic and cultural opportunities on offer"[297]. In addition, globalisation increases the movement of people and thereby creates new diasporas. Cohen argues that the process of globalisation enhances the process of diasporisation although there is no clear causal link between them. "Globalization and diasporization are separate phenomena with no necessary causal connections, but they do 'go together extraordinarily well"[298]. As Pellerin argues, "global restructuring generates or amplifies migration and, in turn, the movement of people across borders is an indication of the globalization of societies, and of the obsolescence of national boundaries"[299]. The immigrants who

[297] Ibid: p. 176.
[298] Ibid: p. 175.
[299] Pellerin, Hélène. "Global Restructuring and International Migration: Consequences for the Globalization of Politics" in Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) *"Globalization. Theory and Practice"* (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 81.

form the new diasporas are involved in the process of global restructuring in two related ways: as objects of the global restructuring and as participants in the process.

> *"As agents of change migrants participate in the process of transforming social organisation. Their movement, and the conditions surrounding it, imply change in the organization of production, in territoriality of societies, as well as in the social production of ideas and identities, both in regions of origin and destination"*[300].

Pellerin argues that the process of migration has contributed to the spatial disarticulation of societies. In addition and in connection with this, the flows of migrants have become less structured and state controlled. Pellerin views the migrants as one of the main factors of transformation in the process of globalisation. "There has been a shift from state-controlled emigration to more transnational forms of emigration where migrants themselves manage their movement"[301]. These new global diasporas open up a new location for transnational identities, as communities disperse around the globe. However, all this said, the developments of new locations for identity on the supra-state level - in economy, in politics (private or state-based), in the culture/media and in the diaspora - cannot be assumed to be equally opening up around the globe. The breadth and depth of these processes is unevenly distributed.[302] For the analysis of the empirical cases here it needs to be clarified that when the analysis refers to political identity on the supra-state level, this does not necessarily mean a 'global' identity, like political identities in the environmental or feminist movement. Supra-state political identity can be located in the diaspora. A political identity on the supra-state level can be a political group of members of a diaspora that tries to have an influence on the politics of their homeland.

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[300] Ibid: p. 81.
[301] Ibid: p. 89.

The four major locations of political identity building in the international realm are: economy, politics, culture/media and diaspora. In each of these locations identity building happens. However the process is not the same in each location. It is a combination of the ways in which political identity building was theorised on the first level (individual/group) and the second (state). In the locations of economy and diaspora and some of the NGOs (the second part of the location politics) the main process of political identity building is individual-driven. It follows the processes outlined in the first part of this chapter (the 'other' as orientation of the individual's own identity). In the location of multilateral politics and culture/media the process of political identity building is an elite-driven phenomenon. It follows the processes in the second part of this chapter (state-level). The diaspora is the main location of identity building for the case studies. Here, identities are constructed by an individual feeling of solidarity with and belonging to one's 'original' homeland (real or constructed). It is clear that these characterisations are only markers which serve as points of orientation in the empirical analysis. Which process in which particular case of a location is dominant is an empirical question and cannot be analytically resolved.

After having identified the three levels of political identity building it is now time to turn to some considerations about some fundamental ontological questions which have to be answered in the process of the construction of political identity on each level. Here six significators are identified which correspond to six basic ontological questions: sense of territoriality, sense of ethnicity, perceived sense of history, sense of language, sense of religion and sense of gender role. To these significators the analysis turns now.

[302] See the discussion of uneven globalisation in the first chapter.

IV. Six Significators of Political Identity Building

In the first three parts of this chapter the discussion centred around the ontological breadth of political identity building. Three levels of political identity building were analysed: the substate (individual/group) level, the state level, and the supra-state level. Parallel to the discussion about the location of political identity, three mechanisms of political identity building were developed. On the individual/group level one can expect political identity building to be an individual process of differentiation during social interaction. On the state level it was argued that one can expect the process to be an elite controlled and elite led phenomenon. On the supra-state level one can expect it to be a mixture of individual and elite led phenomena depending on the location of the process. This last part of the chapter looks now at some of the main variables along which the process of political identity building (all three mechanisms: individual differentiation, elite controlled, and mixture use these variables) is orientated. This serves two purposes. On the one hand it will 'flesh out' the abstract 'bones' of the three mechanisms of political identity building with some concrete issues. On the other hand the variables can be used as empirical guidelines for the empirical analysis in the second part of the thesis.

Six main variables will be analysed. Every variable answers one of the basic ontological questions of an individual and a group: 'sense of ethnicity', answering the question 'who are we?', 'sense of territoriality' answering the question 'where do we belong?', 'sense of history' answering the question 'where do we come from?', 'sense of language' and 'sense of religion' answering the question 'what are we?', and 'sense of gender' answering the question 'what is our position in society?'.

Three clarifications need to be made. Firstly the basic assumption is that these variable can be found on all three levels of political identity building (although not

necessarily all of them on every level). Secondly the list of variables is not exhaustive, but these variables are the most central ones. Thirdly the connections between and the relative weight of the variables on each level and across the three levels is an empirical question. It cannot be analytically resolved. To try to specify these connections would mean to narrow the theory for just one case study. Since the aim is here to develop a general theoretical approach to political identity building it would be counterintuitive to do this. Each variable will now be discussed individually.

IV.I. Significator: 'Sense of Ethnicity': 'Who are we?'

Although it is widely agreed that a sense of ethnic identity is one of the key concepts in the process of political identity building, there is no agreed definition of the term 'ethnicity'. "The sense of a common ethnicity has remained to this day a major focus of identification by individuals"[303]. There is also wide agreement in the literature that "ethnicity has something to do with the *classification of people* and *group relationships*"[304]. One tentative definition is that of Manning Nash. Ethnicity here is defined as a regulator of group boundaries. These boundaries are maintained by cultural markers of difference in order to define who is a member and who is not. The differences among groups are index features which must be easily seen, grasped, understood, and reacted to in social situations. These index markers implicate or summarise less visible, less socially apparent aspects of the group. Ethnicity is therefore defined by these boundary mechanisms. These include cultural markers such as presumed kinship, commensality (eating together), and common cult and surface pointers. "Surface pointers include dress, language, and (culturally denoted)

[303] Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith. "Introduction" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 3.

physical features"[305]. The historical dimension of ethnicity is grasped in the concept of 'tradition'. "Tradition is the past of a culture, as that past is thought to have continuity, a present, and a future"[306]. This tentative definition by Nash is somewhat incomplete. It does not account for the sources, the persistence and the resurgence of ethnicity. It is at this point that the debates in the literature on the concept start. There are two major approaches to the concept of ethnicity: 'primordialists' and 'instrumentalists'.

The 'primordialists' consider "ethnicity as stemming from a given division of human beings into ethnic groups in nature and therefore beyond human control: the identity comprising what a person is born with"[307]. In the words of Walker Connor, ethnic ties are assumed to be beyond reason.[308] One of the most prominent 'primordialists' is Clifford Geertz. He argues that the sense of ethnicity is based on primordial attachments. By these attachments Geertz is refering to assumed 'givens' of social existence:

> *"immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves"*[309].

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[304] Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. *"Ethnicity and Nationalism"* (London: Pluto Press, 1993): p. 4.
[305] Nash, Manning. *"The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World"* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1989): p. 12.
[306] Ibid: p. 14.
[307] Davies, Richard. "Ethnicity: Inside Out or Outside In?" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) *"Identities in International Relations"* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 81.
[308] Connor, Walker. "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 69.
[309] Geertz Clifford. "Primordial Ties" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 42.

Steven Crosby develops this concept further. He argues that from birth a human being does not only belong to his or her immediate family but also to the wider collective. The infant develops into a person by taking part in the objectified, past and current achievements of the collective. He or she participates in the culture.

> *"The individual participates in these given, a priory bounded patterns. The patterns are the legacy of history; they are tradition. Many traditions, too, are constituted by cognitive beliefs focused on primordial objects. Ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location"*[310].

Van den Berghe adds another aspect to 'primordialism'. He argues that the boundaries of an ethnic group are maintained by biologically programmed nepotism. "Consciously or unconsciously we must be able to discriminate according to degree of biological relationship to ourselves, if our beneficence to others is to increase our inclusive fitness"[311]. This recognition is achieved by physical and cultural markers. Physical markers include similarities in physical appearance (skin pigmentation, physical stature for example), cultural markers include dress and language. These historical and biological bonds are translated into an actors 'being', 'knowing' and 'doing'. As Fishman points out, ethnicity is intuitively defined and experienced as part of an actor's 'being'. "Ethnicity is partly experienced as being 'bone of their bone, flesh of their flesh, and blood of their blood'"[312]. The aspect of ethnic 'doing' is directly related to the ethnic 'being'. "The physical heritage of ethnicity creates expressive obligations and opportunities for behaving as the ancestors behaved and

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[310] Grosby, Steven. "The Inexpungable Tie of Primordiality" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 55.
[311] Van den Berghe, Pierre. "Does Race Matter?" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 57.

preserving their great heritage by transmitting it to generation after generation"[313]. This ethnic 'doing' is expressed, among other mediums, through songs, chants, sayings, prayers, innvocations, formulas, rites, jokes, and riddles. Ethnic 'knowing' is the conviction that the 'doing' is authentic. "Ethnicity is a *Weltanschauung* that helps to explain origins, clarify eternal questions, rationalize human destiny, and purports to offer an entre to universal truths"[314].

Primordialists see ethnicity as a phenomenon determined by forces beyond reason and human control, may they be biological or cultural in expression. The individual is formed and his or her behaviour guided by these forces. The 'primordialist' approach has the advantage of being able to explain the emotional power of ethnic identity as well as the persistence of the phenomenon in the face of increasing globalisation. What they are not able to explain is the disappearance of old and the emergence of new ethnicities. This aspect is highlighted by the second approach to the phenomenon, the 'instrumentalist' approach. The 'instrumentalist' approach sees ethnicity as a

> *"product of particular economic, political and social conditions. In this view, ethnicity is an adaptive identity which is determined by, or may vary with, the context in which an individual finds himself or herself and thus the attitudes which one has towards a particular set of circumstances. Ethnic identity in this case is voluntaristic rather than enforced identity"*[315].

Frederick Barth sees ethnic groups therefore as categories of ascription and identification by actors themselves. They organise interaction among people. "To the extent that actors use ethnic identities to categorize themselves and others for

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[312] Fishman, Joshua. "Ethnicity as Being, Doing, Knowing" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 63.
[313] Ibid: p. 65.
[314] Ibid: p. 66.
[315] Davis *op. cit.*: p. 82.

purpose of interaction, they form ethnic groups in this organizational sense"[316]. The organisation into ethnic groups is done by social and cultural markers. However these markers are only significant if the actors perceive them to be significant. These markers are things such as dress, language, houseform or more general life style. They are also basic value orientations, like the standards of morality. These markers define the boundary of an ethnic group. Ethnic groups need organisational requirements in order to emerge and to become significant. "The organizational requirements are clearly, first, a categorization of population sectors in exclusive and imperative status categories, and second, an acceptance of the principle that standards applied to one such category can be different from that applied to another"[317]. If these requirements are not given or disappear (through intermariage for example) the ethnic group does not emerge or disappears respectively.

Abner Cohen and Paul R. Brass argue that the boundaries of ethnic groups are neither given nor emerge by themselves but are political phenomena and outcomes of elite competition. For Cohen "ethnicity is essentially a political phenomenon, as traditional customs are used only as idioms, and as mechanisms for political alignment"[318]. Paul R. Brass argues that ethnic groups, so far as they are subjectively self-conscious, should be called ethnic communities. These are created by elites and are used in their competition for political power. "Ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular elites in modernizing and in postindustrial societies undergoing dramatic social change. This process invariably involves competition and conflict for political power, economic benefits, and social status between competing

[316] Barth, Frederik. "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 78.
[317] Ibid: p. 81.
[318] Cohen, Abner. "Ethnicity and Politics" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 84.

elite, class, and leadership groups both within and among different ethnic categories"[319].

Daniel Bell tries to explain the saliency of ethnic identity in a modernising world. For him the revival of ethnic ties is not simply the result of the plural nature of most societies world-wide (which nurtures a need for identification with a subgroup within the state), but stems from the fact that ethnicity combines affection with material interest. "Those social units are most highly effective, clearly, which can combine symbolic and instrumental purposes. In the political history of our times, it is clear that 'class' and 'ethnicity' have been two such dominant modes of coherent group feeling and action"[320]. Since 'class' does not seem to carry any strong affective tie any more ("the union has focused on the job, and little more"[321]), ethnicity has gained on importance as a way of group identification.

The 'instrumentalist' approaches presented here pay attention to the changing character of ethnic identification. They see ethnic identity as a voluntaristic approach in which the individual actor has a choice. In addition to this they point to the political aspects of ethnic identity. This identification can serve as a political force either within the state or across state boundaries. Ethnic groups can be elite led and be used as a tool in the struggle for political power and economic benefits. However while the 'primordialist' approaches are too static as far as the group dynamics of ethnicity are concerned, the 'instrumentalist' approaches don't pay enough attention to the durability of ethnic identification. They neglect the emotional ties that are involved in the process.

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[319] Brass, Paul R. "Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 89.
[320] Bell, Daniel. "Ethnicity as Social Change" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p.142.
[321] Ibid: p. 143.

The approach of Anthony D. Smith tries to offer an alternative approach to the 'primordialist'-'instrumentalist' debate. His conceptualisation of ethnicity sees the two approaches as extremes and instead stresses the historical and symbolic-cultural attributes of ethnic identity.[322] An ethnic community therefore has six main attributes:

> *"1. a collective proper name*
>
> *2. a myth of common ancestry*
>
> *3. shared historical memories*
>
> *4. one or more differentiating elements of common culture*
>
> *5 an association with specific 'homeland'*
>
> *6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population"*[323]

An ethnic community does not have to possess all six of these attributes. However the more it possesses these attributes and the more attributes of these it possesses, the closer it approximates the ideal type of an ethnic community or ethnie. This approach shows that ethnicity is neither fully 'instrumental' nor is it fully 'primordial'. "All of this suggests that the ethnie is anything but primordial [...] As the subjective significance of each of these attributes waxes and wanes for the members of a community, so does the cohesion and self awareness of that communities membership"[324]. An ethnic community, according to Smith, is formed by either amalgamation of smaller units or by a subdivision of a larger unit.[325] It is this approach to ethnicity that will be used in this study. It will become clear during the case study that the ethnic element is strong in Israeli and in Palestinian society. All five points of Smith's definition are existing in Israeli and Palestinian political

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[322] Smith (1991) *op. cit.* distinguishes between 'ethnic category' which is a group which is perceived by outsiders as such but has only marginal self-awareness and 'ethnic community' or 'ethnie' which is a group that is distinguishable by objective criteria and is subjectively conscious of its distinctiveness.
[323] Ibid: p. 21.
[324] Ibid: p. 23.

identities. However it will equally become clear that the importance of the ethnic element varies among the different groups in each society.

As can be seen in Smith's approach (point 5 above), territoriality still has importance for the process of political identity building. It is to this significator that we turn now.

IV.II. Significator: 'Sense of Territoriality': 'Where do we belong?'

The significator of territoriality is another important issue of political identity building, as it was argued during the discussion of Smith's notion of ethnicity above. One can argue that if a political identity is oriented towards a specific group or a specific society (in difference to an orientation towards the whole of humanity, as it is the case with Marxist political identities for example), it has to take the specific territory in which this group or society lives into account. It has to be spatially oriented. In the first chapter it was shown that, even under the emerging conditions of globalisation, territoriality still holds an important position in political identity building. This has several reasons. First of all, as Deudney shows, there is evidence of the continuing spatial orientation of political identity. "Evidence for topophilia in modern national identity can be found in the symbolic content of various mottos, anthems, monuments, and literary works."[326] In addition, William E. Connolly shows territoriality to be one of the basic building blocks for democracy.[327] Furthermore, it has been argued in the first chapter that the emerging conditions of globalisation are

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[325] See: Ibid: p. 24.
[326] Deudney, Daniel. "Ground Identity: Nature, Place in Nationalism" in Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds) "*The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*" (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996): p. 132.
[327] Connolly, William E "Democracy and Territoriality" *Millenium. Journal of International Studies.* 20, 3 1991: pp. 463-484.

not equally forceful in all parts of the globe. In regions in which the conditions of globalisation have not yet reached their full potential, or in which these changes are just emerging, territory remains a significant aspect of political identity. It is especially important in cases in which the perceived political identity of a group clashes with the territorial boundaries in which it lives, as it is the case with minorities or refugee communities (irredentism). Here, having a state, obtaining a state, or returning to a state is of the highest significance for political identity. In addition, territory can be an important variable in political identities that take religion as their central element. Here, territory can be seen as a sacred space that is necessary for the concrete realisation of religious beliefs.[328] During the analysis of Israeli and Palestinian society this factor will become clear. Jewish radical religious identity and fundamentalist Islamic identity see territory as sacred. For the former, Jewish settlement redeems the land and thereby furthers the coming of the Messiah, for the latter, the land is a sacred religious endowment to the believers (*waqf).* Finally, when territory is contested, political identity necessarily centres around the question of territory. This is the case in the two societies analysed in this study. It has been pointed out in the first chapter that the concept of having a state is central to the political identities in both Israeli and Palestinian societies. It was argued (and we will see this in the analysis in the empirical part of the study) that the concept of being Israeli and Palestinian is central to the political identities prevalent in both societies. However, we will also see that the concrete meaning of being Israeli and being Palestinian is now contested. Political identity groups on the substate and the supra-state level offer different conceptualisations for this problem. This situation is close to what Rosenau argues when he talks about the 'Frontier' an analytical space in

[328] See: Smith, Anthony D. "The 'Sacred' Dimension of Nationalism" in *Millenium. Journal of International Studies. Special Issue Religion and International Relations.* 29, 3 2000.

which different groups from the sub- and suprastate level compete with the state level for the allocation of authority.[329] Historic memory is another important building block of political identity.

IV.III. Significator: 'Sense of History': 'Where do we come from?'

The importance of a sense of history and the role of political myths has already been pointed out in connection with the concept of national identity. Perceived history plays a central role in the formation of political identity. As Friedman points out, "cultural realities are always produced in specific socio-historical contexts and [...] it is necessary to account for the processes that generate those contexts in order to account for the nature of both the practice of identity and the production of historical schemes."[330] The importance of foundation myths in the building of group identity is also pointed out by Farrands. The historicity of these foundation myths however "is wholly irrelevant."[331] They serve as a basis for the building of a unifying identity, therefore it is important to examine their purpose in identity formation rather than their historical correctness. Dienstag points to the importance of the narrative, of the construction of a 'past' in political theory and to the direct relevance of this to personal identity. "Our sense of ourselves, at least on an individual level, is somehow tied to our pasts - to our education, family, employment, or nationality, for example"[332]. By looking at the past, so the argument goes, political theory constructs a sense of the past which then leads to expectations for the future. "It makes sense in thinking about politics and the future to think about history or the past [...] the project

[329] See: Rosenau (1997) *op. cit.*
[330] Friedman, Jonathan. "*Cultural Identity and Global Process*" (London: Sage, 1994): p. 117.
[331] Farrands (1996) *op. cit.*: p. 17.

of political theory is not so much to reform our morals as it is to reform our memories"[333].

There are two broad strategies with which political theory tries to reform the past: reconciliation and redemption. Reconciliation with the past (a strategy chosen by Hegel and Heidegger) implies the assumption that the individual is 'thrown' (the notion of 'throwness' is a Heideggerian concept[334]) into being to which his or her past is an integral part. The individual cannot choose or influence the past and has to accept it. As past, present and future are intrinsically connected it follows that the individual cannot change the future. The strategy of redemption (chosen by Locke and Nietzsche) has a different aim.

> *"Who chooses to attempt a redemption must accept an unreconciled existence, one with loose ends and sharp edges. One gives up the sense of an ending, the good feeling of narrative closure that comes with reconciliation. One gives up without guarantees for the future a sense of time that feels solid. One gives up 'freedom to reveal what is' for the unpromising freedom to remember, and imagine what is not"*[335].

The role of the narrator is central in the project to 'reform memory'. Through his or her work coherence can be given to events which they do not naturally have. The narrators "refigure, and retell the past in an attempt to discuss the present and future"[336]. Therefore their work is highly political. The 'politics of memory' as Dienstag calls it, directly relates to our sense of identity.

> *"Attempts to divorce politics from history and argue about the future as if the past were a blank slate result only in a posture of willful amnesia amidst a*

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[332] Dienstag, Joshua Foa. *"Dancing in Chains. Narrative and Memory in Political Theory"* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997): p. 2.
[333] Ibid: p. 22.
[334] See: Heidegger, Martin *"Being and Time"* (SanFrancisco: Harper, 1962).
[335] Dienstag *op. cit.*: p. 197.

community of stories. There is always the threat that history will enslave us; but if anything we increase the threat when we attempt to deny the role of narrative in politics"[337].

Smith argues along similar lines. He points to the importance of a special kind of narrative for group identity: myths of election. In the context of ethnic and group identity Smith argues that the myth of ethnic election plays a central role. "We need to pay more attention to the subjective elements in ethnic survival, such as ethnic memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions"[338]. Under 'myths of ethnic election', Smith understands the notion that a group perceives itself as historically unique and that there is a special purpose for the group to fulfil, that they are 'chosen'.

"To be chosen is to be placed under moral obligations. One is chosen on condition that one observes certain moral, ritual and legal codes, and only for as long as one continues to do so. The privilege of election is accorded only to those who are sanctified, whose life-style is an expression of sacred values. The benefits of election are reserved for those who fulfil the required observances"[339].

The myth of election is particularly salient in some more radical religious groups in both societies, Israeli and Palestinian. On the one hand, the myth of the chosen people, on the other hand the myth of Jihad in which the chosen ones fight God's war. Therefore only by paying attention to these ethnic myths can we understand the salience and power of group identities. The phenomenon of the myth of election explains how group identity is maintained even when the group is under pressure to

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[336] Ibid: p. 199.
[337] Ibid: p. 211.
[338] Smith, Anthony D. "Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15, 3 1992: p. 440.
[339] Ibid: p. 441.

assimilate or is in the diaspora for a prolonged period of time. These myths of election and the historical memory of a particular group are expressed in a language common to the group. Only those who speak the group-language can be members. These myths are also often of religious character. They relate the groups identity to the supernatural. This leads to the next two significators: language and religion which will be analysed now.

IV.IV. Significators: 'Sense of Language' and 'Sense of Religion': 'What are we?'

Language is one of the weaker significators analysed here. While the possession of a common language makes group identification easier (which follows from the premise that communication is an essential part of the process of identification), a common language is not a fundamental necessity. The role of language in the building process of political identity is shown by Suleiman.[340] Suleiman reasons that "the symbolic function of language is at least as important as its communicative role in signalling collective identity boundaries, both in terms of inclusion and exclusion."[341] Although Edwards argues that language is but one of the markers of group identity he concedes that "many have considered that the possession of a given language is well-nigh essential to the maintenance of group identity"[342]. Language per se is not enough to maintain group identity. Other elements (cultural and social markers, self consciousness as group) are necessary in order to maintain a sense of group identification among the individual members. Edwards even argues that "identities

[340] Suleiman, Yasir. "*Language and Identity in the Middle East and North Africa*" (Richmond Surrey: Curzon, 1996).
[341] Ibid: p. 1.
[342] Edwards, John. "*Language, Society and Identity*" (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985): p. 3.

can and do survive the loss of the original language"[343]. Language is a symbolic marker of group boundaries which can be used by groups in the struggle for political power.

> *"With regard to language the point is that while, ordinarily, communicative and symbolic facets co-exist, they are separable. Among mainstream populations the language of daily use is usually also the variety which carries and reflects group culture and tradition. Among minority groups or within groups in which language shift has occured in the reasonably recent past, the value of language as a symbol can remain in the absence of the communicative function"*[344].

One example of this process is the attachment to Gaelic in the definition of Irishness although the language is no longer widely spoken. Horowitz demonstrates the political use of language as a symbol. Language can be used as a symbol of domination in the struggle for political influence and legitimacy.

> *"For groups uncertain about their worth the glorification of the language is also intended to reflect a revised or aspirational evaluation. The status of language is a symbol of newfound group dignity. Claims for official status for a language are typically demands for an authoritative indication 'that some people have a legitimate claim to greater respect, importance, or worth in the society than have some others'"*[345].

Language is, Horowitz argues, an important symbolic issue. It links political claims to ownership with psychological demands for group affirmation. In addition to this, it ties this "aggregate matter of group status to outright careerism, thereby binding elite

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[343] Ibid: p. 159.
[344] Edwards, John. "Symbolic Ethnicity and Language" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 226.
[345] Horowitz, Donald. "Symbolic Politics and Ethnic States" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 288.

material interests to mass concerns"[346]. Language is often then an issue not because of the special importance of lingusitic differences but because in a multilingual state there has be to a decision which language (or languages) is the official one. This choice directly translates then into career opportunities or barriers for group elites. "Policy choices have consequences, not just for careers of members of one or another ethnic group, but for social-class mobility, for bureaucratic effectiveness, and for international contact"[347]. Balibar follows Horowitz in this respect. Language, so argues Balibar, is used to erect and maintain group boundaries. In a state this is done through the schooling process. Education is used to give the language a sense of naturalness (expressed in the expression 'mother tongue'). In turn this gives the group a certain claim to be based on 'natural' criteria'.

> *"All linguistic practices feed into a single 'love of the language' which is addressed not to the textbook norm nor to particular usage, but to the 'mother tongue' - that is to the ideal of a common origin projected back beyond learning process and specialist forms of usage and which, by that very fact, becomes the metaphor for the love fellow nationals feel for one another"*[348].

The linguistic construction of identity is, according to Balibar, by definition open. Although no individual chooses a certain language as his or her mother tongue, there is always the possibility to learn other languages and to turn oneself into a different bearer of discourse and of the transformations of language. The linguistic community immediately naturalises new acquisitions. "It does so *too quickly* in a sense. It is a collective memory which perpetuates itself at the cost of an individual forgetting of 'origins'. The 'second generation' immigrant inhabits the national language (and

[346] Ibid: p. 289f.
[347] Ibid: p. 290.

through it the nation itself) in a manner as spontaneous, as 'hereditary' and as imperious [...] as the son of [the] heaths"[349]. The language community exists in the present. It produces the feeling that it always existed, but it does not lay down a destiny for successive generations. "Ideally it 'assimilates' anyone and holds no one. Finally it affects all individuals in their innermost being (in the way in which they constitute themselves as subjects), but its historical particularity is bound only to interchangeable institutions"[350]. Language also plays an important part in the next significator which will be analysed: religion. Sacred texts are usually written in a sacred language which by virtue of mostly being a 'dead' language does not only constitute group boundaries between groups but also boundaries between elites and masses within a particular group. In the case study it will become clear that language is a weak element in the political identities present in Israeli and Palestinian society. However language is not an element that can be neglected. This can be seen in the fact that the Zionist movement created a new common language,(*Ivrit*) for the state of Israel. The important integrative force of language can also be seen in the fact that the Russian immigrants to Israeli in the early 1990s who did not by and large learn *Ivrit* remain in isolation from the wider Israeli society.

It is a common place that religion is an important aspect of the process of political identity building. Although this somewhat sweeping assumption must be qualified in regard to the geographical region of which one is talking, there is evidence that religion is assuming a more political role even in highly secularised societies. Jeff Haynes shows that religious groups generally assume a higher political profile than they did two decades ago. "Religious organizations of various kinds seem openly to be rejecting the secular ideals dominating national policies, appearing

[348] Balibar, Étienne. "Fictive Ethnicity and Ideal Nation" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 166.

as champions of alternative, confessional options. In keeping faith with what they interpret as divine decree, increasingly they refuse to render to non-religious power either material or moral tribute"[351]. He argues that religion is refusing to accept the private space it is assigned under the process of secularisation. There are important differences between the West and the Third World, so the argument goes, but the overall trend is towards a more visual role by religious groups in the political arena. He explains this phenomenon with a twofold argument: firstly under emerging conditions of globalisation which increase disorientation, uncertainty, and growing alienation, religion offers a stable base for personal and group identity. Secondly the ongoing process of secularisation pushes religion into the private realm. The strategy of religious groups is therefore to mount a cultural defence by pushing into the political realm. "Many religious communities have survived and flourished to the extent that they have *not* tried to adapt themselves to the perceived requirements of an increasingly secularized world"[352]. This process can be observed in Israeli as well as Palestinian society. On both sides religious groups have gained substantially in influence in the last three decades.

In order to analyse the political role of religious groups, Haynes offers a very useful definition of the concept of 'religion'. It is either 1) a system of beliefs and practices related to an ultimate being, beings or the supernatural or 2) that which is sacred in a society, that is ultimate beliefs and practices which are inviolate. It can be approached a) from a perspective of a body of ideas and outlooks (theology, ethical code) b) as a social group (religious groups and movements).[353] For the issue of political identity building 2) and b) are of particular importance. "It is necessary to

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[349] Ibid: p. 166f.
[350] Ibid: p. 167.
[351] Haynes, Jeff. *"Religion in Global Politics"* (London: Longman, 1998): p. 1.
[352] Ibid: p. 220.
[353] See: ibid: p. 4.

distinguish between religion at the individual and group levels: only the latter is normally of political importance"[354]. To highlight the different importance and role of religion in different states, Haynes devised five categories of states: 1) 'Confessional states' (ecclesiastical authority preeminent over secular power): Iran, Saudi Arabia for example, 2) 'Generally Religious States' (guided by religious beliefs in general, civic religion is important, but not tied to any specific religious tradition): USA, Indonesia for example, 3) 'Officially Established States' (are also highly secular): England, Denmark, 4) 'Liberal Secular States' (notion of secular power holding sway over religion): Netherlands, Turkey for example, 5) 'Marxist Secular States' (religion only permitted to exist as a private matter): China, North Korea.[355] Neither Israeli and Palestinian society fit the models closely. They present a mixture between the 'officially established states' and the 'confessional states' categories. However, in both societies strong tendencies work to move society closer to the 'confessional states' category.

Cynthia Enloe highlights the direct connection between religion and group identity. She points to the importance of religion for stability of group boundaries. She introduces four distinctions for religious practices: 1) the extent to which supra-empirical authorities are explicitly and coherently defined, 2) the difference in organisational structures used to implement clerical authority and the extent of hierarchy and integration in those organisations, 3) the extent of taboos determining dress, diet and other behaviours, 4) the approach to evangelical proselytizing.

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[354] Ibid: p. 5.

[355] See: ibid: p. 10f. Haynes does not mention Israel or the Palestinian controlled eras in this distinction. For the purpose of the empirical study attempted here I would argue that they would fall as far as their official state structure is concerned in category 3 ('Officially Established Faiths). However both have strong substate groups which aim to transform the state to category 1 ('Confessional States'). This makes the concept of religion one of the central categories of political identity building inside and between the two societies.

"The kind of religion - along these lines of distinction - as part of an ethnic group's communal package will determine how porous the ethnic boundaries are [...] The most tense interethnic relationship occurs when two ethnic groups confess different religions, each religion is theologically and organizationally elaborate and explicit, and when those religions have generated taboos operative in the routine aspects of life, for instance diet. The intensity is increased when each religion has a tradition of evangelism"[356].

Religion can play a major role in the process of identity building since it offers a clear mechanism for inside/outside divisions. That religion can be one (but not the only) factor in political conflicts is also clearly shown by Fox. However one has to be careful not to overestimate the conflict potential of religion.[357] He explains that "ethno-religious conflicts are different from other ethnic conflicts [...] religion does play a role in some ethno-religious conflicts but [the] role is not as common as one would believe given anecdotal evidence taken from current events."[358]

The last significator analysed is the concept of 'gender'. This significator is of special importance since it can cross cut not only all three levels of political identity building as the other five significators can but also cross cuts each of the five significators analysed so far. Gender differences can be found in relationship to the sense of ethnicity, the sense of territoriality, the sense of history , the importance of languange and most obviously the importance of religion.

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[356] Enloe, Cynthia. "Religion and Ethnicity" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 196.
[357] See: Fox, Jonathan. *"The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A large-N Study"* Paper Presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association. Toronto 1997.
[358] Ibid: p. 1.

IV.V. Significator: 'Gender': 'What is our Position in the Community?'

Gender is another central aspect of personal but also of political identity. Jill Krause summarises this point eloquently.

> *"Gender is one of the most obvious facets of our personal identity. It is clear that in an important sense our view of ourselves, how we relate to others and how we understand our world and our place in it are all coloured by our perception of ourselves and others as gendered individuals"*[359].

Krause argues that while 'gender' is a social construct, ideas about it are so pervasive and powerful that they seem to be 'natural'. Because one's self-awareness as a gendered individual is connected with various social institutions which tie gender into patterns of domination it is also a highly political concept. As Jill Steans argues "Feminist scholarship has shown that gender plays a role in both the construction of national identity and in defining 'woman's place' within the national order"[360]. Jacqui True shows how the institution of marriage ties in to the domination of women by the state. The state has the monopoly over legitimate force, so marriage has a monopoly on legitimate reproduction and property inheritance and acts as a 'protection racket'. Women seek protection from the violence of other men and economic insecurity (because the international division of labour devalues their work) through marriage.[361]

Challenges to this pattern of domination are exceptional and only possible if the basis for the structural domination is not yet established or challenged. One such

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[359] Krause, Jill. "Gendered Identities in International Relations" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) *"Identities in International Relations"* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 106.
[360] Steans, Jill. *"Gender and International Relations. An Introduction"* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998): p. 69.
[361] See: True, Jacqui. "Feminism" in Burchill, Scott, Andrew Linklater et. al. *"Theories of International Relations"* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 235.

case is the struggle for national liberation. Especially during the mobilisation for national liberation spaces for a challenge to the dominant gender relations are opened up. "However, at the same time, it demonstrates how the existing power relations limit the possibilities for long-lasting change"[362]. Cynthia Enloe follows this characterisation of the role of 'gender' as a concept in nationalist struggles. Using colonial postcards and Hollywood movies as some of her sources, Enloe traces the masculinity within nationalist movements. "Nationalist movements have rarely taken women's experience as a starting point [...] Rather nationalism typically has sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope."[363] Five basic assumptions are connected with women: 1) they are seen as the nation's most valuable possessions, 2) the principal vehicles for a cross generational transmission of the whole nation's value system, 3) the bearers of future generations, 4) being the most vulnerable to defilement and exploitation by oppressive alien rulers 5) being most susceptible to assimilation and co-operation by insidious outsiders.[364] But it is not only the role of women that is important here. Elshtain points to how the concept of 'feminity' is used in the construction of national sovereignty and identification:

> *"The sovereign may bear a masculinized face but the nation itself is feminized, a mother, a sweetheart, a lover. One can rightly speak [...] of 'political love' a love that retains the fraternal dimensions of medieval caritas but incorporates as well a maternalized loyalty symbolized domestically: the nation is home and home is mother"*[365].

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[362] Enloe, Cynthia. "*Bananas, Beaches and Bases. Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*" (Berkley: University of California Press, 1989): p. 70.
[363] Ibid: p. 44.
[364] See ibid: p. 54.
[365] Elshtain, Jean Bethke. "Sovereignty, Identity Sacrifice" in Peterson, Spike V. (ed) *"Gendered States Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory"* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992): p. 149.

The politicisation women experience during a nationalist movement can also have the effect that they become aware of their political role as women. As Enloe explains, women who are active within national movements (South Africa, Ireland, Afghanistan) try to analyse how their 'home' and the international sphere are interconnected. The movement as a whole often includes women's concerns in their programmes and entices their participation in the struggle by promising later benefits. But when independence is finally reached, as Margot Light and Fred Halliday mention, "they have rarely kept their promises to make fulfillment of women's needs a priority."[366] The subordinate role of women is maintained or even increased. Here, Palestinian society can serve as a good example. Although women were active in the struggle against Israel, especially during the first intifada, they were pushed back to the political margins shortly after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).[367] In conclusion, Enloe argues that nationalist movements which shaped the face of the international sphere in the last two centuries (starting with the French Revolution) have been patriarchal movements, which generally did not change the placement of women in their societies. Deniz Kandiyoti also argues that the state as a social construct is "itself a direct expression of men's interests"[368]. Kandiyoti shows the double side of the nationalist discourse. On the one hand, it presents itself as a modern project "that melts and transforms traditional attachments in favour of new identities and as a reaffirmation of authentic cultural values culled from the depth of a presumed communal past"[369]. This has a direct influence on

[366] Light, Margot and Fred Halliday. "Gender and International Relations" in Groom, A. J. R. and Margot Light (eds) "*Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*" (London: Pinter, 1994): p. 48.
[367] Another interesting aspect is the different role refugee camps play for men and women. As Enloe explains, refugee camps are for young men staging areas for guerrilla campaigns, for women refugee camps in Pakistan meant an even stricter seclusion. The men believed, that "the risk was greater that their women would be seen by men outside the safe boundaries of the family." Enloe *op. cit.*: p. 57.
[368] Kandiyoti, Deniz. "Identity and its Discontents: Women and the Nation" in *Millenium. Journal of International Studies.* 20, 3 1991: p. 429.
[369] Ibid: p. 431.

gender relations. Yet, "ironically, the very structures defined as backward, feudal or patriarchal by the modernising state are the ones that get redefined as ethnic markers or as symbols of 'national' identity, especially if they are forcibly obliterated by an authoritarian statist project"[370].

The underlying reason for the reassertion of women's traditional roles is the equation of women with nature. This is argued by Runyan: "it is women's long association with nature in Western political discourse that has given them a 'privileged' position in the construction of not only the political, but also the patriarchal authority of the state"[371]. This has direct and deep consequences for the political discourse. Zalewski and Enloe, while discussing the professional identities of American defence intellectuals which they call 'strategic identities' show how the assumptions of weakness and unprofessionalism connected with the concept of 'femininity' regulate discourse. "Gender and specifically that which is identified as belonging to femininity acts as pre-emptive deterrent to certain modes of thought, action and speech. If the constructions of strategic identity has the power to inhibit what can be said and thought [...] it is indeed a powerful tool with potentially very damaging consequences"[372]. Gender as a concept is not only relevant for the subnational or state level. As Peterson shows, gender has to be taken into account in the discussion of globalisation. She argues that gender has to be treated as a central variable if one wants to understand globalisation. "Ungendered identities, epistemologies, states and markets are not to be found and we do well to take

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[370] Kandiyoti, Deniz. "Women, Ethnicity, and Nationalism" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *"Ethnicity"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 314.
[371] Runyan, Anne Sisson. "The 'State' of Nature: A Garden Unfit for Women and Other Living Things" in Peterson, Spike V. (ed) *"Gendered States Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory"* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992): p. 123.
[372] Zalewski, Marysia and Cynthia Enloe. "Questions about Identity in International Relations" in Booth, Ken and Steve Smith (eds) *"International Relations Theory Today"* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995): p. 291.

seriously how feminists integrate conceptual and contextual critiques of naturalized dichotomies"[373].

It has been argued in this analysis that 'gender' is one of the central variables of political identity building. It has shown how assumptions about gender roles, especially the role of woman and 'femininity' influence identity building on the substate, the state and the supra-state level. It has been argued that the structural domination of women cannot be easily reversed since its social construction has become so pervasive and powerful that it is treated as 'naturalised' by the actors. Both Palestinian and Israeli societies remain highly gendered. The hierarchical division between men and woman is seen as natural.

The above discussion has highlighted the centrality of the six significators chosen for this study. They represent central issues along which individuals and groups on all three levels of political identity building orient themselves. Ethnicity is certainly the most difficult one to define. The reason for this is that the literature on this phenomenon is both extensive and contradictory. It has been shown that the 'primordial' approaches neglect the possibility of change of ethnic groups while the 'instrumentalist' argumentation does not pay enough attention to the emotional bonds that ethnic groups generate and the persistence they show (in some cases over centuries) The approach of Anthony D. Smith was presented as a way of finding a middle ground between the two extremes.

A sense of territoriality is the second important variable of political identity building. Here it was argued that territoriality still plays an important role in political identity building even under emerging conditions of globalisation. Political identity,

[373] Peterson, Spike V. "Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context of Globalisation(s)" in Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) *"Globalization. Theory and*

if it is oriented towards a specific group or society, has to conceptualise the territory in which this group lives. In cases where territory is contested between two communities, political identity has to have a concept of territoriality as a central variable. Furthermore, radical religious identities can see territory as sacred, as the basis for the concrete fulfilment of their religious beliefs.

The importance of a sense of history, of memory and myths for political identity building has already been pointed out in the first chapter of the thesis. Here it was shown that on the one hand narrative memory is central to political theory and from there translates directly into political identity. On the other hand myths of election are an important factor in the formation and maintenance of group boundaries.

Language and religion directly relate to the sense of history. Although language is a weaker significator, it is still an important social marker of group identity. However because of its openness it cannot by itself guarantee the persistence of group boundaries over time. The observation that religion is an important aspect of personal and group identity is somewhat of a common place argument. However Haynes' study showed that religion assumes a more political role even in highly secularised societies in recent decades. Enloe showed the importance of religion for group cohesion and group conflict.

It has been shown that gender roles and assumptions about 'femininity' are used to establish and maintain structural domination over woman on all three levels. It has been argued that these power structures are nearly impossible to change unless the underlying structural causes of the domination (equation of 'femininity' with 'nature' and the need for control) are either not yet firmly established or seriously challenged (as during the struggle for national liberation).

Practice" (London: Cassel, 1998): p. 22.

The aim of this first part of the thesis was to present a general theoretical approach to the problem of political identity building in international relations under emerging conditions of globalisation. Globalisation has been defined as conditions of increasing interconnectedness through global information systems, increasing penetration of state boundaries by international capital, and multinational corporations, and as the transformation of traditional authority structures (which are no longer automatically allocated on the state level). The focus was here on *political* identity. Political identity has been defined as those ideas, convictions, and identifications of actors (individuals and groups) which translate directly into political action.

The theoretical approach presented here tried to combine modern and postmodern approaches to the problem of political identity building. It has been argued that neither of the two paradigms offers a satisfying answer. The modern approaches are inherently limited. They only allow one level on which meaningful political identity building can be located: the state level. The importance of 'national identity' is overriding any other expression of political identity on any level of social interaction. This assumption is based on three major concepts: the modern concept of territoriality, the modern concept of sovereignty, and the modern concept of the state. The modern assumptions about political identity are based on an exclusivistic conception of territoriality. The state, so it is assumed, has complete and exclusive control over its territory. This control is manifested and embedded in an exclusivistic conception of sovereignty. The assumption is that a state is always sovereign on the inside (monopoly of legitimate power) and on the outside (mutual recognition of sovereignty by all states). Because of this a special political community, the 'nation' which is in most cases tightly connected with the state apparatus (hence the concept of the 'nation-state') can develop. This community demands a monopoly over

legitimate political identity. These assumptions present the problem of political identity in a very limited manner. Only one possible level of social interaction can be taken into account. In addition to this the basic assumptions of this approach no longer hold under the emerging conditions of globalisation. States no longer have exclusive control over their territory. Because of this it no longer makes sense to allocate political identity exclusively on the state level.

The postmodern approaches presented here acknowledge these transformations. However they assume a radical fluidity in international relations which is highly problematic in two respects. On the one hand the assumptions about the radical transformation of the international system can not be assumed to be an even global phenomenon. On the other hand if one would accept the assumptions of the postmodern approaches about the end of the state and the radical fluidity of social relationships one would end up with the conclusion that the concept of 'political identity' is no longer useful. Identity would have to be seen as a fluid ever changing social concept. It would therefore not be possible to use such a concept as the basis for an empirical study.

A combination of the modern and postmodern assumptions about political identity was attempted. This new approach was based on Rosenau's concept of the 'Frontier' and 'Fragmegration' as well as Wendt's 'Structurationism' and his solution to the agent-structure problematique. It was argued that effects of the emerging conditions of globalisation for the problem of political identity building can be best understood if one assumes a three level model of political identity building. Three levels have been identified: the substate (individual/group) level, the state level and the supra-state level. Each of the three levels has been analysed separately with respect to the problem of political identity building. It has been shown that on the substate (individual/group) level the process of political identity building is an

individual phenomenon. The actor identifies him- or herself in difference to others in the process of social interaction. On the state level, political identity building is an elite led and controlled phenomenon. It has become obvious that the state level is still an important location of political identity. This is in contrast to the postmodern approaches which assume that the state level has completely lost its significance. However it is no longer of overriding importance as the modern approaches assume. The third level analysed was the supra-state level. Here it was pointed out that this level is becoming increasingly important with the development of the phenomenon of globalisation. The actors on the third level are no longer just nation-states. There are a whole range of locations for political identity: multilateral organisations, multinational corporations, NGOs, and diasporas. It was pointed out that political identity on the supra-state level does not necessarily have to express itself as a globally oriented political identity (as it is the case in the feminist or the environmentalist movement). Political identity on this level can also express itself in a political identity of a diaspora group that tries to influence the politics of their 'homeland'. On this level, the process of political identity formation was assumed to be a mixture of the two mechanisms of the first two levels. Political identity formation can be individualistic or elite led depending on the location in which political identity building is observed.

After the discussion of the ontological breadth of political identity building, the emphasis changed to the problem of the ontological depth. In order to analyse this problem six significators have been discussed. These six significators answer six main ontological questions: 'sense of ethnicity' (who are we?), 'sense of territoriality' (where do we belong?), 'sense of history' (where do we come from), 'sense of language', 'sense of religion' (what are we?), and 'gender' (what is our position in the community?). It was argued that the list of variables was not intended

to be exhaustive, but it was shown that the six significators are the most important variables and can serve as a guideline for the analysis in the case study. It was argued that these six significators have explanatory power on all three levels of political identity building, although not necessarily all variables on all levels at the same time. An analysis of the question of the interconnections between and the relative weight of the variables on and between the different levels was not attempted. It was argued that this is an empirical question and cannot be analytically resolved. If one would attempt to describe these structures one would limit the theoretical approach to just one particular case study. Since the aim was to develop a general approach, which could be used in different cases, this question had to be left open. The different importance of the significators and their connections and relationship to each other will become clear during the case study.

In this first part of the thesis a multilevel model of political identity formation in international relations under the emerging conditions of globalisation has been developed. This theory combines the insights of modern and postmodern approaches to political identity building and pays attention to the ontological breadth and depth of political identity. It identifies the locations in which political identity formations can be observed and presents six major significators which can guide the analysis.

The Peace Process and the Quest for Jewish / Israeli Political Identity

The question of Jewish / Israeli identity has become of new importance since the start of the Oslo Process. The possibility of a peaceful resolution of the long standing conflict between the two societies opened up a debate not only on the nature of the state of Israel but also on the relevance of the traditional Zionist ideology and by extension on the nature of Jewish / Israeli political identity. Several different identity groups are now challenging the traditional Zionist basis of Israeli identity and are competing for recognition of their notion of Jewish / Israeli political identity. This development did not appear over night but is the result of debates and conflicts within the Israeli society that started with the Yishuv and the debates surrounding the formulation of Zionism as a coherent political and social ideology.

This chapter will outline the historical development of Israeli society and the impact of the Oslo process on Jewish / Israeli identity. An in-depth analysis of the different identity groups will be postponed to the last chapter of the thesis. The main emphasis in this part of the thesis will be to analyse how the Zionist ideology served as a unifying force in Israeli society during the decades of conflict and which political circumstances enabled the change towards a possible peaceful solution of the dispute. The chapter has two main parts. The first part of the chapter analyses the development of the Jewish and Israeli polity from the 19th century until the recent government of Prime Minister Barak. The second part of the chapter examines the five main issues that result from the negotiations of the peace process: the question of territory, the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the problem of external

and domestic security of Israel, the role of religion in the state, and the resulting quests for a new and different Jewish / Israeli identity. These issues strike at the core of Jewish / Israeli identity building. The Oslo process which newly opened up the debate about Jewish / Israeli identity is the result of long historical and political developments inside Israeli society which enabled this historic breakthrough. Without an understanding of these developments the current identity debate in Israel cannot be fully understood.

I. Historical Development of Israeli Political Identity: From Labor Zionism to 'Normalisation'?

I.I. From Zionism to the Yishuv

The idea of a physical in addition to a spiritual return of the Jews to Palestine developed in Eastern Europe in the Middle of the nineteenth-century. This was due to the situation of Jewish communities within the czarist empire, which responded to the threat from Western reforms during and following the period of the Enlightenment and the Napoleonic era by "imposing new restrictions and intensifying the fight against subversive liberal ideologies. The Jews became the chief victims, as fresh restrictions were imposed on Jewish movement, places of residence, and employment"[374]. As a response to these persecutions new Jewish movements emerged, propagating the idea of a Jewish nationalism.

These movements established the first modern Jewish settlements in Palestine (the First Aliyah, immigration). However their numbers were small and the settlements were dependent on donations from benefactors in the diaspora. The

[374] Peretz, Don and Gideon Doron. *"The Government and Politics of Israel"* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997): p. 13f.

various different movements unified under the leadership of Theodor Herzl at the turn of the century to become the World Zionist Organisation. The Jewish Agency for Palestine was later set up to organise and finance immigration and the acquisition of land in Palestine. The World Zionist Organisation held its first congress in Basle in 1897. Herlz became the symbol of modern Zionist aspirations. His work, *'Der Judenstaat'* (1896), can be seen as the foundation of the international Zionist movement. In this short book he developed the idea that "since there was no reasonable hope for the disappearance of anti-semitism, an orderly exodus of the Jews to their own homeland and the creation there of a sovereign Jewish state, would have to be worked out in conjunction with the Great Powers"[375].

Herzl's was a top down strategy, first seeking the approval of the 'Great Powers' (notably the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers), then initiating the actual immigration. This 'political Zionism' contrasted with the bottom up approach of the Russian Zionists (practical Zionism) which argued for continuing immigration and settlement first. "The two branches competed, but competed more or less cooperatively, until 1904, when Herzl died"[376]. The year of Herzl's death also marked the start of the Second Aliyah (1904-1914). This immigration wave brought some of the future leaders of the state of Israel to Palestine. "The early labour parties and leaders came from this group, and the political institutions that the Second Aliyah founded had a great impact on the future of both the pre-state Yishuv and subsequently the State of Israel. The members of this Aliyah were more highly motivated than those of the First, being predominantly young, single, socialist

[375] Wistrich, Robert. "Theodore Herzl: Zionist Icon, Myth-Maker and Social Utopian" in Wistrich, Robert and David Ohana (eds) *"The Shaping of Israeli Identity. Myth, Memory and Trauma"* (London: Frank Cass, 1995): p. 19.
[376] Garfinkle, Adam. *"Politics and Society in Modern Israel. Myths and Realities"* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997): p. 39.

males"[377]. The members of the Second Aliyah wanted to create an exclusive Jewish economy and therefore did not employ the local Arab workers.

At the same time as the members of the Second Aliyah began to organise the Yishuv politically and economically, the Zionist World Organisation achieved a significant political success. "By the summer of 1917 the British government had begun to look to the Zionist movement as another possible ally in a war which seemed to be going badly for the Allies on all fronts"[378]. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a Russian born chemist teaching at Manchester University, was able to use his contacts with the British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour to get a commitment from the British government, the Balfour Declaration.[379] During their campaign against the Ottoman Empire, the British government gained control over Palestine just over a month after the declaration was given.[380]

Shortly after the First World War the Third Aliyah made its way to Palestine (1919-23).

> *"Much like the Second Aliyah, the Aliyah was composed mainly of young single males who were not only ideologically committed to Zionism, but also brought with them an appreciation of the importance of political organisation and control gained from their experience in Europe. They had come to Palestine to build a Jewish state, and had received political instruction in*

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[377] Lochery, Neill. *"The Israeli Labour Party. In the Shadow of the Likud"* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997): p. 4.

[378] Fraser, T. G. *"The Arab-Israeli Conflict"* (London: Macmillan Press 1995): p. 8.

[379] The wording of the declaration is as follows:
His Majesty's Government view in favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights of and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

[380] With this declaration the British government was contradicting the promises of independence that the British High Commissioner McMahon had made to the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein in 1915. The pledges were made to enlist the support of Arab tribes in the fight against the Ottoman empire. The pledges had specific geographical exclusions which Hussein assumed to be referring to parts of Syria and the later Lebanon, but the British later argued referred to Palestine.

their countries of origin to help prepare them for their role. Crucially, they accepted the leadership of the Second Aliyah, and together these two groups became known as the founding fathers of Israel"[381].

In 1920 one of the most important political organisations of the Yishuv was founded, the Histadrut (General Federation of Hebrew Labour). The Histadrut not only worked on workers' issues but also organised immigrant absorption and social services. Within a couple of years this organisation would develop into a quasi-state organisation and one of the main political instruments of the Yishuv.

Following the disturbances of 1929, when rioting broke out between the Arab and the Jewish communities in Palestine[382], the British government announced its intention to limit Jewish immigration. This was based on the recommendations of two British Commissions investigating the causes for the rioting (Hope-Simpson report). However the government had to backtrack because of strong pressure from the British Conservatives and the Zionist organisation. The Arab Revolt (1936-1939) and its aftermath brought another Commission to Palestine. This time the recommendation was partition (Peel Report) of the country into a Jewish and an Arab state. The Zionist organisation in the meantime had experienced a serious split at its Congress in 1935. Ze'ev Vladimir Jabotinsky, a political activist, along with his 'Revisionist Movement' split from the World Zionist Organisation. The split had been foreshadowed at the World Zionist Congress in 1931. "The Congress of 1931 pitted the left against the right in a bitter confrontation. Both political tendencies had by this time coalesced into structured ideological movements"[383]. Both movements also developed separate defence organisations. The Labor Zionists controlled the

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[381] Lochery *op. cit.*: p. 5.

[382] During these riots, the old Jewish community in Hebron was partly wiped out. The survivors were evacuated by the British after the riots.

[383] Shindler, Colin. *"Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream. Power, Politics and Ideology from Begin to Netanyahu"* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995): p. 9.

Haganah, the Revisionists the Irgun. This split laid the foundations for the first general cleavage in Israeli society, between left and right of the political spectrum.

In 1938 a new British policy foresaw the independence of Palestine within ten years as a unified country. In addition it limited the number of Jewish immigrants to 75, 000 which meant that the Jewish community would remain a minority in Palestine. Until 1938 the Fourth (1919-1923) and Fifth Aliyah (1933-1936) brought mainly Jews from Poland and Germany to Palestine.[384] This ended with the British policy of limited immigration. This new policy was aimed at securing Arab oil for the coming Second World War.[385] "The Holocaust intensified Jewish nationalistic fervor and galvanized most organized Jewish communities behind Zionist demands for a Jewish state in Palestine"[386]. The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the 'Jewish Revolt', a paramilitary campaign directed mainly against the Mandatory power. Its aim was to drive the British out of Palestine. Increasing clashes between the British forces and the Jewish community[387] led Britain to hand the Mandate over to the United Nations in 1946. The General Assembly adopted on the 29th of November 1947 a compromise partition solution. The country was divided between the Arab and the Jewish communities. The leadership of the Yishuv accepted the resolution but the leaders of the Arab community rejected it. The British decided to leave Palestine on May 15th 1948. The day before the official end of the British Mandate on the 14th of May 1948, the state of Israel was declared by David Ben Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and leader of the Yishuv. The first country to recognise the new state was the United States of America.

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[384] The Fifth Aliyah altered the class structure of the Yishuv. Most of the new arrivals (mainly from Germany) were physicians, engineers, musicians and other highly educated people with diverse skills.
[385] However the limitation on Jewish immigration had especially severe consequences for European Jews since it meant that the gates to Palestine as a possible refuge from the Holocaust remained closed.
[386] Peretz and Doron *op. cit.*: p. 41. The Holocaust is of central importance to Jewish and Israeli identity. It will analysed in more detail in the last chapter of the thesis.

I.II From the Declaration of the State of Israel to the Begin Government 1948 - 1977: The Dominance of Labor Zionism

"The State of Israel was declared, and its first government was established amid war and chaos on May 14th 1948. Actually, a de facto government had begun to function several months earlier in anticipation of the end of the mandate"[388]. From this time until the fall of the Labor government in 1977, Israel's politics was dominated by the ideas and ideology of Labor Zionism in various different coalitions. "The Israeli political system was, until at least 1973, a one-and-one-half party system. Israeli politics revolved around the perennial coalition between a large, governing labor party (Mapai), and the preeminent religious party (Mafdal)"[389].

However the new state immediately faced an existential crisis. Shortly after the declaration the new state was attacked not only by the militias of the Arab community in Palestine but also by the armies of a coalition of the Arab League states. At the end of the war Israel had conquered substantial amounts of land especially in the Galilee and the western part of Jerusalem. The war also resulted in the expulsion and flight of several hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs to neighbouring countries and created the refugee problem that still exists today.[390]

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[387] The most famous one is Irgun's attack on the headquarters of the mandate power, the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on the 22nd of July 1946 in which 91 people died.

[388] Peretz and Doron *op. cit.*: p. 42.

[389] Roberts, Samuel J. *"Party and Policy in Israel. The Battle Between Hawks and Doves"* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990): p. 3.

[390] How this mass exodus of Palestinian Arabs came about and if they fled on false promises of a quick victory by their leaders or if they were systematically expelled is one of the most intensely debated issues in Israeli academia. A group of Israeli academics, the 'New Historians', assert that most of the Palestinians were systematically expelled and that the 'myth' of their voluntary flight was created as a cover up. Others criticise the 'New Historians' for interpreting intentions into documents that were not there. The issue is too complicated and the debate too vast to be discussed here in detail. For the 'New Historians' see: Moris, Benny. *"The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Moris. Benny. *"1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians"* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), Finkelstein, Norman G. *"Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestinian Conflict"* (London: Verso, 1995). One fierce critic of the 'New Historians' is Efraim

Over the newly controlled areas the Israeli government imposed military law until 1966. In addition to a night-time curfew "limitations on freedom of movement were placed upon Israeli Arabs during daytime as well. A regime of licences cast a heavy shadow over their lives, inhibiting their development"[391]. The land that was left by its inhabitants during the conflict was declared state land through the 'absentee property law'. Only about 35,000 refugees were allowed back, mainly as part of family reunification programs. The rest remained stranded in the neighbouring Arab countries.

Labor Zionism developed into an ideology characterised by a combination of socialism and nationalism, termed 'mamlachtiut' (statism) by Ben Gurion.[392] This new concept, which was developed by the state elite, was used to cover up and suppress already existing cleavages within Israeli society. 'Mamlachtiut' encapsulated the overriding importance of the state in the political identity of the individual. This overriding importance did not only cover the political but also the economic realm where a state dominated economic system was implemented. This constructed consensus remained intact, though not unchallenged, until 1977. It was gradually eroded until then by increasing economic difficulties, social unrest due to the heightened political awareness of the Sephardim, and several political scandals within the Labor Zionist elite. The Histadrut remained the most important political organisation in the new state. "Since the unity of the control of the union-party-state was consolidated within months of independence, the relationship of the Israeli government to the economy and society was mediated through the Histadrut long

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Karsh, see: Karsh, Efraim. *"Fabricating Israeli History. The 'New Historians'"* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

[391] Stendel, Ori. *"The Arabs in Israel"* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996): p. 5.

[392] For a discussion how far nationalism and socialism played a role in the thinking of 'founding fathers' see: Sternhell, Zeev. *"The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

after 1948"[393]. The question of the influence of religion in the state was determined in what is called the 'status-quo agreement' between Labor Zionism and religious Zionism. This 'status-quo agreement' gives the religious courts exclusive influence on family matters and conversions to Judaism as well as determines that the state will respect the religious rules and traditions, for example religious holidays and the fact that all official buildings serve only kosher food. The religious groups were also allowed to build up their own educational system with state funds. This was the origin of the second basic cleavage in Israeli society: secular versus religious. The revisionist opposition was pushed to the margins, its military organisation included in the Haganah which transformed into the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The Knesset, originally the constitutional assembly, transformed itself into a parliament on the 14th of February when it became clear that no consensus for a constitution could be reached.[394] In 1949 the Knesset passed the Transition Law which served as a quasi constitution and has since been amended by the Basic Laws.

In 1956 Israel participated alongside Great Britain and France in the attempt to regain control of the Suez Canal which had been nationalised by the new Egyptian leader Nasser. This resulted in a short occupation of the Gaza Strip and parts of Sinai peninsular by Israel. However, after the United States and the Soviet Union forced a cease-fire, Israel had to withdraw from those territories. During the 1950s and 1960s Israel was threatened by cross border attacks, mainly by Palestinian groups. This reinforced the Israeli perception at being under constant threat.[395] This in turn led to the development of a security doctrine which favoured massive military retaliation

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[393] Garfinkel *op. cit.*: p. 84.

[394] Because of the insistence of the religious parties that *halakha*, the Jewish law be incorporated in the constitution. The basic constitutional arrangements are regulated by Basic Laws which are not officially a constitution but should serve as the basic building blocks of a future constitution.

[395] Which in turn is based on the Jewish experience in the diaspora. See: Luz, Ehud. "Through the Jewish Historical Prism: Overcoming a Tradition of Insecurity" in Bar-Tal, Daniel, Dan Jacobson and

against the country in which the Palestinian groups were based.[396] It is from this time that the question of internal security in Israeli society originates. One of the crucial wars in the history of Israel, however, was fought in 1967 (June 5th to June 10th). The Six Days War in which Israel attacked Syria, Jordan and Egypt in a pre-emptive strike lead to the occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai desert by Israel.

This war and the following occupation by Israel had wide ranging effects in Israeli society. It triggered a political discussion on what to do with the newly won territories. Two general positions were brought forward. On the one hand, right wing Zionists promoted an inclusion of the territories in the state of Israel and its settlement by Jews at the expense of the Palestinians. On the other hand,

> *"for most other thinking Zionists, the territories were a mixed blessing. The strategic advantages were important. But the political entity that was emerging was far from the idea of a Jewish state: three million Jews dominating the lives of over one and a half million Arabs living under military rule, in addition to more than a half a million Israeli Arab Palestinians, formally citizens of Israel. It was just too far removed from the simple and classical goal of Zionism, the Jewish state, to be acceptable as a permanent situation"*[397].

This was termed 'demographic threat', the fear that the Jewish majority would be lost by the incorporation by territories with a high number of Palestinian inhabitants. The groups holding these two views were termed 'hawks' and 'doves' respectively. On

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Aharon Klieman (eds) *"Security Concerns. Insights from the Israeli Experience"* (London: Jai Press, 1998).

[396] See: Brecher, Michael. *"The Foreign Policy System of Israel. Setting Images, Processes"* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) and Brecher, Michael. *"Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy"* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

[397] Kaminer, Reuven. *"The Politics of Protest. The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada"* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996): p. 8.

June 27th 1967 the Knesset however passed a set of laws extending Israeli jurisdiction and administration to the eastern part of Jerusalem. Between 1968 and 1970 constant military struggles between Egypt and Israel were fought along the Suez Canal in what became known as the 'war of attrition'. In 1973 another large scale war broke out between Egypt, Syria and Israel. The 'Yom Kippur War' or 'October War', surprised the Israeli military establishment and resulted in a near defeat of Israel in the early days of the conflict. Together 1967 and 1973 can be seen as turning points in the Arab Israeli conflict. Both wars showed the limits of force as a political instrument in the conflict. "This disillusionment began with the 1967 Six Day War, which dealt militant pan-Arabism a mortal blow and disabused many in the Arab World of their hopes to destroy the State of Israel. It continued with the 1973 October War, which shattered Israeli illusions that the Arabs could be forced into any solution"[398].

The debacle in 1973 also had domestic ramifications. "The failure of the leadership - and in particular the Prime Minister, Golda Meir, and her Defence Minister, Dayan - to act on intelligence briefings warning of an imminent Arab attack illustrated the arrogance and the lack of a clear sense of direction coming from the elite"[399]. The Labor Party, hitherto the leading party in power, lost the elections of 1977 to its rival, the Likud Bloc, under Menachem Begin. However the disastrous war was not the only reason that brought down the Labor Party. Neglected social problems, financial scandals and internal struggles among the leadership of the party contributed to its downfall. The first major crisis in the Labor Party was the "Lavon Affair" from 1954 onwards.[400] The 1970s saw the rise of a Sephardim protest

[398] Karsh, Efraim. "Peace Despite Everything" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) *"From Rabin to Netanyahu. Israel's Troubled Agenda"* (London: Frank Cass, 1997): p. 118.
[399] Lochery *op. cit.*: p. 17.
[400] The affair began with the arrest of an Israeli spy-ring in Cairo in 1954 and their trial and conviction. Pinhas Lavon, then Minister of Defence, was blamed for acting without informing the government.

movement, the 'Black Panthers'. "Borrowing the name of the notorious American black revolutionary group, the Israeli Panthers were the closest thing to a revolutionary movement Israel's citizens had ever seen in their country"[401]. The movement addressed the concerns of the Sephardi immigrants in Israel. These immigrants from Africa and the Near East, the Balkans, India and the Muslim Republics of the former Soviet Union were mostly living in the so called 'development towns' in the south and the north of the country. In these towns unemployment was high and social problems were severe. The 'Black Panthers' operated from 1971 onwards and directed their protest against the government's neglect of the concerns of the Sephardim and directly against Prime Minister Golda Meir. Although the movement declined in 1972 it was the first emergence of the Sephardim as a political force in Israel. It led the Herut (later one of the main factions of the Likud Bloc) to target the Sephardim as a group of voters. This was to play a decisive role in the elections in 1977. Less than a year after the 1973 war, Golda Meir resigned and was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin. The Rabin government however was hindered by the strong personal rivalry between the Prime Mininster Rabin and the Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. In 1976 the partnership between the religious parties and the Labor Party broke down because Rabin had scheduled an official government event on the eve of Shabbat. In addition the government had to handle several political and financial scandals during its term in office. All these factors finally led to the defeat of the Labor party in the 1977 elections.

The affair led Ben Gurion to leave Mapai in 1965 and form his own party, Rafi. Although Rafi joined the newly formed Labor Party in 1968, Ben Gurion refused to join.

[401] Sprinzak, Ehud. *"Brother Against Brother. Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination"* (New York: The Free Press, 1999): p. 133.

I.III. From Begin to the Second Premiership of Yitzhak Rabin

1977-1992: Zionism and the Vision of 'Greater Israel'

"During the era of Mapai political domination, Labor was perceived by many, even its rivals, to be an indispensable permanent fixture. When Likud became the largest party following the May 1977 election, shock waves radiated throughout the entire political system"[402]. Likud's electoral victory was due in large parts to its appeal to the Sephardim electorate. With the new Herut government, the classical Labor Zionist ideology was amended by a greater emphasis on the idea of 'Greater Israel'. This meant a stronger emphasis on holding on to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. This can be seen in the more structured settlement policy of the new government compared to the Labor administration. Under the Herut party the settlement activity in the occupied territories intensified.[403]

Shortly after the electoral victory of Begin and his Herut party, the president of Egypt Anwar Sadat made a bold move in the Middle East peace process. From the 19th until the 21st of November 1977 Sadat visited Israel and gave a speech in the Knesset (20th) in which he urged negotiations and a settlement of political disputes. However this political move did not bring any immediate results. It was not until the Camp David Summit from the 5th to the 17th of September 1978 that a framework for a peace treaty was agreed. The summit resulted in the bilateral peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979. Begin agreed to evacuate the Sinai in exchange for peace with Egypt (which also meant the evacuation of various Israeli settlements and one newly build town). The Begin government was willing to give up the Sinai since it

[402] Peretz and Doron *op. cit.*: p. 79. At the following election in 1981, the newly formed Likud Bloc was able to gather 60 % of the Sephardim vote which gave it a second decisive victory. See: Peretz, Don and Sammy Shmooha. "Israel's Tenth Knesset Elections - Ethnic Upsurgence and Decline of Ideology" in *Middle East Journal* 35, 4 1981.

did not have the same religious connotations and significance as the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. But the government's vision of 'Greater Israel' was not changed by giving up the Sinai. Consequently, the Israeli Prime Minister did not agree on a comprehensive settlement of the status of the other territories occupied in 1967. Begin's proposal for the Palestinians was personal but not political autonomy. "His definition of the Palestinians was couched in Jabotinskyian terms and focused on their status as a national minority. They were part of a wider Arab nation that had already secured national self-determination in a plethora of countries"[404]. The government's stand towards the occupied territories can also be seen in the decision to annex the Golan Heights (14th of December 1981) to Israeli territory.

The following year the Israeli government answered the continuing attacks on its northern border with Lebanon with a large scale invasion of the country. "Begin perceived the build-up of conventional Palestinian forces in Southern Lebanon to be a great danger"[405]. On the 6th of June 1982 Israeli forces entered Lebanon in the 'Operation Peace for Galilee'. It became quickly clear that the Israel intended to install a Christian regime under Bashir Gemayel in Lebanon. However shortly after his election as Lebanese president (23rd of August 1982), Gemayel was assassinated (14th of September). Two days after the assassination of Gemayel the Phalangists entered the refugee camps of Sabre and Shatilla and murdered hundreds of Palestinian civilians. Although a later Israeli commission of inquiry did not allocate direct responsibility for the massacre to the Israeli military commanders, it blamed them and Defence Minister Sharon for serious neglect of their duties. The massacre provoked massive protests against the government. After the demonstration of 400,

[403] The first settlements were established shortly after the 1967 war. However the Labor government did not officially support the settlement activities. It only declared the settlements legal after their establishment. For a more detailed discussion of Israeli settlements see below.
[404] Shindler *op. cit.*: p. 89.
[405] Ibid: p. 116.

000 at a Peace Now rally in Tel Aviv, Begin was forced to dismiss Sharon. However the lingering war in Lebanon and the aftermath of the massacres resulted in Begin's resignation in September 1983. His successor was Yitzhak Shamir.

The Lebanon war and the massacres gave rise to a more visible Israeli peace movement. The Lebanon war was seen by a substantial segment of the Israeli public as an unnecessary military adventure. This openly showed the division between 'doves' and 'hawks' in Israeli society. The national elections of 1984 brought no decisive results. In consequence Labor and Likud decided to form a National Unity Coalition which remained in power until 1990. The two main tasks of this coalition under the rotating premiership of Shimon Peres (until 1986) and Yitzhak Shamir were the control of the deteriorating inflation and the end of the war in Lebanon. Ever since the 1973 war, the Israeli economy was deteriorating. The huge costs of the replacement of arms and equipment crippled the economy and caused the budget deficit to soar. "Fuelled by budget deficits which ran at levels of 10-14 per cent of GDP in the early 1980s, inflation marched steadily higher, reaching triple digit levels in 1979 and developing into full-fledged hyper-inflation after 1983"[406]. After the election, the government installed the Economic Stabilisation Programme ESP which showed quick results. The same year the government decided to withdraw from most of Lebanon except for a small security zone in the south of the country. The early 1980s also saw the rise of a radical right wing movement, Kach (Thus). Lead by the New York rabbi Meir Kahane the movement openly advocated violence against Palestinians and gained its first seat in the Knesset in 1984.

> *"What was significant about his victory was Kahane's ability to present with great clarity a fundamental contradiction between democracy and the Jewish-*

Zionist character of Israel. Others were unable to answer questions raised such as how to cope with Arab nationalist aspirations, with Jewish-Arab intermarriage, with equality of non-Jews in a Jewish state, and with the dilemma of integrating the occupied territories with over a million Arabs"[407].

Two factors threatened the new economic recovery in the late 1980s and the early 90s: the intifada and the immigration of around 400,000 immigrants from the republics of the former Soviet Union. The tension between Israelis and Palestinians reached a new height with the start of the *intifada* in 1987.

"The intifada caught the Israelis unaware [...] The massive size of the demonstrations [...] its rapid spread from Gaza to East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, the discipline shown by the demonstrators, the use of nonviolent actions [...] the rapid formulation of an indigenous Unified National Leadership [...] and the breadth of involvement by Palestinians were all unexpected"[408].

The *intifada* created downward pressure on the economy with low GDP growth and rising unemployment. These problems were increased with the mass immigration of Jews from the republics of the former Soviet Union.[409] "More than half a million citizens of the former Soviet Union have emigrated to Israel, increasing the population by about 10 per cent."[410] This aliyah was distinctly different in its compositions from the earlier ones. First of all, the Jews from the Soviet Union have on average a higher education than the Jews in the earlier aliyas. Another significant

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[406] Landau, Pinchas. "The Israeli Economy in the 1990s: Breakout or Breakdown" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) *"Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges"* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994): p. 63f. In the election year 1984 the inflation was 400 per cent per annum.

[407] Peretz, Don and Sammy Shmooha. "Israel's Eleventh Knesset Election" in *Middle East Journal* 39, 1 1985: p. 91f.

[408] Gerner, Deborah J. *"One Land, Two Peoples. The Conflict over Palestine"* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994): p. 98.

[409] For a more in-depth analysis of the immigration see: Quigley, John. *"Flight into the Maelstrom. Soviet Immigration to Israel and Middle East Peace"* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997).

difference was that these immigrants were mostly not ideologically or religiously motivated to immigrate to Israel. "There was less 'ascending up to Zion', more quitting Russia or the other republics."[411] These two factors created social tensions, because on the one hand, it was difficult to find appropriate jobs for the new immigrants, and on the other hand they did not have the ideological conviction to accept this. A third factor which makes the absorption of the Russian immigrants more difficult is that they take pride in the preservation of their cultural heritage. "Since the immigration of the Jews of Germany in the 1930s, there has been no wave of immigrants with such pride in the culture of their country of origin and determination to preserve it."[412] These changes and divisions led to the increasing decline of the societal consensus in Israel.

On a more concrete level, these problems resulted in the collapse of the National Unity Government in 1990. Shimon Peres brought the government down in an attempt to form a Labor led coalition. However, after a ruling of an American rabbi prevented the small religious party Agudat Israel from joining the coalition, the attempt failed and Shamir formed a narrow right wing coalition. "Public indignation at these abuses of power was profound and universal; it seemed as if the nation's leadership conducted its affairs without the slightest regard for the ethical standards, not to mention the interests of their constituents"[413]. These protests lead to the electoral reform of 1992 which stipulated that the head of government is to be elected directly and that the Knesset cannot pass a motion of no confidence without

[410] Shepherd, Naomi. "Ex-Soviet Jews in Israel: Asset, Burden, or Challenge" *Israel Affairs* 1, 2 1994: p 245.
[411] Kyle, Keith. "Questions for the Future" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) "*Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges*" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 236.
[412] Shepherd *op.cit.*: p. 261.
[413] Klein, Yitzhak. "The Problem of Systemic Reform" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) "*Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges*" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 56.

dissolving itself. These reforms took effect for the first time during the elections in 1996.

The same year in which the National Unity Government fell, the Kuwait crisis and the subsequent second Gulf War brought a new impetus into the Middle East peace process. The Madrid peace conference was initiated in which Israel took part. However the negotiations in Madrid and Washington were slow and did not yield any tangible results. During the 1992 election campaign the Labor Party under Yitzhak Rabin focused on the peace process and promised a decisive move ahead should they be elected. Several issues played a role in the fall of the Likud led coalition in 1992.

First of all there was a shift in the perception of the importance of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for Israel in an increasing part of Israeli society. "The outcome of the election was portrayed as a vote for peace. The Israeli public had cast its verdict on the peace process, forsaking the intransigence of Yizthak Shamir and the dream of Erez Yisrael Hashlema (Greater Land of Israel) for the path of peace and compromise."[414] The building of further settlements was widely seen as unnecessary expenditure. Labor leader Rabin had no problems terming further settlements as 'political' rather than 'strategic' settlements.[415] This attitude towards settlements seems to be a long term trend in Israeli society. As early as 1985, Falk observed that a near majority of Israelis:

> *"-Believe Israel has enough settlements for its security.*
>
> *-Do not favour a policy of placing settlements in populous Arab areas of the West Bank and Gaza*

[414] Peters, Joel. "The Nature of Israeli Politics and Society" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) "*Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges*" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 1.
[415] 'Strategic settlements' were defined as necessary for Israel's security, while 'political' settlements were defined as projects out of a radical Zionist ideological position without any direct relevance to the security of the state.

-Oppose annexation, but feel Israel should maintain some form of military presence in the West Bank and Gaza"[416].

One other reason for this shift in the perception of the importance of the occupied territories was influenced by the newly arrived immigrants from the former Soviet Union. The immigrants were very critical towards the building of further settlements. This was for several reasons. The immigrants felt that these 'political settlements' were diverting resources which were needed for the development of the economy in order to cope with their absorption. In addition, the new immigrants "have never been fully committed to the idea of the Greater Land of Israel."[417] Because of this, economic and social aspects dominated among the immigrant electorate. "They' too' had been waiting for Israel's post-Gulf War recovery. Instead they were faced with a national unemployment rate of 11.5 per cent and a rate which was much higher in their towns and neighbourhoods."[418] The immigrants from the former Soviet Union brought the balance between Sephardi and Ashkenzi Jews back to equilibrium. During the 1980s the Sephardi Jews were slowly gaining the majority. As Bar-On notes, Sephardi Jews had in general a greater psychological affinity towards right-wing parties.[419] Another factor which influenced the new immigrant electorate was the international level. The late government of Yizhak Shamir responded to inflow of immigrants in 1989 "with an expanded building and settlement programme in the West Bank which the Americans saw as a further obstacle to prospects for peace."[420] The Bush administration connected a $ 10 billion loan guarantee to a freeze in the settlement programme. When the American Congress passed its foreign aid bill the

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[416] Falk, Gloria H. "Israeli Public Opinion: Looking Toward a Palestinian Solution" *The Middle East Journal* 39, 3 1985: p. 249.
[417] Sprinzak, Ehud. "The Israeli Right" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) "*Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges*" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 136.
[418] Ibid: p. 136.
[419] Bar-On, Mordechai. "Trends in the Political Psychology of Israeli Jews 1967-86" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 17, 1 1987: pp. 21-36.

loan guarantees requested by Israel were not included. "The policy that Bush adopted was not new - every U.S. administration since 1967 had expressed its opposition to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories - but Bush was the first to enforce that policy."[421] These loan guarantees however were of vital importance to Israel in order to be able to settle the thousands of new immigrants. This situation, combined with the immigrants indifference towards settlements in the occupied territories, led to an overwhelming protest vote of the new immigrants in favour of Labor. After being elected, the new government announced a stop in settlement programs and therefore secured the American loan guarantees.

In addition to these problems, the Likud Bloc was weakened during the elections by a internal dispute between Yizhak Shamir and David Levy. This debate was fought along ethnic lines since Levy was the leader of the Sephardim in the Likud Bloc. "Most detrimental to Likud, its nominating system took the ethnic genie out of the bottle. In actual distribution of places on the party list [...] Levy was located fourth after Shamir, Arens and Sharon, with his supporters relegated to the bottom of the list. The infuriated Levy quickly claimed that he was the victim of a plot between the Shamir and the Sharon factions, inspired by anti-Sephardi sentiments."[422] This dispute damaged Likud's reputation and lost Sephardim votes.

The second important feature on the domestic level was the personalised campaign of the Labor party. It focused on Rabin as the military hero of the 1967 war who would guarantee the progress of the peace process without jeopardising Israel's security. The question of religion also played a significant role in the campaign and in the following coalition bargaining. As Peters observes, the religious parties belong

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[420] Fraser *op.cit.*: p. 141.
[421] Cleveland, William l. *"A History of the Modern Middle East"* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994): p. 441.
[422] Elazar, Daniel J. and Shmuel Sandler. "The 1992 Knesset Elections Revisited: Implications for the Future" *Israel Affairs* 1, 2 1994: p. 223.

to the losers of the 1992 elections. "While their percentage of the vote did not fall dramatically the overall distribution of seats means that they no longer hold the balance of power in the Knesset."[423] The fact that Shas entered the government coalition against the expressed opposition of one of its spiritual leaders, Rabbi Schach, shows the internal division of the religious camp. "Rabbi Schach remains the only implacable Haredi opponent, but his influence has declined considerably."[424]

The election in June 1992 resulted in a very astonishing outcome. "On June 23, 1992, Israeli voters and a new set of political, social and economic tremors produced an electoral 'earthquake' that reduced Likud from 40 seats to 32 seats in the Knesset, while Labor increased its power from 39 seats to 44 seats."[425] The new government, formed under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, included the left wing alliance Meretz, the Sephardim religious party Shas, and the tacit support of the Arab Democratic Party and the communist dominated Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.

I.IV. Rabin, Netanyahu, and Barak 1992-1999: The Breakdown of Societal Consensus

One year after its electoral victory, the new Israeli government concluded the 'Declaration of Principles' with the PLO. "The September 1993 Israel-PLO agreement marked the greatest advance towards peace in the Arab-Israel conflict's history."[426] As Kyle and Peters point out, Rabin was under pressure to show results in the peace process. "It was apparent that something would have to give, and

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[423] Peters *op.cit.*: p. 10.
[424] Friedman, Menachem. "The Ultra-Orthodox and Israeli Society" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) "*Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges*" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 201.
[425] Hadar, Leon T. "The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and the Fall of the 'Second Israeli Republic'" *Middle East Journal* 46, 4. 1992: p. 594.
[426] Rubin, Barry. "From War to Peace" in Rubin, Barry, Joseph Ginat and Moshe Ma'oz (eds) "*From War to Peace. Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993*" (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1994): p. 3.

quickly, if the Labor-led coalition was not to lose all credibility."[427] That the Israeli public expected results can be seen in the immediate public support in favour of the Oslo accords. Within a few days the opinion polls showed a support in the high sixty percent. The perception of officials in the government towards negotiations with the PLO changed as well. "With the Oslo talks, both Israel and the PLO recognized that negotiations were a positive-sum if nonsymmetrical game. Even though neither side could get *everything* it wanted, both agreed that an imperfect solution was better than no solution. [...] Domestic support (or the expectation of such support) was vital to the agreement."[428] This new perception of negotiations did not generate out of thin air. Ben-Dor points out that since the Yom Kippur war in 1973, negotiations between Israelis and Arabs slowly but steadily built up confidence in the other side's intentions.[429]

On the international level, the conditions for peace negotiations with the Palestinians were very favourable. On the one hand "the Gulf war drastically weakened Israel's most powerful foe, Iraq [...] buried the myth of a united Arab political front and left the radical Arab camp in disarray; and demonstrated that the United States, Israel's patron and the world's only post-Cold War superpower, would intervene in the Middle East to protect its vital interests."[430] As we will see in the following chapter, the war also weakened the PLO considerably. Therefore the Israeli government went into the negotiations in a position of considerable advantage vis-a-

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[427] Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters. "Preface" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) "*Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges*" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. viii.
[428] Flamhaft *op.cit.*: p. 184.
[429] Ben-Dor, Gabriel. "Confidence Building and the Peace Process" in Rubin, Barry, Joseph Ginat and Moshe Ma'oz (eds) "*From War to Peace. Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993*" (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1994): pp. 61-77.
[430] Makovsky, David. "*Making Peace with the PLO. The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord*" (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996): p. 107.

vis the PLO. This can be seen in the emphasis on Israeli security rather than on the Palestinians needs that the Oslo accords entail.[431]

The Oslo process however brought to the forefront the internal divisions in Israeli society. The growing breakdown of the basic societal consensus can be seen in the frequent changes of government since. Despite Labor's achievement of a framework agreement with the Palestinians, the Israeli parliamentary elections at the 29th of May 1996 brought another change in government. The leader of the Likud Bloc and candidate for the election of prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, succeeded in the national elections. "Six months after public fury at the killing of Yizhak Rabin [4th of November 1995, HJS] catapulted his successor, Shimon Peres, to a 3:1 lead in the polls, and while the duo's crowning feat - the Oslo Accords - retained support of a clear majority of the electorate, including many Likud voters - Peres contrived to lose the 1996 election by a narrow but convincing margin."[432] These were the first elections in which the prime minister was directly elected. Although Netanyahu won the premiership, the Likud Bloc did not win any more seats in the Knesset. They secured 32 seats while Labour won 34. The religious parties, however, had their best ever result. Shas, NRP and Thora Block (formerly Agudat Yisrael) secured 23 seats. Netanyahu formed a coalition in which he included the religious parties plus the Russian immigrants party, Yisrael BeAliya, and the moderate party 'Third Way'. This coalition gave Netanyahu a majority of 66 seats (out of 120). "Netanyahu's government [was] heavily weighted to the right."[433]

The issue of territory played again, as in 1992, a major role in the election campaign. The main focus was on the negotiations with Syria over a peace settlement

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[431] For an analysis of the different agreements see following chapter.
[432] Kidron, Peretz "Netanyahu Seizes Victory for Likud" *Middle East International* (7th of June 1996): p. 3.
[433] Morris, Benny "Israel's Elections and their Implications" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, 1 1996: p. 76.

and the return of the Golan Heights. Although Israel was willing to negotiate withdrawal in return for stringent security provisions, Syria was perceived as unwilling to come to an agreement before the elections in 1996. In consequence, Peres broke the negotiations off. "Netanyahu was able to portray him as having offered major concessions (the whole of the Golan Heights) to an Asad uninterested in peace : Peres had been duped by the Arabs and had displayed 'weakness' in his headlong rush for peace."[434] In addition to this, in February and March 1996 several suicide bombings and Katyushka attacks questioned Peres ability to guarantee Israel's security. Peres' military action to ensure the security of northern Israel, 'Grapes of Wrath', back fired when the UN outpost Kafr Kana in southern Lebanon was accidentally attacked and over a hundred civilians died. This was not only an international embarrassment for Israel but also alienated the Israeli Palestinian[435] electorate. "A large number of Arab voters either boycotted the polls or cast a blank ballot for the premiership."[436]

The second major factor which was important for the election result was again the vote of the new immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In 1992, 70 per cent of the new immigrants decided to vote for Labor. However in 1996, the vote went for the Likud Bloc. Again this was a protest vote against the poor economic conditions in which they were living. In addition, as Morris points out, the immigrants "had never really been Labor supporters."[437] Coming from a socialist-communist regime which discriminated against them, their allegiance is more likely to lie within the Likud Bloc. These votes contributed to the 11 percent lead Netanyahu had within the Jewish vote.

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[434] Ibid: p. 74.
[435] In terming Palestinians with Israeli citizenship Israeli Palestinians, rather than Israeli Arabs or Arab Israelis, I follow this group's self definition. See: Rouhana, Nadim N. *"Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict"* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
[436] Ibid: p. 73.

The third major factor in the election was the religious vote. On the one hand, Netanyahu got "cliff-hanger endorsements [...] by [...] Haredi rabbis."[438] They declared his campaign a 'holy war' and blessed Netanyahu. The other reason for such a strong religious vote was the fact that for the first time the prime minister was elected by a direct vote. It was not required for him to have the majority in the Knesset. Therefore many voters did not feel that they had to cast their vote for one of the large parties and voted instead for one of the smaller religious parties.

The loss of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 meant a major blow to the Labor Party. The achievements of Rabin during the history of Israel made him a leader that seemed to be able to ensure Israel's security during the peace process. "The popular Rabin - the former IDF chief of staff and victor of the 1967 war- was the only Labor Party leader capable of carrying the nation with him through the peace process."[439] The personalised election of the prime minister, due to the new election law of 1992 favoured Netanyahu's campaign. He did not only manage to unite the Likud Bloc after its defeat of 1992, but also managed a "successful courting of the pivotal Orthodox community."[440] Peres on the other hand did not manage to exploit the 'outrage vote' against the right after the assassination of Yizhak Rabin. Even during the election campaign in 1996, the assassination of Rabin was barely mentioned. "Lastly, Labor contributed to its own defeat by mounting a poor election campaign."[441] The powerful television campaign of Benjamin Netanyahu was countered by portraying Peres as "an elder statesman, an incumbent prime minister

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[437] Ibid: p. 74.
[438] Lutick. Ian S. "Reflections on the Peace Process and a Durable Settlement: Roundup of Views" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, 1 1996: p. 10.
[439] Morris *op.cit.*: p. 70.
[440] Kidron, Peretz. "Bibi's adroit Footwork" *Middle East International* (21st June 1996): p. 9.
[441] Morris *op.cit.*: p. 75.

above the fray."[442] This campaign did not succeed in mobilising the Israeli electorate for Peres.

The new government faced very difficult coalition negotiations which resulted in a coalition which included a wide range of different parties with different political aims.[443] This uneven coalition was put to its first test in January 1997 with the conclusion of the 'Hebron Protocol' in which the Netanyahu government agreed to re-deploy its troops out of most of the city of Hebron while maintaining control over the old part of the town and the settlers living in the city. The Protocol passed with a small cabinet majority. However the 1998 Wye River memorandum proved the stumbling stone of the coalition. It clearly showed the influence of right wing and religious groups in the government and in Likud which did not accept further territorial concessions to the Palestinians. After the government agreed to the document which envisaged a further re-deployment of Israeli troops in the occupied territories as well as the resumption of the final status negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israeli government, several small parties walked out of the coalition and subsequently the government was forced to schedule early new elections for May 1999. During the months before the elections the negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government came to a standstill. The Wye River Memorandum was not implemented. In addition the government had to face continuing high unemployment and economic recession.

The 1999 election campaign was dominated by a very personalised campaign against Prime Minister Netanyahu. Before the elections several leading Likud figures left the party to form a new group called 'Center Party' which stood in opposition to

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[442] Ibid: p. 75.

[443] For an analysis of the coalition bargaining of the Netanyahu government see: Mahler, Georg S. "The Forming of the Netanyahu Government: Coalition Formation in a Quasi-Parliamentary Setting" in Karsh, Efraim (ed.) *"From Rabin to Netanyahu. Israel's Troubled Agenda"* (London: Frank Cass

the policies of Prime Minister Netanyahu. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir also openly criticised Netanyahu and let it be known that he would not vote for Likud in the elections. David Levy one of Netanyahu's oldest allies walked out of the coalition and joined an alliance with Labor, now led by Ehud Barak.[444] These factors resulted in a devastating defeat of the Likud Bloc (going down from 32 to 19 seats) and Prime Minister Netanyahu (winning only 43.9 per cent of the vote) in the May 1999 elections. The Sephardim religious party, Shas, had the largest gain in the elections, increasing its share of seats in the Knesset from 10 seats in 1996 to 17 seats in 1999. Again, the new government, led by new Labor leader Ehud Barak, faced difficult coalition negotiations. However, it was able to build a majority of 75 seats (out of 120).[445]

Shortly after the elections, the government resumed the final status negotiations with the Palestinians which had started in May 1996 but had reached a deadlock shortly after the election of the Netanyahu government. In September 1999 the new government signed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum which was mainly concerned with the implementation of the already agreed Wye River Memorandum of the preceding year. In October 1999 a safe passage route for Palestinians travelling between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was opened. However the final status negotiations in late 2000 in Camp David failed, which led to increased violence between Israelis and Palestinians. In consequence Prime Minister Barak resigned in early 2001 and was defeated by Likud's Ariel Sharon in the following elections.

1997) and Caspit, Ben and Ilan Kfir. *"Netanyahu. The Road to Power"* (London: Vision, 1998): pp. 184-187.

[444] This new alliance, 'One-Israel', included the Labor Party, Meimad (a liberal religious party) and Gesher (Levy's faction)

[445] The coalition included: One-Israel, Shas, Meretz, United Torah Judaism, National Religious Party, and Yisrael b'Aliyah (Russian immigrant party). In addition the government could count on the support of the Arab parties and two smaller Jewish parties which brought its majority up to 97 seats.

The new stage of the Middle East Peace Process which started with the declaration of principles in 1993 touches several issues which go to the core of Israeli identity and have been debated Israel since the Yishuv and the establishment of the state of Israel. These issues are: 1) the problem of territory, and the extend of the state of Israel. 2) Connected with this is the issue of the character of the state: Jewish and/or democratic. 3) The role that religion plays in the state (the question of the sanctity of territory). 4) The problem of internal and external security and the question of the status of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. These issues which have been touched upon in the preceding overview of the development of Israeli society, will be the focus of the next part of the chapter.

II. The Peace Process and the Quest for Israeli/Jewish Identity

II.I. The Question of Territory

The question of territory lies at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "The predominant importance given to the territorial dimension of this conflict can be attributed to the often violent nature of this struggle."[446] During the time of the establishment of the Yishuv the already existing Palestinian society was developing national aspirations of its own. In consequence, in order to realise the Zionist aim of a state, a struggle over territory was unavoidable. The Zionist consensus was: "Judaism in its primarily traditional forms of existence in the Diaspora had become untenable under conditions of modern nationalism and that, therefore, Jews, too,

[446] Romann, Michael. "Territory and Demography: The Case of the Jewish-Arab National Struggle" *Middle Eastern Studies* 26, 2 1990: p. 371.

must recreate their own national homeland in Zion."[447] However, the issue of territory became increasingly relevant for the Israeli society after the 1967 war in which Israel conquered the West Bank, the Gaza strip and the Golan Heights.[448] Since this time the discussion within Israeli society centres around the question of whether these territories are an inalienable part of Israel or if they can be given back as part of a peace agreement. As far as Israeli identity building is concerned, two basic and antagonistic positions can be observed: Land for Peace / Land is Peace[449], which encapsulates the basic difference between 'doves' and 'hawks'. These two antagonistic positions reflect the internal division in Israeli society as far as the future of the occupied territories is concerned. There are three different political approaches to this problem in Israeli society:[450]

1) Right-Wing Nationalist Zionism, which sees all occupied territories as inalienable lands of Israel and aims in extreme cases at the expulsion of all Arabs form Israel[451] Religious right wing groups add another dimension to the interpretation of territory. Their messianic ideas claim that the redemption of all territory of Eretz Israel by Jews is a necessary precondition for the redemption of the world. Therefore all territory is sanctified.
2) Mainstream Zionism, which wants to negotiate some of the territories but under no circumstances endanger the security of Israel. This includes the non-Zionist

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[447] Bar-On, Mordechai. "Zionism into its Second Century: A Stock-Tacking" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) "*Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges*" (London, I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 20f.
[448] It also conquered the Sinai but as we have seen, this territory was given back to Egypt following the Camp David agreement.
[449] See: Aronson, Geoffrey. "*Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank*" (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), p. 93ff.
[450] See: Kaminer, Reuven. "*The Politics of Protest. The Israeli Peace Movements and the Palestinian Intifada*" (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996): p. xxif.
[451] This position is based on a long lasting division within Zionism. As we have seen, in 1935 a group of radical Zionists under the leadership of Vladimir Jabotinsky separated from the World Zionist Congress. The question of territory was at the heart of the division. Jabotinsky advocated a maximalist version of Zionism, named Revisionism. For a short overview of the influence of Revisionist ideology and political groups see: Heller, Joseph. "The Zionist Right and National Liberation: From Jabotinsky to Avraham Stern" *Israeli Affairs* 1, 3 1995: pp. 85-109.

left and sections of the Zionist Left in Israel, which propagate the establishment of a Palestinian state as a solution to the conflict

3) Anti-Colonialist and Anti-Zionist position, which sees Palestine as an Arab country. The national rights of the Jews should be recognised within a restructuring of the whole region. This position however is only held by a small minority.

The issue of territory is also one of the central concerns of the Oslo process. It can be argued that the Rabin-Peres and Barak governments followed the second approach mentioned above (Mainstream Zionism). The government of Netanyahu was closer to the first approach (Right-Wing Nationalist Zionism). One of the most important parts of the negotiations concern the extend to which the Palestinian authority is allowed to control its territory and how much territory it is allowed to control. It can be argued that the Israeli government so far has given the Palestinian Authority a structured autonomy, not sovereignty over the areas under its control.[452] Connected with the problem of territory is the question of the sovereignty of a possible future Palestinian state. As far as this problem is concerned, the political leadership of Israel is very hesitant. Neither Likud nor Labor have yet committed themselves to the achievement of this goal.

> *"Israeli fears are profound. Obviously. A Palestinian state would not represent a conventional military threat to the most powerful army in the Middle East, but the history of attacks launched against Israel from the Occupied Territories is reason enough to give Israelis pause about giving up control here"*[453].

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[452] See following chapter.
[453] Ciment, James. *"Palestine / Israel. The Long Conflict"* (New York: Facts on File, 1997): p. 153.

The issue of the final status of the borders has therefore been postponed to the final status negotiations. One practical problem that is connected with the issue of territory is the status of the Israeli settlements that have been build in the occupied territories since the end of the Six Days War in 1967. Because of the importance of this problem, an analysis of its importance for Israeli political identity is necessary.

II.II. The Settlements in the Occupied Territories

> *"The establishment of settlements in the West Bank since 1967 has undergone a number of changes in emphasis. These changes relate to the way in which the dominant political party of the time perceives the relationship between the state of Israel and the Land of Israel, in particular that part of the West Bank known as Judea and Samaria which has specific religious and historical connotations and is distinct from the Jordan Valley"*[454].

The first post-1967 Israeli settlement was established in Hebron. The city has specific religious importance for Jews since it houses the Cave of Patriarchs. In April 1968, a group of Jews under the leadership of Rabbi Moshe Levinger rented rooms in a Hotel in Hebron for Passover. After the feast was over they refused to leave, declaring that they had established the first Jewish presence in Hebron since the 1929 massacre. The Labor government did object to the move of the settlers but did nothing to evacuate them. After a clash outside the hotel between the settlers and local Palestinians, the government moved the group to a nearby military camp. In 1971 the government of Golda Meir tried to diffuse the situation by constructing the Kiryat Arba settlement on the outskirts of Hebron. Another motive behind settlement was security. "The Labor government was ideologically torn between its professed

[454] Newman, David. "The Evolution of a political Landscape: Geographical and Territorial Implications of Jewish Colonization in the West Bank" in *Middle Easter Studies* 21, 2 1985: p. 193.

commitment to the Geneva accords, which bans transfer of indigenous peoples and implantation of foreign populations in occupied territories, and its determination to establish a security presence, including armed settlements, in the West Bank"[455].

The move to establish settlements acquired an organisational framework after the 1973 war. Gush Emunim was founded in 1974 as a movement within the 'National Religious Party'. Gush Emunim can be seen as a reaction to the near military defeat of Israel in the 1973 war on the one hand and on the other hand, as a religious alternative to the socialist and by then tired ideology of the Labor Party. "Gush Emunim in the 1970s touched a sensitive cord in the Israeli collective psyche, namely the cherished memory of Zionist settlement and pioneering. [...] Gush Emunim emerged to build and expand the borders of Zionism."[456] Gush Emunim's declared aims were to settle anywhere and everywhere in the Biblical Lands of Israel. Its religious-political doctrine states that the coming of the Messiah depends on the political restoration of the Jewish people. While the precise territory of the Land of Israel is subject to dispute, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not negotiable. "Settlement is of paramount importance because Jews can partake in the Grace of God and attain spiritual purification only when they live in the Land of Israel."[457] Gush Emunim has translated its doctrine into political action, by pursuing the extension of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[458] The movement transformed into the YESHA council, the umbrella organisation of the Jewish community in Judea, Samaria, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights.[459] Under

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[455] Ciment *op. cit.*: p. 47.

[456] Sprinzak (1993) *op. cit.*: p. 124. The doctrine of Gush Emunim is outlined in: Don-Yehiya. "Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim" *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, 2 1987: pp. 215-234.

[457] Weissbrod, Lilly. "Gush Emunim and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Modern Religious Fundamentalism in Crisis" *Israel Affairs* 3, 1 1996: p. 88.

[458] The role of Gush Emunim in the West Bank is analysed in: Goldberg, Giora and Efraim Ben-Zadok. "Gush Emunim in the West Bank" *Middle Eastern Studies* 22, 1 1986: pp. 52-73.

[459] The revocation of the old biblical names, Judea and Samaria, for the territory of the West Bank also shows the strong religious overtones that are prevalent in the settler movement.

the Likud government after 1977 the emphasis changed. "The Likud government immediately announced their intention of widespread settlement throughout Judea and Samaria [...] the Gush Emunim settlement movement was legalized, and the government provided increased ideological and practical support for the establishment of new settlements in the Judea / Samaria mountain region"[460]. The fact that Begin agreed to evacuate settlements in the Sinai dessert under the Israeli/Egyptian peace treaty can be explained by the fact that this territory does not have high religious importance for Judaism. Nevertheless the government had to use force in order to make the settlers leave. In 1978 the Israeli ministry of agriculture modelled its settlement plan on the vision outlined by Gush Emunim. "Its aims were twofold: to settle 100,000 Jews in the territories between 1982 and 1987, and to increase their numbers to half-a-million by the year 2010"[461]. Begin's successor Shamir was equally committed to the settlements as can be seen in the debate over the $ 10 Billion loan guarantees from the USA.

Although the government under Rabin/Peres committed itself not to build any further settlements, existing settlements were expanded. However the massacre of Palestinians in the Hebron mosque in February 1994 by a Jewish settler from Kyriat Araba led the government to contemplate plans to evacuate the small Jewish community living in the centre of Hebron. Although the plan was never officially announced, the mere possibility of an evacuation led to strong settler protest which achieved that the plans were dropped. The Netanyahu government followed the Labor government in mainly expanding existing settlements with the notable exception of the allowance to build 132 apartments inside East Jerusalem which was granted to an American Jew in 1996 and the building of a new settlement in Abu

[460] Newman *op. cit.*: p. 193.

Ghunheim. The government of Prime Minister Barak evacuated some small settlements in November 1999 in the West Bank. However during its short term in office it granted over 3000 permission to build houses in existing settlements (in comparison the average number of building permits by the Netanyahu government was 3000 annually).

As can already seen from the discussion of the settlement problematic, security plays a vital role in the Oslo Peace Process. Some of the original settlements had been build to 'secure' the newly occupied territories, a tactic that had been developed during the time of the Yishuv. These settlements served both as agricultural industries and military bases. The issue of security will therefore be analysed as an independent issue in the next part of the chapter.

II.III The Problem of Security

The question of external and internal security has been discussed in Israel since the Yishuv. The five major wars that Israel fought proved the importance of this issue. Three basic premises guided the Israeli's approach to their nation's security:[462] First, their Arab neighbours were hostile to Zionism, the return of Jews to the Land of Israel. Second the Middle East and the International System are anarchic: no single agent has a monopoly of force that would guarantee the existence and survival of the other states. "The third basic perception affecting almost every facet of Israeli efforts to cope with Arab hostility was that in all categories of national power the Arab countries enjoyed a quantitative advantage"[463]. Because of these perceptions, Israel

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[461] Efrat, Elisha. "Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: Past, Present and Future" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) *"Peace in the Middle East. The Challenge for Israel"* (London: Frank Cass, 1994): p. 145.
[462] See: Feldman, Shai. "Israel's National Security: Perceptions and Policy" in Feldman, Shai and Abdullah Toukan *"Bridging the Gap. A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East"* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997): p. 7ff.
[463] Ibid: p. 8f.

developed a military strategy of self reliance and a large indigenous military industrial complex. "The main motivation behind the development of the defence industry was the fear that weapons needed for Israel's security would be unavailable on the world market for political reasons"[464]. However, Israel was at no point in danger of becoming a military dominated state. The IDF played and continues to play a major political and social role in Israel. However, as Yehud Ben-Meir shows, although Israel had been in a perpetual state of war from its creation onwards, the IDF "nevertheless does not pose any real threat to the democratic institutions of the state"[465]. The IDF is a civilian institution, controlled by the civilian authorities of the state.

Because of its lack of strategic depth, Israel became sensitive to the problem of an Arab surprise attack, a fear that proved justified after the 1973 October War. This situation led Israel to develop a nuclear capability which in turn made Israel less vulnerable to such an attack. Karsh and Navias even argue that this nuclear capability was one of the catalysts for a Israeli-Arab reconciliation. "It was only after the suspicion that Israel had managed to acquire nuclear weapons had become an established reality in the minds of her Arab neighbours, that a slow process of acquiescence in the fact of Israel began to evolve"[466].

The external threat to Israel from her immediate neighbours has been step by step reduced since the 1973 war. The first step was the Camp David accords and the subsequent peace treaty with Egypt. The peace treaty with Egypt had also highly symbolic meaning. As Mandelbaum points out, the conflict arose "from the

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[464] Inbar, Efraim and Shmuel Sandler. "The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation: toward a Security Regime" in *Review of International Studies* 21 1995: p. 46.
[465] Ben-Meir, Yehuda "Civil-Military Relations in Israel" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) "*Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges*" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 224.
[466] Karsh, Efraim and Martin Navias. "Israeli Nuclear Weapons and Middle East Peace" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) *"Between War and Peace. Dilemmas of Israeli Security"* (London: Frank Cass, 1996): p . 86.

conviction that Israel was transient and illegitimate. For Egypt to treat Israel like other nations was symbolically to abandon that position"[467]. This trend was complemented by the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty on the 26th of October 1994. Therefore, the only two countries which border Israel and which do not have a peace treaty with her are Lebanon and Syria. The Peres administration tried to advance the negotiations with Syria before the elections in 1996 however the negotiations remained unsuccessful. [468]

The negotiations with the Palestinians concern the internal security of Israel. "There are two levels on which security would be considered: the political and the technical"[469]. On the political level Israel is likely to resist the formation of a fully fledged Palestinian army in order to prevent the possible future Palestinian state to become a military threat. On the technical level, questions of border controls and demilitarised zones between Israel and the Palestinian authority are of major importance. Here Israel is likely to insist on exclusive control of the borders of a future Palestinian entity. The political importance of internal security can be seen in the fact that the suicide bombings of 1996 decisively influenced the elections, wiping out the massive lead prime minister Peres had over Netanyahu in the polls which led to his narrow defeat in the national elections.[470]

In addition to Palestinian terrorism, Jewish terrorism is the another internal security problem. The settler movements oppose the Oslo formula of 'Land for Peace'. Up until now only a handful of small settlements have been evacuated; however the question remains as to what will happen if the Israeli government

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[467] Mandelbaum, Michael. "Israel's Security Dilemma" in *Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs* 32, 3 1988: p. 363.
[468] Barak withdrew the Israeli forces from the security zone inside Lebanon.
[469] Sirriyeh, Hussein. "Is a Palestinian State Politically Possible?" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) *"Between War and Peace. Dilemmas of Israeli Security"* (London: Frank Cass, 1996): p . 49.
[470] See: Steinberg, Gerald M. "Peace, Security and Terror in the 1996 Elections" in *Israel Affairs* 4, 1 1997: pp. 209-234.

decides to remove larger settlements or settlements that have symbolic character. The magnitude of this threat was tragically highlighted by the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. As Sprinzak shows, the assassination was not a singular event, but the culmination of a long process. "Rabin's assassination did not take place in a vacuum. Although Amir [the assassin, HJS] acted alone, his act was the culmination of a process of delegitimization of the Israeli government by Israel's ultranationalists"[471].

The direct influence of religion on the politics of Israel can be clearly seen from this tragic event. The peace process has opened up an intense debate about the role of religion in Israeli society. This question has several ramifications. It not only concerns the question of the sanctity of territory, the idea of the land as a holy possession of the Jewish people, but also the influence of the religious parties in politics and on the peace process. The role of religion in Israeli society will be the focus of the next part of the chapter.

II.IV. The Role of Religion

The influence of religion and religious groups can be traced back to the beginnings of the state of Israel. In 1949 the government of Ben Gurion and the 'National Religious Party' (NRP) concluded the 'status quo' agreements. "They included agreement not to draw up a permanent constitution - something that the NRP insisted would have to be based on the *Halacha* or religious law - and the establishment of a ministry of religious affairs, with formal authorization over many aspects of Jewish life, for example marriage."[472] In addition to these concessions, religious students are excluded from the nation service, all food served in official

[471] Sprinzak (1999) *op. cit.*: p. 245.

buildings and restaurants has to be kosher and official business is not allowed during the Sabbath. Another feature which shows the influence of religious parties is that the orthodox community in Israel uses government funding for their own education system. As Cohen points out, the religious community's interpretation of the state is becoming an increasingly legitimate alternative to the classic Zionist conception, which had been accepted earlier even by religious Zionists. The basic question in Israeli society is what role religion, Judaism, should play in the state and how far the state should be defined by Judaism. The two basic positions can be formulated as whether Israel is a 'state of Jews' or a 'Jewish state'. "A phenomenon accompanying the revival of religion and Jewish religious customs is a renewed emphasis on Jewishness as traditionally defined, rather than on the Zionist synthesis ideal of the 'new Jew'."[473]

Many Israeli Jews have embraced a neo-traditional Jewish nationalism which stresses particularistic Jewish claims and goals in the Land of Israel. Gush Emunim, mentioned above must be seen in this intellectual context. "A consensual base clearly exists among the religious-nationalists regarding the theological legitimacy of Isarel's claim to *Judea* and *Samaria*"[474]. This claim is based on a combination of biblical precedence and *halachic* jurisprudence with the belief that Zionism and Jewish settlement heralds the beginning of the messianic era. The growing influence of religious-nationalism in the wider Israeli society was demonstrated by the rise of Rabbi Meir Kahane's radical Kach movement in the early 1980s.[475] The massacre of

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[472] Owen, Roger. "*State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*" (London: Routledge, 1992): p. 190f.
[473] Cohen, Eric. "Israel as a Post-Zionist Society" *Israel Affairs* 1, 3 1994: p. 209.
[474] Jones, Clive. "Ideo-Theology: Dissonance and Discourse in the State of Israel" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) *"From Rabin to Netanyahu. Israel's Troubled Agenda"* (London: Frank Cass, 1997): p. 29.
[475] See: Mergui, Raphael and Philippe Simonnot. *"Israel's Ayatollahs. Meir Kahane and the far Right in Israel"* (London: Saqi Books, 1987). Rabbi Kahane was assassinated in New York in 1992 and his Kach movement was banned in Israel for propagating racist ideology. The movement however exists now under the new name of Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives).

Palestinian civilians in Hebron in 1994 showed how dangerous the presence of these radical groups is in highly contested areas such as Hebron.

The Haredim (or ulta-orthodox) communities are the second largest group in the religious camp. Traditionally they were opposed to the state of Israel since in their eyes only a state based on *halacha* is a legitimate Jewish state. However since the 1973 war the Haredim community has, for pragmatic reasons (funding for their educational and social institutions), softened its traditional opposition to the secular Israeli state and consequently joined Israeli government politics in 1977[476]. The ultra-orthodox community felt justified in its negative assessment of the Zionist ideology. In their eyes "the Yom Kippur war proved that the Haredi analyses of Zionism and the condition of Israel were correct. The result was to magnify Haredi self-confidence and this is certainly a precondition to the kind of co-operation with secular Jews that is required by a government coalition"[477].

In the late 1970s and the early 1980s divisions inside the religious camp emerged. These became obvious for the first time after the elections of 1988. "Far from being a united block as many Israelis, particularly the secular opponents of religious coercion, had feared, the religious parties showed themselves during the coalition bargaining [after the election in 1988] to be badly divided."[478] Since then the three major parties of the religious camp are the NRP, the ultra-orthodox Agudat Yisrael and the Sephardim ultra-orthodox Shas. Nevertheless, the twelfth Knesset elections in 1988 brought about a "dramatic rise in the political power of the Haredi

[476] Agudat Israel joined Begin's coalition in 1977. This was the first time an Haredim party joined a government coalition. For a detailed analysis ultra-orthodox politics in Israel see: Kook, Rebecca, Michael Harris and Gideon Doron. "In the Name of G-D and Our Rabbi: The Politics of Ultra-Orthodox in Israel" in *Israel Affairs* 5, 1 1998: pp. 1-18.

[477] Liebman, Charles S. "Paradigms Sometimes Fit: The Haredi Response to the Yom Kippur War" in Wistrich, Robert and David Ohana (eds) *"The Shaping of Israeli Identity. Myth, Memory and Trauma"* (London: Frank Cass, 1995): p. 181.

[478] Freedman, Robert O. "Religion, Politics and the Israeli Elections of 1988" in *Middle East Journal* 43, 3 1989: p. 422.

(or ultra-Orthodox) parties."[479] Since 1988 the religious parties have become a political force which is neither associated with Labor Party nor Likud. Therefore they can negotiate coalitions with either side. "The Haredim had thus become an essential component of any coalition, thereby gaining significant positions of influence."[480]

The national-religious and ultra-orthodox groups do not only differ in their political goals from large parts of the Israeli population, they offer a completely different notion of Jewish/Israeli identity. This touches on the most basic issue of the peace process: what kind of state is Israel? A democratic state or a Jewish state or both? What political identity does this state represent: a religious Jewish identity or a secular Israeli identity or a combination of both? Since the beginning of the peace process, these questions have achieved growing political relevance. After the easing of the pressure of an outside military threat with the conclusion of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and with the chance for a peaceful coexistence with the Palestinian society, the question of the form and identity of the state of Israel has again become a hotly debated issue. It is to this issue that we turn in the last part of the chapter.

III.V. The Quest for Identity

"The signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993 reawakened a dormant ambivalence regarding Israeli identity"[481]. One can argue that the voluntary relinquishment of territory to the Palestinian authority strikes at the core of Jewish/Israeli identity. This can be seen as a de facto admission that the ancient historical claims to the territory are no longer valid in the face of more recent claims. On the other hand with this process Israel admits that these territories were

[479] Friedman, Manachem. "The Ultra-Orthodox and Israeli Society" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) "*Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges*" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 177.
[480] Ibid: p. 177.

taken by force and unjustly. "If Israelis were intruders in 1967, they were as much intruders at the turn of the century. An unethical origin is an unacceptable constituent of identity; no group asserts distinctiveness by dint of a trait or action to which it itself ascribes a negative connotation"[482]. Therefore a novel moral justification for the existence of the state of Israel is required in order to maintain a minimum of group cohesion.

The traditional Zionist ideology can no longer be sufficient as a basis for this group identification. "Like older nations, Israel is discovering that its citizens feel the need for sources of identity narrower than the national one"[483]. Consequently, the dominant Zionist collective identity is challenged no longer only from marginal groups at the fringes of the political spectrum (like the Haredim or communist groups) but also from political and cultural leaders representing the political centre.

> *"Avraham Burg, the new head of the Jewish Agency, the premier Zionist institution whose raison d' être has been to encourage and facilitate immigration to Israel, argued that Zionists must finally accept the Diaspora as a permanent reality [...] The privileging of Israel's position over that of the Diaspora has been one of the most sacred and central aspects of Zionist dogma. By promoting [...] equality, Burg implies that the Jews who choose to remain in Exile are no less legitimate than those who choose to make the Zionist Return"*[484].

The decline in the appeal of classical Zionist ideology and national themes could be seen during the elections of 1996. The highly personalised electoral campaign was

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[481] Weissbrod, Lilly. "Israeli Identity in Transition" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) *"From Rabin to Netanyahu. Israel's Troubled Agenda"* (London: Frank Cass, 1997): p. 47.
[482] Ibid.: p. 58.
[483] "The Economist. A Survey of Israel. After Zionism. Israel at 50" in *The Economist*, 25th of April 1998: p. 5.

characterised by an unprecedented public disinterest in the political issues that were debated. Both candidates Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu positioned themselves in the centre of the political spectrum. "The moderate political position the prime ministerial candidates espoused was directed at an electorate increasingly concerned more with itself than with issues of national concern"[485]. This development can be seen as a change of classical Zionism its transformation from an ideology to an aspect of everyday life in Israel. Azaryahu argues that "the decline of messianic and eschatological notions is a necessary condition for fulfilling the old Zionist dream about 'normalization'"[486].

This 'normalisation' results in the search for a revaluation of past certainties. Two of the most striking examples are the discussion of the position of conservative and reform Judaism in Israeli society and the already mentioned discussion surrounding the 'New Historians'. The debate around the status of Conservative and Reform Judaism (summarised under the slogan: 'Who is a Jew?') has direct implications for Israel's relationship with the diaspora. "In Israel only the Orthodox tradition is officially recognised by the state; in the diaspora, the leading traditions are Reform and Conservative. Israel would have to become more pluralistic in its religious orientation to maintain its ties with world Jewry"[487]. The relaxation of the Law of Return which allowed more loosely defined Jews to come to Israel has brought this international problem into the domestic arena as well. The election of several conservative rabbis into religious councils in 1999 started a heated public

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[484] Aronoff, Myron J. and Pierre M. Atlas. "The Peace Process and Competing Challenges to the Dominant Zionist Discourse" in Peleg, Ilan (ed) *"The Middle East Peace Process. Interdisciplinary Perspectives"* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998): p. 50f.
[485] Ben-Moshe, Danny. "Elections 1996: The De-Zionization of Israeli Politics" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) *"From Rabin to Netanyahu. Israel's Troubled Agenda"* (London: Frank Cass, 1997): p. 67.
[486] Azaryahu, Maoz. "It is no Fairy Tale - Israel at 50" in *Political Geography* 18 1999: p. 145.
[487] Peretz and Doron *op. cit.*: p. 276.

debate about the exclusive recognition of Orthodox rabbis as members of religious councils.

The debate surrounding the 'New Historians' is another expression of this reorientation in Israeli political identity. "Historical 'Revisionism' is in fashion in Israel as in most of the western world as established views of the past are critized, reassessed or openly debunked"[488]. The revaluation of the War of Independence and the question whether or not the Palestinians fled or were expelled by Israeli forces strikes at the heart of the Zionist project by questioning the picture of the Yishuv as the threatened entity that was defending itself in a moral and restrained manner. It can be seen as a result of a change in the character of Israeli society. "In contemporary Israel, with its technological sophistication, its more easy-going individualism and all-too-cynical knowingness, nothing it would seem, is sacred any more"[489].

In this situation different identity groups compete in the political arena for the recognition of their notion of Jewish / Israeli political identity. One can distinguish three main identity groups:

1) Right wing religious identity:

This group sees Zionism as a de-secularised ideology and tries to integrate Jewish national aspirations into a wider religious, or messianic framework. Its emphasis lies on exclusivist Jewish goals. The state of Israel is seen as a *Jewish state,* i.e. a religious state. Here the element of democracy is seen as secondary since Judaism, as a religious or ethnic variable takes precedence in the definition of the state. Its radical fringe envisage Israel as a theocracy.

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[488] Wistrich, Robert and David Ohana. "Introduction" in Wistrich, Robert and David Ohana (eds) *"The Shaping of Israeli Identity. Myth, Memory and Trauma"* (London: Frank Cass, 1995): p. vii.
[489] Ibid: p. viii.

2) Mainstream secularised Jewish nationalists:

This group is split into three subgroups: a) 'Doves' are willing to negotiate about the territories while not endangering the security of Israel. b) 'Hawks' promote the annexation of the occupied territories but not of the Palestinians living in it. The two options which are proposed for the Palestinian population of these areas are transfer out of the territories or the acceptance of their status as second class citizens. This movement sees the state of Israel as a *state of the Jews*. c) Religious liberalists: They envisage Israel as a "Jewish state based on universalistic values, which would ensure the personal liberty and civil rights to all its citizens, irrespective of creed an origin"[490]. All three see the state of Israel as both a *Jewish and democratic state* that is not endowed with eschatological or messianic meanings.

3) Secular binationalists:

This group propagates a separation of state and religion in which personal and not national goals are given priority. The state of Israel is to become a *secular democracy*. This group emphasises a secular Israeli political identity, irrespective of one's religion. This however is still a minority position, held by Jewish left wing groups and by the majority of Palestinian-Israelis.

These groups act and interact on all three levels of political identity building. Their different notions of political identity and their positioning in relation to the centres of political power directly influences the political decision making in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The last chapter of this thesis will turn to a more in-depth analysis of these identity groups.

The aim of this chapter was to analyse the basic political and historic developments in Israeli society that led to the Oslo process and the impact of this process on

Jewish/Israeli political identity building. In order to be able to fully understand this impact, the historical development of Israeli society had to be analysed. During the Yishuv and the first decades of Israeli statehood Labor Zionism was the main unifying ideological force in Israeli society. However this notion of Zionism was not uncontested. Since the split of the 'Revisionist Movement' from the World Zionist organisation in 1935, two competing versions of Zionist ideology existed. In addition the Zionist narrative was contest by religious movements which negated the secular aspects of Zionism. In 1977 the revisionist ideology was able for the first time to penetrate the centre of political decision making, the government.

The religious notion of Jewish/Israeli identity became a decisive political factor in the aftermath of the 1967 war and the settlement drive into the occupied territories. The developing Middle East peace process that had its first peak with the Camp David accords and the subsequent Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty slowly easing the security threat that hang over the state of Israel since its creation. However the Palestinian problem was not seriously addressed until the 1990s, after several years of the intifada and the near collapse of the PLO following the Second Gulf War in 1991.

The Oslo process starting with the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 offered on the one hand the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the two societies. On the other hand the issues of the negotiations made a revaluation of the traditional Zionist ideology a necessity. By dealing with issues such as the voluntary relinquishment of territory to the newly established Palestinian Authority, the negotiations struck at the heart and core of the traditional Jewish/Israeli identity. Questions about the form and the character of the state of Israel and the connected questions of the external and internal security of the state,

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[490] Ibid: p. 212.

the future of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the role of religion in Israeli society became of fundamental importance.

This new debate lead to an increased fragmentation of Jewish/Israeli political identity into three different identity groups which can be characterised as 'right wing religious identity', 'mainstream secularised Jewish nationalists' (including religious liberalists), and 'secular binationalists'. These three different identity groups increasingly compete for recognition of their notion of Jewish/Israeli identity. Their positioning in relation to the centres of political power directly influences the decision making process in the peace process.

The next chapter of the thesis will attempt to analyse the development of Palestinian political identities as well as the constrains on Palestinian political identity building in the autonomous areas.

Constrains on Palestinian Political Identity Building in the Autonomous Areas

This chapter analyses the structures in which Palestinian political identities in the autonomous areas operate. An examination of the social and political structures is necessary since these structures can either aide or constrain political identities. The analysis will attempt to show that internal and external constraints exist that make the expression of political identities difficult. This will provide the framework for the analysis of the process of political identity building and its influence on policy decision which will be the aim of the last chapter of the thesis.

The chapter has two main sections. First the external constraints that Palestinian society is facing will be examined. A short historical overview of the main events in the formation of Palestinian political identity will be pointed out. This should serve as a background for the analysis of the external constraints imposed on the Palestinian society during the negotiations with Israel. In addition the agreements themselves will be analysed. The main focus will be on the Oslo Accords, the Gaza-Jericho agreement, the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Protocol and the Hebron Protocol. After the analysis of the agreements, the effects of these arrangements on Palestinian society will be examined. Here the emphasis will be on the economic situation and the problem of water, the problem of the Palestinian refugees, external security of a possible future Palestinian state, and the status of the Israeli settlements. It will be argued that all these elements constrain the development of a Palestinian state structure. This structure could serve as one level on which Palestinians could express their political identities.

The second section of the chapter will look at the internal constraints that make an expression of Palestinian political identities difficult. The emphasis is here on an examination of the internal political and social structures of the autonomous areas. The aim will be to show how these structures influence the ability of Palestinians to express their political identities on the substate level. The main issues discussed in this respect are: the autocratic and neopatrimonial structure of the PA, the institutional arrangements inside the autonomous areas, especially the role of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), civil society and democracy, the role of the internal security apparatus, and the problem of legal reform.

I. External Constrains on the Ability to Express Palestinian Political Identities

This section of the chapter looks at the struggle for Palestinian national identity. It has two main parts. In the first part the historical development of the national Palestinian identity and the national movement will be described. The main argument will be that Palestinian national identity asserted itself at the beginning of the 19th century and inspired the struggle for independence which reached a new stage with the Oslo accords. The second part of this section will look at the Oslo process and the different agreements between the PLO and the state of Israel. It tries to evaluate how far these agreements allow and constrain political identity building in the Palestinian society in the autonomous areas.

I.I. The Development of Palestinian Political Identity

The origins of a distinct Palestinian 'national' consciousness can be traced back to the beginning of the 19th century. One of the most significant influences on the development of a national consciousness among the population of Palestine under Ottoman rule were the reforms of the Young Turk movement. Most important among these reforms, as far as the development of a Palestinian national consciousness is concerned, was the spread of education and the development of a administrative apparatus which unified the regions of Palestine. "In the rapid evolving new dispensation of the *Tanzimat,* education was to a large degree secularized and brought under control of the government, which established a network of new public schools throughout the country"[491] These new schools laid stress on Ottoman patriotism and developed the origins of a modern (European) national consciousness. The reformed state administration offered opportunities for the graduates of the secular school system and was therefore an alternative to a traditional religious career. These reforms "were crucial instruments in the transformation of society in terms of the formation of new social strata, professionalism along Western lines, and familiarization of large segments of society with the everyday routines of the modern, Western world"[492]. A new Westernised elite of urban notables formed which was the vanguard of the developing national consciousness. The development of an awareness of a distinct national identity in Palestine can be seen in the numerous publications and newspapers of the time.[493] However from the onset 'Palestinian' identity was not sharply differentiated from Arab or even Islamic identity. The

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[491] Kahlidi, Rashid. *"Palestinian Identity. The Construction of Modern National Consciousness"* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997): p. 39.
[492] Ibid: p. 47.
[493] The most popular and widely distributed was '*Filastin*'. The newspaper was published from 1911 onwards and ran a nationalist editorial line. For a content analysis of *'Filastin'* and other Palestinian newspapers of the time see: Ibid: pp. 119-144.

Palestinian elite was concentrated in the urban centres: Jerusalem, Akko, Haiffa, Jaffa, and Nablus. Especially Jerusalem developed into the centre of intellectual and cultural life in Palestine. The main economic factor in Palestine was agriculture. Few industrial developments took place (especially glass and soap in Nablus). However the elite was constituted of landed urban notables. The concentration of land in the hands of the upper class was accelerated by the land reform of 1861 which enabled the purchase and registration of state land as private land. The reform also enabled foreigners to own land (which would greatly help Jewish immigration later on). As a consequence "a great number of peasants lost the legal right to their land and became sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and rural wage laborers"[494]. At the same time the first wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine occurred (First Aliya). However tensions with the new immigrants did not start until the Second Aliya (1904-1914). These new Jewish immigrants aimed at establishing a exclusively Jewish economy and pushed the tenant farmers off the land that they had purchased from the absentee landlords in Palestine and Lebanon (Beirut mainly). These tension caused the "development of the Arab and Jewish economies and, eventually the creation of two separate nationalist movements"[495].

These separate movements collided during the British Mandate. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Britain occupied Palestine. The official Mandate was given to Britain by the League of Nations in 1922. The tensions between the Palestinian inhabitants and the new Jewish immigrants resulted in several incidents of which the 1929 incident was the most serious. During the riots

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[494] Farsoun, Samih K and Christina E. Zacharia. *"Palestine and the Palestinians"* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997): p. 39.

[495] Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. *"Palestinians. The Making of a People"* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994): p. 24. For an analysis of the Arab reaction to the Jewish immigration see: Muslih, Muhammad Y *"The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism"* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988): pp. 69-87.

133 Jews and 116 Palestinians were killed.[496] The first Palestinian nationalist uprising on a major scale occurred between 1936-1939. During the so called 'Arab Revolt'. The British administration nearly lost control over Palestine. "It mobilized thousands of Arabs from every stratum of society, all over the country, heralding the emergence of a national movement in ways that isolated incidents and formal delegations simply could not accomplish"[497]. Internal struggles among the Arab population, a shrinking military leadership (due to deportations and imprisonment by the British administration), and a massive military operation by the British administration finally crushed the revolt. The 'Arab Revolt' can be seen as the first major political assertion of Palestinian national identity. However it left Palestinian society with a weakened political and military leadership which can be seen as one of the causes of the devastating Palestinian defeat in 1948/49.

The 'Arab Revolt' is important in one more aspect. During the revolt the British government established the Peel Commission to inquire into the causes of the uprising. This commission published its report in 1937. In this report, the partition of Palestine was suggested. The report was hesitantly embraced by the 'Zionist Executive'; however the 'Arab High Committee' rejected any partition of the land, because the partition would have left thousands of Arabs in northern Palestine under Jewish rule. After the end of the 'Arab Revolt' tensions between the two national movements in Palestine continued and slowly increased to the level of civil war. The main point of contention was Jewish immigration (which had been limited as a result of the revolt). Two major national movements were established in 1941, the 'Congress of Workers' and the 'Union of Section of Arab Workers'. Both were

[496] See: Farsoun *op. cit.*: p. 102.
[497] Kimmerling *op. cit.*: p. 96. For a detailed analysis of the revolt, its causes, and the major incidents see: Ibid.: pp. 96-123.

nation wide Palestinian organisations and under the influence of the communist movement.

After the World War II the newly founded United Nations (UN) established the 'United Nations Special Commission on Palestine' (UNSCOP) in 1947. This commission published a report in which the partition of Palestine in a Jewish and an Arab state was recommended. The UN general assembly agreed to the plan on the 29th of November 1947. The Arab side rejected it while the Jewish Agency adopted the plan. On the 14th of May 1948 the British Government ended the Mandate in Palestine. On the same day the Jewish Agency declared the state of Israel. The following military confrontation between Jewish/Israeli and Arab forces ended in 1949 with a devastating defeat of the Palestinian side and the exile of thousands of Palestinians.

The defeat and the following exodus of thousands of Palestinians between 1948 and 1949 is one of the most important turning points in the development of Palestinian national identity. '*Al-Nakbah*' (catastrophe) deprived the Palestinian society of a territorial base under their own sovereign control. "Al-Nakbah meant the destruction of Palestinian society and patrimony and Palestinian dispossession, dispersal and destitution"[498]. The exodus established a large diaspora community which was destined to play the leading role in the development of Palestinian national identity until the outbreak of the *intifada* in 1987 and finally the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994.[499] As a result of the exodus of the Palestinians, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 194 which established the right of the refugees to return to Palestine or seek compensation.

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[498] Farsoun *op. cit.*: p. 123.

[499] The defeat and exodus established also the so called Israeli Palestinian. This problematic will not be analysed here. For an overview see: Stendel *op. cit.* and the discussion in the following chapter.

The emphasis of Palestinian national identity building was from then on mainly located in the diaspora. It was here where the Palestinian society started to rebuild itself. The Mufti of Jerusalem tried to reorganise his influence by declaring an 'All Palestine Government' in Gaza with Egyptian protection. However this institution, which was constituted mainly of old notables and landlords, failed to establish legitimacy. In 1952 the Arab League dissolved the 'All Palestine Government'. The years between 1948 and the six days war in 1967 were characterised by the rise of a new Palestinian elite in the diaspora. Three major organisations were founded in this period. In 1951 George Habash organised the 'Arab Nationalists' Movement' (which later transformed into the 'Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine' PFLP). In 1959 Yasir Arafat created the Fateh movement and in 1964 the PLO was founded. All three organisations had a Pan-Arab orientation. The 'Arab Nationalists' Movement' and the Fateh movement were advocating 'armed struggle' as the way to liberate Palestine. This concept became the prime focus of Palestinian national identity building after the 1967 war. The hopes for a Pan-Arab solution to the conflict were shattered in 1967 when the Arab armies suffered a major military defeat. However the defeat had two effects on Palestinian society. Firstly it became clear that the hope of help from outside states had to be abandoned. In consequence a distinctly Palestinian political identity began to take precedence over the Pan- Arab political identity. Secondly, because of the occupation by Israel the Palestinians that remained in Israel after 1948/49 were reunited with the Arabs in the newly occupied territories. In response to the war, the UN security council adopted Resolution 242, which called for a two-state-solution and the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict"[500]. The missing 'the' before the term 'territories' is crucial as it allows Israel to claim it needs to withdraw only from part of the occupied

[500] "Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967" in Farsoun *op. cit.*: p. 319.

territories. The problem of the Palestinian refugees is only mentioned in one phrase that calls "for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem"[501].

Efforts to form a national Palestinian identity inside the occupied territories resulted in the establishment of a National Guidance Committee (NGC) in 1979. It was formed by majors which had a nationalistic ideology and orientation. These came to power in the 1976 municipal elections. However, outside the occupied territories guerrilla groups took the lead in the struggle for an expression of Palestinian national identity after the 1967 war. Although they differed in ideological orientation they had one concept in common. "Throughout their evolution, the guerrilla groups composing the PLO consistently described armed struggle as the principal, even the exclusive means of liberating Palestine"[502]. How much this ideological goal became part of the mainstream Palestinian thinking can be seen from the fact that in 1969 Yassir Arafat's Fateh guerrilla movement took control of the PLO. The Palestinian national movement's main concern after 1967 was to find bases from which it could carry the armed struggle into Israel and the occupied territories. The development between 1967 and 1982 was characterised by two major defeats which forced the nationalist movement to relocate its bases further and further away from its theatre of operation. The first base of operations was Jordan. However as the guerrilla groups gained more and more autonomy they posed a threat to the regime of King Hussein. The tensions came to a height on the 6th of September 1970 "when members of the PFLP flouted Jordanian sovereignty so openly as to bring three hijacked international airliners into the desert airstrip in Jordan"[503]. This

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[501] Ibid: p. 319.
[502] Sayigh, Yezid. "Armed Struggle and State Formation" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, 4, 1997: p. 17. For a detailed analysis of the concept of armed struggle and its importance in the development of Palestinian struggle for a state see: Sayigh, Yezid. *"Armed Struggle and the Search for State. The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
[503] Cobban, Helena. *"The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. People, Power and Politics"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984): p. 49.

incident sparked a military confrontation between the Jordanian troops and the Palestinian guerrillas which ended with the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970/71. The organisation was forced to relocate in Lebanon. The 1973 October war which resulted in the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979 did not enhance the position of the Palestinians in their struggle. Although there were provisions for the Palestinian problem in the agreement, these were never followed up.[504]

In 1974 at the meeting of the 'Palestinian National Council' (PNC), one of the main political organs of the PLO, the decision was made to found a state on any part of the 'liberated' homeland. This was a crucial decision since it was the first step in changing the general political goal of 'liberating' all of Palestine to accepting a 'two-state-solution'. The state envisaged was an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This decision had ramifications for the Palestinian diaspora. The diaspora was now effectivley split into two groups: the refugees of the 1948/49 and the Palestinians which fled after the 1967 war. The first group of refugees were effectively marginalised from the political process since, with an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, only the second group could expect to return to their former homes. Israel had and has no interest in allowing the refugees of the 1948/49 war return to their original homes. This would substantially alter the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in Israel and therefore 'threaten' the Jewish character of the state. During the summit of the Arab League in Rabat (Morocco) on the 26th of October 1974, the Arab states backed this decision and recognised the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

[504] As a result of Camp David, Egypt was ousted by the Arab world which lost with Egypt its main military and political power.

With this diplomatic backing the PLO set out to develop its already existing structures in Lebanon into a quasi-state structure. However starting from 1975 the organisation became increasingly involved in the Lebanese civil war. Its involvement continued until the 1982 invasion of Israel, which after a siege of Beirut for several weeks, forced the PLO in August to evacuate to Tunis. This marked the end of the Palestinian quasi-state in Lebanon. This exodus of the leadership from the region meant that for the first time it was territorially separated from the occupied territories. In the following years this physical separation from the conflict was mirrored by the PLO's weakness in the international arena and by a slow development of a new leadership inside the occupied territories. The PLO's weak stand was reflected in the resolutions of the 1987 Amman summit of the Arab League. For the first time in the history of Arab summitry, "both the concluding statement and the secret resolutions failed to mention the goal of an independent Palestinian state [...] The outcome reflected the summit's low priority regarding the Palestinian issue, to which the Palestinian community responded with overt rage and frustration"[505].

The discontent on the part of the Palestinian society living in the occupied territories, coupled with agitation from part of the PLO under Abu Jihad (which aimed at escalating the situation in the occupied territories), resulted in a massive uprising starting in December 1987, the *intifada*.[506] The *intifada* had profound effects on the situation of the Palestinian national movement. Firstly it propelled the Palestinian problem back to the attention of the international media. As the uprising continued the international 'image' of Israel was damaged as the media portrayed the brutality of the 'iron fist' policy devised by then defence minister Yitzhak Rabin.

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[505] Sela, Avraham. *"The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order"* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998): p. 296.

[506] For an analysis of the aims and tactics of Abu Jihad and the military wing of the PLO see: Inbari, Pinhas. *"The Palestinians between Terrorism and Statehood"* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press,

Secondly, during the *intifada* a new internal leadership asserted itself in contrast to the PLO leadership in Tunis. Thirdly, at the outbreak of the uprising one of the most important radical Islamic organisations, Hamas, was founded. "Hamas - the Islamic Resistance Movement - was born of the *intifada* which marked the beginning of the true political revival of the Islamic forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip"[507]. Hamas is based on the Muslim Brotherhood movement and serves as its military wing. Hamas soon developed into a "serious challenge to the secular forces led by the PLO"[508].

During the uprising the developments on the diplomatic arena continued. On the 31st of July 1988 King Hussein of Jordan declared that he no longer claimed sovereignty over the West Bank. "On the 15th of November 1988 the uprising reached its peak. The Palestinian National Council in Algiers proclaimed, in seldom found unanimity, an independent Palestinian state"[509]. The basis of the declaration was UN General Assembly Resolution 181, the resolution which decided on a partition of Palestine. Included in the declaration were also a recognition of Resolutions 242 and 338. This recognition marked a shift in official PLO policy. Inherently, in the acceptance of these resolutions is a recognition of the state of Israel and the goal of a two-state settlement of the conflict. Parallel to this the PLO and the US government approached each other. After Arafat's statement in Geneva in December 1988 in which he recognised the rights of all participants in the Middle East conflict (including Israel) and denounced terrorism, the USA and the PLO entered into an open dialogue. These talks resulted in an American Peace initiative

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1996): pp. 64-83. Within days protests developed into a massive uprising with mass demonstrations, strikes, road blocks and later on mass resignations of Palestinian tax officials and police men.

[507] Abu-Amr, Ziad. "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, 4, 1993: p. 5.

[508] Ibid: p. 12.

[509] Baugarten, Helga. *"Palästina. Befreiung in den Staat"* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991): p. 305. [Translation by the author]

(the 'Baker Plan'). After a failed terrorist attack on Tel Aviv on the 29th of May 1990, which Arafat failed to denounce, the US terminated the official dialogue with the PLO.

The start of the Gulf crisis in August 1990 marked the beginning of one of the worst disasters for the Palestinian national movement. "The 1990-19 Gulf crisis resulted in one of the worst setbacks for the Palestinians in modern times. Only the 1936-39 Arab Revolt and the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars were more costly"[510]. The decision of the PLO leadership (supported by the Palestinians in the occupied territories) to take an neutral position towards Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait resulted not only in the extradition of around 300,000 Palestinians from Kuwait (which meant the end of their remittances for their families), but also in the end of the financial backing of the PLO from the Gulf monarchies. In addition to these economic losses, the PLO found itself internationally isolated after the end of the Gulf war. It was from this weakened position that the Palestinians took part in the in Madrid/Washington peace conference which started on the 31 October 1991 as part of the Jordanian delegation.[511]

The negotiations did not achieve any concrete results. Inbari argues that this is partly due to the fear of Arafat that a breakthrough at the conference would result in a power loss of the 'outside' PLO elite.[512] The stalemate at the negotiations was also caused by the hard line approach of the Israeli Likud government under Prime Minister Shamir. The change of government in Israel in 1992 which brought the Labour party to power opened up the possibility of another channel for negotiations. The Labour party was elected on an election platform which promised results in the

[510] Mattar, Philip. "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis" in *The Middle East Journal* 48, 1 1994: p. 31.
[511] The composition of the Palestinian delegation which had to be constituted solely of Palestinians from the occupied territories (excluding East Jerusalem) that were not members of the PLO was at the heart of a power struggle of the Palestinian national movement between the new leadership 'inside' the territories and the 'outside' PLO leadership in Tunis. See: Inbari *op. cit.*: pp. 139-151.

'Peace Process'. In secret negotiations in Norway (of which the Palestinian negotiation team in Washington was not informed), the PLO and the Israeli government (primarily Yossi Beilin and foreign minister Shimon Peres) negotiated the 'Declaration of Principles' (DOP). The DOP outlined the establishment of an autonomous administration for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and Jericho and a timetable for discussions on further developments of the autonomy of the Palestinians. The DOP was signed on the 13th of September 1993 in Washington. A few days earlier the PLO and Israel exchanged letters of recognition. This marked the beginning of a process which resulted in the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Gaza Strip and Jericho in May 1994.

The historical development of the Palestinian national movement has several characteristics. First and foremost it is a struggle to establish a state structure on the former territory of Palestine. Since the defeat in 1948/49 the Palestinian society had lost the ability to develop its own state structures. Until 1967, the territory of the former Palestine were under Israeli, Jordanian (West Bank), and Egyptian (Gaza Strip) control. After 1967 Israel dominated the territory alone. It can be seen from this outline of the historical developments that the structures of national identity and an awareness of a distinct 'Palestinianess' (albeit with 'Arab' or 'Islamic' content) which originated in the 19th century remained alive and even survived the destruction of the structures of Palestinian society in 1948/49 and in 1967. After the 1967 war, the national movement restructured its main focus along the lines of the ideology of 'armed struggle'. However in the following years, the movement was expelled from its two main bases in Jordan and Lebanon. Before its expulsion the movement however was able to establish quasi-state structures and near autonomy in both countries. Beginning in 1974, the PLO's aspiration gradually narrowed from seeking

[512] See: Ibid.: pp. 190-200.

the 'liberation' of all of Palestine, to achieving a 'two-state-solution'. Since 1982 the leadership of the PLO (which dominated the movement since 1969) had to operate outside the region in Tunis. This situation did not change until 1994 when the PA was established. The struggle to establish state structures was launched on two fronts: the military front in direct confrontations with Israel and on the diplomatic front. However at the time of the Oslo process, the PLO was internally and externally in a very weak position. This imbalance of power resulted in agreements that are severely restricted as far as the possibility of future transformation of the partial autonomy into statehood is concerned. In the next part of this section of the chapter, the agreements themselves will be analysed.

I.II. The Israeli-Palestinian Agreements and the 'Peace Process'

The 'Oslo Accords

What is commonly understood as the 'Oslo accords' consist of two separate sets of documents: the letters of recognition between the PLO and Israel and the 'Declaration of Principles' (DOP).[513] Both sets of documents must be seen as an integrated whole because the letters of recognition made it possible for the PLO and Israel to sign the DOP. "Without the prior agreement on mutual recognition there would have been no meaningful agreement on Palestine self-government"[514].

The weak bargaining position of the PLO, which will be obvious in the entire negotiation process after Oslo, can already be seen in the letters of recognition. "While the letters of mutual recognition have great clarity with regard to Israeli

[513] For a documentary record of the accords see: Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington D.C. *"The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement. A Documentary Record"* (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994).

demands, they are full of obscurity concerning the rights of the Palestinian people"[515]. The letter from Arafat to Rabin endows the state of Israel with legitimacy, however fails to define which Israel is recognised (Israel in which part of the former Palestine). The act of recognising Israel amounts to a recognition of Israeli laws (including those that are used to expropriate land, expel Palestinians ect.). The PLO recognises Israel's right to exist in peace and security which implies that Israel's right to exist takes precedence over the rights of the Palestinian people. Furthermore the letter renounces terrorism and declares the parts in the Palestinian Charter which contradict this as inoperative (with this step Arafat exceeded his authority since only the PNC can change the Charter). In the letter of Prime Minister Rabin, which is about a fifth in length, Israel simply recognises the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and declares her willingness to start negotiations with the PLO.

The imbalance in power is also obvious in the DOP. It divides the negotiations in two phases: an interim period and a permanent status. During the interim period the Palestinian Authority (PA) initially has authority over the Gaza Strip and Jericho from which the Israeli military will withdraw. The PA has authority in six spheres: internal security, education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. These powers shall not encompass external security, foreign relations, Israeli settlements and Israeli citizens. "These powers are therefore not territorial but personal, relating to Palestinians alone and excluding foreigners and Israelis"[516]. The issues for the final status negotiations are: the status of Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, security arrangements and final borders. Both parties undertake the commitment not to prejudice or pre-empt these issues in the agreements reached for the interim phase.

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[514] Shlaim, Avi. "The Oslo Accord" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, 3 1994: p. 25.

This situation leaves the Palestinian side with hardly any bargaining power. The only concessions it can make are on the final status issues. This situation can be seen in the fact that the Palestinian side had to accept, however grudgingly, the actions of the Israeli governments during the interim process which were of direct relevance for the final status issues. Two major issues need to be pointed out. Firstly, the timetable set out in the Oslo Accords for the development of the Palestinian autonomy was not implemented. Secondly, Israel continued to expand existing Israeli settlements and in the case of Jabal Abu Ghnheim (Har Homa) even started constructing new ones.

According to the timetable set out in the DOP, the final status negotiations should have been concluded in May 1999. The failure to meet this deadline is due to substantial delays during the interim period. This has been particularly the case under the Likud government of Prime Minister Netanyahu which came to power in 1996. "The opponents of the process itself, that is, opponents of the principles of compromise upon which it is based, can interrupt, stall, complicate, and even thwart it by (prematurely from the point of view of supporters) treating the agreement as a legal codex rather than a political framework"[517].

The second issue which is important in this respect is the enlargements of Israeli settlements since the beginning of the 'Peace Process' in 1993. This can be seen by the rise in the number of settlers: between 1979 and 1989 the number rose from 12,000 to 75,000, however from 1989 to 1994 the number rose to 150,000. "Strikingly enough, the greatest increase began to manifest itself after the Oslo

[515] Dajani, Burhan. "The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents. A Textual Analysis" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, 3 1994: p. 6.
[516] Ibid: p. 15.
[517] Lustick, Ian S. "The Oslo Agreement as an Obstacle to Peace" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27, 1 1997: p. 61f.

Accords had been signed in 1993"[518]. The Likud government under Prime Minister Netanyahu shortly after taking power stepped up the building campaign by voting to abolish previously imposed building restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza. In addition to this, "the government approved the use of about three hundred government owned mobile homes to expand settlements in the West Bank"[519]. The relevance of beginning construction of the new settlement on a hill called Jabal Abu Ghnheim (Har Homa) at the outskirts of East Jerusalem lies in the fact that this new settlement will contribute to a nearly closed ring of Israeli settlements surrounding East Jerusalem. Such a ring would prevent any territorial continuity between East Jerusalem (which is predominantly inhabited by Palestinians) and a future Palestinian state. The expansion of settlements prevents the territorial continuity of a future Palestinian state which makes its internal and external security structure dependent on Israel.

Considering that the final status issues are the most crucial for the construction of a sovereign state structure the agreement restricts the Palestinian side's possibilities to develop such a structure and therefore find an adequate expression of its political identities. However the accords have one main achievement as Michels points out. The agreements recognise that the Palestinian people exist and that they have rights. "The Israeli recognition of 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people' (Article III), the first genuine recognition in the history of Zionism that the Palestinian are 'a people', renounces no less than the Palestinians have done, key elements of the Israeli narrative"[520]. To sum up, the Oslo

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[518] De Jong, Jan. "The Geography of Politics. Israel's Settlement Drive after Oslo" in Giacaman, George and Dag Jørund Lønning (eds) *"After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems"* (London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 78.
[519] Shikaki, Khalil. "The Future of the Peace Process and Palestinian Strategies" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, 1 1996: p. 85.
[520] Michels, Jeffrey. "National Vision and the Negotiation of Narratives: The Oslo Agreement" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, 1 1994: p. 29.

Accords reflect the imbalance of power of the two negotiating parties. They put severe constrains on the process of future Palestinian state building and therefore constrain the Palestinian's need for a meaningful expression of their political identity on the state level. However in the Oslo Accords Israel is recognising for the first time the Palestinian's existence as a people and their legitimate rights. However the Oslo Accords only marked the starting point for a number of further negotiations concerning the implementation of the interim phase. We will now turn to the agreements reached during these negotiations. Again the main focus will be on the question which possibilities and which constraints these agreements construct for the expression of Palestinian political identity.

The Interim Stage Agreements

Four agreements will be the main focus of this analysis: The Gaza-Jericho agreement reached on the 4th of May 1994 (Cairo agreement), the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Protocol singed on 29th of April 1994 (included later in the Cairo agreement), and the Hebron Protocol signed on the 15th of January 1997. These three agreements regulate the fundamental workings of the PA.

The Gaza-Jericho agreement is the agreement that transferred jurisdiction to the PA in those areas. However, as Shehadeh points out, the Gaza-Jericho agreement leaves serious legal restrictions in place. Article VII, 9 states that all laws and military orders prior to the agreement remain in effect in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. This formula "perpetuates, with Palestinian consent, the occupier's law"[521]. As far as the jurisdiction over land is concerned, the Gaza-Jericho agreement preserves the status quo. It does not challenge the land confiscations by the Israeli authorities that

[521] Shehadeh, Raja. "Questions of Jurisdiction. A Legal Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, 4 1994: p. 19.

occurred during the occupation. As far as the jurisdiction over water is concerned, it also does not change the existing situation. The PA can neither change the amount of water that is allocated to the Palestinian areas nor can it change the difference in price for water that Israeli citizens and Palestinians are paying (Palestinians are paying ten times the amount per litre). In addition to this, no provisions were made to hold Israel liable for the twenty eight years of occupation. "Israel is [...] exempted from legal responsibility for acts committed during its nearly twenty eight years of occupation"[522]. All legal claims against Israel have to be referred to the PA. If Israel is to pay any compensation, the PA has to reimburse Israel. The Palestinian side also undertook the commitment to keep the employees of the civil administration that Israel had appointed in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. This short overview of just some of the restrictions shows that the establishment of the PA was from the outset burdened with legal restrictions in many ways. It did not have full control over the autonomous areas.

The Economic Protocol which became part of the Gaza Jericho agreement imposed further restrictions on the PA. The protocol covers all essential Palestinian economic sectors, the Palestinian and Israeli roles, and Palestinian economic relations with Israel and other countries. It does not allow the PA to have its own currency (which deprives it of the instrument of monetary policy). However it does allow significant control over banking operations and the establishment of a 'Palestinian Monetary Authority' for that purpose. It does allow the PA to collect direct taxes, however the collection of indirect taxes (such as tariffs and VAT) is restricted. The PA can set tariffs on imports according to the last General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs GATT which takes effect in Israel. Therefore it can not have

[522] Arubi, Naseer H. "Early Empowerment. The Burden not the Responsibility" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, 2 1995: p. 37.

lower tariffs than Israel. The protocol lists goods that the PA can import from other countries (other than Israel). For some of these goods quantitative restrictions are set in the protocol. "The protocol states that there is to be free movement of both agricultural produce and industrial goods between the two sides without additional customs and import taxes"[523]. However there are quantitative restrictions on Palestinian exports of vegetables products, poultry and eggs to Israel. As far as the movement of workers to Israel is concerned, the protocol states that the number of persons allowed into Israel for work would be negotiated from time to time between the two sides. The protocol reflects the clear Israeli goal of "protecting its own producers and maintaining insofar as possible its dominant share in the Palestinian market"[524]. Taken together the Gaza-Jericho agreement and the Economic Protocol arrange the set up of Palestinian autonomy which could serve as a structure for the expression of a distinct Palestinian political identity. However this structure is still severely restricted. One of the main restrictions at this stage is the limited amount of territory that is controlled by the PA. The Hebron Protocol was meant to enlarge the area controlled by the PA. It is to this protocol that we turn now.

The Hebron Protocol regulated the control over the city of Hebron. It divided the city into two areas, one under the control of the Israeli military (the old city) and one under control of the PA. "By signing the protocol and agreeing to pull back from West Bank territory, the Likud for the first time was effectively endorsing the underlying land-for-peace assumption of the Oslo accords"[525]. However during the negotiations of the protocol the Israeli government received backing from the US administration for its claim to maintain control both over the timetable and the scope

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[523] Elmusa, Sharif S. and Mahmud El-Jaafari. "Power and Trade. The Israeli-Palestinian Economic Protocol" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, 2 1995: p. 23.
[524] Ibid: p. 29.
[525] Andoni, Lamis. "Redefining Oslo. Negotiating the Hebron Protocol" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, 3 1997: p. 17.

of future withdrawals. The Hebron negotiations were made difficult by the fact that there is an Israeli settlement in the centre of Hebron's old city. Under the Oslo Accords the issue of settlements is a final status issue. The Palestinian side agreed in the Oslo Accords not to negotiate the dismantlement of settlements during the interim negotiations. However the importance of the Hebron protocol as far as the new situation under the Likud government at the time was concerned, lies not the fact that 20 percent of the city remain under Israeli control, but in the fact that the Likud government agreed to cede 80 percent of the city and to transfer it to Palestinian autonomy. The significance of the Hebron protocol for the need to develop a Palestinian state structure however is that further problems have been put in its way. Especially the Israeli control of the timetable and extent of withdrawals means that there are no guarantees or safeguards that the PA will get full control over the West Bank in the near future. The aspiration of the Palestinian society to express their political identity is therefore further restricted.

The Wye River Memorandum of September 1998 and the Sharm El-Sheikh memorandum of October 1999 are basically agreements about the implementation of the earlier Oslo and Cairo agreements. In the Wye River memorandum Israel agreed to redeploy from a further 13 % of the West Bank, to allow the Gaza airport to open and to create a 'safe passage' for Palestinians between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and to release some Palestinian prisoners. In return, the Palestinian Authority agreed to revise the PLO Charter and to erase the passages which call for the destruction of Israel. In addition the Palestinian side agreed to reduce the number of Palestinian policemen and to make further efforts in the control of Palestinian terrorist activities. However on the 2nd of November 1998 the Netanyahu government stopped the implementation of the agreement, the day the agreement was scheduled to be implemented. The Sharm El-Sheikh memorandum between the Palestinian

Authority and the Barak government was in large parts a reiteration of the Wye River memomrandum. Again Israel agreed to a phased redeployment of further territories of the West Bank, the release of Palestinian prisoners, the creation of a 'safe passage', and the resumption of the final status negotiations which were stopped under the Netanyahu government. The only new item on this list was that Israel allowed the beginning of the construction of the Gaza Sea Port. In return the Palestinian Authority agreed to further increase its efforts in the fight against terrorism. The safe passage route between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank which allows the connection between the different 'islands' of Palestinian controlled areas was subsequently opened. However the transit of the safe passage route is tightly controlled by Israel. Palestinians have to apply to the Israeli authorities for magnetic passes in order to be able to use this transit passage. The passage is only open twice a week and any Palestinian travelling on this route must keep within a time limit.

Seen as a package all agreements analysed here enable the Palestinian society to start establishing a structure which would allow a free expression of their political identities. The agreements recognise the Palestinians as 'a people' and as having rights to self determination. However the agreements put severe hurdles in the way of future Palestinian state building. There are political constraints (the control and jurisdiction over territory is limited) and economic restraints (the Palestinian economy will remain dependent on the Israeli economy). The main drawback however is the postponing of the most important issues as far as the state building process is concerned, until the final status negotiations. This situations coupled with the missing of any safeguards against Israeli unilateral actions which could create facts on the ground needs to be examined in more detail. The next part of this section of the chapter will look at this problem. The main focus will be on analysing how the

'Peace Process' developed on the ground and what effect these agreements had on the lives of the Palestinian population.

I.III. The 'Peace Process' and its Implications for the Palestinian Population

The 'Peace Process' had a profound impact on the lives of the Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The fact that the first Palestinian entity in the territory of the former Palestine since 1948 was created is the one of the most important aspects of the 'Peace Process'. Now the question is what form it will have and if the PA will be capable and allowed to transform itself into a state structure. The problem is, however, that "the agreement does not define the political nature or territorial extension of the future Palestinian entity"[526]. What form this entity will take depends to a large extend on the development of the 'Peace Process' and on the Israeli side's willingness to let the PA progress towards statehood.[527] Among the issues that lie ahead in the future negotiation process are: economic development of the autonomous areas, the problem of the Palestinian refugees, the external security of the autonomous areas (and connected with it the future position of the Israeli settlements). The outcome of the negotiations on these issues will depend to some extent on the Israeli governments the PA will negotiate with. These issues will now be reviewed individually.

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[526] Butenschøn, Nils A. "The Oslo Agreement. From the White House to Jabal Abu Ghnheim" in Giacaman, George and Dag Jørund Lønning (eds) *"After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems"* (London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 19.

[527] The PA's internal challenges will be analysed in the next section of this chapter.

Economy and Water

The economic situation in the autonomous areas is at a very precarious stage. As a World Bank report for 1996 states: "The estimates reveal an economy operating under stress"[528]. Especially hard hit by this development was the Gaza Strip. Here the economic decline did not begin only in 1994. It started already in 1982 and was accelerated during the *intifada* and in the aftermath of the Gulf War . The main reasons for this decline were the drastic cut in the number of permits issued for workers from Gaza who worked in Israel and the loss of remittances from the Palestinian guest workers in the Gulf who were expelled after the conflict ended. The amount of remittances lost amounted to $ 350 million in 1991 alone. "The steady sealing of the Israeli market to Arab labour, especially since the start of the gulf crisis, proved most damaging for the Gaza economy given its inordinate dependence on employment inside Israel"[529]. After the implementation of the interim agreements, the situation did not change. The use of closures in the West Bank and Gaza did not only disrupt the flow of labour but also the flow of goods between Israel and the autonomous areas. "The progressively more severe 'closures' imposed on Gaza and the West Bank not only restricted the flow of workers, but also impended - sometimes even halted - the movement of merchandise form the PNA into or through Israel"[530].

Other problematic issues are the allocation of water quotas and the control of water resources. The current situation is characterised by an imbalance of water allocation and water pricing between the Palestinian and Israeli side. "While a Palestinian uses on average 107-156 cubic meters (cm)/year, an Israeli uses 370

[528] Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. "The Palestinian Economy. Excerpts form a World Bank Report" in *Palestine-Israel Journal* 5, 1 1998: p. 108.
[529] Roy, Sarah. "Separation or Integration. Closure and the Economic Future of the Gaza Strip Revisited" in *The Middle East Journal* 48, 1 1994: p. 14.

cm/year, and a Jewish settler uses between 605-1,714 cm/year"[531]. The imbalance is also reflected in the pricing system. Israelis pay $ 0.40 per cubic metre for domestic use and $ 0.16 per cubic meter for agricultural use, the Palestinian standard rate is $1.20 per cubic meter. If this imbalance is to be changed, so argues Soffer, the only possibility will be to introduce desalination in the future because both Israeli and Palestinian water demands will grow. "At this point Israel is the only developed state in the Jordan Basin. On this account, demands are being made on Israel to be the first to enter the age of desalination and to revolutionize its economy"[532]. The change in distribution and pricing of water is especially important for the autonomous areas since their economy is based largely on agriculture. The higher price the Palestinian agricultural industry has to pay is a burden on the competitiveness of their produce.

Palestinian Refugees in the Diaspora

The status of the Palestinian refugees in the diaspora has not been addressed in the interim agreements. It has been postponed until the final status negotiations. Therefore "political progress on the Palestinian refugee issue verges on the nonexistent, both in the multilateral and bilateral tracks of the peace process"[533]. Brynen argues that under no conceivable circumstances will the Israeli state agree to a large scale return of refugees form 1948. "No Israeli government ever will countenance substantially changing the demographic balance of the state, the raison d'être of which is its Jewish character"[534]. The second possible route is also difficult.

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[530] Awartani, Hisham and Ephraim Kleiman. "Economic Interactions among Participants in the Middle East Peace Process" in *The Middle East Journal* 51, 2 1997: p. 223.
[531] Issac, Jad. "A Palestinian Perspective on the Water Crisis" in *Palestine-Israel Journal* 5, 1 1998: p. 55.
[532] Soffer, Arnon. "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict over Water Resources" in *Palestine-Israel Journal* 5, 1 1998: p. 50.
[533] Brynen, Rex. "Imagining A Solution: Final Status Arrangements and Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, 2 1997: p. 42.
[534] Ibid: p. 45.

Compensation payments would amount to several tens of billions of dollars. In addition to this, little attention has been paid to what possible resources might be available for the payments. The approaches of the Israeli and Palestinian side towards the problem of refugees are different. As Zureik argues, the Israeli approach to the problem seems to be informed by a liberal model. "Thus, each refugee case is treated individually, without considering the relevance of group membership to refugee rights. When refugee rights clash with state rights, the liberal model accedes primacy to the state"[535]. The Palestinian side's approach seems to be informed by a communitarian model which sees the refugees as a group from which the individuals define their identity and status. This view of the problem, so argues Zureik, is supported by UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which treats the refugees as a group and not as individuals. However, by accepting the Madrid formula for the 'Peace Process' which excluded the UN as a mechanism for solving the problem of the refugees (and set up its own Refugee Working Group instead), the Palestinian side has "seriously weakened their demand for the implementation of the right of return"[536]. The issue of the refugees remains therefore unresolved. This puts a severe restriction on the efforts of Palestinian state building since large parts of Palestinian society are forced to remain in exile.

External Security and Israeli Settlements

Both external security and the connected issue of the Israeli settlements have been postponed until the final status negotiations. During the interim period the PA is only responsible for internal security and the prevention of terrorist attacks against Israel. The internal security arrangements are however limited to Palestinians only.

[535] Zureik, Elia. "Palestinian Refugees and Peace" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, 1 1994: p. 16.
[536] Ibid: p. 16f.

Settlements, Israeli citizens and foreigners are excluded. In addition, the large Palestinian police force that was created for the task is a heavy economic burden on the economy in the autonomous areas. "The highly visible police and intelligence services consumed a large share of the self-rule administration's meager financial resources"[537]. One factor that will be decisive for the external security of a future Palestinian state is the issue of the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. All the settlements and bypass roads in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are currently fully under Israeli control. If these settlements and roads remain under Israeli jurisdiction a future Palestinian state would not have territorial continuity. De Jong speaks of a 'cantonisation' of the Palestinian areas. He sees six cantonal clusters emerging: Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho, Hebron, and the Gaza Strip. This cantons would remain largely unconnected. In addition to this, "the Palestinian clusters will be subject to a territorial fragmentation, much more serious then appears at first sight. The consolidation of Jewish settlement blocs strongly prejudices what cohesively remains for the Palestinian areas in between"[538]. The settlements and their bypass roads would cut the six cantons into smaller parts. The main Palestinian thoroughfare from Jenin and Nablus in the north to Hebron and Dhahriya in the south is intersected at various points by the bypass roads and military checkpoints. Therefore any territorial sovereignty of a future Palestinian state would be severely limited from the outset.

The 'Peace Process' enabled the Palestinian society to create an autonomous entity in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. However the PA which developed since 1994 faces serious external challenges. It is confronted with a precarious economic

[537] Weinberger, Naomi. "The Palestinian National Security Debate" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, 3 1995: p. 22.

situation made more difficult by an imbalance of water allocation and pricing between Israelis and Palestinians. In addition, large segments of Palestinian society still live as refugees outside the autonomous areas. Another unresolved question is the issue of external security and the status of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These problems are coupled with the serious delay in the timetable set out in the Oslo Accords. This in addition with the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank make future negotiations over final status issues very difficult. However the external constrains imposed on the PA are only one part of the problem. In the next section of this paper the internal constrains that the PA itself is imposing on the Palestinian society are analysed. The main focus here will be to see if the PA is willing and able to let a democratic structure evolve in which a Palestinian civil society could develop and political identities could be expressed.

II. Internal Constrains on the Palestinian Society

The main internal constrains that prevent a free development of Palestinian political identities are: the autocratic and neopatrimonial structure of the PA, the weak political institutions (especially the Palestinian Legislative Council PLC in contrast to the Executive Authority), the constrained development of civil society and democracy, the newly established internal security services, and the problem of legal reform. These issues will now be analysed individually.

[538] De Jong *op. cit.*: p. 104.

The Structure of the PA

After the establishment of the PA in 1994, two issues have been pointed out by critics examining the structure of the Palestinian elite: the personal leadership style of Yassir Arafat, and connected with this the neopatrimonial structure of elite formation in the PA. As Brynen argues the "members of the PA appointed (or apparently appointed) are hardly reflective of the broad scope of Palestinian society in a statistical sense"[539]. There is a disproportionate representation of middle-class professionals and traditional elites, and no members of the opposition. The bulk of members are from Fateh or pro-Fateh independents. However, taken as a whole the elite structure is heterogeneous, "characterised by a multiplicity of sources, overlapping 'elite-types' and multiple potential lines of elite cleavage"[540]. Cohesion depends on Yassir Arafat's charismatic leadership which is able to command legitimacy and influence over all political power structures. Brynen calls the structure that has been set up a "charismatic autocracy"[541]. Arafat managed to bind all decision making power to the presidency and more concretely to his person because "any devolution of political and economic decision-making would weaken is ability to manage both elites and mass constituencies"[542]. In order to achieve this, Arafat has, to a large extent, relied on political patronage and neopatrimonialism.[543] Brynen sees this structure as an internal function of the PLO which enabled Arafat to accommodate the various groups and factions that make up the PLO structure. It can be seen as "a direct outgrowth of the 1968 takeover by the resistance movements of

[539] Brynen, Rex. "The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, 3 1995: p. 38.
[540] Ibid: p. 40.
[541] Ibid: p. 41.
[542] Brynen, Rex. "The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian Politics" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, 1 1995: p. 32.
[543] Brynen defines the term 'neopatrimonialism' following Weber as: a political structure where the power of the ruler is extended through a complex network of functionaries and subfunctionaries. This informal legal structure is overlaid by the structure of a state. See: ibid: p. 24f.

the PLO"[544]. This system of trying to accommodate various factions by political patronage has been translated into the political structure of the PA. One could argue that such an elite based social and political structure would be best for a transitional period. It does provide stability at a time of deep transformations in society and in the political system. However, as Sabella points out:

> *"the overwhelming participation of Palestinians in the election for the Administrative 'Legislative' Council and for the president of the PNA, on 20 January 1996, is proof of exactly the opposite point of view, the need for democratic and pluralistic systems that would secure the needed stability for the society and for the governing authority. Thus exit and opinion polls conducted prior to and on election day show Palestinian voter expectations for an open and free system of governance"*[545].

These reflections point towards the society's need to express multiple political identities. The present structure, although guaranteeing a certain coherence on the level of the political elites cannot be said to accommodate this need. How strong the elite structure is in the PA's political system and what an overwhelming position the presidency commands will become clearer when the institutional arrangements (especially the role of the PLC) are examined.

Institutional Arrangements: The Role of the Palestinian Legislative Council PLC

The Palestinian Legislative Council PLC was elected on the 20th of January 1996. The timing of the elections was a crucial fact, partly determining the role the PLC would be allowed to play in the Palestinian political system under autonomy. The

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[544] Hilal, Jamil. "PLO Institutions: The Challenge Ahead" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, 1 1993: p. 55.

[545] Sabella, Bernard. "Political Trends and the New Elites in Palestine" in Palestinian Academic Society of the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). *"Palestine, Jordan, Israel. Building a Base*

elections took place after the establishment of the executive branch of government (as was laid out in the Oslo Accords). This had a particular effect on the role of the opposition. "Prior to the elections the National Authority, as the acting government, was able to weaken the radical Islamic opposition when the latter tried to challenge its authority, and succeeded in establishing itself as the only central power"[546]. This weakening of the opposition had two connected effects. Firstly, it marginalised the Islamic opposition and made it therefore harder to control its military wings. Secondly, the opposition boycotted the elections of 1996. This was a particularly serious failure of the political system. By failing to incorporate the Islamic opposition (apart form a couple of Islamists who ran as independent candidates) the PA did not achieve legitimisation from this part of the Palestinian society. Therefore it is left with the same dilemma it faced before the elections: "the opposition does not recognise the legitimacy of the authority, thus reject being a 'loyal' opposition"[547].

The elections reflected this situation. The Fateh movement won 57 seats in the PLC, independent candidates (most of the pro-Fateh) won 40 seats in the council and 3 seats went to opposition parties. It has been argued that the election system has contributed to the sweeping victory of Fateh, since it disadvantaged small parties and independent candidates.[548] "It is evident that the methods used led to significant distortions in the relative representation of the various segments of the population"[549]. The parallel elections of the president ended with a victory for Yassir

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for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle East" (Jerusalem: PASSIA Publications, 1997): p. 239.

[546] Hilal, Jamil. "The Effect of the Oslo Agreement on the Palestinian Political System" in Giacaman, George and Dag Jørund Lønning (eds) *"After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems"* (London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 123.

[547] Lindholm Schulz, Helena. "One Year into Self-Government. Perceptions of the Palestinian Elite" (Jerusalem: PASSIA Publications,1995): p. 28.

[548] The West Bank and the Gaza Strip were split up into 16 electoral districts, which were allotted a number of candidates according to the size of the population. Whichever candidates got the most votes were elected to the PLC.

[549] Ghanem, As'ad. "Founding Elections in a Transitional Period. The first Palestinian General Elections" in *The Middle East Journal* 50, 4 1996: p. 527.

Arafat. He could claim 87.1 percent of the vote. His only challenger, Samiha Kahlil claimed 12.9 percent. Starting with its inaugural session in March 1996, the PLC meets weekly. However the influence of the PLC on the executive authority (the 'presidency') is limited. In its first year of existence, it passed 135 resolutions, none of which were implemented. The PLC also tried to pass a Basic Law, that would act as a transitional constitution for the interim period. However after the first reading it was referred to the 'president' and made no further progress. This "leaves the Palestinian areas with no legal framework to regulate the various aspects of Palestinian life and to ensure a more than superficial separation of powers and accountability"[550]. This failure of a proper separation of powers is reflected in the fact that the PLC had no yet access to the full government budget. "The overall budget has not been discussed, the budgets of each individual ministry have been presented and discussed extensively"[551]. One can therefore argue that the PLC can not fulfil its duty to hold the executive authority accountable. "The PA with its various ministries and departments, continues to operate without serious restrains"[552].

Abu-Amr sees eight reasons for the weakness of the PLC[553]: 1) it has no clearly defined mandate, 2) the elections were valued less for their democratic significance than for their political value (they enabled further troop redeployments by Israel), 3) most social, economic, and political forces in the Palestinian society are weak and are absent from the PLC, 4) the power balance is in favour of the executive authority; it was therefore able to marginalise the PLC, 5) the individualistic leadership of Yassir Arafat, 6) the Fateh majority prevents a head on confrontation with the executive authority, 7) a sense of frustration among the members

[550] Abu-Amr, Ziad. "The Palestinian Legislative Council. A Critical Assessment" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, 4 1997: p. 91.
[551] Ashrawi, Hanan. "Guarded Optimist on the Peace Process. An Interview with Hanan Ashrawi" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, 3 1997: p. 84.
[552] Abu-Amr (1997) *op. cit.*: p. 91.

themselves, and 8) Israel's frequent refusal to give permits to members of the PLC so that they can travel to the sessions (several times the necessary quorum was prevented this way). One other reason has to be added to these. Speaking of the Palestinian opposition movement in general, Malki observes: "The Palestinian opposition lacks experience; it does not know how to behave as an opposition, or how to play the role properly. This lack of experience leads to the confusion that is reflected in the opposition's statements"[554]. The PLC, one of the central institutions in which Palestinian society which could potentially express a multitude of political identities, can therefore be seen as failing to fulfil this function. It has already been pointed out that one of the reasons for the weakness of the PLC is the weakness of the structures of Palestinian civil society. The reasons for this weakness deserve a more detailed analysis.

Civil society and Democracy

As Tamari shows, Palestinian civil society is historically characterised by two deep divisions: a localised consciousness, based on clan structures, and a divide between the inside (inside the occupied territories) and the outside (exile) leadership.[555] A third divide has to be added to this: the divide between secular and Islamic forces (although it can be argued that this divide is sometimes blurred). These divisions translate into different political identities. "The diversity of political views among Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza suggests the existence of a highly

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[553] See: Ibid: pp. 93-95.
[554] Malki, Riad. "The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process. A Palestinian Perspective" in Palestinian Academic Society of the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) *"Palestine, Jordan, Israel. Building a Base for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle East"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA Publications, 1997): p. 40.
[555] See: Tamari, Salim. "Government and Civil Society in Palestine" in Palestinian Academic Society of the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) *"Palestine, Jordan, Israel. Building a Base for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle East"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA Publications, 1997): pp. 213-217.

pluralistic body politic"[556]. This pluralism can only be expressed and protected by democratic structures. Therefore "in the Palestinian case, the question concerning the prospects for the development of civil society can be rephrased as a question concerning the prospects of democracy in Palestinian society"[557]. We have already seen that the 'parliament', the PLC, is in a 'weak' institutional position. In addition the PA, far from encouraging civil society, seeks to constrain it.

> *"Holding the view that the requirements of democracy may contradict those of national reconstruction, and that in the early stages of state building it is more important to assert the state's right to monopolize power and eliminate competitors for the people's loyalty than to democratize the system, the PA adopted undemocratic policies aimed at 'protecting' the peace process and the process of national reconstruction"*[558].

Non Governmental Organisations (NGO), already weakened by the partial loss of financial resources due to the Gulf War, found themselves without foreign financial resources. The donor focus shifted towards the PA and its institutions. "The shift in priorities not only weakened the institutions of civil society, but also served to strengthen the ability of the PA to contain and, if necessary, emasculate these institutions"[559]. Civil liberties have been weakened especially since the establishment of military courts in February 1995 (aimed against Hamas and Islamic Jihad). These courts allow secret evidence to be presented. Legal representation is not always provided and the 'president' can weaken or stiffen the sentences. "Several people, including opposition figures not directly involved in attacks against Israel have been

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[556] Ross, Lauren G. and Nadar Izzat Sa'id. "Polling Arab Views on the Conflict with Israel. Palestinians. Yes to Negotiations, Yes to Violence" in *Middle East Quarterly* 2, 2 1995: p. 22.
[557] Giacaman, George. "In the Throes of Oslo. Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the Future" in Giacaman, George and Dag Jørund Lønning (eds) *"After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems"* (London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 11.
[558] Shikaki, Khalil. "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, 2 1996: p. 9.

convicted by these courts"[560]. Mass arrests of opposition leaders after an attack against Israel are frequently ordered. These arrests are exercised without charge or trial. "Many people complained of torture, and several suspects died in jail during interrogations"[561]. This in turn delegitimises the PA, which, by enforcing or claiming to enforce Israel's security imperatives, is suppressing its own people.

Another factor weakening the democratic structures and civil society is the media law from July 1995. This allows the Minister of Information and Culture "to ban any Palestinian publication that 'jeopardises national unity'"[562]. No definition of the term 'jeopardises' was given. This law seriously challenges the freedom of the press and weakens therefore the growth of the Palestinian civil society.

The role of women in Palestinian is another factor which needs to analysed. During the *intifada* women took an active role in the uprising.[563] They were therefore able to establish free spaces of their own activity which gave them a certain amount of autonomy. However, "there is no doubt that the worsening economic conditions, have greatly diminished the options available to women. So, too has the shift from popular organizing to state formation"[564]. The fact that only a handful women[565] serve in elite positions in the PA points to the fact that women "are still considered subordinate members of the nation [...] the gap between men's and women's roles, and women's subordinate status, are maintained"[566].

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[559] Ibid: p. 10.
[560] Ibid: p. 10.
[561] Ibid: p. 10.
[562] Usher, Graham "The Politics of Internal Security. The Palestinian Authority's New Security Services" in Giacaman, George and Dag Jørund Lønning (eds) *"After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems"* (London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 151.
[563] For an analysis of the view of women in the Palestinian national narrative before and during the *intifada* see: Massad, Joseph. "Conceiving the Masculine. Gender and Palestinian Nationalism" in *The Middle East Journal* 49, 3 1995.
[564] Berger Gluck, Sherna. "Palestinian Women. Gender Politics and Nationalism" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, 3 1995: p. 13.
[565] Only four women were appointed to the more than three hundred slots in the technical committees after the Madrid conference. See Ibid: p. 11.
[566] Massad *op. cit.*: p. 483.

To sum up, it can be argued that Palestinian civil society is not supported by a strong democratic structure. The weakening of the NGOs, the military courts, the media law, and the continued subordinate role of women all serve to strengthen the executive authority in the autonomous areas by marginalising developments that would help a civil society to grow. The different mechanisms that weaken the development of a Palestinian civil society are supported by a strong internal security and police apparatus.

The Internal Security Apparatus

In the Oslo Accords it was agreed that the PA is responsible for the internal security inside the autonomous areas (excluding the settlements, Israeli citizens, and foreigners). One of the central aims of this was to prevent terrorist attacks on Israel. To fulfil this commitment a network of different security, intelligence, and police agencies has been created. These security agencies consist of the General Security Service (GSS), the Preventive Security Force (PSF), the Presidential Guard (PG)/Force 17, the Special Security Force (SSF), and a host of police forces. These are of special concern because of their "amorphousness, and lack of terms of reference, which makes it impossible to define their different responsibilities"[567]. Since their tasks are not clearly defined and since some of them do technically not exist either under the Oslo agreement or even according to the PA, "they are in a very precise legal sense lawless and boundless both in the occupied territories and the autonomous areas"[568].

The initial impression that these services gave was positive. They filled the security vacuum that was left after the Israeli military redeployed. "At the time these

[567] Usher Graham "The Politics of Internal Security. The PA's New Intelligence Services" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, 2 1996: p. 24.

forces were able to discharge their duties without transgressing the rights of the public. It is true that the lack of preparation robbed them of the aura of authority, but still the initial impression was positive"[569]. They seem to have three main tasks: 1) They act as a police force. This includes the fight against crime, intervening in clan or family disputes and punishing those who are accused of 'moral offences' such as drug-taking or prostitution. 2) "The PSF especially seems to have assumed powers to solve the 'unfinished business' of Palestinian collaborators' [...] despite the 'amnesty' pledge in the Cairo agreement, the PA's public stance vis-à-vis collaboration, both past and present, is that the guilty will be punished as traitors"[570]. 3) They also are in charge of internal surveillance of Palestinian political opposition. All these three tasks are accomplished without any legal basis to restrain and guide the agencies actions. This leads to frequent disregard for suspects human or civil rights. These violations seriously constrain the freedom of civil society in the autonomous areas to develop a politically pluralistic environment. The actions of the internal security services should be based on a legal framework. However the issue of legal reform is in itself a problem that weakens the position of Palestinian civil society.

The Problem of Legal Reform

"Creating a viable legal system in Palestine is among the most daunting yet generally unrecognized tasks of the Palestinian Authority"[571]. The main problem is that there are several distinctly different legal codes operating in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. "The judicial system contains a hodgepodge of British, Jordanian, and Israeli

[568] Ibid: p. 24f.
[569] Abu-Amr, Ziad. "Report from Palestine" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, 2 1995: p. 42.
[570] Usher (1996) *op. cit.*: p. 25.
[571] Robinson, Glenn E. "The Politics of Legal Reform in Palestine" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27, 1 1997: p. 51.

laws"[572]. Until 1948, both areas were under the same legal code: Ottoman law before and British law during the Mandate. However, after 1948 the West Bank was under Jordanian jurisdiction. Jordanian law was extended to the entire West Bank at the time it was annexed by Jordan in 1950. The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control. Egypt left the existing legal code in its place, without any changes. After the occupation of both areas in 1967, the Israeli government left the different legal systems in place and established a military jurisdiction that took most cases from the civil Palestinian courts. "By the time of the Oslo accords, neither area possessed any mechanisms for legal development or for adopting new laws; in neither area did the law in any way reflect the changing needs of the society it served"[573]. The problem is now that Gaza has a legal system based in large part on the British common law tradition while the West Bank' s legal code is informed by continental law tradition. The fact that the Palestinian negotiators undertook the obligation in the Gaza-Jericho agreement to leave all Israeli military orders in place complicates the legal system even further.

Robinson sees three main obstacles to a legal reform in the autonomous areas: 1) The divergence in the legal code which has the effect that one set of civil servants probably will have to completely revise their legal knowledge. 2) The unconsolidated lines of authority in the legal field present a difficulty. It is far from clear if the attorney general in the Gaza Strip is also responsible for the West Bank. In addition to this two chief justices (one for Gaza and one for the West Bank) and a minister of justice have been appointed. However under the British common law tradition in Gaza, the chief justice makes the post of minister of justice in principle redundant. "This lack of clear hierarchy has meant that there is a an inordinate amount of

[572] Segal, Aaron. "Is Palestine Viable?" in *Middle East Quarterly* 3, 4 1996: p. 32.
[573] Robinson *op. cit.*: p. 53.

political jockeying among different players within the legal establishment"[574]. 3) The overall lack of clarity and jurisdiction complicates the situation further. "Uncertainty about legal jurisdiction plagues both legal communities. For example, while Gaza law has been applied in select cases in the West Bank, there is no uniformity in its application"[575]. Two more factors add to the complexity of the problem. Firstly, "no legal actor has the authority to implement decisions not deemed compatible with the security interests at the highest levels of the PA"[576]. The second factor is the practice of customary law. As Frisch shows, customary laws (rules regulating clan fights and family disputes, ect.) which are outside the 'normal' jurisdiction are practised in the autonomous areas. They "provide a an alternative legal system to the civil courts"[577]. The legal system in the autonomous areas can therefore be described as consisting of several sometimes contradictory legal codes and legal traditions. Such a system with its lack of clarity, hierarchy and jurisdiction cannot serve as a firm basis on which a civil society can be built. The difficult legal situation narrows the legal space in which political identities can be meaningfully expressed.

The emphasis of this section of the chapter was on the analysis of the internal constrains that the Palestinian society is facing. It was shown that the neopatrimonial elite structure, Arafat's personal leadership style, the weakness of the PLC (the central institution in which political identities could be expressed in the state structure), the weak position of the civil society and democratic structures, the unrestrained actions of the security services, and the difficult and unclear legal system all serve to hinder the growth of a social and political structure in which

[574] Ibid: p. 55.
[575] Ibid: p. 56.
[576] Ibid: p. 56.

political identities could be meaningfully expressed. The Palestinian's need to express the plurality of their political identities within the structure of the autonomous areas is therefore to a large extent denied. These structures show one consistent pattern: The executive authority is strengthened, possible political identities which could serve as an opposition to the executive authority have only a weak and severely constricted space in which they can be expressed.

The central aim of this chapter was to analyse the constraints that are imposed on the Palestinian society's process of building up and expressing its multitude of political identities. Since the social and political structures of a society are central to its expression of political identities, these were the main focus of this chapter. In a first step the history of the Palestinian movement was analysed. This historical background was necessary in order to be able to explain what external constrains are imposed on Palestinian society.

In the short historical overview it has become clear that the Oslo Accords of 1993 and the subsequent agreements between the PLO and the state of Israel have been negotiated at a time, when the national movement was in a deep crisis. Since 1982 the leadership has been acting from outside the immediate region in Tunis. Coupled with this geographical distance was the fact that a new, alternative leadership developed inside the occupied territories which asserted itself during the *intifada.* In addition to this, the loss of financial and international support for the movement after the Gulf War meant that by the early 1990s the PLO was in a deep internal and external crisis.

The Oslo Accords and the interim agreements, while for the first time acknowledging the Palestinian's as 'a people' with legitimate rights, put a series of

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[577] Frisch, Hillel. "Modern Absolutism or Neopatriachal State Building? Customary Law, Extended Families, and the Palestinian Authority" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29 1997: p.

external constrains on the new Palestinian entity. The postponement of issues that are central for a future statehood to the final status negotiations while having no safeguards against unilateral actions by the state of Israel is the most serious constrain that could endanger the possibility of the entity to develop into a future state structure. These issues are among a host of external constrains: the deteriorating economic situation, the unequal distribution and pricing of water, the unacknowledged problem of the Palestinian refugees, the unsolved question of external security and the independent status of Israeli settlements (part of this problem is the futures status of Jerusalem). All these issues constrain the Palestinian society's expression of its political identities.

However in addition, there are also serious internal constraints. These internal problems are: the neopatrimonial character of the Palestinian elite structure, the personalised leadership of Yassir Arafat, the weakness of the PLC (the central institution for an expression of political identities), the weak democratic structures and resulting from this the weak Palestinian civil society, the unrestrained actions and proliferation of internal security agencies, and the multitude of difficult, unclear and overlapping legal systems in the autonomous areas. All these external and internal constrains taken together serve as a network for the continuing restrained imposed on a free expression of political identities in Palestinian society.

The next chapter will attempt to analyse comparatively Israeli and Palestinian societies and their different identity groups as well as the actions and interactions of these groups on the three levels of social interaction, the substate level, the state level and the supra-state level. Here the identity model developed in the first part of the thesis will be used to analyse the developments in both societies.

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Political Identity Building in Israeli and Palestinian Society: A Comparison

In the previous two chapters of this thesis we have looked at the historical and political development of Israeli and Palestinian society separately. During this discussions the main aspects of political identity building have already been roughly outlined. It has been shown that Israeli and Palestinian society have both developed a serious internal identity crisis which was aggravated by the peace process itself. In this chapter we will now attempt an in depth, comparative analysis of political identity building in Israeli and Palestinian society.

The structure of this chapter follows the system developed in the theoretical approach to political identity building in the first part of the thesis. It will analyse the three different levels of political identity building, the substate level, the state level and the supra-state level, separately. Within each level the analysis will look at the six main variables, ethnicity, territoriality, history, language, religion, and gender, identified during the theoretical discussion, the three level model of political identity building. The relative weight of these factors to each other will become clear during the analysis. After the separate discussion of the processes of political identity building in Israeli and Palestinian society, the similarities and differences will be outlined in the concluding section of this chapter.

The chapter has five different aims. First of all, it will attempt to demonstrate the growing divisions within Israeli and Palestinian society. It will become clear that these division are reaching the stage where the coherence of Israeli and Palestinian society is in question. Secondly, the chapter will try to explain the genesis of these

divisions and the reasons for their political importance. It will argue that these divisions have historical roots within each society but are now acquiring growing political importance. Thirdly, it will analyse the impact that the peace process has on the development of these divisions. It will be argued that while the peace process did not create these divisions it deepened the rifts between the different identity groups to a point where they are becoming mutually exclusive conceptions on what kind of states Israel and Palestine should be. Furthermore, because we have argued in the theoretical approach to political identity building that the state level is increasingly unable to control the pressures from the substate and the supra-state level, particular emphasis will be put on the analysis of this issue. While the state level and the concept of 'having a state of one's own' is still an important part of Israeli and Palestinian political identities, the societal consensus of what it means to be an Israeli or a Palestinian is increasingly difficult to reach. It will be shown that neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian state level is able to effectively react to the growing division in each society which in turn reinforces these divisions and widens the rifts between the different political identity groups. Finally, in the theoretical model it was argued that because the reflexive self has increased his/her education and capabilities under the conditions of globalisation, he/she is more capable to form politically effective groups on the substate and on the supra-state level. Therefore special attention will be paid to the analysis of this point. It will be shown that in both societies various identity groups have formed, the most effective of which are the radical religious groups, which were able to establish their own independent educational and social institutions. We will now turn to the discussion of the processes of political identity building on the different levels in Israeli and Palestinian society respectively.

I. Political Identity in Israeli Society

I.I. Substate Level: Fractures and Divisions

The internal crisis in Israeli society has been widely recognised at least since the beginning of the *intifada*. However the roots of the crisis of the Israeli state and the slow breakdown of societal consensus can be traced back to the formation of the state in 1948, secondly, to the 1967 war which created the basic question in Israeli society on how to treat the occupied territories. "The war initiated a strong mobilization of traditional expansionist and 'messianic' elements in the Zionist movement. They saw a historical opportunity in the war gains to extend the State of Israel and shape it more according to their own visions"[578]. In addition, the Labour Industrial Complex (LIC), as Grinberg calls it, which was the backbone of the Israeli state until 1977, became more and more weakened. The marginalisation of the Histadrut is the main example of this development.[579]

The state however with its highly centralised bureaucracy remained unresponsive to these changes.[580] This led to a new strategy for translating changes in society into political power. "The only real option remaining to the public was quasi exit [from the political system, HJS]: the establishment of alternative social systems which would exist side by side with the official ones".[581] At the beginning of the 1990s the situation bordered on non-governability. "Most of Israel's basic problems, neglected for too many years, were thrown into sharp relief after the fall of the

[578] Butenschøn, Nils A. "The Frontier State at Work. Models of Contemporary Israeli State Building" in *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4, 4 1992: p. 429.
[579] See: Grinsberg, Lev Luis. "The Crisis of Statehood. A Weak State and Strong Political Institutions in Israel" *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 5, 1 1993.
[580] See: Yishai, Yael. "Interest Groups and Bureaucrats in a Party-Democracy: the Case of Israel" in *Public Administration* 70, 2 1992.
[581] Lehman-Wilzig, Sam N. "Loyalty, Voice and Quasi Exit. Israel as a Case Study of Proliferating Alternative Politics" *Comparative Politics* 24, 1 1991: p. 101.

National Unity government in March 1990"[582]. The two basic questions left un-addressed were the connected problems of the nature of the relationship between the state and religion in Israel and the conflict with Palestinian society. This crisis of identity became even more pronounced since the start of the Oslo process in 1993, since, as I have argued in the preceding chapter on Israeli society, the peace process is putting the basic building blocks of the Zionist consensus into question:

> *"First peace itself will involve questions of essence such as withdrawal from territories that at least some Israelis perceived as sacred. Second, the ability to ignore the Essence Dilemma 'because of the situation' - an accepted Israeli formula (or pretext) for not facing up to serious problems - would vanish. Third under conditions of peace, the Universalist forces will have an opportunity to generate a genuine debate about the fundamental problems that have plagued the young Israeli democracy from the start"*[583].

This situation aggravates the already existing tensions and frictions within Israeli society and leads to questions about the Israeli political identity as a group. "In Israel the we-feeling that stems out of the membership of a Jewish-Israeli community and which was held together by a national consensus is at the moment in the process of being differentiated into several different we-feelings"[584]. Here the tendencies towards fragmentation can be seen, as predicted in the theoretical model. Klein sees four main cleavages been strengthened: the national cleavage, that between Jewish and Arab Israelis; the ethnic cleavage between Ashkenazim and Sephardim (or Mizrahim); the religious cleavage between the secular and religious elements of

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[582] Barzilai, Gad and Yossi Shain. "Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads: A Crisis of Non-governability" *Government and Opposition* 26, 3 1991: p. 365.
[583] Peleq, Ilan. "Epilogue: The Peace Process and Israel's Political Kulturkampf" in Peleg, Ilan (ed) *"The Middle East Peace Process. Interdisciplinary Perspectives"* (Albany: New York State University Press, 1998): p. 258.

society; and a cleavage along gender lines. The basic question that these cleavages bring into focus is: 'What kind of state should Israel be?' This debate, which is more and more taking the form of a serious Kulturkampf[585], has helped to define three basic positions within Israeli society: 'right wing religious identity', 'mainsteam secularised Jewish nationalism', and 'left wing binationalism'. These three positions correspond to identity groups that have taken shape in Israel.[586] All six variables of political identity building (ethnicity, territoriality, religion, language, history and gender) that were identified in the theoretical section take on differing values in these group identities. Only when we look at the six significators of political identity building and their meaning for the different identity groups can their different and incompatible answers to the question 'What kind of state should Israel be?' be fully understood. The three identity groups vary fundamentally in their interpretation and importance that they allocate to the elements 'Judaism' (defined in religious, ethnic and national terms) and democracy in their definition of the state. The political consequence of this are their different conceptions on what to do with the occupied territories. The three groups struggle for access to political power on the state level. This power struggle is reflected in the unstable government coalitions since 1996. However, in order to understand the political outcomes of this power struggle it is necessary to look at the developments and the group formations on the substate level. We shall examine these groups individually to see what the major elements of these group identities are.

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[584] Klein, Uta. "Zum Verhältnis von Nationalität, Ethnizität, Religion und Geschlecht: Spaltungen in der israelischen Gesellschaft" in *Berliner Debatte INITIAL* 8, 1/2 1997: p. 140. [Translation by the author]

[585] See: Hofman, Sabine. "50 Jahre nach der Staatsgründung. Isarel auf dem Weg in den 'Kulturkampf'? Konflikfelder in der Auseinandersetzung um nationale Identität und regionale Legitimation" in *Bürger im Staat* 48, 3 1998.

[586] As will become clear during the discussion, the 'mainstream secularised nationalism' category is the largest but most diverse identity group. The 'right-wing religious identity' category is fairly coherent in its political identity and has disproportional influence in the political system. -The 'secular binationalism' category is politically the weakest.

'Right Wing Religious Identity'

This identity group consists of several groupings which have quite different political outlooks. However religion, Judaism, is the central element of their political identity. Therefore they share the same basic conception regarding the answer to the question: "what kind of state should Israel be?". The common denominator is that all the groups in this category aim for Israel to be Jewish state, even if this would imply the weakening or the abandonment of democratic structures and practices because the state would be religiously defined. In consequence all citizens that are not Jewish would be necessarily relegated to a secondary status. The two main groups in this category are the national religious settlers and the ultra-orthodox community.

The national-religious settler community[587] formed after the war of 1967 to settle the newly occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. "The 1970s and 1980s were crucial [...] for it was then that Israel's ties with the occupied territories were forged and a new map was effectively drawn, influenced by the new reality created by the Six Day War"[588]. The ideological underpinnings of the settlement movement were the teachings of Rabbi Abraham Isaaac Kook and especially those of his son Rabbi Zvi Yehudah ha-Cohen Kook. The basic elements of their teachings are what Ravitzky calls 'Messianic Religious Zionism', a combination of the religious idea of redemption and the coming of the Messiah with the Zionist national ideology. They regard "'the state as the embodiment of the vision of Redemption'"[589]. The coming of the Messiah is hastened by the settlement of the

[587] Settlers are defined as those Israeli Jews that live inside the occupied territories i.e. the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Obviously not all of those belong to the national religious camp but there is a hard core in such settlements, such as Kyriat Arba or the small settlement in Hebron, which form the heart of the national religious community.

[588] Efrat, Elisha. "Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: Past, Present and Future" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) *"Peace in the Middle East. The Challenge for Israel"* (London: Frank Cass, 1994): p. 136f.

[589] Ravitzky, Aviezer. "Religious Radicalism and Political Messianism in Israel" in Sivan, Emmanuel and Menachem Frieman (eds) *"Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East"* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990): p. 17f.

Land of Israel, the land is redeemed. The flip side of this argument, however, means that if settled land is given back to non-Jewish use, the land ceases to be redeemed and the coming of the Messiah is in effect delayed. After the war of 1973 this ideology crystallised in the Gush Emunim. "GE [Gush Emunim, HJS] is a religious revival movement par excellence"[590]. It combines a mythical messianic belief system with a political revolutionary movement. Gush Emunim saw itself as the continuation of the early Zionist pioneer movement. Elyakin Ha'Etzni, one of the founders of Gush Emunim expresses this intimate combination: "In Judaism the national identity and the religious identity is one and the same. For a religious Jew Eretz Israel is a religious tennet [...] the Jewish nationality expressed in Zionism, the new form it took, drew solely from the religious symbolism"[591].

The land and the nation acquire a transcendental, mythic quality. David Wilder , international spokesman of the Hebron community, describes the centrality of religion for the national religious settler movement: "Your ideology is formed to a very large degree by your beliefs, religious beliefs, your outlook on life, which is shaped by your religious persuasion. [...] Judaism is not just a religion, it is a people. [...] Judaism is a total way of life"[592].

The central organisation of the settler communities today is the YESAH council of the Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The council is responsible for 144 Jewish communities in the occupied territories. Yehudit Tayar, spokeswoman of YESHA, highlights the importance of ethnicity in the religious settler's worldview:

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[590] Aran, Gideon. "Redemption as a Catastrophe: The Gospel of Gush Emunim" in Sivan, Emmanuel and Menachem Frieman (eds) *"Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East"* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990): p. 159.
[591] Ha'Etzni, Elyakin. Kyriat Arba, 22.03.99. [Interview with the author] The names of all the interviewees in this chapter are spelled following the interviewees' personal preferences.
[592] Wilder, David. Hebron, 09.02.99. [Interview by the author]

"Judaism is not an organisation, it is what we are. It is a heritage: a present, a past and a future. A relationship with Jews throughout the world and it is what links us to this land. Judaism, unlike other religions [...] encompasses both an ethnic group, a religion and nationalism"[593].

It has become clear that the central element of the religious nationalist identity group is Judaism, which in one comprises a religious, ethnic and national component. The issue of territory flows directly from the religious messianic ideology. It has a mythical quality and its redemption is part of the hastening of the coming of the messiah. The other identity components history, language, and gender follow from this conception and reinforce it. Language for example is seen as the "main bridge [...] between the different types of Jews who come here to live or to visit"[594]. But it also has a religious connotation:

"The genetic code of the Jewish people is the bible and this code has an inner rythm. It has a tenor, it has a texture which is particularly Jewish [...] Language is more than a means of communication. Language is a code, it is an imprint"[595].

The second identity group in the 'right-wing religious identity' category are the ultra-orthodox communities in Israel. The Haredi communities are split up into several different groupings which nevertheless share the same conviction:

"The State of Israel is a religiously neutral entity, part of the secular realm still belonging to the age of exile [...] it should be judged [...] according to its concrete relationship to the Torah, and according to the attitude of its leaders and adherents to the precepts of the halakhah"[596].

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[593] Tayar, Yehudit. Jerusalem, 16.03.99. [Interview by the author]
[594] Tayar, Yehudit. Jerusalem, 16.03.99. [Interview by the author]
[595] Ha'Etzni, Eliatkim. Kyriat Arba, 22.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[596] Ravitzky, Aviezer. *"Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism"* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): p. 145.

The two main groups in this sub-category define themselves according to their Jewish ethnicity, the Ashkenazim Haredi and the Sephardim (Oriental) Haredi. Both live in a chosen internal exile in the state since in principle they do not recognise the state's legitimacy as a Jewish state. The only legitimate Jewish state in their eyes has to be based on *halacha.* However, they make concessions in order to take part in the political process of Israel. The main aim seems to be to secure state funds for their own separate educational and social networks. "Huge sums are laundered through the budgets of key ministries controlled by religious parties"[597]. The Haredi also fight for the maintenance the 'status quo' which makes certain allowances towards the religious communities.[598] The Sephardim community in Israel developed its own political grouping in the late 1980s.[599] Shas had great electoral success in the last elections, growing to be the third largest party in the Knesset. It also was able to build up a separate educational and social system for the Sephardim community which is by and large state funded.

At the most radical fringe of the Haredi identity group are those ultra-orthodox Jews which see the establishment of the state of Israel as a sacrilege since only the Messiah can bring the Jews back from exile to the land of Israel. The argument is that "the physical rebuilding of the Land of Israel entails, by definition, spiritual decay and destruction [...] The 'Holy Land' sustains its holiness during the period of exile only by denying its very materiality"[600]. This group therefore does not take part in the political process apart from protests against state actions such as the opening of streets on Sabbath.

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[597] Silver, Eric. "Sacred and Secular in Contemporary Israel" in *Political Quarterly* 61, 2 1990: p. 173.
[598] See preceding chapter on Israeli society.
[599] See: Hirschberg, Peter. *"The World of Shas"* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2000): http://www.ajc.org/pre/shasf.htm.
[600] Ravitzky (1993) *op. cit.*: p. 47.

The political identity of the Haredi identity group defines itself out of the religious commandments of the Torah, the Talmud and their commentaries. Everything flows from this. The Haredi ultimately do not give legitimacy to the Israeli state. Their conception of a truly legitimate Jewish state is the one to be established at the end of the days by the Messiah himself. They feel "an existential state of alienation, both personal and collective, reflected in the identification of secular Jewish authority with the Gentile ruler"[601].

Although relatively small in number, the 'right wing religious identity' group has had dis-appropriate influence on the political scene in Israel. The already mentioned 'status quo' is only the outgrowth of the "intricate connections between religious leaders and the leaders of the government"[602]. This disproportionate influence can partly be attributed to the fact, that the Zionist discourse had to use religious symbolism in order to gain legitimacy.

> *"From the very beginning, at least on the level of historical consciousness and collective identity, essential elements of the Jewish religion were included in this culture. The target land for immigration and settlement was 'Zion', the language of the secular Zionist movement was modernised Hebrew, and a secularised Bible were all borrowed from the Jewish religion"*[603].

As Shahak shows, the influence of religious groups and ideas in Israeli society has steadily increased since the 1967 war.[604] Despite the differences within this identity group they share the same basic tenets which puts religion at the centre of identity in

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[601] Ibid: p. 148.
[602] Etzioni-Halevy, Eva. "The Religious Elite Connections and Some Problems of Israeli Democracy" in *Government and Opposition* 29, 4 1994: p. 477.
[603] Kimmerling, Baruch. "Between Hegemony and Dormant *Kulturkampf* in Israel" in *Israel Affairs* 4, 3/4 1998: p. 50.
[604] See: Shahak, Israel. *"Jewish History, Jewish Religion. The Weight of Three Thousand Years"* (London: Pluto Press, 1997).

general and political identity in particular. All other aspects of the political identities of this group are influenced by this basic assumption. In consequence, the territories cannot be given back. For the religious settlers they have a sacred character. The Haredi also support the claim of Israel for the occupied territories.[605] The only exception here is Shas which has a changing and unclear position on this. On the one hand they opposed the Oslo II agreement, on the other hand, Aryeh Deri, the political leader of Shas, was putting pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu to sign the Wye River agreement.[606] This shows that there is no necessary connection between an ultra-orthodox political identity and intransigence as far as the peace process is concerned. However, Shas is not having a clear stand on the occupied territories since their main priority is securing state funds for their autonomous social and educational institutions.

'Mainstream Secularised Jewish Nationalism'

The second large identity group in Israeli society, the 'mainstream secularised Jewish nationalism' group offers a much more diffuse picture of political identities. This identity group is the largest of the three in Israeli society. It is located in the political centre of Israeli society. It is also the most diverse of the three identity groups with a wide spectrum of political identities. The main political identity cleavage in this category is between the classic political left and right wing orientation which co-insides with the already mentioned 'doves' and 'hawks' orientation towards the peace process.[607] Additional cleavages including that between the new immigrants and the olim (those who live in Israel for a longer period), or between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, as well as the growing social gap between the top and the bottom of

[605] See preceding chapter in Israeli society.
[606] See: Hirschberg *op. cit.*

the income scale in Israeli society are gaining in importance, although they still seem to be overshadowed (and will remain until a final peace agreement with the Palestinians is reached) by the 'doves'-'hawks' division. Nevertheless, the additional cleavages within this category have been the basis for the emergence of several strong subcultures which have gained in strength in the last years, like the Sephardim subculture and the newly formed Russian subculture.[608].

All different identity groups in this category answer the question 'what kind of state should Israel be?' with the formula: 'a democratic state with Jewish character', the basic consensus on how this formula can be realised however seems to have broken down. Israeli society at large today is "on the one hand more individualistic, materialistic and aggressive, and on the other hand more conservative and traditional"[609]. Especially the upper class in Israeli society is strongly influenced by American materialism. "The innovative, revolutionary vision of the creation of a new, secular Israeli culture, which the pioneers had, lost more and more influence and substance. Lifestyle, cultural participation and consumption in the upper class became more and more Westernised thanks to its strong orientation on America"[610].

The weakening of the classic pioneer vision of Israeli society was aided, as Shapira demonstrates, by its spiritual rootlessness. Because the pioneer movement was secular it could only relate to Jewish fate in the 'here and now'. Therefore it was unable to offer the individual a firm orientation in his or her worldview. This is what Shapira calls the "spiritual-cultural narrowness of the 1948 Generation"[611]. This

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[607] See preceding chapter on Israeli society.
[608] Veit, Winfried. "50 Jahre Israel. Ein Staat auf der Suche nach einer neuen Identität" in *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 3 1998: p. 279. [Translation by the author]
[609] Sheffer, Gabriel. "Structural Change and Leadership Transformation" in *Israel Affairs* 5, 2/3 1999: p. 68.
[610] Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. "Kollektiver Symbolismus und die Krise der Demokratie: Über die Auswirkungen der Ermordung Rabins auf die israelische Demokratie" in *Leviathan* 24, 2 1996: p. 188. [translation by the author]
[611] Shapira, Avraham. "Spiritual Rootlessness and Circumscription to the 'Here and Now' in the Sabra World View" in *Israel Affairs* 4, 3/4 1998: p. 126.

transformation can also be seen in the weakening of the central historical myths of the pioneer society. National traditions such as the celebration of the defence of Tel Hai against an Arab attack by the early pioneers, the Bar Kochbar revolt or the defence of Masada which belong to the core of pioneer traditions, are increasingly being questioned. Their functions as unifying historical myths is lost in the discussion about the historical correctness of their representation as historical events.

> *"The emergence of countermemories and the greater visibility that they enjoy in contemporary Israeli culture have become so pronounced during the last two decades that Israeli discourse has labeled [sic] this phenomenon niputs mitosim (shattering of myths)"*[612].

The 'older' pioneering myths are replaced by the tradition of Holocaust remembrance. Shortly after the foundation of the state of Israel Holocaust remembrance was not a main part of the Israeli socialisation process. This can be seen in the fact that it was not taught as a separate subject in Israeli schools.[613] Only after the Eichmann trial[614] in 1961 did the Holocaust remembrance enter the realm of national Israeli traditions. Today, however, it provides the central legitimation for the state of Israel in the 'secularised Jewish nationalism' identity group. "The further the Holocaust lies in the past, the stronger it influences the Israeli consciousness and the process of socialisation in Israel"[615].

Another central pillar of the Israeli socialisation process is also in a process of change, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The "IDF after all, was not merely a

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[612] Zerubavel, Yael. *"Recovered Roots. Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition"* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995): p. 232.

[613] See: Schatzker, Chaim. "Die Bedeutung des Holocaust für das Selbstverständnis der israelischen Gesellschaft" in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 15 1990.

[614] Arendt discusses some of the political aspects of the Eichmann trial which was, so her argument, conducted in the way it was in order to demonstrate to Israeli society and the world the Holocaust in its totality as a historical event and not only to convict Eichmann of the crimes that he had committed. See: Arendt, Hannah. *"Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil"* (London: Penguin Books, 1992).

fighting force, it was also - and perhaps above all else - an essential instrument for new Jewish 'nation building'"[616]. Because of its structure as a 'citizens army', with a large part of it made up by reservists, the IDF is particularly vulnerable to changing trends in society as a whole. "In absence of domestic consensus with respect to security policies, however, the militia nature of such an army renders it vulnerable to disaffection"[617].

Because of these fundamental changes, ethnicity has become the main defining factor for political identity in this group. This process, which started during the *intifada*, has been enhanced by the peace process and brought a new possible solution to the conflict between Israeli and Palestinian societies. For this group, "ethnic and territorial separation between Israelis and Palestinians has emerged, increasingly, as a more plausible method for improving Israel's conflict management capacity"[618]. Separation is now seen to guarantee the 'Jewish character' of the state of Israel which has become a central political aim for this identity group as a whole.[619]

Based on these changes and frictions within this identity group, there are three basic subgroups of political identity in this category, the left wing, the centre and the right wing. At the left fringe of this identity category are those groups which, now for the first time, do not see the peace process as the primary element in their political work. Here the environmental groups can be seen as one poignant example. Dr. Yaakov Garb, an environmental consultant, sees his connection to the land as being a

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[615] Zimmermann, Moshe. "Die Folgen des Holocaust für die israelische Gesellschaft" in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 12 1992: p. 33. [Translation by the author]
[616] Cohen, Stuart A. "The Peace Process and Societal-Military Relations in Israel" in Peleg, Ilan (ed) *"The Middle East Peace Process. Interdisciplinary Perspectives"* (Albany: New York State University Press, 1998): p. 115.
[617] Ibid: p. 116.
[618] Barzilai, Gad and Ilan Peleg. "Israel and Future Borders: Assessment of a Dynamic Process" in *Journal of Peace Research* 31, 1 1994: p. 71.
[619] See: Benvenisti, Meron. *"Intimate Enemies. Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

concern for the Middle East landscape: "It is not particularly important who owns it [...] My allegiance is to the landscape, it is to the palms and the logs and the way the light falls"[620]. Jewishness as an ethnic concept is seen in national terms. Tamir Yaari, an environmental educator close the Israeli Green party, defines it in the following way: "It is almost synonymous with being Israeli. It is clear that me being Israeli comes from me being Jewish. I am definitely first Jewish and that is why I am Israeli"[621]. Judaism as a religion however does not play a major role in the political identity of this subgroup. It is a private affair that does not influence politics. "It should be integrated enough to make the secular Jews know and feel about religion on the one hand and on the other hand it should not try to suppress their sense of freedom"[622].

The human rights groups such as Peace Now and the Meretz party openly advocate a secular Israeli state with a Jewish character. Religion, in their view, should be separated from the state. "I am for a separation of religion and state. I am not religious at all but I want Israel to be the centre of the Jewish people"[623] explains Avital Aviram, international secretary of Young Meretz. The Jewish character of the state of Israel is of major importance to this subgroup. However the Jewish character is related to demographics, devoid of a mystical character. Mossi Raz, Meretz candidate for the 1999 national elections and General Secretary of Peace Now, defines it in the following way: "For me a Jewish state is a state in which the majority is Jewish and in which every Jew from everywhere can come"[624]. The issue of territoriality is seen in the light of the security needs of the state of Israel not in a religious connection.

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[620] Garb, Yaakov. Jerusalem, 08.05.99. [Interview with the author].
[621] Yaari, Tamir. Matte Yehuda, 08.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[622] Yaari, Tamir. Matte Yehuda, 08.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[623] Aviram, Avital. Tel Aviv, 29.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[624] Raz, Mossi. Tel Aviv, 12.04.99. [Interview with the author]

The main groups in the centre of this categories are those which subscribe to the Labor party and Centre party program. This group shares with Meretz the view of the question of territory being purely a security question. Ran Feingold, organisational secretary of the Young Labour party, explains: "I believe in the connection to the land. But we need to be pragmatic. I believe also in the connection to human rights. I would not like to have a contradiction. I would not like that my right to the land means kicking out another people that lived here for generations. I believe that they too have some rights to the land [but] it is still very important to have territory from a military aspect"[625]. Territory has meaning however as far as the location of the state of Israel is concerned. Ron Punik, head of the Economic Cooperation Foundation, which is close to the Labour party, emphasises this point: "I am a Zionist, meaning I see the Jewish people in Israel. I don't see them in Uganda or somewhere else. This is on the conceptual level. The seize of the territories, [...] I see as a political question"[626]. Religion and state should be separated, religion being a private matter: "You can maintain a religious character as an individual even though religion and state are separated"[627] explains Ellis Goldman of the Centre Party. Ethnicity is a group identity for this subgroup but it is mainly a national concept. Eran Weintraub, chairman of the Young Centre Party, illustrates this: "I was born Jewish I relate to this. [...] I am very attached to our heritage [...] For me being Jewish is first of all living in Israel"[628].

A small section of the religious community falls in the 'secularised Jewish nationalism' category. Although religion is central to their political identity, they do not see Israel as a purely Jewish state but want to maintain the democratic element. Religion is seen as a private affair. "I don't see Israel having total separation of

[625] Feingold, Ran. Tel Aviv, 19.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[626] Pundik, Ron. Tel Aviv, 12.04.99. [Interview with the author]

religion and state [...] I would like more pluralism in the Jewish community acknowledged but Judaism is the official state religion but it should not be imposed on anybody, especially non Jewish citizens"[629] outlines Yehezkel Landau, one of the founding members of Oz ve Shalom, the religious Zionist peace movement. Ethnicity is seen as a national and as a religious concept. It is influencing all aspects of life. Prof. Joseph Walk, founder of Oz ve Shalom, describes it in the following terms:

> *"Judaism is nation and religion. [...] We have a very detailed system of laws in Judaism, which is based on the Talmut which is developed right into our times.[...] The Talmut is very detailed and relevant in some of the most contemporary aspects. To name just one example there are religious laws concerning workers' rights"*[630].

The issue of territory is seen in pragmatic terms as Zvi Wolf, director of Diaspora relations of MEIMAD the religious dovish party, argues: "At the beginning of the 21st century we need to be political realists and we might not be able to have everything that we have the right to"[631].

Right of the political centre, are those groups which attach greater importance to the occupied territories than the left wing, although here too ethnicity is taking the central position in political identity. Ma'oz Azaryahu, an academic affiliated with the Likud, explains: "Being Jewish means that I am committed to Jewish continuity in cultural terms, in ethnic terms, in political terms in the sense that Israel represents today the idea, the notion and the possibility of Jewish continuity. Judaism is a religious, cultural, national and ethnic concept"[632]. However the occupied territories,

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[627] Goldman, Ellis. Tel Aviv, 04.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[628] Weintraub, Eran. Tel Aviv, 05.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[629] Landau, Yehezkel. Jerusalem, 21.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[630] Walk, Joseph. Jerusalem, 23.03.99. [Interview with the author, translation by the author]
[631] Wolf, Zvi. Jerusalem, 18.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[632] Azaryahu, Ma'oz. Tel Aviv, 04.05.99. [Interview with the author]

especially the West Bank are not seen in purely pragmatic terms as Yod Lavi, member of the Likud secretariat, argues:

> *"This is really the cradle and homeland or our culture and our nation although we cannot ignore the perspective of the present circumstances and only depend on the history of our nation's dreams and our nation's beliefs. We have to take into consideration the fact that there are people, Arab people, who are living there and who have identified themselves as Palestinians [...] they have a right to live there [...] I ask them only to share with me this land"*[633].

Religion and state, in the view of this subgroup are seen as partially integrated: "State laws cannot be separated from religion [...] One has to appreciate religion to keep one's identity"[634] says Liat Ravner, head of the International Likud. Nevertheless, the basic separation of state and religion is seen as necessary. "For me the Jewish state is a value. Personally I would like total freedom but we have to realise that total freedom means zero Judaism maybe zero Zionism in the future and it gives you 100 per cent 'Israelism' [...] Faced with these options I prefer the conservative way of preserving the status quo"[635] argues Amir Rosenberg, a lawyer affiliated with the centre-right. Language is not seen as a purely instrumental means of communication but has important inherent aspects of identity. Ammon Lord, a Likud affiliated journalist, describes this as follows: "Hebrew is a language that has the code of this land. The bible is written in Hebrew and so in some way the language is like an internal code"[636].

At the right wing fringe of the mainstream, the boundaries towards the 'right wing religious' identity group becomes blurred. Here some of the main

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[633] Lavi, Yod. Ramle, 04.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[634] Ravner, Liat. Tel Aviv, 05.05.99. [Interview with the author]

characteristics of the 'secularised Jewish nationalism' identity category, like the emphasis of the Holocaust, the basic separation of religion and state are less obvious. This can be clearly seen in the views of Madav Ha'Etzni, a right wing journalist:

> *"The Holocaust is only one element of the chain. When I deal today with any aspect of our dispute with the Palestinians I cannot start with the Holocaust. [...] It [the land, HJS] is mine only because it was mine 3000 or 4000 years ago [...] The right does not emerge from the Holocaust"*[637].

In the 'secularised Jewish Nationalism' identity category, several core elements of political identity that are common to all groups in this category, despite their obvious differences, have emerged. First of all, ethnicity, Judaism as an ethnic, national concept, is the central pillar of political identity. Secondly, territory is seen in security terms and is largely devoid of religious, mythical meaning, although within the Likud it bears historical significance. Thirdly, religion is seen as part of the private domain, state and religion should be separated, although Israel should have a definite Jewish character. Fourthly, the Holocaust emerges as a central historical tradition, replacing the pioneer traditions. Finally, language is a tool for communication. It has religious meaning but this fact, if seen at all, is regarded as secondary. The political identities in the 'secularised Jewish nationalism' category offer slogans like the 'Jewish character' of the state of Israel without clearly defining what is meant by this.

'Secular Binationalism'

The last identity category in Israeli society, the 'secular binationalist' offer a completely different notion of Israel as a state. Here the Jewish character is not seen as something to be maintained but as something to be removed in order to offer equal

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[635] Rosenberg, Amir. Tel Aviv, 15.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[636] Lord, Ammon. Jerusalem, 05.05.99. [Interview with the author]

individual rights and freedom. This identity category is the weakest of the three main identity groups in Israeli society. It consists of the Jewish far left wing fringe and the majority of the Israeli Arabs. Because of this, the category has only marginal success in the political arena. The fundamental tenet that all groups within this identity category share is the overriding value that is ascribed to democracy. Individual freedom, equal rights, and human rights are seen as the central political aims. The Jewish character of the state of Israel is seen as a problematic factor that prevents the realisation of these goals. Territory is described as a 'homeland' for all people regardless of their religion. Religion, even more so as in the 'secularised Jewish nationalism' category, is a private affair which should be completely separate from the state. Judaism in consequence is mainly seen in ethnic terms.

"My political identity is very difficult for me to define. In general Israeli politics the dominant factor is ethnicity [...] the division between Jewish and Arabs is the basic division of Israeli society, the basic problem of Israeli politics"[638] explains Adam Keller, spokesman of Gush Shalom, a left wing Israeli peace movement. Tomer Feffer, press officer of the human rights organisation B'tselem, sees equally problems with the role ethnicity plays in Israel: "There are 20% of people in Israel that are not Jewish [...] I think they are equal in their rights and duties. But I cannot ignore the fact that they are not part of Israeli society unfortunately [...] The country is combining citizenship with being Jewish"[639]. Territory is not seen as sacred or endowed with religious meaning. There are other overriding factors that are more important than territory. Rabbi Arik Ascherman, executive director of Rabbis for Human Rights, describes it in the following way:

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[637] Ha'Etzni, Madav. Jerusalem, 02.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[638] Keller, Adam. Tel Aviv, 13.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[639] Feffer, Tomer. Jerusalem, 04.02.99. [Interview with the author]

"Territory is not as important as human life, justice and all these other things. I also think that in the realities of today Jews need a state because history has taught us that we cannot depend on anybody else to defend us [...] The size of the territory is irrelevant. I would want Jews to be able to live in safety in all of the land of Israel but state boundaries per se are a function of political reality and in my mind they don't have any sanctity behind them"[640].

For the far left wing fringe of this subgroup, the state of Israel as a Jewish state is openly opposed. "I oppose a Jewish state, a state for all the Jews in the world. I want Israeli citizenship, Israel as a democratic state for all its citizens"[641], demands Sergio Yahni, a member of the executive committee of the Alternative Information Centre, an Israeli-Palestinian human rights organisation. Religion is seen as a problematic factor by the left wing fringe groups. Amira Haas, a left wing journalist, explains it in the following terms: "Religion and state should be separated but I don't think that this is possible in Israel today. [...] Israel is now running against so many international resolutions that it needs the mystical, religious legitimacy. That is why the religious parties are so strong in this country because they give some legitimacy that has been dwindled"[642].

Similar ideas to those of the left wing fringe Israeli groups are entertained by the second and by far numerically larger subgroup in this category: the Israeli Palestinians. These are those Palestinians which stayed after the war of 1948 and became subsequently Israeli citizens. Because of the distinction that Israel makes between citizenship (Israeli) and nationality (Jewish or Arab), the Israeli Palestinians have equal rights as citizens but are discriminated against on grounds of their nationality. A large segment of the Jewish Israelis do not see the Israeli Palestinians

[640] Ascherman, Arik. Jerusalem, 13.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[641] Yahni, Sergio. Jerusalem, 23.03.99. [Interview with the author]

as fully legitimate participants in the body politique. "While Jews and Arabs formally enjoy equal citizenship rights, only Jews can exercise their citizenship as practice by attending to the common good"[643]. Therefore Israeli Palestinian parties have so far not been included in government coalitions. In addition, since the Anti-Racism Law of 1985, a party which negates the existence of the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people is not allowed to run in elections. Therefore even the Israeli Palestinian parties, which on the whole have a left wing, socialist orientation, must recognise in their program the basis for the discrimination of the people that they represent.[644]

The Israeli Palestinian community as a whole is currently undergoing a crisis of identity. Both societies to which they belong, Israel via citizenship and the Palestinian via their nationality, see them as a minority. "In the tension between modernity and tradition and as an ethnic minority in a state that is ethnically defined, the Arabs have yet to find their place"[645]. Rouhana argues that the Israeli Palestinians since 1967 have undergone a re-Palestinisation process and, as far as their self identification is concerned, increasingly identify with the Palestinian society.[646] However they have no intention to move to a Palestinian state.[647] They expect a conclusion of the conflict with the Palestinians to herald an era in which they will receive equal rights in Israel. "They expect their prolonged underpriviledged civil status, which they attribute mainly to this conflict, to be quickly amended"[648].

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[642] Haas, Amira. Jerusalem, 03.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[643] Peled, Yoav. "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab citizens of the Jewish State" in *American Political Science Review* Vol. 86 No. 2 1992: p. 432.
[644] See: Rouhana *op. cit.*: p. 34.
[645] Senfft, Alexandra "Israelis zweiter Klasse? Die Araber in Israel auf der Suche nach ihrer Identität" in *Der Überblick* 35, 3 1999: p. 102. [Translation by the author]
[646] See: Rouhana *op. cit.*
[647] See: Al-Haj, Majid, Elihu Katz and Samuel Shye. "Arab and Jewish Attitudes toward a Palestinian State" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, 4 1993.
[648] Hermann, Tamar S. and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar. "Two People Apart. Israeli Jews' and Arabs' Attitudes Toward the Peace Process" in Peleg, Ilan (ed*) "The Middle East Peace Process. Interdisciplinary Perspectives"* (Albany: New York State University Press, 1998): p. 61.

As a result of these processes Israeli Palestinians have a very unique political identity. Territory is perceived as the 'homeland' which does not entail the need to control it. Michail Fanous, executive director of the Open House in Ramle, an Israeli Palestinian co-habitation project and member of the city council of Ramle, elaborates:

> *"I identify more with Ramle. Ramle was once in Palestine, so we are Palestinians. Ramle is inside Israel, so I am Israeli. [...] I feel that I am in my homeland of my family. My family lived here in Ramle for almost a thousand years, so this is my homeland. I won't leave my homeland to be part of the Palestinian state"*[649].

Religion, although a part of their identity is for most Israeli Palestinians not endowed with political meaning. "Religion is one of the major components of a person's identity. However it all depends on the person himself. It is a personal choice"[650] explains Mosbah Ziaed, secretary of the Democratic Front for Peace and Democracy (DFPD) in Nazareth. The DFPD is an Israeli Palestinian national party with a left wing program.

The issue of ethnicity is most difficult for the political identity of Israeli Palestinians. Michail Fanous describes the situation: "I am a Palestinian, so the issue between Israel and Palestine of course is having an effect on me because my state fights my people and my people fight my state"[651].

At the left wing fringe of the Israeli Palestinian political identity spectrum, binationalism is seen as the best solution to the conflict. Rayek Rizek, secretary general of Wahat Al-Salam/Neve Shalom, another cohabitation project near Ramle, explains:

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[649] Fanous, Michail. Ramle, 30.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[650] Ziaed, Mosbah. Nazareth, 07.05.99. [Interview with the author]

"I don't accept the idea of a division the land. I think historically it was a difficult idea to implement and we are still living with this difficulty because of what happened in 1947 and 1948. [...] To think again today of dividing the land again it is not possible because it will not bring the justice that I think should be brought. [...] I am not for dividing the land but for dividing authority and having the resources used equally by both people"[652].

The political identities of the secular binationalism identity category have their basis in the belief in democracy, equal rights, and human rights as overriding values. Therefore the basic building blocks, territoriality, ethnicity, religion, are seen in this light. The Jewish character of the state of Israel is seen as an obstacle in the way of achieving these fundamental rights and freedoms. As far as the Israeli Palestinians are concerned, the Jewish character of the state is the basis for their social and political underpriviledged status since this means that full citizenship is defined ethnically and not territorially (all those who live within the state borders). This group is the smallest and politically weakest of the three main identity blocks in Israel. It also offers little depth as far as political identity is concerned. It is more or less a defensive political identity which argues against existing discriminatory practises.

Gender Roles in Israel

In the theoretical model it was argued that the significator 'gender' is an important variable of political identity that cuts across and influences all other significators. Therefore we will now look at 'gender' as a variable of political identity building in Israeli society. The position of women in Israeli society is characterised by a very low

[651] Fanous, Michail. Ramle, 30.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[652] Rizek, Rayek. Wahat Al-Salam / Neve Shalom, 18.03.99. [Interview with the author]

gender awareness and by a latent, deep seated structural discrimination against women, who, by and large, remain in their traditional female roles. "That Israel is a Jewish state is common knowledge. What is less well known is how Israel's definition of 'Jewish' affects the lives of its female citizens"[653].

Israel can be characterised as a traditional society as far as gender roles are concerned. This became obvious during the interviews conducted on the substate level. A striking lack of gender awareness can be observed by all but the most left wing interviewees. The influence of religion in combination with policies that put the family at the centre of society, relegates women largely to their traditional female roles as wives and mothers. "Historical patriarchal influences have produced a traditional family-oriented society in which family stability is the rule in all sectors of society"[654]. Because of the status quo agreement between the early state and the orthodox religious community all matters concerning personal and family matters are handled by religious courts, which legislate according to orthodox Jewish tradition. This enforces the subordinate role of women. The secular legal system also reflects the patriarchal character of society.

> "*In 1951, the Women's Equal Rights Law was passed, under which women were to be entitled to legal equality and equal rights to carry out legal transactions. Unfortunately the law did not have constitutional force; while it could be used to invalidate laws existing prior to its enactment, as far as subsequent legislation was concerned, it was considered merely a directive to*

[653] Swirski, Barbara and Marilyn P. Safir. "Living in a Jewish State: National, Ethnic and Religious Implications" in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) "*Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel*" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991): p. 7.
[654] Safir, Marylin. "Religion, Tradition and Public Policy Give Family First Priority" in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) "*Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel*" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991): p. 57.

assist in the interpretation of ambivalent legislation and a norm allowing invalidation of secondary legislation"[655].

The discrimination against women is translated equally into the workspace. "Women [...] serve largely as cheap labour, with relatively little authority and with low to intermediate levels of skill"[656]. However, women are not only over-represented in low pay occupations, they also do not receive equal pay. "Despite the 'equal payment' law, several studies indicate that in the Israeli labour market, women are paid less than men for working in the same occupation"[657]. Although one can see an increase of the number of women in the workforce, the primacy of the family has clearly an effect on the kinds of occupations most women choose. A large proportion is in part time employment.[658]

One aspect that has always been seen as a great achievement towards gender equality is the fact that women, like men, serve in the IDF. However a closer look shows a clear gender hierarchy in the armed forces as well. There are no female officers above the rank of Brigadier General in the IDF. The rank of Brigadier General is held by the officer commanding CHEN the Women's Corps of the IDF. Although CHEN is a separate organisational unit, its commanding officer is not part of the General Staff of the IDF. The fact that CHEN is exclusively responsible for judicial matters of female soldiers creates a two class society along gender lines in

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[655] Raday, Frances. "The Concept of Gender Equality in a Jewish State" in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) "*Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel*" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991): p. 20.

[656] Bernstein, Deborah. "Economic Growth and Female Labour: The Case of Israel" in Azmon, Yael and Dafna N. Izraeli (eds) *"Women in Israel. Studies in Israeli Society Vol. VI"* (London: Transaction Publishers, 1993): p. 67.

[657] Semyonov, Moshe and Vered Kraus. "Gender, Ethnicity, and Income Equality: The Israeli Experience" in Azmon, Yael and Dafna N. Izraeli (eds) *"Women in Israel. Studies in Israeli Society Vol. VI"* (London: Transaction Publishers, 1993): p. 100.

[658] See: Azmon, Yael and Dafna N. Izraeli. "Introduction" in Azmon, Yael and Dafna N. Izraeli (eds) *"Women in Israel. Studies in Israeli Society Vol. VI"* (London: Transaction Publishers, 1993): p. 6.

the IDF[659]. In addition the fact that most combat related jobs are closed to women disables them from reaching the highest ranks in the hierarchy. Because a successful military career is a good basis for a political career in Israel, it is no surprise that women are also underrepresented at the political level. As Herzog shows, this already starts at the local level. "Women's representation in local governments is lower than in the Knesset and in political parties"[660]. One area however where women are very active is grassroots political organisations. "The Palestinian uprising (Intifada) has been accompanied by the proliferation of Israeli peace and protest groups in which women play a prominent role"[661]. However since the Oslo process these groups have lost political influence and have been marginalised. Nevertheless a slow rise in the participation of women even in foreign and security affairs (traditionally been seen as an all-male domain) can be observed. "Some gradual modifications in the status of women MKs [members of Knesset, HJS], however have become apparent since the early 1990s. Women have become more visible in the work of the House, and are showing unprecedented professionalism and self-confidence when dealing with external relations matters"[662].

The situation of Israeli Palestinian women follows the pattern seen among Jewish Israeli women. However the family structure in Israeli Palestinian society is

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[659] See: Bloom, Anne R. "Women in the Defense Forces" in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) "*Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel*" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991): p. 136.
[660] Herzog, Hanna. *"Gendering Politics. Women in Israel"* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999): p. 22. The representation of women in the Knesset between 1949 and 1984 ranged between 9.1 % and 6.7 %. Which was average in Western democracies. In the current 15th Knesset (since 1999) it has reached an all time high of 12.5 % (15 out of 120 members). See: Etzioni-Halevi, Eva and Ann Illy. "Women in Legislatures: Israel in a Comparative Perspective" in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) "*Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel*" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991).
[661] Chazan, Naomi. "Israeli Women and Peace Activism" in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) "*Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel*" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991): p. 152. However women are also active in grassroots organisations on the political right. One example is the right-wing movement 'Women in Green'.
[662] Hermann, Tamar and Gila Kurtz. "Prospects for Democratizing Foreign Policymaking: The Gradual Empowerment of Israeli Women" in *Middle East Journal* 49, 3 1995: p. 454.

still more rigid than in the Jewish part of society. Consequently women by and large are even more forced into their traditional female roles.[663]

Women in Israel are still occupying a subordinate role in all the aspects of public life as well as in their role in the family. Gender should therefore be an important part of political identity in Israel. However only the most left wing interviewees on the substate level showed any kind of gender awareness. In addition, the women interviewed in the various political identity groups showed no distinctly different attitudes from their male colleagues. Therefore a strong gender based political identity has yet to emerge. From the power centres of the state level women are by and large excluded although the situation is slowly changing.

It has become clear during the discussion of the Israeli substate level that the tendency towards fragmentation predicted in the theoretical model can be observed. Groups have formed which are presenting different political identity conceptions. It is interesting to note that groups in the 'radical-religious identity' category are the most influential politically when compared with their size. All different identity groups presented here try to make their demands heard on the state level. It is the power centres of the state level that we will analyse now. The aim is to see if and how the changes shown to be happening on the substate level are being translated to the state level and in which forms the state level is reacting to these changes.

[663] See: Shokeid, Moshe. "Ethnic Identity and the Position of Women Among Arabs in an Israeli Town" in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) "*Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel*" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991).

I.II. State Level: Instability and Unresponsiveness[664]

It was argued in the theoretical model that identity building on the state level is an elite led phenomenon. It was predicted that the state level would still be important for political identity building but has increasingly problems to produce coherence in society. In the preceding chapter on Israeli society, several elements that are common to the elites on the state level have been discussed. The elites show a strong commitment to the existence of the state of Israel as a state with a Jewish character. Therefore religion should play a role in the definition of the state. Furthermore, this state should be the state of all Jews, not just of its citizens (thereby inherently discriminating against Israeli Palestinians). In consequence, one of the state's aims should be to bring the diaspora to Israel.[665] In addition, 'security', internal and external, plays an important role. However, there is no clear, agreed definition of these different elements between the different state elites. How each element can be translated in concrete policy is highly contested. The elites follow in their political identities those of their different substate supporters.

Since the mid 1990s an important change in leadership style on the state level in Israel can be observed. The state level in Israeli society was until recently characterised by the dominant position that the parties held in comparison to other political actors on the state level. However, this dominant role is currently undergoing a deep transformation. As Medding[666] argues, the party system in Israel has undergone three major changes since 1948. Before 1967 the party system was characterised by a government by party and the domination of one party, Mapai.

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[664] I have already outlined the major historical developments and changes on the state level in the previous chapter on Israeli society. Therefore I will restrict myself only to analyse the major current trends on this level as far as they are important for the question of political identity building.

[665] For an outline of the elite perceptions of Labor Zionism see: Brecher (1972) *op. cit.*: pp. 229-250. For the influence of elite perceptions on Israel's foreign policy decision making until the 1990s see: Roberts ,*op. cit.*: pp. 89-173.

Between 1967 and 1996 the state level was characterised by domination of specific party leaders while the party system was slowly developing into a stalemate with Likud and Labor holding roughly equal amounts of votes. Since 1996 Medding characterises the system as "government despite party, [a] fluid and extreme multi-party system, [and] disaggregated majoritarian executive power"[667].

It was under the second phase, during the stalemate in the party system that the rifts between the three political identity categories on the substate level deepened. During the time of the stalemate, it was necessary to grant minor coalition partners unprecedented influence. "Dictation to the coalition *formateur* by potential minor coalition partners and the increasing willingness and necessity of the major coalition party and its leaders to accept such dictation, give ground and make concessions on policies and administrative co-ordination, even on major matters, increasingly became the norm"[668]. During this time the religious parties gained increasing influence on the Israeli political scene. The religious parties in particular were able to build up and finance their separate educational and social system because they could extract substantive amounts of government money for this purpose.

In addition to these structural changes, the professionalisation of the large parties triggered a process in which the group of party activist grew increasingly distant from the general electorate. "The activist's behaviour responds to the demands of political careers [...] Political involvement by party activists feeds on itself; in doing so, it increases the differences between activists and the rest of the electorate"[669].

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[666] See: Medding, Peter Y. "From Government by Party to Government Despite Party" in *Israel Affairs* 6, 2 1999.
[667] Ibid: p. 191.
[668] Ibid: p. 181.
[669] Zuckerman, Alan S., Michal Shamir and Hanna Herzog. "The Political Base of Activism in the Israeli Labour and Herut Parties" in *Political Science Quarterly* 107, 2 1992: p. 322.

Because of the deadlock situation that was particularly obvious in the two national unity governments from 1984 until 1990, a widespread feeling developed that "political system in Israel requires major repairs"[670]. These reforms were passed in 1992 to be implemented for the first time in 1996. Two reforms were introduced. First and most importantly, the election of prime minister is now done via a direct vote from the electorate. Secondly, the barrier for entry into the Knesset has been raised from 1 % to 1.5 %. The direct election of the prime minister is by far the more important change. The aim was to counter the constant threat of breakdowns of coalitions which under the past system would immediately remove the prime minister from office. Now the prime minister can govern with a minority coalition as Prime Minister Barak demonstrated in the last months of his tenure. However, the reforms did not have the effect of stabilising the political system as a whole. "Measured on the intentions that the lawmakers had in mind at the time the reform was passed, the new system seems to achieve the opposite: the small parties were strengthened at the cost of the larger parties"[671]. The need to form coalitions out of a substantive number of different parties has remained and with it the fluidity of the system as a whole. This has particular dangers as Keren points out: "A political system resting on the slim, inconstant, often volatile majorities in the Knesset is, therefore, in danger of losing both its balance and its legitimacy"[672].

These developments aided and were accompanied by the rise of a new type of political leadership in Israel. "This group of leaders pays little heed to ideology and they demonstrate little respect or loyalty to their parties. The former Likud leader Netanyahu, and the Labor leader, Barak, have been inclined to reduce their parties'

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[670] Galnoor, Itzhak. "The Israeli Political System: A Profile" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) *"Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges"* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993): p. 93.
[671] Gundermann, Albrecht. "Israel's staatliche Ordnung nach den Reformen" in *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 8, 4 1998: p. 141. [Translation by the author]

power and influence"[673]. This new type of leaders, who act independently of their parties was not initiated with Netanyahu and Barak. Already under the Rabin/Peres administration this trend became obvious.

The peace process is the first example of how this new type of leadership tried to redefine the political game in order to further their own goals. "Rabin and other partisans of the peace process were attempting to draw a line between an Israeli national identity that was Zionist and liberal, a particular narrative of Israel, a frame that promised peace and prosperity, and a territorial compromise with the Palestinians [...] in their view a territorial compromise was imperative if Israel was to rid itself of a dire threat to its identity as a liberal and Zionist state"[674]. The peace process was not only initiated in secret, without consultation of the Labor Party elite it can also be characterised as the work of a new political class, unbound by former party structures. "The Oslo Accords of 1993 and all subsequent agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, were rather consistent with the norms of technocrats, industrialists, businessmen, managers, public administrators, professionals, and other incumbents to the 'new class'"[675]. Another sign of the change in leadership style is the fact that Netanyahu refashioned the prime minister's office, introducing a whole array of personal advisors which duplicated the work of the different government ministries. "Central to Netanyahu's thinking in attempting to maximise the influence of his office was his desire to control all aspects of the peace negotiations"[676].

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[672] Susser, Bernard. "Direct Election of the Prime Minister: A Balance Sheet" in *Israel Affairs* 4, 1 1997: p. 256.
[673] Sheffer, Gabriel. "Structural Change and Leadership Transformation" in *Israel Affairs* 5, 2/3 1999: p. 68.
[674] Barnett, Michael. "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo" in *European Journal of International Relations*" 5, 1 1999: p. 24f.
[675] Keren, Michael. "Elections 1996: The Candidates and the 'New Politics'" in *Israel Affairs* 4, 1 1997: p. 269.
[676] Lochery, Neill. "The Netanyahu Era: From Crisis to Crisis, 1996-99" in *Israel Affairs* 6, 3/4 2000: p. 225.

That the independence of the prime minister's leadership is not just limited to foreign affairs can be seen on the major policy changes prime minister Barak was suggesting in late August 2000. These far reaching social changes concerned one of the major domestic issues in Israeli society: the status quo agreements with the religious groups. Without consultation Barak informed the Labor party elites that he had set a new domestic agenda, concentrating on social issues. This agenda, which was quickly termed by the media 'secular revolution', included: "a constitution; legal options for civil marriage and burial, national service for all (including haredim and Arabs); lessons in citizenship, English and mathematics for all (inlcuding yeshiva pupils); and the abolishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs"[677]. These Reforms were complemented by the plan that in the Israeli passport the distinction between citizenship and nationality should be dropped "so that it remains open if the owner of the passport is a Jew or a member of the Arab minority"[678]. These reforms, if implemented, would mark a fundamental change in the structure of Israeli society. That such an important decision, altering a long standing Labour policy, initiated by David Ben Gurion, and observed by every prime minister (Labor or Likud) since, was taken without previous consultation and has angered the elite of the Labor Party which promptly accused Barak of "violating the party's traditional allegiance to the secular-religious status quo"[679]. Barak has defended his decision to propose the what he calls 'civil agenda':

> *"It is an attempt to find balance in our society between the democratic, pluralist, progressive, open society [...] and the Jewish character of the state,*

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[677] Derfner, Larry. "He says he wants a revolution" in *Jerusalem Post Internet Edition:* http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2000/08/24/Features/Features.11327.html

[678] Günther, Inge. "Baraks zivile Reform erhält Kontur. Zumindest im Pass sollen alle Israelis künftig gleich sein" in *Frankfurter Rundschau Online*: http://www.fr-aktuell.de/fr/102/t102005.htm [translation by the author]

[679] Derfner, Larry. "Reaping a social whirlwind" in *Jerusalem Post Internet Edition:* http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2000/09/14/Features/Features.12239.html

its roots and character. The attempt to find a balance can't take place if we wait until everyone agrees with everyone else, because that will not happen. [...] I think [emphasis added, HJS] that it is important for the citizens to have a constitution after 52 years"[680].

It becomes clear from this statement that Barak favoured a highly centralised leadership style in which he tried to fashion the country according to his beliefs and convictions. This leadership style however cannot include all different identity groups in Israel and widened rather than narrowed the rifts between the groups in the three political identity categories outlined during the analysis of the substate level.

The state level is still an important location for political identification in Israeli society. However what it means to be an 'Israeli' and what kind of state Israel should be is highly contested. Therefore, the state elites have increasing problems to establish societal cohesion. The political system at the state level in Israel is at one of the same time responsible for the deepening rifts between the groups in the three identity categories on the substate level, while being unable to respond to these rifts in a manner that would reduce their salience. The fact that small coalition parties, especially from the religious part of society, were able since the 1970s to exert disproportional pressure on the leading party and in doing so were able to build up their own separate educational and social systems, gave their separate conceptions of the character of the state of Israel legitimacy and financial support. The only groups which were not able to extract financial support were those in the secularised binational category which, in turn, isolated these groups from the political centre as well. The growing rifts between the different identity groups led to a highly unstable

[680] Keinon, Herb and Jeff Barak. "Exclusive Interview with PM Ehud Barak" in *Jerusalem Post Internet Edition:* http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2000/10/02/Features/Features.13098.html

political environment in which government crisis were a reoccurring factor. This led to structural reforms of the electoral system which however did not achieve the expected stability. In contrast the direct election of the prime minister enabled the emergence of a new style of centralised leadership. This cannot serve to narrow the already existing gaps since the prime minister can only take into account of the wishes of a specific part of society. Therefore the state is increasingly unable to react effectively to changes in this part of society. However the state level is not only coming under pressure from within society. Also the relationship with the diaspora, especially the American Jewry is in a state of change. It is this change that will be at the centre of the analysis in the next part of this chapter.

I.III. Supra-state level: Changing Relations with Diaspora

In the theoretical model, it was argued that the supra-state level is of increasing importance for political identity building and can no longer be left out of the analysis. It was pointed out that diaspora communities are one of the groups on the supra-state level that are of particular importance. This is because their political identity is strongly connected with their 'original' (real or imagined) 'homeland'. The relationship with the Jewish diaspora plays a central role in Israel. The state is defined as the state of the Jewish people as a whole in its declaration of independence. It is a central aim of the state to bring the Jewish diaspora to Israel. The American diaspora is playing here a central role for two main reasons: 1) Its size: it has more members than Israel has inhabitants, and is sending large amounts of monetary contributions to Israel, 2) The close connection since the 1970s between Israel and the US makes this diaspora the most important one, politically.[681]

[681] See: Lipson, Charles. "American Support for Israel: History, Sources and Limits" in Sheffer, Gabriel (ed) "U.S.-*Israeli Relations at the Crossroads*" (London: Frank Cass, 1997); also: Ben-Zvi,

However, since the 1980s, signs of cracks in the uncritical American Jewish support for Israel have surfaced. Some major political dramas clouded the relationship between the American Jewry and Israel. The most famous one is the Pollard affair. Pollard, a civilian intelligence analyst with the US Navy, was unmasked as a Israeli spy in 1985 and sentenced to life in 1987.

> *"Pollard's arrest sent shock waves through the US Jewish community. There was considerable anger towards Israel, which had clearly enlisted an American Jew to spy against his own country. This had been done with seemingly no concern as to the impact his unmasking would have on the US Jewish community. The case threatened to raise all the old canards about dual loyalty and where the US Jewish community's true allegiance lay"*[682].

Another factor which brought the differences between American Jewry and Israel into the foreground was the still ongoing 'Who is a Jew' debate in Israel. The debate centres around the question of who can be recognised as a Jew. According to the 1950 version of the Law of Return, only Jews have the right to immigrate to Israel and receive immediate citizenship. However "the Law of Return did not define 'Jew', a vagueness that would lead to contentious legislation and court rulings"[683]. In 1970 an amendment to the Law of Return was passed in which the Knesset tried to define the term 'Jew' more clearly. However the definition that a 'Jew' is a person whose mother is a Jewess or who converted to Judaism equally left the question open. It was not defined what kind of conversion to Judaism the potential immigrant would have to undergo in order to qualify. In addition, the amendment created a category of people who had the 'rights of a Jew'. Those persons could immigrate under the law

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Abraham. *"Decade of Transition. Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American-Isareli Alliance"* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

[682] Marcus, Jonathan. "Discordant Voices: the US Jewish Community and Israel during the 1980s" in *International Affairs* 66, 3 1990: p. 551.

of return but would not be recognised as Jews by the state. "Those individuals include any child or grandchild of a Jew (male or female), the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew, and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew"[684].

Since then, the so called 'conversion crisis' is at the heart of the 'Who is a Jew' debate. Orthodox parties in Israel have sought to introduce legislation which would only recognise orthodox conversions. While in Israel most Jews are either secular or belong to the orthodox strand of Judaism, the overwhelming majority of American Jews are either conservative or reform Jews. If the Law of Return would only recognise orthodox conversions, those American Jews which are not orthodox would not be recognised as Jews in Israel. This, of course, created strong resistance among the American Jewish community. "During the late 1980s, American Jewish leaders intervened in the Israeli political process with a boldness and vigor not equaled before"[685].

Not only because of these political factors is the relationship between the American Jewry and Israel in a state of change. Steven Bayme, the director American Jewish Committee's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, paints a problematic picture of Israel-diaspora relations:

> *"One change is demographic. [...] Within the next ten to fifteen years - if present trends are not reversed - Israel will surpass the United State as the world's largest Jewish community [...] A second area of transformation is political. Israel is now pursuing a peace process with the PLO and its Arab neighbours [...] A third area of change is the cultural transformation in Israeli-Diaspora relations. Our language divide continues to grow [...] We*

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[683] Anti Defamation League. *"The Conversion Crisis. A Backgrounder on the Current Debate on Religion, State and Conversion in Israel"* (New York: Anti Defamation League, February 1998): p. 2.
[684] Ibid.: p. 2.
[685] Landau, David. *"Who is a Jew? A Case Study of American Jewish Influence on Israeli Policy"* (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1996): p. 1.

are also growing further apart in our attitudes toward intermarriage. American Jews are increasingly accepting intermarriage [...] Another example of the cultural divide concerns religious pluralism. For the great majority of American Jews, plurality of religious expression is an axiomatic aspect of contemporary Jewish identity. Israelis, however, who implicitly recognise Orthodoxy as the legitimate form of Judaism [...] have little interest in religious pluralism for its own sake"[686].

These internal and external developments were at the basis of a new attitude of the American Jewish leadership towards Israel before the start of the Oslo peace process. "Attachment to the State of Israel has of late become far more problematic for American Jews"[687]. Although surveys show that the great majority of American Jews consistently supported the handling of peace process by the Israeli governments since 1993[688], a critical attitude within the American Jewish establishment developed. "Some of Israel's most ardent American supporters concluded that the Rabin government was on a suicidal course, and they set out to derail it"[689]. The long held consensus of the major Jewish lobby organisations in America to support whatever

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[686] Bayme, Steven. *"Changing Patterns in Israel-Diaspora Relations. Address at the National Conference of the American Jewish Press Association"* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 16th of June 1994): p. 2ff.

[687] Eisen, Arnold. *"A New Role for Israel in American Jewish Identity"* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1992): p. 1.

[688] However there were significant variations during the tenures of prime ministers Rabin, Peres, and Netanyahu: Rabin: 66-70% in 1994, 68% in 1995; Peres: 79% in 1996; Netanyahu: 61% in 1997, 56% in 1998; in early 1999 43% answered 'not enough' to the questions: 'Is the Israeli government doing enough or not doing enough to carry out the peace agreements it has signed with the Palestinian Authority (PLO)?'. See: Cohen, Renate and Jennifer Golub. *"The Israeli Peace Initiative and the Israeli-PLO Accord. A Survey of American Jewish Opinion in 1994"* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1995); American Jewish Committee. *"The Israeli Peace Initiative and the Israeli-PLO Accord. A Followup Survey"* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1994); American Jewish Committee. *"American Jewish Attitudes Toward Israel and the Peace Process. A Public-Opinion Survey"* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1995); American Jewish Committee. *"In the Aftermath of the Rabin Assassination: A Survey of American Jewish Opinion About Israel and the Peace Process"* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1996); American Jewish Committee. *"1997 Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion"* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1997); American Jewish Committee. *"1998 Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion"* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1998); American Jewish Committee. *"1999 Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion":* http//www.ajc.org/pre/ajc99survery.htm.

democratically elected government of Israel in at least all aspects relating to security is slowly breaking down as well. Rifts between and within the organisations created different political factions, similar to the 'secularised Jewish nationalism' and 'right wing religious identity' categories in Israeli society.[690]

'American Religious Nationalism'

The "American religious nationalism" group is the smaller of the two identity categories. Although religion is one of the central elements of their identity, they do not argue for a religious state in Israel. Jordan Frankel, an orthodox Jew and lobbyist with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), argues "I happen to think that Israel is a Jewish state and that religion should play a very strong role and that you cannot separate religion and state". On the other hand "you should not use religion to coerce others"[691]. Consequently, ethnicity is seen mainly as membership in a group of believers. "Obviously in my mind it is a connected grouping. To say, it is a religion would be to limit it"[692]. The membership of this grouping also entails certain obligations. "One of those responsibilities is to do everything you can to protect Israel, the state of Israel. This is a Jewish obligation [...] if you are in the diaspora you should be somehow involved in something that helps Israel to survive"[693]. However in contrast to their Israeli counterparts, in principle, territory can be given up in order to achieve peace. "I don't see a religious barrier to giving up land"[694]. Similar to the members of this identity grouping in Israel, language is seen

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[689] Goldberg, Jonathan Jeremy. *"Jewish Power. Inside the American Jewish Establishment"* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1996): p. 49.

[690] Obviously the third category, 'secular binationalism' cannot be found in American Jewish lobby organisations since an argument for a religiously neutral Israel would necessarily sever the link between the American Jewry and Israel since their special relationship is based on the religious and cultural affiliation with the Jewish character of the state of Israel.

[691] Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]

[692] Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]

[693] Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]

[694] Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]

as having religious and spiritual meaning. "The Hebrew language is a very different language to all other languages. [...] Just take prayers for example. You cannot translate the Hebrew prayers, it is impossible [...] There is a certain way of Jewish thinking that is closely connected to the language"[695]. Within this group, which mirrors the political identity of its Israeli counterpart, a strong opposition to the Oslo process developed since 1993, the main argument being that it endangers the security of Israel. Jordan Frankel characterised the Oslo process as a "danger to the state of Israel"[696].

'American Secular Jewish Nationalism'

The 'American secular Jewish nationalism' is also a mirror image of its Israeli counterpart. It is interesting to note that the location of the members of this identity group has an impact on their political outlook towards the peace process. In general, those working in Israel seemed to have a more optimistic look towards the Oslo process than those working in the United States. Also within one lobby group, people from different identity groups are working together. There are three identity subgroups in this category: left, centre and right of centre.

Guy Brenner, a foreign policy research analyst with AIPAC, is in his political identity on the left of the 'American secular Jewish nationalism' category. Here, ethnicity is not based mainly on a religious definition of Judaism. "There is a variety of ways to look at Judaism. Judaism is not only just religion [...] It is a shared identity which combines elements of history, culture and of course religion"[697]. Territory is devoid of religious meaning and is seen mainly from a security point of view. Laura Kam Issacharoff, assistant director of the Anti-Defamation League's Jerusalem

[695] Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]
[696] Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]

office, explains: "A good majority of the land that was conquered [...] will eventually have to be given up [...] that it has to be done on the basis of Israel's security needs"[698]. Religion and state in the view of the left in this American political identity category should be separated. Thomas R. Smerling, executive director of the Israel Policy Forum, outlines it: "There should be complete separation between religion and state"[699]. Language is seen in nationalist and not in religious terms. Tom Savicki, deputy director of AIPAC's Jerusalem office, outlines this: "A country is defined by its language to a very great extend and it is from the language that a cultural identity like literature comes forth. I think it is the same for Israel"[700].

The centrist position in this American Jewish political identity category is taken by those that put more emphasis on the Jewish character of the state. Joseph Alpher, who immigrated to Israel in the early 1960s and who is currently the director of the American Jewish Committee's (AJC) Jerusalem office explains:

> *"I think that religion and politics should be completely separated. But in the specific case of Israel I don't think religion and state can be completely separated [...] Religion is part of Judaism even if some of us don't participate in it. [...] We have to acknowledge that certain aspects of religion will be intertwined with the state"*[701].

Similarly to the left wing subgroup, territory in the centrist group has no intrinsic religious meaning and is seen in pragmatic political terms "Historical claims that have to do with the bible have some importance to me but very little compared to the historical claims based on who has been living in the area not for hundreds of years,

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[697] Brenner, Guy. Washington, D.C., 18.02.99. [Interview with the author]
[698] Issacharoff, Laura Kam. Jerusalem, 24.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[699] Smerling, Thomas R. Washington, D.C., 16.02.99. [Interview with the author]
[700] Sawicki, Tom. Jerusalem, 17.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[701] Alpher, Joseph. Tel Aviv, 08.02.99. [Interview with the author]

but for this century"[702], argues Jason F. Isaacson director of government and international affairs of the AJC. Parallel to the 'secular Jewish nationalism' political identity in Israel, the Holocaust takes a central position in the political identity and is used as the main justification for the state of Israel. George Spectre, associated director of B'nai Brith's Centre for Public Policy, outlines this. "I think it was a very sharp spotlight for the need for a Jewish homeland, some place the Jews could always go to if they were persecuted"[703].

The right of centre position political identity is characterised by a more central position that nationalism defined as an ethnic concept takes. Alan Schneider, director of B'nai Brith's World Centre in Jerusalem, argues "My Jewishness expresses itself mainly in Jewish nationalism. In other words I see all of Jewish culture and history even religion in a perspective of nationalism. My primary affiliation with being Jewish is the national character of that designation"[704]. In addition language is more than just a cultural or national tool in the political identity. Stacy Burdett, assistant director of Government Relations of the Anti-Defamation League, defines language in the following way: "It certainly enhances the person's connection with the Jewish text and the Jewish past. It [Judaism, HJS] is a religion and a culture were the word is the thing"[705].

Israel-diaspora relations, in specific Israel's relationship with the largest diaspora community, American Jewry, is in a state of change. Beginning with the 1980s the two communities grew steadily more distinct form each other as far as their social, religious and political outlook is concerned. Within the politically active establishment, the traditional consensus which demanded that the democratically

[702] Isaacson, Jason F. Washington D.C., 16.02.99. [Interview with the author]
[703] Spectre, George. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]

elected government of Israel should be supported in whatever security decisions it has made, is slowly breaking down. Between and within the major American Jewish lobby organisations similar rifts and cleavages in political identity have appeared as we have seen in Israeli society. However the different political identity conceptions within the diaspora have not yet become as fundamentally incompatible as have the different political identity conceptions in Israel. All of the political identities within the American diaspora share the definition of Israel as a 'democratic and Jewish state'. Nevertheless, the American Jewish diaspora has, at least as far as the political establishment is concerned, become more diverse. Since the 1980s, as we have seen, different diaspora groups and actors compete for influence on the highest level of political power in Israel in order to give their political identities a hearing in the political decision making process of the state of Israel. This in turn puts contradicting political pressures on the Israeli state level from the outside. The highly centralised decision making in the Israeli government however is unable to accommodate the increasing number of different political identity conceptions which woe it for influence.

Israeli society is an era of fundamental change on all levels of political identity building. Starting in the 1980s and intensified by the currently ongoing peace process the fundamental consensus in Israeli society is breaking down. Although the concept of the state, of 'having a state of one's own' is still an important element of political identities, the concrete definition of what it means to be an 'Israeli' and what kind of state Israel should be is becoming highly contested. The answers to these basic questions have never been agreed upon since the founding of the state. However

[704] Schneider, Alan. Jerusalem, 16.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[705] Burdett, Stacy. Washington, D.C., 16.02.99. [Interview with the author]

while during a time of outside pressure and insecurity this question was not at the forefront of the political debate and interim solutions could always be found (the 'status quo agreement' and the lack of a constitution in Israel testify to this). This situation has now changed. Israel has now peace treaties with two of his three immediate neighbours, its troops have withdrawn from southern Lebanon and, the riots since October 2000 notwithstanding, it is pursuing a peace process with the Palestinians. The easing of the security situation has brought this long neglected question to the political debate. The fact that since for the first four decades of Israel's existence the question was never seriously tackled has led to the emergence of three different, mutually exclusive identity conceptions that are loosing their basic common ground ('right wing religious identity', 'mainstream Jewish nationalism', 'secular binationalism').

The debate has in parts taken the form of a *Kulturkampf* in which different identity conceptions are fighting for political influence. The danger in this situation lies in the fact that at least in the two 'extreme' categories, 'right-wing religious nationalism' and 'secular binationalism', groups are located, which feel increasingly alienated from the state and have violent potential. That the prospect of internal violence is not just a theoretical option can be seen on the assassination of prime minister Rabin and on the violent demonstrations of Israeli Palestinians in October 2000 (which for the first time since 1948 participated in widespread violent demonstrations using firearms).

The state level in Israel is increasingly unable to create societal cohesion. The political system has developed from a virtual stalemate in the 1980s to a highly fluid and unstable system. Because of the direct election of the prime minister, a new type of leadership could establish itself. Starting already with the second premiership of Rabin and establishing itself with premiers Netanyahu and Barak, political decision

making has become a highly centralised affair. Therefore the state level is increasingly accommodating specific political identity conceptions that are prevalent in Israeli society and in consequence unable to reestablish a basic and widely accepted societal consensus.

The changing relationship with the diaspora, especially the American Jewry, is also affecting the state level. Since the early 1980s American Jewry has steadily growing apart form Israeli Jewish society in religious, cultural and political terms. At the time of the Oslo process in 1993, the American Jewish political establishment had developed a more critical stance vis-à-vis Israel. The old consensus of the different American Jewish political organisations that demanded largely uncritical support of the democratically elected government of Israel in security matters is slowly breaking down. Now for the first time opposition to Israel's security policy from the left and the right is openly voiced and critics trying to become actively involved in the political decision making process in Israel which in turn puts additional pressure on the Israeli state level.

As we can see the predictions of the theoretical model fit closely the situation of political identity building in Israeli society. All three levels of political identity building are important and are trying to have an impact on the political decision making. Although the state level remains an important element of political identification, the predicted problems of the elites on the state level to create societal cohesion and a widely accepted political identity can be observed. The weaker role of 'language' as a significator in the political identity of most groups, predicted in the theoretical model, can be observed, since only the groups in the 'right wing political identity' category point to language as an important element of political identification. 'Gender' on the other hand does not have the explanatory power

expected. This can be attributed to the still very effective exclusion of women from political decision making structures.

After having analysed the situation in Israeli society and the impact of the peace process on its political identities we will now turn to Palestinian society to see what similarities and differences to Israeli society exist. Particular emphasis will be given to the question of whether the Palestinian state level is able to accommodate its different political identity conceptions.

II. Political Identity in Palestinian Society

II.I. the Substate Level: Divisions and Marginalisation

Palestinian society is in a state of crisis at the present time.[706] Not only has it to cope with a political situation of extremely limited autonomy but the Palestinian Authority (PA) itself is actively engaged in marginalising any independent political development within the occupied territories. "Palestinian state building is taking place in an era when society is disengaging from the state and the state is retreating from society"[707]. The primary aim of the PA seems to be to perpetuate its hold on political power in Palestinian society. "The time in exile deeply influenced the PLO and was one of the main reasons that it developed into an organisation that follows the primary aim of securing its political dominance"[708]. To this end the PA has developed a political structure that can best be described as 'neopatrimonial'.[709] In addition "the Exterior Leadership attained full control over the institutions of the

[706] In the previous chapter on Palestinian society I have analysed the major problems and restrictions that Palestinian society is facing as far as a free expression of their political identities is concerned. Therefore in this chapter I will restrict myself to an outline of only the major factors.
[707] Frisch, Hillel. "*Countdown to Statehood. Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and Gaza*" (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998): p. 152.
[708] Beck, Martin. "Die Misere der palästinensischen Autonomiegebiete" in *Leviathan* 26, 1 1998: p. 84. [Translation by the author]
[709] See discussion in preceding chapter on Palestinian society.

autonomy"[710]. This was the culmination of a struggle for control which started during the *intifada*, as the local United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which started out as an autonomous body, founded and controlled by the 'inside' leadership, came increasingly dependent on the PLO cadres in Tunis. Similarly, when the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace conference had to be selected from inside the occupied territories, the outside PLO leadership "made sure that most of the delegation's members would lack any independent power base. Moreover, the delegation's only source of legitimacy in the Interior was its identification with the PLO"[711].

In its effort to 'de-politicise' Palestinian society in the occupied territories, the PA is also strengthening the old clan or extended family (hamula) structure of Palestinian society. This structure has traditionally been one of the bases of associational life in the occupied territories. "The essence of social organisation is a network of *hamulas* (extended families) and smaller families as well as village, neighbourhood, and religious solidarities"[712]. Along with this tactic goes an effort to avoid an institutionalisation of the political system. On the one hand, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was effectively relegated to the margins of political decision making. On the other hand, "neither Fatah nor the organized Palestinian political opposition (consisting of the Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, the PFLP, and the bulk of the DFLP) transformed themselves into parties or indicated their willingness to contest other forces in the political arena"[713]. In addition, the different Palestinian Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which played a vital

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[710] Litvak, Meir. "Inside Versus Outside. The Challenge of the Local Leadership, 1967-1994" in Sela, Avraham and Moshe Ma'oz (eds) *"The PLO and Israel. From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 1964-1994"* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997): p. 190.
[711] Ibid: p. 189.
[712] Muslih, Muhammad. "Palestinian Civil Society" in *Middle East Journal* 47, 2 1993: p. 259.
[713] Frisch *op. cit.*: p. 152.

role during the *intifada*[714] are suffering from a loss of international funds as the donors emphasis has shifted to the PNA. Furthermore, the PNA has actively tried to control the NGOs. In 1995 the PNA drew up a law which "gave the PA the right to dissolve or merge together NGOs without their consent and to appoint members of the boards of directors, and placed prohibitive restrictions on the handling of NGO finances. In short, the draft law gave the PA, and not members of civil society, the right to determine if an NGO should exist or not"[715]. Although the law was withdrawn it clearly showed the intentions of the PA elite. In addition, "an increasingly diffuse situation as far as political, economic and developmental measures are concerned, is feeding growing doubts about the self government's ability to fulfil its tasks"[716].

But not only the politics of the Palestinian authority influence the political identity crisis in Palestinian society in the occupied territories.

> *"The PA's detractors point out that current agreements represent a challenge to the social and spatial inclusiveness of the Palestinian nationalist ideology and structures. There is no longer any clear object of resistance - no authority with clear responsibility for economic and social hardships - and thus an important tool for social mobilization and carving out the awareness of unity has been blunted"*[717].

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[714] See: Barghouti, Mustafa. "The Palestinian NGOs and their Contribution to Policy Making" in Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) *"Civil Society Empowerment. Policy Analysis"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1998).
[715] Robinson, Glenn E. *"Building a Palestinian State. The Incomplete Revolution"* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997): p. 184.
[716] Nasser, Majed. "Das Dilemma bleibt. Die Palästinenser 'nach Oslo'" in *Vereinte Nationen* 6 1997: p. 206. [Translation by the author]
[717] Paerker, Christopher. *"Resignation or Revolt? Socio-political Development and the Challenges for Peace in Palestine"* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999): p. 65.

As Lindholm Schulz points out, Palestinian national identity was fashioned around the concepts of struggle, suffering and sacrifice.[718] For decades the PLO and Fatah "argued that armed struggle was the only way to liberate Palestine"[719]. Now the way to liberate Palestine is through negotiations with the former enemy Israel. This took away one of the central elements, 'armed struggle', that served as a common basis of the different political identity conceptions of Palestinian society.

These complex tendencies led to a political identity crisis which in turn gave rise to two basic political identity categories in Palestinian society: 'fundamentalistic Islamic identity' and 'secular nationalism'. Here, similar to Israeli society, fragmentation of political identities can be observed, as it was expected in the theoretical model. As we shall see, both categories share only their critical stance vis-à-vis the PA. Their basic conceptions of what kind of state the future state of Palestine should be are, nevertheless, mutually exclusive. This can only be fully understood if all six signifactors of political identity (territory, ethnicity, history, language, religion, gender) are analysed. In the case of the 'Fundamentalistic Islamic Nationalism' category whose groups advocate an Islamic state in all of the former Palestine, the opposition to the PA turns at times to outright active resistance. It is this category that we shall analyse first.

'Islamic Fundamentalistic Identity'

Modern Islamic oriented groups in Palestinian society have a long history. They are an outcome of the Islamic renaissance in the whole of the Middle East which developed in the late 19th century as a response to European colonialism. The Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna, opened branches in

[718] See: Lindholm Schulz, Helena. "*The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism. Between Revolution and Statehood*" (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999): p. 121ff.

Palestine in the 1930s and 40s. It continued its activities after the establishment of the state of Israel. Following al-Banna's teachings, it concentrated mainly on social and religious activities, trying to reform and Islamise society from below, rather then attempting a revolution from above. "The Brotherhood's work on campuses and in other grassroots settings strengthened its foundations and created a degree of dependency on its institutions"[720]. The 1967 war had a decisive impact on Islamic movements all over the Middle East and especially in Palestinian society.

> *"Islamists [...] argued that the war was punishment for misplaced trust in the promise of alien ideologies that had been fostered as a means of mobilizing for modernization and development. The defeat was devastating because the margin of deviance from the faith was great"*[721].

The *intifada* gave the movement an additional boost and heralded the establishment of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. Hamas was created as an independent wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.

> *"The emergence of Hamas added a new dimension to Palestinian politics. The new organisation was not willing to subsume itself within the framework of the PLO and threw down the gauntlet in the struggle for political power"*[722].

The start of the peace process in Madrid in 1992 drew immediate opposition from Hamas.[723]. Equally, Hamas opposed the Oslo process and in consequence the PA. However it is not only the political process as a whole that is problematic for the

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[719] Gee, John R. *"Unequal Conflict. The Palestinians and Israel"* (London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 91.
[720] Ahmed, Hishami H. *"From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994): http://www.passia.org/publications/research_studies/Hamas-Text/chapter1.htm.
[721] Haddad, Yvonne. "Islamists and the 'Problem of Israel': The 1967 Awakening" in *Middle East Journal* 46, 2 19992: p. 266f.
[722] Milton-Edwards, Beverly. *"Islamic Politics in Palestine"* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999): p. 147.
Therefore Israel was supporting Hamas for a short time after its establishment in order to weaken the PLO inside the occupied territories. It is obvious that this strategy has backfired.

movement. The PA, bound by the security commitments it made with Israel, is actively engaged in an attempt to suppress Hamas's activities. "Oslo has been *the* great challenge faced by Hamas, for the movement has known from the outset that its own success is premised on the failure of Yasir Arafat's colossal gamble on accommodation with Israel"[724]. Consequently the first violent clashes between the newly established PA and followers of Hamas occurred on the 18th of November 1994 during which the Palestinian police killed 14 people and wounded 270. After the confrontation which cost the newly established PA credibility on the Palestinian street, "Arafat changed the rules of the game: by withdrawing PA officials (the police) and mobilizing Fatah, he turned the conflict into a factional one between Hamas and Fatah - a conflict in which Hamas declined to engage"[725]. One of the problems for Arafat is that with Hamas he is facing "a movement of national liberation, not just domestic opposition objecting to his policies"[726].

The PA devised a strategy to cope with Hamas which would satisfy Israeli security demands without bringing Hamas into complete opposition to the Authority. "The authority arrested many supporters of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other groups. These arrests were limited and did not intensify the situation to a state of war between the two sides"[727]. The other part of the strategy consisted of attempts to co-opt Hamas into the newly political structure. One sign of this strategy was the 1995 tacit agreement between Hamas and the PA that Hamas would no longer attack targets in Israel that do not serve Palestinian interests in return for the PA's easing of

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[723] See: Miton-Edwards, Beverly. "Political Islam in Palestine in an Environment of Peace?" in *Third World Quarterly* 17, 2 1996.
[724] Kristianasen, Wendy. "Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, 3 1999: p. 19.
[725] Ibid: p. 25.
[726] Kodmani-Darwish, Bassma. "Arafat and the Islamists: Conflict or Cooperation" in *Current History* 597 1996: p. 29.
[727] Barghouti, Iyad. "Islamist Movements in Historical Palestine" in Sidahmed, Abdel Salam and Anoushiravan Etheshami (eds) *"Islamic Fundamentalism"* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996): p. 170.

its persecutions of the members of Hamas's military wing, the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigade. Although the agreement was broken with the suicide bombings of 1996, it shows that the PA was able to use the argument of a danger of a Palestinian civil war in order to bring Hamas into line at least temporarily. This co-optation strategy became especially intensive before the 1996 elections for the PLC.

Although Hamas did not participate in the elections, it also did not call for a boycott and fielded several 'independent' candidates. However, this brought Hamas in conflict with its 'outside' leadership in Amman.

> *"The 'outside' activists subscribe to a vision of political Islamism - that is, a revolution from above - rather than with religious revelation through ordinary processes of communal activity. However they do not have to cope with the reality of Israeli occupation, the PA's domination, and the daily hardships of the Palestinian community, which might explain why they can afford to adopt a harder line concerning the armed struggle and the Oslo process"*[728].

However, Hamas was able to adapt its ideology and strategy to the political situation if this was required. Western concepts, such as 'democracy' or 'nationalism', were integrated into its ideological outlook to respond to policy demands. As Nüsse explains, Hamas's ideology can be be described "as based on traditional Islamic teaching, enriched with modern concepts and ideas of mainly Western origin [...] In their application to contemporary situations and problems, the interpretation and emphasis of [...] elements of traditional Islamic teaching often change"[729].

However, in principle, the long term goal is the liberation of all of Palestine. In its charter in article 11, the basic justification of this is given: "The Islamic Resistance

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[728] Mishal, Shaul and Avraham Sela. *"The Palestinian Hamas. Vision, Violence and Coexistence"* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): p. 161.

Movement believes that the land of Palestine have been an Islamic waqf throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or abandon it or part of it"[730]. It becomes clear from this, that similar to 'right wing religious identity' in Israel, territory is endowed with religious meaning. Religion is the central element of Hamas's political identity. Mahmoud El-Zahar, spokesman of Hamas in Gaza, explains this: "By Islam we are speaking our language, not meaning our Arab language, but we are expressing ourselves"[731]. Therefore there can be no separation between religion and the state. Ethnicity is seen from a historical and religious perspective. El-Zahar argues: "Our life is controlled individually and generally by Islam and Islam started with the Arabs, through the language of the Arabs and through an Arab prophet"[732]. The political identity of Hamas offers the individual clear orientation on all three levels of political identity building. EL-Zahar explains this worldview: "We are speaking about three levels, our country, or you can call it a state [...] this is part of the Arab world and the Arab nation is one of the nations inside Islam"[733]. In consequence, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is also seen in this wider context. Sheik Wajih Khalil Yaghi, a member of the PLC (as an independent) and close to Hamas, argues: "Palestinians are part of the Arab world [...] I don't look at the Palestinian problem as only a Palestinian problem. For me it is a Islamic and Arab problem"[734].

Islamic Jihad is the second major Islamic movement in Palestinian society. In 1980 it split from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, because it "perceived the

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[729] Nüsse, Andrea. *"Muslim Palestine. The Ideology of Hamas"* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998): p. 175.
[730] Hamas Charter: gopher://israel-info.gov.il/00/terror/880818.ter.
[731] El-Zahar, Mahmoud. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[732] El-Zahar, Mahmoud. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[733] El-Zahar, Mahmoud. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[734] Yaghi, Sheik Waji Khalil. Gaza, 11.05.99. [Interview with the author]

activities of the Brotherhood as too conservative"[735]. From its inception, the movement carried out terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in order to achieve an Islamic revolution. Its view on the conflict is similar to that of Hamas. "The Islamic Jihad sees the Palestinian problem as [...] a problem that concerns the entire Islamic nation [...] Islamic Jihad believes in an Islamic popular war of liberation, resulting in the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic state in Palestine"[736]. Islamic Jihad sees itself as the revolutionary vanguard of this war. Rather than transforming society first, as the Muslim Brotherhood attempts, "Islamic Jihad's position gives priority to the elimination of Israeli rule"[737].

For Islamic Jihad, religion is seen at the centre of personal and political identity. Sheik Abdullah Achmed Shami, spokesman of Islamic Jihad in Gaza, explains: "I believe that Islam is a great way of arranging the relationships between human beings and also the relations with the universe in general. It is also a great religion of justice"[738]. Therefore the distinction between personal, religious, and political identity is erased. Sheik Shami outlines this in the following way: "I see no difference in Islam between the religious, personal or political, they are all under Islam"[739].

The groups within the 'Islamic fundamentalist identity' category in Palestinian society put Islam, religion, at the centre of their political identity. In addition, because of their rejection of the current peace process as a whole (it is seen as fundamentally flawed), the groups in this category can maintain the three basic elements of the nationalist ideology: struggle, suffering, and sacrifice. Israel is clearly

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[735] Schoch, Bernd. *"The Islamic Movement. A Challenge for Palestinian State Building"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1999): p. 44.
[736] Abu-Amr, Ziad. *"Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad"* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994): p. 105.
[737] Ibid: p. 106.
[738] Shami, Sheik Abdullah Achmed. Gaza, 25.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[739] Shami, Sheik Abdullah Achmed. Gaza, 25.03.99. [Interview with the author]

marked as the enemy against which one has to struggle, from which has to suffer and against which one as to sacrifice. The aim, an Islamic state in all of Palestine is also clearly marked. The groups within this category were able to build up their own educational, religious and social network separately from the state. They form a society within the society which offers the individual not only spiritual guidance but also tends to his or her social and educational needs. However, the specific outline of the future Islamic state and what particular strategies one has to use in order to achieve this aim, given the current circumstances, are not elaborated. This leaves groups within this category without a clear political alternative to the present situation.

'Secular Nationalism'

The second political identity category in Palestinian society is 'secular nationalism'. Being the largest in Palestinian society, this category is includes a diffuse set of political identities which are therefore easier to manipulate by the PA. While the groups in the 'Islamic fundamentalistic identity' category were opposed to the PA in general, the groups in the 'secular nationalism' category are critical of the policies of the Authority without mounting a challenge to the idea of a two state solution in general. It's common ground are the critical stance vis-à-vis the current policies of the PA and the wish for a democratic secular state in Palestine. However there are three subdivisions in this category: 1) the old 'inside' leadership and those political leaders that were termed 'personalities', which rose to prominence during the intifada (this also includes the supporters of the PA from the 'inside' Fateh movement); 2) the Palestinian NGOs, an outgrowth of the *intifada* and now in a struggle with the PA to maintain their independence; 3) the leftist opposition, consisting of the different factions of the PLO. We now analyse these groups in turn.

The 'inside' leadership gained in political importance after the PLO left Beirut in 1982. However it took centre stage in Palestinian political life after the beginning of the *intifada* after 1987. As the *intifada* progressed however the 'inside' became gradually more and more controlled by the 'outside', exile leadership. During the 1992 Madrid/Washington negotiations the 'inside' and the independent 'personalities' which were conducting the negotiations were already effectively marginalised. Nevertheless the experience of the *intifada* and the peace process after 1992 changed the perception of the 'inside' leadership. "After the exposure of local leaders and personalities to the PLO leadership, [...] the local leaders and personalities have become aware of the limitations of PLO leaders. And also aware of their [own] distinct skills, capabilities and ability to perform vis-à-vis some PLO leaders"[740]. After the establishment of the PA in 1994, the 'inside' leadership became aware that they were effectively shut out of all important positions of political power. This can be seen on the fact that Haidar Abdul Shafi, the former head of the Palestinian delegation during the Madrid/Washington talks, resigned from the post of speaker of the PLC in protest at the council's lack of political influence. Nevertheless this group supports the PA in general and wants to work with the PA to reform the PA's structure. This can be seen in the fact that a large number of members of this group have been elected to the PLC.

The political identity of this group centres around the vision of a secular democratic state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Territory is seen in a national, historic sense, as a homeland without specific religious connotations. Abdul Shafi explains: "The Palestinians are the descendants of the Semitic tribes [...] Before the establishment of the Jewish Kingdom, during the Jewish Kingdom and after the

[740] Abu-Amr, Ziad. *"Emerging Trends in Palestine Strategic and Political Thinking and Practice"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996): p. 41.

Jewish Kingdom, we had continued presence on this territory and so our entitlement to Palestinian territories in its entirety is a fact"[741]. Because of this historical view on territory, ethnicity is seen in an Arab context; Rawya Shawa, an independent member of the PLC and member of the Shawa family, an old family in the Gaza Strip, explains the connection: "We are part of the Arabs because we are supposed to be one nation despite all the plans for divisions since the middle of this century"[742]. Sharif Husseini, general director of the International Relations Department of the Orient House, describes it in the following way: "I think it is a matter of circles. The inner circle is the smaller circle, Palestinian. The outer circle is Arab"[743].

State and religion should be separated as far as politics are concerned. However religion in a cultural aspect should influence the state. Mahdi Abdul-Haid, head of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) in Jerusalem, argues: "You cannot exclude the fasting months of Ramadan, you can cannot exclude the major feasts, you cannot exclude prayers, you cannot exclude maintaining the holy places, the holy sites. [...] They are part of the heritage, the culture of the society"[744]. Hatem Abdel Quader, a Fateh member of the PLC, describes the aspired separation between religion and state: "Religion is important [...] all our people are interested in religion but not in a political way [...] We must create a balance between religion and the political affairs"[745]. Religion in the Palestinian context is a more complex issue as it is in Jewish Israeli society since a minority of Palestinians are Christians.[746] This gives the question of the relationship between the state and religion an added level of complexity. Constantine

[741] Abdul Sharif, Haidar. Gaza, 16.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[742] Shawa, Rawya. Gaza, 13.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[743] Husseini, Sharif. Jerusalem, 19.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[744] Abdul-Hadi, Mahdi. Jerusalem, 19.03.99. [Interview with the author]
[745] Quader, Abdel Hatem. Jerusalem, 16.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[746] See: Tsimhoni, Daphne. *"Christian Communities in Jerusalem and the West Bank since 1948. A Historical, Social and Political Study"* (Westport: Praeger, 1993).

S. Dabbagh, executive director of the Near East Council of Churches' Committee for Refugee Work (NECCRW) in Gaza, argues: "The state should not be based on religion [...] They should adopt in the laws of the state what is good [in all religions, HJS]. But they should not have 100% religious laws"[747]. Language is seen as a national symbol devoid of any religious meaning. Saleh Ra'afat, general secretary of FIDA, summarises: "Arabic is very important. It is my mother tongue"[748]. In summary, the political identity of the 'inside' leadership / personalities subgroup is centred around a secular democratic state which takes religion as a cultural background and feels connected to the wider Arab world through common ethnicity, religion, history and language. However this identity conception remains vague in specifics.

Palestinian NGOs form the second subgroup of the 'secular nationalism' identity category. "Palestinian civil society in the occupied territories is peculiar in one fundamental respect. It encompasses [...] a de facto political society based on Palestinian non-governmental organisations"[749]. Established during the three decades of Israeli occupation after the 1967 war, the NGOs formed a separate structure from the Israeli occupation authorities. "Pluralism has been a feature of Palestinian life for almost three decades, during which the absence of a national government to deal with the policies of the Israeli occupier has resulted in the establishment of hundreds of NGOs, many of which were established by political factions, partly as a means to extend their influence in society by providing services"[750]. Since the establishment of the PA the NGOs have been engaged in a political struggle against the PA to keep

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[747] Dabbagh, Constantine S. Gaza, 14.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[748] Ra'afat, Saleh. Ramallah, 20.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[749] Usher, Graham. *"Palestine in Crisis. The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo"* (London: Pluto Press, 1997): p. 46.
[750] Abdul Haid, Mahdi. "Government and Civil Society - Relationships and Roles: A View from the Civil Society" in PASSIA *"Policy Analysis. Civil Society Empowerment"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1998): p. 73.

their independence. They represent a different vision of a secular democratic Palestinian state in which civil society has the main political influence.

While different in its political goals, the political identity of this subgroup is similar in its basic elements to the 'inside' leadership/'personalities' identity subgroup. Territory is seen as a homeland, a right for a people, as Hasan Barghouti, the general director of the Centre for Democracy and Workers' Rights in Ramallah, explains: "First of all you are talking about rights of the people. This is my land, this is my home"[751]. Ethnicity, similar to the 'inside' leaders/'personalities' subgroup, is seen in a wider context of the Arab world. Mahmod Yousef Dahman, director of the Centre for Democracy and Workers' Rights in Gaza, emphasises: "I do not see a difference between being Arab and being Palestinian. Both are combined"[752]. Religion and state should be separated, although the role of religion is acknowledged. Hasib Nashashibi, project coordinator at LAW - The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, states: "My ideal would be a secular state. [...] But it cannot be because religion plays a major role in society [...] it is also important for our heritage and our relations with the other Arabs because we are a part of the Arab world"[753]. Language is not seen as a central pillar of a Palestinian identity; it is a tool for communication as Nassef Mu'allem, director of the Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy, explains: "To speak Arabic is important but one can be Palestinian without speaking Arabic. A Palestinian is any person who was born in Palestine or who was born anywhere to a Palestinian mother or father"[754]. There is one significant difference between this subgroup and the 'inside' leadership subgroup. Human and civil rights and democracy are at the centre of this identity subgroup. Sabhia Joma'a, a lawyer with the Palestinian Independent

[751] Barghuti, Hasan. Ramallah, 18.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[752] Dahman, Mahmod Yousef. Gaza, 14.04.99. [Interview with the author]

Commission for Citizens' Rights, describes this: "In order to build a state, the Palestinian Authority would have to respect democracy, the differences between the factions, and human rights. At the moment they are not concentrating on building a state. The only thing that they seem to care about is keeping the Oslo process going"[755].

The third major subgroup in this political identity category are the leftist opposition groups. These groups are in opposition to the Oslo process. This can be seen in the fact that they boycotted the 1996 elections for the PLC. "The hard core secular opposition (DFLP and PFLP) [...] rejected the elections, because they were based on the Israeli-Palestinian agreements (Oslo I and Oslo II) and in turn would acknowledge the loss of territory, which was seen as a defeat"[756]. The leftist opposition is a small identity subgroup within Palestinian society in the occupied territories. In the Palestinian diaspora, as we shall see, these groups play a major role. The PA is not seen as legitimate authority by the leftist opposition.

> *"To them, the Authority lacks legitimacy in terms of both the way it has been established/appointed and its functioning [...] It is perceived as a major contradiction that the Authority has been established because of the occupation and not as an opposing structure to occupation. [...] PFLP/DFLP are promoting a democratic struggle, thus challenging the authoritarian style of the PNA"*[757].

Territory is seen as central to Palestinian political identity. Saleh Zeiden, member of the political office of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP),

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[753] Nashashibi, Hasib. Beit Hanina, 02.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[754] Mu'allem, Naseef. Beit Hanina, 10.02.99 [Interview with the author]
[755] Joma'a, Sabhia. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[756] Perthes, Volker and Muriel Asseburg. "Palästina auf dem Weg zum Staat" in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 41, 3 1996: p. 269. [Translation by the author]
[757] Lindholm Schulz, Helena. *"One Year into Self-Government. Perceptions of the Palestinian Political Elite"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997): p. 48f.

explains this: "Without land there is no Palestinian history. Without land there is no Palestinian identity"[758]. The envisioned two state solution is seen only as a first step to a binational state in all of Palestine in which Jews and Palestinians have equal rights. "At the present time the solution is the 1967 borders [...] to follow this we have to build a binational state"[759].

Ethnicity is seen in an Arab context. Rafat Athman Ali Al-Najar, a former member of the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and now an independent member of the PLC, explains: "Palestinians are part of the Arab world. Being Palestinian is more specific than being an Arab but there is no deeper difference"[760]. Jamil H. M. Shadaha, General Secretary of the Arab Palestinian Front in Gaza, elaborates: "The relationship between being an Arab and being a Palestinian has two implications: the first one is the historical, civilisational component, and the second is the struggle, which makes Palestine the central issue of interest for all Arabs"[761]. As can be seen from this, history, Palestinian history is an important element of political identity of this subgroup. Religion and state should be separated as Mohammed Abbas, the general secretary of the Arab Liberation Front, explains: "I believe in a separation between religion and state because we are a multi-religious society"[762]. Again, language is not seen as a central component of one's political identity: "Language is not the only element that is shaping the national belonging. Nationalism is a group of principles and only one of them is language"[763].

It has become clear that all three subgroups in this category share the same vision of Palestine as a secular democratic state which is informed by Islamic religion and culture. However the political identities of these groups remain unspecified when

[758] Zeiden, Saleh. Gaza, 15.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[759] Zeiden, Saleh. Gaza, 15.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[760] Al-Najar, Rafat Athman Ali. Gaza, 15.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[761] Shadaha, Jamil H. M. Gaza, 11.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[762] Abbas, Mohammed. Gaza, 14.05.99. [Interview with the author]

it comes to details on what guidelines such a state should be following. There is a substantial difference as far as strategy and tactics to achieve this goal are concerned. While the 'inside' leadership/'personalities' subgroup (including the 'inside' Fateh movement) wishes to reform the PA, the NOGs are fighting the PA and accuse it of violating human and civil rights and in doing this diminishing the changes of establishing a Palestinian state. The leftist opposition groups on the other hand negate the legitimacy of the PA as such and reject the Oslo process in principle. Their long term political aim is a secular democratic state in all of the former Palestine, including what is now Israel, although in the medium term the accept a two-state-solution, hence in practice they have abandoned their goal of destroying Israel. Therefore while agreeing on the general principles, this identity category is diffuse and divided when it comes to specific issues.

Gender Roles in Palestine

It is interesting to note that in all groups interviewed, a striking lack of gender awareness can be observed. This goes so far that questions concerning gender related topics were by most dismissed as irrelevant to the discussion. This also included the women interviewed in the various identity groups. Similar to Israeli society, 'gender' does not play a major role in political identity building of Palestinian society. Palestinian women live in a highly traditional and patriarchal society. "The family is the basic unit of Palestinian society. In her family a Palestinian girl develops her social personality and gains consciousness about her gender. On marriage a women moves from the sphere of control of her own family into that of her husband"[764].

[763] Abbas, Mohammed. Gaza, 14.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[764] Manasra, Najah. "Palestinian Women: Between Tradition and Revolution" in Augustin, Ebba (ed) *"Palestinian Women. Identity and Experience"* (London: Zed Books, 1993): p.7.

Traditionally women's involvement in the public sphere was centred around charitable work. [765] This situation began to change after the 1967 war.

> *"Under occupation [...] traditional family roles are being continuously transformed and strained. On the one hand, growing economic need has forced women into the labor force to meet the rising costs of living. On the other hand, with the men either at work in Israel, or deported or imprisoned at the hands of the Israeli authorities, or else forced to emigrate abroad, it is the Palestinian women who now have to bear the responsibilities of holding together a secure and stable family under the continuous pressures of life under occupation"*[766].

Several women's committees were founded along the lines of the different factions of the PLO. During the *intifada*, women were mobilised on a large scale to take part in popular committees and demonstrations. "The sheer number of women active in committee work increased considerably"[767]. However as the *intifada* progressed, the early achievements made by the women's movement regarding gender roles regressed. "Women continue[d] to be subservient to men, not only at home but also in the domain of political activism"[768].

In addition, the growing influence of the Islamic movement, especially in Gaza, made itself felt. One example of this development is the *hijab* (headscarf) campaign of the Islamic movement in Gaza. During the summer of 1989 the Islamic movement stepped up a campaign trying to force all women to wear a *hijab*. During

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[765] See: Holt, Maria. *"Women in Contemporary Palestine. Between Old Conflicts and New Realities"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996).

[766] Dajani, Souad. "Palestinian Women Under Israeli Occupation. Implications for Development" in Tucker, Judith E. (ed) *"Arab Women. Old Boundaries New Frontiers"* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993): p. 110.

[767] Augustin, Ebba. "Development in the Palestinian Women's Movement during the Intifada" in Augustin, Ebba (ed) *"Palestinian Women. Identity and Experience"* (London: Zed Books, 1993): p. 23.

the summer the situation slowly heated and ultimately led to several violent attacks on women. The United Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) did not take the issue seriously until late August 1989 when it issued a leaflet condemning the harassment of women.

> *"The UNLU statement [...] was incapable of reversing the overall effect of the campaign, which had already succeeded in positioning women's dress and behaviour as appropriate subjects of political discipline, or as sites for the reproduction of the social, and, ultimately, the physical integrity of the intifada"*[769].

The Oslo process and the establishment of the PA did not reverse this trend. On the contrary, under the new authority the decline of women's organisations and the regress of women's achievements continued. "Oslo has contributed to the decline of an already disintegrating model of a centralized, partisan, and PLO-led women's leadership group"[770]. The traditional social structures, especially in the public sphere, which seemed to be changing during the occupation and especially the *intifada*, are now being reinforced. "Traditional patriarchy within Palestinian political culture has been solidified under the PA"[771]. In order to safeguard their achievements, several women's organisations under the umbrella of the General Union of Palestinian Women (PLO affiliated) have come together to draft a Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Women's Rights. "The text stresses three main areas in which women seek equality: political rights, civil rights, and (taken together) economic, social, and

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[768] Giacaman, Rita and Penny Johnson. "Intifada Year Four: Notes on the Women's Movement" in Sabbagh, Suha (ed) *"Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West Bank"* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998): p. 227.
[769] Hammami, Rema. "From Immodesty to Collaboration: Hamas, the Women's Movement and National Identity in the Intifada" in Beinin, Joel and Joe Stork (eds) *"Political Islam. Essays from Middle East Report"* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997): p. 201.
[770] Kawar, Amal. "Palestinian Women's Activism after Oslo" in Sabbagh, Suha (ed) *"Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West Bank"* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998): p. 242.
[771] Abdo, Nahla. "Gender and Politics Under the Palestinian Authority" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, 2 1999: p. 40.

cultural rights"[772]. Although the document was submitted to the PA, it was not acted upon.

The classical argument of national liberation movements that issues of gender equality and women's rights are secondary to national issues is also widely established in Palestinian society even among women's leaders. Yusra Ibrahim Berbery, chairwomen of the Palestinian Women's Union, is an example of this viewpoint: "For the time being, we have to concentrate on political issues, to liberate our country"[773]. The PA established women's departments in every ministry. However their impact on actual policy is questionable as Sana Asi, coordinator of the Gender Statistics Program in the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, points out:

> *"They gave us 'traditional' gifts like women's departments in every ministry for example. You can have women's issues in every department and discuss them [...] But if you are looking at the plans and look where the part is that women contributed you will find that they are not clearly defined"*[774].

Gender roles in Palestinian society still largely follow traditional gender lines. Women are in a subordinate position in the private as well as the public realm. Gender as a pillar of political identity should be important and explain significant differences. Although the role of women during the early phase the *intifada* seemed to change the traditional perceptions of women in society, as the *intifada* progressed these achievements regressed. An important role in this process was played by the growth of the Islamic movement which led to a general reversal to more conservatism in Palestinian society. The establishment of the PA did not change this pattern and in certain ways the process was even encouraged by the PA. In the

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[772] Sabbagh, Suha. "The Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Women's Rights: An Analysis" in Sabbagh, Suha (ed) *"Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West Bank"* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998): p. 248.
[773] Berbery, Yusra Ibrahim. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[774] Asi, Sana. Ramallah, 06.05.99. [Interview with the author]

current situation, women are not only absent from the centres of political decision making on any level of Palestinian society they are also heavily underrepresented in the public realm in general. However all groups interviewed on the substate level displayed a striking lack of gender awareness. This shows that an effective political identity based on gender has yet to develop.

Similar to Israeli society, the tendency towards fragmentation has led to the establishment of different political identity groups. Similar to Israeli society, the radical religious groups, here within the 'fundamentalistic Islamic identity' category, were able to build their own social and educational institutions. All of the opposition groups on the substate level, however, share one central weakness. "Secular and religious opposition however are in a crisis time and again they are criticising the declaration of principles, the actions and the work, and the political program of the Palestinian leadership without offering a believable alternative for the national Palestinian agenda"[775]. In addition none of the opposition groups, at least as far as the groups within the 'secular nationalism' category are concerned, are willing to seriously challenge the PA: "The opposition's behaviour [...] vis-à-vis the PA has shown very clearly that they will not try to destroy what the PA tries to build. Rather they 'swallow' policies and decisions rather than openly oppose the PA"[776].

Although all groups are trying to put pressure on the state level to make their demands heard, this has not led to a fluid and fragmented system of governance, as in the Israeli case. In addition to the weakness of the opposition groups, the cohesion of

[775] Abdul-Hadi, Mahdi. "Unabhängigkeit oder Katastrophe. Der Friedensprozeß aus palästinensischer Sicht" in *Internationale Politik* 70, 7 1995: p. 19. [Translation by the author]
[776] Malki, Riad. "The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process. A Palestinian Perspective" in PASSIA *"Palestine, Jordan, Israel. Building a Case for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle East"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997): p. 41.

the Palestinian state level is also maintained by its autocratic and neo-patrimonial character.

II.II. State Level: Dominance and Unresponsiveness

The state level in Palestinian society is an important location for identification. The concept of a 'state', of having a 'state of one's own' is, similar to Israeli society, an important part of Palestinian political identities. Nevertheless, the elites on the state level have increasing difficulty to maintain societal cohesion. The PA has since its inception in 1994 tried to exclude any independent political development on the Palestinian substate level. [777] In contrast to Israeli society where the state level is unable to accommodate the diverse political identity conceptions within the wider society, the PA was never trying to develop mechanisms through which it could be responsive to demands from wider society. This can be seen in the Arafat's refusal to sign the basic laws as well as in the political marginalisation of the PLC.[778] The PA has developed into a quasi autonomous society within society, mostly unresponsive to changes or demands from the substate level. Most members and supporters of the PA are located on the state level. This is why they were not included in the analysis of the Palestinian substate level.

In the eyes of the elites on the state level, the primacy of obtaining an independent political entity in the occupied territories overruled democratic developments or the building of a strong civil society. That this is the primary aim was already outlined by one of the Palestinian signatories to the declaration of principles. "The nascent Palestinian entity is striving to break away from the dominance of Israel and build for itself an independent existence protected by a

[777] See previous chapter on Palestinian society and the introduction to the Palestinian part of this chapter.

strong shield"[779]. While acknowledging the need for democracy and a multi-party system, Abu Mazen argues: "We must move from the mentality of revolution to the mentality of state building"[780]. As Muslih shows, Arafat's understanding of democracy was questionable from the outset of the PA. Talking an incident in summer 1995 Muslih describes:

> *"In a discussion of local Palestinian politics with representatives from refugee camps in the Gaza Strip last summer, PLO chairman Arafat was asked about his understanding of democracy. His answer: 'Democracy is respect for the Palestine National Authority'"*[781].

That the elites on the state level do not allow effective political input from the other levels of Palestinian society is surprising because in their political identity conception the PA's officials are remarkably close to the groups in the 'secular nationalism' political identity category. Ethnicity is a central element. Being 'Arab' and consequently being 'Palestinian' is ethnically defined. Marwan Kanafani, spokesman of the president's office: "I believe in the Arab nation, in the Islamic heritage, and the uniqueness of the Palestinian people [...] they are unique because of the suffering that they had to go through"[782]. Yousef Abu-Safieh, Minister of Environmental Affairs, elaborates on this national view of ethnicity: "The Arab nationality is very important because this is a historical root for the Palestinian. It is part of the Palestinian history and heritage. We cannot isolate ourselves from our nationality as Arabs"[783]. Territoriality is seen in terms of rights to the land, not in religious terms. Hassan Asfour, Minister of Negotiations Affairs: "It is our right to have the territory. It is our

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[778] See preceding chapter on Palestinian society.
[779] Abbas, Mahmoud (Abu Mazen). *"Through Secret Channels. The Road to Oslo: Senior PLO Leader Abu Mazen's Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel"* (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1995): p. 223.
[780] Ibid: p. 223.
[781] Muslih, Muhammad. "Arafat's Dilemma" in *Current History* 588 1995: p. 23.
[782] Kanafani, Marwan. Gaza, 10.05.99. [Interview with the author]

territory [...] when we accepted the historical compromise with the Israelis it was not because it is not our land but because we want to have a solution for the problems"[784]. Hisham Abd El-Raziq, Minister for Detainee Affairs, summarises this viewpoint: "This is our homeland. It is part of our national belonging. It part of our religion, history, ideology, and security needs"[785]. Mohammed Achmod El-Fdilat, general director in the Interior Ministry and responsible for the Palestinian NGOs, uses 'classic' nationalistic terminology to describe the connection to the land: "The land is like a mother for the people"[786]. Religion and state should be separated nevertheless it should play a role as a cultural background. Mohammed Dahlan, head of the Preventive Security Force (PSF) in Gaza, makes this point: "It should be integrated in the state system. I hope that it would have a very important role in the social and religious life of the people but not in everything. In brief I am working for a secular state"[787]. Language, although seen as part of Arab culture, is mainly seen as a communications tool which is only one element of the political identity, ethnicity is more important. Ahmad Abed El-Rahiman, Minister and Secretary General of the Cabinet, explains this: "He is still Palestinian even if for him Arabic means nothing"[788]. Jamal Zakout, general director of the Ministry for Civil Affairs, agrees: "He would still be a Palestinian [without speaking Arabic, HJS] because for us to be Palestinian is your identity no matter where you live"[789].

It has become obvious that the political identity offered by the state level, the PA is very close to the political identity conceptions of the 'secular nationalism' political identity category. However this did not lead to a situation where the groups

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[783] Abu-Safieh, Yousef. Gaza, 10.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[784] Asfour, Hassan. Gaza, 14.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[785] El-Raziq, Hisham Abd. Gaza, 13.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[786] El-Fdilat, Mohammed Achmod. Ramallah, 16.05.99. [Interview with the author]
[787] Dahlan, Mohammed. Gaza, 17.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[788] El-Rahiman, Ahmad Abed. Gaza, 14.04.99. [Interview with the author]
[789] Zakout, Jamal. Gaza, 11.05.99. [Interview with the author]

within that political identity category where included in the decision making of the PA. From the outset the PA and Arafat, however, were faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, the Islamic forces, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, had the potential, through terror attacks against Israeli targets, to derail the nascent peace process which in turn would threaten the dominance of the PA elites in Palestinian society and politics by turning Israel against it. On the other hand, the leftist opposition forces could de-legitimise the PA by openly challenging the undemocratic structures and political decision making. Therefore the PA is actively working to marginalise all opposition groups on the substate level regardless of differences in political identity. In addition, the Palestinian NGOs are seen as a disrupting factor in the new power structure. The NGOs which functioned as a parallel political structure during the Israeli occupation posed now a challenge to the dominance of the newly established PA. Therefore the PA attempted to control the NGOs "because it believes that this is its role as a government"[790]. For the same reason, the 'inside' leadership and the 'personalities' are pushed to sidelines of the political process, despite their general support for the PA.

In order to prevent any substantial challenge to their dominance from materialising, the PA adopted a two legged strategy. The opposition from the left "have been easily defused by a combination of co-optation, appointments and mild repression and by a process of self-exclusion of these groups"[791]. With the Islamic forces, namely Hamas, the PA followed a different pattern. "HAMAS has proven to be too formidable an opponent to be subject to these mechanisms of co-optation, and was therefore subjected to a strategy of attempted dialogue, followed by direct

[790] Dajani, Mohammed. "Government and Civil Society - Relationships and Roles: A View from the PNA" in PASSIA *"Civil Society Empowerment. Policy Analysis"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1998): p. 71.
[791] Tamari, Salim. "Governance, Civil Society and State-Building in Palestine" in PASSIA *"Civil Society Empowerment. Strategic Planning"* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1998): p. 40.

repression when that dialogue did not lead to the desired results"[792]. This two-legged strategy seemed to be successful in preventing a direct challenge to the regime.

However it is obvious that this strategy had negative consequences for Palestinian society as a whole. First of all, in order to effectively repress the opposition, a large police and security apparatus had to be established. Indeed the security apparatus, in accordance with the Israeli-Palestinian agreements, was already in place before Arafat took over power in the Gaza Strip. "One of the institutions at the centre of this structure is the newly-established state security apparatus, including the police and internal security forces"[793].

The second negative development was the involvement of the nascent Palestinian economy in the neo-patrimonial system. In order to co-opt critics, Arafat used economic incentives. "At the moment the PNA is the largest employer and also has additionally increased its apparatus through a system of clienteles"[794]. This had negative consequences as far as international donor money is concerned. The donor countries grew steadily uneasy with the lack of transparency and efficiency within the PA. "It became nearly impossible to match the agreed upon donations to individual projects because neither the structures for their implementation were established nor was the specifically agreed spending of the donations assured"[795]. The neo-patrimonial system made it necessary to establish overlapping eras of competence in order to create competition between the different ministries and in turn prevent the development of alternative power centres. Beck demonstrates that this is part of neo-

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[792] Ibid: p. 40.
[793] Milton-Edwards, Beverly. "Palestinian State-Building: Police and Citizens as Test of Democracy" in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, 1 1998: p. 96. See also the discussion in the preceding chapter on Palestinian society.
[794] Hofmann, Sabine. "Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Westjordanland und im Gazastreifen zwischen politischem Imperativ und wirtschaftlicher Realität" in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 39 1997: p. 33. [Translation by the author]
[795] Hafez, Kai. "Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des palästinensischen Autonomiegebietes: Fehlinvestitionen in den Frieden? in *Orient* 36, 2 1995: p. 321. [Translation by the author]

patrimonial systems which strive for "the maintenance their privileged status in the power structure - with or without a rational strategy for development"[796].

The lack of democracy and civil society is blamed, by officials of the PA, exclusively on the situation and on pressure form Israel. Hani Al-Hassan, member of the central committee of the PLO argues: "We failed to build a society from which we can say that we are satisfied with it [...] It is because of Oslo. Now with the Wye River accords you have to arrest people because they are planing, they are thinking to plan to do something. How can you have rule of the law?"[797]. While this situation is true to a great extend, it does not explain the marginalisation of all the different groups of the substate level. The 'inside' leadership and the 'personalities' group for example is not involved in terrorist activities. Nevertheless they too are pushed to the margins of the political process.

The Palestinian state level is increasingly unresponsive to demands and changes of the substate level. The groups within the 'Islamic fundamentalistic identity' political identity category pose not only a serious political challenge to the PA but also offer a fundamentally different conception of the state of Palestine. Therefore it is not surprising that the PA is not attempting to respond to their political demands. However, despite wide agreement in political identity conceptions, with the groups within the 'secular nationalism' identity group, the PA is also unresponsive to their demands. The requirements of the maintenance of its political dominance, coupled with the outside, Israeli pressures combine to widen the rift between the state and the substate level in Palestinian society. Using a system of co-option, patronage and violent repression, the PA is isolating itself from the demands of its constituency in the occupied territories.

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[796] Beck, Martin. "Strukturelle Probleme und Perspektiven der sozioökonomischen Entwicklung in den palästinensichen Autonomiegebieten" in *Orient* 38, 4 1997: p. 647. [Translation by the author]

As was predicted in the theoretical model, the Palestinian state level, although important, is increasingly unable to produce societal cohesion within wider society. However, in contrast to the Israeli system, the weakness of the opposition and the autocratic and neo-patrimonial structure of the PA prevents the fragmentation of the political system on the state level.

However not only the substate level is increasingly marginalised. Since the Oslo accords in 1993, the Palestinian diaspora on the supra-state level is also isolated from the political decision making. It is to the analysis of this level of political identity building in Palestinian society that we turn now.

II.III. Palestinian Supra-State Level: Neglect, Marginalisation, Isolation

Similar to Israeli society, the supra-state level is an important level of political identity building. Here again, the diaspora (as predicted in the theoretical model) is of particular importance. Until 1993, the centre of Palestinian political decision making was located in the diaspora. The PLO, located in Tunis, was the internationally recognised representation of Palestinian society. As we have seen, even during the *intifada*, the exile PLO was able to regain control of the 'inside', after an initial shift of emphasis to the occupied territories at the start of the *intifada*. Since the Declaration of Principles in 1993 however, the political power centre has moved to the occupied territories. Not only was the PA located in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but the issue of the Palestinian diaspora, the refugees, was declared a 'final status' issue. This meant that during the interim phase, the issue would not be discussed between Israel and the Palestinians. This relegated the Palestinian refugees

[797] Al-Hassan, Hani. Gaza, 08.04.99. [Interview with the author]

in the diaspora de facto to the margins of Palestinian politics. As Klein argues, the PLO never had a clearly defined unified strategy for dealing with the issue of the return of the refugees. By showing flexibility on the demand of a complete realisation of the right of return, the PLO assumes that this issue can be used to put pressure on Israel to grant independence.

> *"Although the PLO leadership has not yet developed any detailed programme for realizing the right of return [...] the PLO has developed informal attitudes regarding the right of return as an instrumental means to achieve the Palestinian independent state, thus assuring the organization the option of adjusting itself to changing circumstances"*[798].

In addition the Oslo process, with the possibility of a two-state solution, has reinforced the subdivision in the refugee population created when the PLO moved to the acceptance of a two-state-solution after 1974.[799] With the implementation of the first practical steps towards a two-state-solution, the de facto discrimination between the refugees from the 1967 war, which Israel would allow to return to their former homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the refugees of 1948 which Israel will not allow to return (at least not to their former homes in Israel), has been strengthened. Only the territories occupied in 1967 are part of the negotiations. That the issue is not seen as pressing by the PA can be seen from the fact that until now, no programme for the possible absorption of the refugees has been developed. This situation has obviously led the Palestinian diaspora communities to join the opposition to the PA. The leftist opposition groups, such as the DFLP and the PFLP have their main power bases in the diaspora, specifically in Damascus. Already in 1993 the main opposition groups, the leftist groups, nationalist factions, and the

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[798] Klein, Menachem. "Between Right and Realization: The PLO Dialectics of 'The Right of Return'" in *Journal of Refugee Studies* 11, 1 1998: p. 14.

Islamist forces formed an alliance in Damascus.[800] "Its primary purpose is the derailment of the Oslo-based peace process and the persistence in all forms of struggle, including armed struggle, to liberate Palestine 'from the river to the sea'"[801]. However although including most of the oppositional forces of the Palestinian diaspora, the alliance was not able to present a coherent program with a realistic alternative to the ongoing peace process. "The alliance was set up as an activist front, but failure to agree on tactics and strategy has caused it to engage in very little constructive activity"[802]. The armed struggle against Israel is the central aim. Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah, general secretary of the Islamic Jihad explains this:

> *"The Palestine question and the struggle against the enemy is a question of right and wrong [...] Five years after the Oslo agreement was signed, has the Palestinian problem been resolved? Have the refugees returned to their homeland? [...] the Palestinian cause has no solution through negotiations and compromise. The struggle for Palestine is a historical struggle that will continue for generations despite attempts to co-opt and terminate [it]"*[803].

It becomes obvious from this that the concept of continued 'armed struggle' is seen as an end itself and no clear strategy or goal, apart from the liberation of the entire former Palestine in the far future, is offered. Because of this, the oppositional forces in the Palestinian diaspora have been largely ineffective in influencing the policies of the PA.

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[799] See preceding chapter on Palestinian society.
[800] The members of the alliance are: DFLP, PFLP, Palestinian Communist Party, PFLP-General Command, Palestine Liberation Front, Palestine Popular Struggle Front, Fatah-Uprising, Sa'iqa, Islamic Jihad, Hamas.
[801] Stringberg, Anders. "The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: A Primer" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, 3 2000: p. 60.
[802] Ibid: p. 62.
[803] Journal of Palestine Studies. "The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process. An Interview with Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah" in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, 4 1999: p. 66.

The second politically important Palestinian diaspora are the Palestinians and Arabs living in the United States. The major Arab/Palestinian lobby groups in the USA work on a political identity basis which is close to the PA's and the groups within the 'secular nationalism' category. Ethnicity is always seen in a wider Arab context in which being Palestinian is a specific identity. Hala Salaam Maksoud, president of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, argues: "Being Arab is a wider agenda of commitment with the core issue being the Palestinian issue"[804]. Territory is seen as a homeland and as a question of rights. Maya M. Berry, director of government relations at the Arab-American Institute defines it in the following way: "It is a matter of the rights of self-determination of the people [...] Palestinians as a people with their national identity and a homeland deserve the right for this homeland to be restored"[805]. The separation of religion and state is seen as an important issue, although the state should be influenced by the cultural heritage that religion offers. Muhammad Halleq, former chairman of the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, argues: "I think of religion as part of a cultural heritage [...] It think religion has to play a role in certain mores of society but not in the state. Since it is not only a state for Muslims, [as] many Palestinians are not Muslims"[806]. Similar to the secular groups in the occupied territories, language is not seen as core element of an Arab political identity. It too is seen in a cultural context. "It [language] is one way of strengthening your cultural identification"[807] as Maya M. Berry points out.

The influence of the Arab/Palestinian lobby groups are not comparable in their influence on American foreign policy to the Israeli lobby organisations. This has several reasons. First of all, the Arab/Palestinian lobby organisations are not as focused on the Palestinian issue as the Israeli lobby organisations are. They are

[804] Maksoud, Hala Salaam. Washington, D.C., 15.02.99. [Interview with the author]
[805] Berry, Maya M. Washington, D.C., 19.02.99. [Interview with the author]

focusing on Arab issues in general, of which the Palestinian issue is only one. In addition the lobby groups suffer from a lack of organisation, as Maya M. Berry points out: "We ourselves are not organised enough yet to be at a point that if you do something against our interests there is a political cost to it"[808]. However it is not simply a matter of better organisation of the lobby. As Christison shows, there is a deep seated historically negative perception of Arabs in general and the Palestine issue in particular in the American political establishment.[809] "Aside from a large, politically active Jewish community, such factors as memory of the Holocaust, Israeli assistance to U.S. interests, mutual opposition to Soviet influence and radical Arab states, and greater cultural proximity created a positive public opinion toward Israel"[810]. This support for Israel did not fundamentally change during the Oslo process in which the USA takes part as a broker between the two sides. "There are no illusions, and certainly no claims, that the United States is a disinterested party, a neutral party, or a party acting in the broad interests of the region or the interests of peace, without looking at its own strategic advantage"[811].

It has become clear during the analysis of the Palestinian supra-state level, that groups on this level are isolated from the political decision making process of the PA. This is partly because the PA has marginalised this level of political identity building and partly because the constituencies and groups on this level do not command enough political cloud to be heard. This isolation of the supra-state level has several

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[806] Halleq, Muhammad. Washington, D.C., 15.02.99. [Interview with the author]
[807] Berry, Maya M. Washington, D.C., 19.02.99. [Interview with the author]
[808] Berry, Maya M. Washington, D.C., 19.02.99. [Interview with the author]
[809] See: Christison, Kathleen. *"Perceptions of Palestine. Their influence on U.S. Middle East Policy"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
[810] Rubin, Barry. "Misperceptions and Perfect Understanding. The United States and the PLO" in Sela, Avraham and Moshe Ma'oz (eds) *"The PLO and Israel. From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 1964-1994"* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997): p. 149.

concrete reasons. First of all, the PA itself at the moment does not see the problems of the diaspora as a pressing political issue. The right of return of the Palestinian refugees, guaranteed in UN resolution 194 has in the Oslo declaration of principles been postponed as a 'final status' issue. Secondly, the Oslo agreements created a new subdivision of the refugee community, those who fled after the 1967 war and those of 1948/49. The PLO/PA did not prevent this subdivision from being established. The PA also sees the issue of the Palestinian refugees as a political bargaining chip in the negotiations over the attainment of independence. The third reason for the marginalisation of the Palestinian supra-state level is the fact that those political groups which command most of the following among the refugees are opposed to the Oslo process itself and do not see the PA as a legitimate authority while being unable to offer a realistic alternative to Oslo. Fourthly, the American diaspora community, which by living in the country of the broker of the Middle East peace process and would normally be an important constituency is politically weak for a variety of reasons, lack of organisation, traditional support of the USA for Israel, and strategic interest of the US in the region. Although close in their political identity to the PA, this constituency is too weak politically to be able to have an impact on the PA's policies. For all these reasons, the state level is not only increasingly isolated from the Palestinian sub-state level in the occupied territories but also from the Palestinian diaspora on the supra-state level.

Palestinian society is, similar to what we have seen in Israeli society, in a time of political identity crisis. The Oslo process and the establishment of the PA are the two prime factors underlying this development. However the reasons for this political

[811] Benny, Phyllis. "Clinton's Middle East Policy: Continuity or Change?" in The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine. *"Honest Broker? U.S. Policy and the Middle East Peace Process"*

identity crisis are different from what we have seen in Israeli society. In Palestinian society groups on all levels of political identity building do not feel represented in the centres of political decision making of the state level. The PA's policies seem to be more concerned with the maintenance of their political dominance in Palestinian society than with the representation of the constituencies themselves. This can be seen on the PA's policy of marginalising any independent development within society.

On the Palestinian substate level two major political identity categories can be observed. These have opposing political identity conceptions. Groups within the 'Islamic fundamentalistic identity' category take religion as the central element of their political identity. The two main political organisations, Hamas and Islamic Jihad agree on the aim of establishing an Islamic religious state in all of the former Palestine. The second major political identity category on the Palestinian substate level is: 'secular nationalism' block. Here a three major subgroups can be seen: the 'inside' ledership/'personalities' subgroup (including the 'inside' Fateh movement), the Palestinian NGOs, and the leftist opposition groups. All three subgroups have very similar political identities and agree on the aim of establishing a secular democratic Palestinian state. However they differ as far as strategy and tactics to achieve this aim are concerned. Despite their more or less critical stand towards the PA, none of the groups on the substate level has yet been able to offer a viable and practical political alternative to the current Oslo process.

The concept of 'having a state' is still a central element of political identification for all political identity groups in Palestinian society. However, as we have seen, the Palestinian state level is increasingly unresponsive vis-à-vis Palestinian society at large. Although there is agreement with the majority of groups

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(Washington, D.C.: The Center for Policy Analysis on the Palestine, 1997): p. 19.

as far as political identity and the aim of a secular Palestinian state with Islamic character is concerned, the PA's aim of political power maintenance prevents true representations of these political identity conceptions. However, herein lies an inherent danger for the PA itself. If most of society feels increasingly marginalised and sees the state level as unresponsive to its demands, opposition against the PA will increase. The Islamist groups offer not only an alternative conception of political identity, they also have a social and educational structure which can be seen as a state within a state. Substantial parts of society might switch loyalties if they do not feel that they have any impact on the PA's policies. The reasons for this change in loyalty does not have to be purely religious; it can be done as a simple sign of protest if all other avenues of political expression are closed. The violent protests of Palestinians against Israel in October 2000 might have united Palestinian society behind the PA for a short time. However if the outcome of these protest is a breakdown of the peace process it is more than questionable if the PA will be able to survive.

Similar to the Israeli case, the predictions of the theoretical three level model of political identity building can be observed in Palestinian society. Fragmentation has led to the establishment of different political identity groups which lack common ground in their identity conceptions. The state level, although an important location for political identification, is under increasing pressure from above and below. However in difference to the Israeli system, cohesion of the state level is maintained by the weakness of the opposition groups and the autocratic and neo-patrimonial nature of the PA. Similar to the Israeli case the significator 'language' is a weaker element of political identity building for most groups (with the exception of those in the 'Islamic fundamentalistic identity' category), as was predicted in the theoretical model. The variable 'gender' is of limited predictive value since the exclusion of women from the centres of political decision making is very effective.

III. Comparison: The Political Identity Crisis in Israeli and Palestinian Societies

The Oslo process has had a deep impact on both the Palestinian and Israeli societies, not only politically but also in the realm of political identity formation. Both societies have developed a basic crisis of political identity which goes to the core of both societies and has the inherent danger of breaking up the community. However despite similarities, the reasons for this crisis are different.

Within Israeli society the Oslo process is aggravating the development of three distinct, mutually exclusive political identity blocks which in turn argue for a Jewish religious state, a secular democratic state with Jewish character, and a secular binational state for all its citizens. These political identity conceptions have fundamentally different assumptions and do not share a common ground. Although these conceptions were already present at the founding of the state they grew increasingly separate during the 1980s and 1990s. During this time groups within the 'right-wing religious nationalism' political identity category were able to build up their own autonomous educational and social system, which stands in opposition to the state of Israel in its present form. The Oslo process brings these different political identity blocks to the forefront. There are two reasons for this. First of all, the increased security of Israel because of the conclusion of peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan as well as the withdrawal from Lebanon allows for domestic issues to also take to the centre stage of the political debate beside foreign and security policy. Secondly, the Oslo process opens up fundamental questions about the nature of the state of Israel itself. The question is not only what size the state of Israel should have (especially the question of what to do with the occupied territories) but equally what kind of state Israel should be. It becomes obvious that for neither of these questions a

broad consensus in Israeli society exists. The three political identity blocks offer mutually exclusive answers to these two questions.

The state level is still an important location for political identification. However, while 'having a state of one's own' is central to political identities, what this means in concrete terms has become highly contested. In addition, structural changes on the state level have made it increasingly difficult for the state elites to bridge the different political identity conceptions prevalent in Israeli society. These structural changes which developed out of the political deadlock situation of the late 1980s and early 1990s have had two consequences. The position of the prime minister has been giving the central role in the political decision making because of the direct election to the post. This in turn allowed for the development of a new, highly centralised leadership style, as well as an even more fragmented and fluid party system. These two developments taken together make it difficult for state elites to agree on and create a widely accepted conception of political identity.

The relationship with the diaspora, especially the American Jewry has also been in a state of change since the 1980s and 1990s. The increasingly separate development of the two communities has resulted in a growing critical attitude of the diaspora Jewry vis-à-vis Israel. At the time of the Oslo process, the diaspora consensus of political support for any democratically elected government had been eroded. In consequence, the diaspora, mirroring the divisions within Israeli society, is also putting diverse pressure on the Israeli state level.

It becomes clear that in this constellation of growing societal divisions and decreasing ability of the state level to include and compromise these different political identities, the fundamental discussion about what kind of state Israel should be cannot be resolved. This however has some inherent dangers.

First of all, the groups within the two political identity blocks at the 'extremes' of Israeli society ('right wing religious nationalism', 'secular binationalism'), have violent potential. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and the violent protests of the Israeli Arabs in October 2000 demonstrate this development. Secondly, in the direct contest of political identities in Israeli society, the groups within the 'right-wing religious identity' category can also back their ideological and religious convictions with a autonomous educational and social system, tending to the practical needs of the individual. They are increasingly developing towards a situation in which they form a 'state within a state' while exerting disproportional political influence because they are needed as coalition partners. This is increasingly challenging the cohesiveness of Israeli society. Israeli society is experiencing a deep seated crisis of political identity. What it means to be an 'Israeli' and what kind of state Israel should be have become highly contested issues.

In Palestinian society a similar crisis can be observed, however, for different reasons. Since the *intifada* two basic political identity blocks have been developing in Palestinian society in the occupied territories: 'Islamic fundamentalistic identity' and 'secular nationalism' working for an Islamic state in all of the former Palestine and a secular democratic state with Islamic character in the West Bank and Gaza respectively. Here, as in Israeli society, groups within the 'Islamic fundamentalist identity' category not only have violent potential but were also able to build up their own autonomous network of social and educational institutions which makes them increasingly independent from PA institutions.

Although the concept of 'having a state' is central to political identities in Palestinian society, the divisions within society over what kind of state this should be and how to achieve this aim have been growing. This is because the Oslo process in general and the establishment of the PA in particular resulted in a marginalisation of

all levels of Palestinian society from the political decision making process on the state level. The primary reasons for this are: the PA's emphasis on the state building, coupled with Israeli overemphasis of the security aspects of the process, and the PA's attempts to maintain their political dominance in Palestinian society in the occupied territories. These factors necessitated the development of a neo-patrimonial system of clienteles with a highly centralised and personalised form of decision making, centralised in Yassir Arafat's hands. In addition, this system is backed up by a large and politically uncontrolled police and security apparatus.

This has led to a rather bizarre situation in which, although there is no fundamental disagreement over political identity and over what kind of state Palestine should be (only on the means on how to achieve it) between the PA and the groups within the 'secular nationalism' category, effective political participation from the substate level is not allowed. The PA cannot allow independent political power centres to emerge, even if they are in basic agreement, because this would end their exclusive dominance of the Palestinian political scene. Therefore, the state level has developed political marginalisation strategies which in turn make it unresponsive to society at large. The Palestinian supra-state level has also been removed from the political picture partly because the Oslo process relegated the diaspora communities to the margins of the political discussion during the interim phase and partly because the diaspora communities are either opposed to the Oslo process in principle or, as is the case with the American diaspora, do not command enough political cloud to put pressure on the PA.

This situation has inherent dangers similar to the ones in Israeli society. The unresponsiveness of the state level marginalises society at large. The fact that no independent political development is allowed and that those developments that took place are either tightly controlled or reversed through a combination of co-optation

and repression is bound to increase the feeling of frustration within society. In addition, the deteriorating economic situation which makes life difficult for the majority of the Palestinians in the occupied territories does not allow the acquiescence of society through rising standards of living. Furthermore, the Islamist groups do not only offer an alternative worldview but also an alternative system of social and educational institutions which tend to the individual's needs. This, coupled with the potential for violence, creates a challenge for the PA itself. So far, the PA has been able to control society and marginalise the challenges to its rule effectively, partly because it had the tacit support of a large part of society (including the 'inside' leadership), partly because with the security services it has effective mechanisms for the suppression of serious challenges to its power, partly because the opposition groups were unwilling to risk a Palestinian civil war, and partly because the opposition was not able to offer a viable political alternative to the Oslo process. How much longer this combination of factors can persist is questionable. Most likely a failure of the Oslo process to achieve the minimum demands of the Palestinians will result in the downfall of the PA.

On the analytical level, several similarities between the Palestinian and Israeli cases emerge. The most important variables for the definition of political identity which are common to all groups analysed are: 'ethnicity', 'territoriality', and 'religion'. 'Language' and to a certain extend also the variable 'history' serve as a background but do not seem to explain significant differences between the groups (since in both societies, only the radical religious groups mention them as one of the central variables of their political identity). The fact that language has been seen as a weaker variable in the interviewees' political identities is surprising, since it can be argued that language carries in itself political meaning. One can speculate that this is due to the fact that in the Israeli case, modern Hebrew (Ivrit) has only been

(re)created half a century ago. Therefore, it might not yet be internalised as a political variable in identities. In addition, since a majority of the Jewish diaspora does not speak Ivrit, a strong emphasis on language as part of political identities would separate the diaspora from the Jewish Israeli community. A majority of the Palestinian interviewees also did not indicate language as a central element of their political identity. However, all Palestinian interviewees identified themselves as Arabs. Therefore, one can argue that language, Arabic, has become such a 'naturalised' element of political identities in Palestinian society, that it is no longer rationalised as having a special influence on political views. A similar argument can be made about the variable 'gender'. Gender as a variable should be an important element of political identity building because in both societies there is a clear structural discrimination and subordination of women. However, it has only limited explanatory force because the overwhelming majority of groups within both societies display a striking lack of gender awareness. This was also the case for the majority of the women that were interviewed in the different political identity groups in both societies. Non of the women did displayed any strikingly different views compared with their male colleagues in the same political identity group. In consequence, one can argue that the structural discrimination of women has been internalised in the individuals' identities to an extent that the differences are no longer obvious to the actors themselves. A strong gender based political identity which has political influence has not yet been developed in both societies.

In addition, in both societies groups whose political identities are based on radical religious believes are able to back up their political identity conceptions with autonomous networks of social and educational institutions. Therefore, in the ongoing direct confrontation of political identities in both societies these groups have a distinct advantage which could give them increased political support.

Conclusion

The central aim of this thesis was to develop a general theoretical approach to political identity building under conditions of emerging globalisation and to apply this approach to the analysis of political developments in Israeli and Palestinian society since the start of the Oslo process in 1993.

It was shown that the 'classical' theories of International Relations see political identity as an unproblematic variable since any effective political identity rests on the state level, as 'national identity'. This is based on specific modern concepts of exclusive control over territory and exclusive sovereignty. These assumptions however are challenged by changes on the macro and micro levels of the international system which were summarised under the term 'globalisation'. As the thesis has demonstrated, modern conceptions underestimated the impact of these changes on political identity building, while postmodern approaches go too far in arguing that these changes dissolve the importance of the state level.

Therefore, combining Rosenau's concepts of frontiers and fragmegration with Wendt's notion of structurationism and identity building, a three level model of political identity was proposed. It was shown that identity building on the substate (individual\group) level follows a mechanism of self-definition in which the reflexive individual uses his\her increased skills and capacities. In consequence it was expected that individuals would be able to form more effective political groups. On the state level it was argued that the phenomenon of political identity building is an elite led phenomenon. It was assumed that the state level remains an important but no longer in itself sufficient level for the analysis of political identity. It was also pointed out that the state level has increasing problems to present a widely accepted political

identity. It is under pressure from above and below. On the supra-state level, four different locations of political identity building were analysed: economy, politics (NGOs), culture\media and diaspora. It was shown that diaspora is a different kind of political identity since its members define their political identity in connection with their 'original' (real or imagined) homeland. Here it was argued political identity is a combination of elite led and individually driven self-definition. The ontological depth of political identity was analysed through a discussion of the six main significators of political identity: territory, ethnicity, history, language, religion and gender. It was pointed out that all six significators are present on all three levels although not necessarily all on all levels at the same time.

In the analysis of Israeli society it was argued that it is characterised by a series of inner societal cleavages. The two most important ones are the left-right political cleavage and the secular-religious cleavage. Both were already present at the inception of Israeli society in the yishuv. Since 1967, the left-right cleavage marks the different assumptions on what to do with the occupied territories ('hawks' versus 'doves'). The religious-secular cleavage centres around the question on what role religion should play in Israeli society. Until the start of the Olso process, these issues were not seriously debated in Israeli society. It was possible to avoid those issues because any tension arising could be calmed by the recourse to the need for unity in face of a precarious security situation. Therefore, temporary compromise solutions were found (such as not having a constitution). Since the start of the Oslo process this recourse is more difficult. In consequence, these cleavages have moved to the centre of the political debate.

During the analysis of the historical development of political identity in Palestinian society it was argued that the free development of political identity is severely constrained. Due to the power imbalance between the PLO and the state of

Israel the different negotiated agreements since 1993 put severe limitations on Palestinian autonomy. Furthermore, the actions of the Israeli government, mainly the continuing expansion of settlements and the building of bypass roads, are limiting the possibility to establish a viable Palestinian political entity. In addition, the internal structure and workings of the PA constrain free political identity building. The emerging structure of the PA can be characterised as an autocratic and neo-patrimonial system of governance. Arafat displays a very personalised leadership style, designed to ensure the overriding importance of his position as the 'rais' of the PA. This situation is exacerbated by the strong and politically unchecked role that the internal security services play and by a difficult, diffuse and unclear legal structure in the territories. In consequence civil society and its institutional representation, the PLC, are marginalised from the political process.

Both societies display a high level of fragmentation in the current situation. It was shown that Israeli society is characterised by three distinct identity groups on the substate level. These have been defined as 'right-wing religious identity', 'mainstream secularised Jewish nationalism' and 'secular binationalism'. Each one of these identity categories has a different conception of what kind of state Israel should be. Groups within the 'right-wing religious identity' category want Israel to be a Jewish state, a state defined and guided by *halacha*, the Jewish religious legal codex. This is seen as being of overriding importance. Democratic elements can therefore be neglected if they clash with the Jewish religious legal framework. Territory is seen as sacred by the religious nationalists; therefore the occupied territories cannot be given up. Groups within the 'mainstream secularised Jewish nationalism' category want Israel to be a 'Jewish and democratic state'. However, the different groups vary in their definition of the precise content of this formula. The 'Jewish character' of the state, defined in ethnic terms, however, is the main factor of

the political identities of the groups in this category. In principle, all members of this category agree that the occupied territories are negotiable. The goal is to preserve the Jewish majority in Israel by separating Israeli and Palestinian societies. 'Secular binationalism' is politically the weakest identity category, mainly consisting of Palestinian-Israelis. Here, a secular democratic state is the aim in which both Jews and Palestinians are equal citizens.

The concept of a 'state' of 'having a state of one's own' remains a crucial aspect of the political identity of all groups. However the question of what kind of state Israel should be and what it means to be an Israeli is increasingly contested. In addition, the Israeli state level is fragmenting. The direct election of the prime minister, practised since 1996, enhanced this tendency. Therefore the state elites have increasing problems in establishing societal cohesion. Small political groups, mainly from the 'right-wing religious identity' category, have disproportionate political influence on the state level since they are needed for coalition building. The supra-state level, especially the American Jewish diaspora, is mirroring the cleavages prevalent in Israeli society. Here, too, groups try to enhance their influence on the Israeli state to make their demands heard. This in turn puts further pressure on the already fragmented state structure.

Palestinian society experiences the development of different identity groups on the substate level as well. Here, two main categories emerge: 'fundamentalist Islamic identity' and 'secular nationalism'. 'Fundamentalist Islamic identity' describes groups that aim for an Islamic state in all of Palestine. This state should be organised by and oriented towards Islamic religious law. Groups in the 'secular nationalism' category are generally aiming for a democratic state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However the exact content of this state is not agreed upon. All

groups on the substate level of Palestinian society share their critical stance, in some cases outright opposition, towards the PA.

However, here, as in Israeli society, the concept of 'having a state of one's own' is a central element of all political identities. Nevertheless, the PA and its elites are increasingly unresponsive and isolated from wider Palestinian society. The effect of different political identity conceptions is absorbed by the autocratic, neo-patrimonial structure of the PA and by a combined strategy of cooptation and repression. This increases the opposition of the different identity groups towards the PA in particular and the current peace process in general. The PA's isolation is all the more surprising since its elite's political identity differs only marginally from the political identities of the groups within the 'secular nationalism' category. At the supra-state level, the Palestinian diaspora is marginalised from the political process as well. There are two main reasons for this: First of all, the diaspora, the question of the rights of the refugees, has been politically marginalised during the interim phase of the negotiations. The question of the 'right of return' of the refugees has been defined in the DOP as a final status issue. Secondly, the PA seems to count on the rights of the refugees as a bargaining chip in the negotiations for full sovereignty of the Palestinian political entity.

The effects of the emerging globalisation, predicted in the three level model of political identity building, can be clearly observed in Israeli and Palestinian society. The increase in the skills and capabilities of the individuals due to the effects of increased and more accessible educational opportunities coupled with the increase in the availability of communication technology was defined as the basic features of globalisation. There are two main effects that these changes have on individuals. First of all, they enable them to form more effective political groups. In addition, individuals feel more connected on a world wide scale. That globalisation is

'emerging' in Israeli and Palestinian society can be seen on the fact that the educational and technological means are available but the feeling of interconnectedness is not as widespread as in Europe and the USA for example. However the more effective political mobilisation capabilities are already present. This can be seen in the effective mobilisation strategies that radical religious groups in both societies use. In both societies, these groups were able to manipulate the political system in a way that allowed them to build up and maintain their own, autonomous social and educational institutions. In addition, the predicted fragmentation can be seen in the development of different political identity groups in both societies which lack common ground in their perceptions of what kind of states Israel and Palestine should be.

The three level model assumed that the state level would remain an important location for political identity. However it was argued that the state elites would have increasing problems in formulating a widely accepted political identity conception. The definition of a 'national identity' by the elites on the state level was assumed to be contested by alternative conceptualisations of this 'national identity' at the substate and the supra-state level.

This is the case in Israeli society. Here, the state level is undergoing a process of increasing fragmentation. This process led in the 1980s to a political stalemate with neither Likud nor Labor being able to get a clear majority. This situation resulted in constantly unstable government coalitions. The electoral reforms of 1992, enacted for the first time in 1996 were designed to bring movement back in the political system. However, the direct election of the prime minister resulted in an even more fragmented and fluid political system. In consequence, so far neither of the two governments (Netanyahu and Barak) was able to stay in power for their full term. In addition, the enhancement of the independence of the prime minister, due to

his direct election, favoured a highly centralised leadership style in which the both Netanyahu and Barak tried to govern despite and in some cases in opposition to their own party. The more fragmented state level is more and more a battleground for particular political identities which are prevalent in Israeli society. Therefore, it has growing problems to establish societal cohesion.

In Palestinian society the state level, the PA and its elites, did not fragment. Through the establishment of an autocratic, neo-patrimonial system of government and by employing a combined strategy of cooptation and repression the PA was able to maintain its internal cohesion. However, this resulted at the same time in an increased isolation of the PA structure and elites from Palestinian society at large. This development increased the support for the opposition to the PA and the current peace process.

The three level model expected the supra-state level to have an enhanced impact on the process of political identity building. This is clearly the case in Israeli society. The American diaspora, the largest and politically most influential diaspora of the Jewish community, has fragmented into similar political identity groups as Israeli society. Since the 1980s and especially since the start of the Oslo process in 1993, these groups also have been increasingly trying to make their voices heard on the Israeli state level. Here, the state level is clearly under pressure from above and below, from the substate and the supra-state level.

In Palestinian society the impact of the supra-state level lies in the fact that it increases the isolation of the PA from Palestinian society at large. The Palestinian disapora has been marginalised in the political process. Not only has the centre of political decision making moved from the diaspora (Tunis-PLO) to the occupied territories (PA) but the PLO has also agreed in the DOP to define the question of the Palestinian refugees as a final status issue. In addition, the PLO seems to count on

this issue as a bargaining chip in the negotiations for full sovereignty in the autonomous areas. In consequence, the opposition to the PA and the current peace process has increased in the Palestinian diaspora, further isolating the state level.

Since the process of increasing fragmentation of the substate level, the growing difficulties of the state elites to establish societal cohesion and the growing impact of the supra-state level became more obvious after the start of the Oslo process, one could argue that it was the Oslo process that caused these changes and not the effects of the emerging conditions of globalisation. The start of the Oslo process can explain why questions of political identity became important in both societies. However, it cannot sufficiently explain why groups on the substate level and on the supra-state level are increasingly able to efficiently present their political identity conceptions to society at large, therefore fragmenting the state level in the Israeli case and isolating it in the Palestinian case. Only the increase in the individuals' skills and capabilities, combined with the problems of the state level to establish societal cohesion can explain the fragmentation of the substate level and the growing impact of the supra-state level respectively.

As can be seen, the ontological breadth of political identity building can be adequately explained by the three level model of political identity building developed in this thesis. In addition, the application of the three level model allows interesting observations of the different impact that the emerging conditions of globalisation have on different types of political regimes. In Israel, which is at least formally a democracy (always keeping the structural discrimination of the Israeli-Palestinians in mind), these emerging conditions led to an increase in the fragmentation of the political system. The Palestinian structure of governance, the PA, which is autocratic and neo-patrimonial, did not fragment. However, due to its strategy to marginalise both the substate and the supra-state level, the PA and its elites are increasingly

isolated from their political constituencies on all levels of political interaction. As a reaction the PA has to face growing opposition.

The ontological depth of political identity was analysed according to six main significators of political identity: territory, ethnicity, history, language, religion and gender. Language was a weaker variable in the political identity of most groups in both societies. The only groups which saw language as an important element of their political identity were the radical religious groups in Israeli and Palestinian society. Being Palestinian or being Israeli was defined in ethnic, not in linguistic terms by the other groups. While language was seen as cultural marker, it was not seen as having a strong influence on the political aspects of identity. One can speculate that this is because in the Israeli case, the language is a 'recent' (re)creation, which has not yet been internalised. In addition, the majority of the diaspora does not speak the language so that it can potentially separate the Jewish Israeli community from the diaspora. In the Palestinian case, language has become such a 'natural' part of the actors' political identity that its importance is no longer rationalised. The same can be said about the variable 'gender'. Gender, which was assumed to be an important variable in political identity building, did not have the predicted explanatory force. Even most of the interviewed women did not display a marked awareness of 'gender' as an important influence on their political identities. This can be explained by the highly patriarchal character of both societies and the effective exclusion of women from the realms of political decision making. The remaining variables however were able to describe and explain important and crucial differences in the political identities of both societies.

In conclusion, the three level model provided a theoretical framework with which political identity building in Israeli and Palestinian society could be analysed and the crisis in both societies be explained. Furthermore, it allowed important

observations about the different effects the emerging conditions of globalisation have on varying types of political regimes.

What effects do these mechanisms and structures of political identity building have on the future negotiations between the two societies? The first and more general remark one has to make in answer to this question is that for Israeli society the process of establishing a widely accepted negotiation position is going to be increasingly difficult. In Palestinian society the same situation will further isolate the PA as the negotiations continue. Nevertheless, it can be argued that both sides have a political interest in keeping the negotiations alive as an ongoing process. On the Israeli side, the peace process ensures more or less uncritical international and American support (although the new stand of the Bush administration remains to be seen at the time of writing). In addition, once the current hostilities are over, the continuation of the process assures a politically and economically dependent PA which can be pressured into serving Israel's security needs without damaging Israel's standing in world opinion. In addition, an admission of the failure of the process would considerably strengthen the radial elements on the right wing by in some way legitimising their opposition towards the peace process in general.

On the Palestinian side, the PA elites have an interest in prolonging the process for two reasons. Firstly, it allows them to continue their political domination because they can convincingly argue that Israel 'forced' them to suppress political opposition. Secondly, the PA elites, especially Arafat, have been arguing that the constraints on political and economic development and freedom are the 'price' that the Palestinians have to pay to reach their goal: a sovereign Palestinian state in all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. As the first attempt to reach a final peace agreement between the two sides, the Camp David summit in 2000, showed, not even an Israeli Labor prime minister would be able to

make such far reaching concessions at this time. To do this would mean the relocation of thousands of Jewish settlers, some of which are religious and political fanatics, the re-division of Jerusalem and the handing over of the newly built infrastructure (bypass roads) to the Palestinians. In addition, the Palestinians would have to have control over the natural resources in the occupied territories, especially the water resources. Finally, Israel would have to allow independent economic development in the Palestinian territories rather than prolonging the economic dependence of Palestinian society. If all these concessions would be enacted it would carry the danger of a Jewish civil war.

Therefore, because the attainment of full sovereignty under these conditions is a highly unrealistic scenario, the PA elite tries to keep the process going, as their people expect. An admission that the process failed and will not produce the desired results could provoke an unpredictable reaction from the Palestinian substate level and most likely the removal of the PA elite.

However, the possibility of prolonging the process as a process can only be a temporary solution. As the second intifada, the Al-Aqsa intifada, clearly shows, sooner or later the discontent with the process will grow to a point where one or both societies resort to violence. In this particular case, it is violence between the two societies. However, there is also a strong possibility that sooner or later violence will erupt inside both societies as well. If the process will not produce the desired results for both societies, individual and collective perception of increased security for Israeli society, statehood, economic development and growth for Palestinian society, the only certain prediction is that one can expect more internal and external violence. Considering the political structures and realistic political developments, the pessimists have, at least for the time being, the stronger arguments.

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LAW The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment: http://www.lawsociety.org

Questionnaire (Israeli)

Personal Data

Name:
Age:
Occupation:
Education:

Family status:
Political Group affiliation:
Position in Group:

Questions concerning political identity

I. Ethnicity

1) How important for your political views is the fact that you are Jewish?

Not at all important *only of little importance* *don't know* *important* *very important*

Please explain your choice.

2) What does it mean to you to be Jewish?
3) How does this relate to your view of politics?
4) What role do you think the difference between Ashkenazim and Sephardim plays in Israel?
5) How does this divide relate to your view of politics?
6) Do you see a difference between being Jewish and being Israeli?

II. Territoriality

1) What importance does the issue of territory have in your view of politics?

Not at all important *only of little importance* *don't know* *important* *very important*

Please explain your choice.

2) What in your view comprises Israel as far as territory is concerned?
3) Is the concept of 'Eretz Ysrael' a desirable political concept for you?
4) What is the main issue concerning territoriality for you?

Religion *ideology* *history* *security* *diplomacy*

5) Do you see the issue of territory becoming more or less important in the future political thinking of your group (given the fact that territory can no longer guarantee adequate security)?

III. History

1) What importance does the role of history play in your view of politics?

Not at all important *only of little importance* *don't know* *important* *very important*

Please explain your choice.

2) Which were the most important historical events that shaped your view of politics?
3) How important are historical claims to territory for you?
4) Are security arrangements or historical claims to territory most important in deciding how to deal with the occupied territories?

Please explain your choice:

IV) Language

1) What role do you see Ivrit (modern Hebrew) play as an integrational force in Israel?

no role at all *a small role* *don't know* *an important role* *a very important role*

Please explain your choice.

2) What role does Ivrit (modern Hebrew) play in your definition of Jewishness?

3) Can one be fully Jewish without speaking Hebrew?

V) Religion

1) What role does religion have in your view of politics?

no role at all *a small role* *don't know* *an important role* *a very important role*

Please explain you choice.

2) How should a state relate to religious values and laws?

3) What role does religion play in your definition of Jewishness?

4) Can one be fully Jewish and secular at the same time?

5) How important do you think religious traditions are in your view of politics?

VI) Gender

1) How far do you think your role as male/female influences your view on politics?

no influence *a slight influence* *don't know* *an important influence* *a very important influence*

Please explain your choice.

2) Do you think that there is a different way in general for men/women to do politics?

3) What role do you see for women in the political system?

4) Do you see an advantage for society when women are active in politics?

VII) Overview of Political Identity

Which of the factors we just talked about (ethnicity, territoriality, history, language, religion, gender) are the most significant in you political orientation and why?

Political Orientation/Behaviour

1) What best describes your view of Palestinian rights to land of what they once viewed as Palestine?

A) Palestinians wherever they are now living (in the occupied territories or in the diaspora) have a right to live as equal citizens in the state of Israel.

B) Those who lost their homes in Palestine are entitled to compensation or to return and those in the West Bank and Gaza an independent state.

C) Those living in the West Bank and Gaza have a right to the land and a state but the Palestinian diaspora must settle in Arab lands.

D) Palestinians can live in the West Bank and Gaza without an independent state.

E) There is plenty of room for Palestinians in the Arab states.

2) What in your opinion describes best the Oslo process?

A) The Oslo process is in Israel's best interest, because it will lead to a future Palestinian state.

B) The Oslo Process is in Israel's best interest because it will give the Palestinians some autonomy while they are taking care of the terrorists.

C) The Oslo process is a danger to Israeli security and should be stopped.

D) The Oslo process is destroying the central aspects of the state of Israel by giving up land that is an integral part of Israel. It must be stopped immediately.

3) What is your view of the Palestinians?

A) Most of them are peaceful people.

B) If we have to, we can get along.

C) Most of them are dangerous terrorists.

D) They are a permanent enemy that wants to destroy Israel

4) How important do you think that settlements are for Israeli security? Should they be expanded?

5) Would you be willing to dismantle some or all of the settlements in exchange for a 'real' peace with the Palestinians?

6) How should the water resources be divided between Israelis and Palestinians? Should there be any changes to the current allocation of water?

7) Should Palestinians have greater rights to build in the West Bank and Jerusalem?

8) Do you support or reject house demolitions? If illegal Palestinian houses are demolished should illegal Israeli buildings also be demolished?

9) What do you think should be the future status of Jerusalem?

A) It should always remain fully under Israeli control.

B) There could be some power sharing between the Palestinians and Israel as far as the municipal administration is concerned.

C) East Jerusalem should be under Palestinian control, West Jerusalem under Israeli control.

D) Jerusalem should be the capital of Israel and of a future Palestinian state.

10) As for the autonomous areas, what status should they have in the future?

A) They should develop into an independent Palestinian state.

B) They should remain under autonomous Palestinian control, but there should not be a state.

C) In these areas the Palestinians should have some autonomy but Israel should stay in control.

D) They should be brought back under full Israeli control.

11) Here are some prominent Palestinian and Israeli figures. Please select those with whom you can identify (at most you can select two per group).

Yossi Beilin Amnon Lippkin-Shahak Shimon Peres
Binjamin Netanyahu Benni Begin Rabbi Moshe Levinger

Abu Mazin Yassir Arafat Faisal Husseini Hanan Ashrawi
Sheik Yassin George Habash

12) What should a future Palestinian entity encompass?
A) All of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The 'Green Line' should be the border.
B) Most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at least more than is now under Palestinian control.
C) As much as is now under Palestinian control.
D) There should not be a Palestinian entity at all in the future.

13) What is your view on political violence?
A) Under certain circumstances it can be a legitimate political tool.
B) It can only be used as a last resort.
C) It is illegal under any circumstances.
Please explain your choice:

14) Should Israel also allow non Jewish immigrants to become full Israeli citizens?

15) What role do you think the US government should play in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
(QUESTION ONLY FOR US INTERVIEWEES)

Comments about the questionnaire:

Questionnaire (Palestinian Israelis)

Personal Data

Name:
Age:
Occupation:
Education:
Family status:
Political Group affiliation:
Position in Group:

Questions concerning political identity

I. Ethnicity

1) How important for your political views is the fact that you are an Arab?

Not at all important *only of little importance* *don't know* *important* *very important*

Please explain your choice.

2) How does this relate to your view of politics?
3) What is in your view the difference between being Arab and being Palestinian?
4) What is the difference between an Arab and a Palestinian view of politics?

II. Territoriality

1) What importance does the issue of territory have in your view of politics?

Not at all important *only of little importance* *don't know* *important* *very important*

Please explain your choice.

2) What in your view comprises the future Palestinian state as far as territory is concerned?
3) What is the main issue concerning territoriality for you?

Religion *ideology* *history* *security* *diplomacy*

4) With which territory do you identify more Israel or the Palestinian autonomous areas?
5) Do you see the issue of territory becoming more or less important in the future political thinking of your group (given the fact that territory can no longer guarantee adequate security)?

III. History

1) What importance does the role of history play in your view of politics?

Not at all important *only of little importance* *don't know* *important* *very important*

Please explain your choice.

2) Which were the most important historical events that shaped your view of politics?
3) How important are historical claims to territory for you?
4) How important are security arrangements and historical claims to territory for you?

IV) Language

1) What role do you see Arabic as a language play in your definition of being Palestinian?

no role at all *a small role* *don't know* *an important role* *a very important role*

2) What role do you see Ivrit (modern Hebrew) as a language play in your definition of being an Israeli Arab?

no role at all *a small role* *don't know* *an important role* *a very important role*

Please explain your choices.

3) Can one be Palestinian or Arab without speaking Arabic?

V) Religion

1) What role does religion have in your view of politics?

no role at all *a small role* *don't know* *an important role* *a very important role*

Please explain you choice.

2) How should a state relate to religious values and laws?

3) What role does religion play in your definition of being Arab/Palestinian?

4) Can one be fully Palestinian and secular at the same time?

5) How important do you think religious traditions are in your view of politics?

VI) Gender

1) How far do you think your role as male/female influences your view on politics?

no influence *a slight influence* *don't know* *an important influence* *a very important influence*

Please explain your choice.

2) Do you think that there is a different way in general for men/women to do politics?

3) What role do you see for women in the political system?

4) Do you see an advantage for society when women are active in politics?

VII) Overview of Political Identity

Which of the factors we just talked about (ethnicity, territoriality, history, language, religion, gender) are the most significant in you political orientation and why?

Political Orientation/Behaviour

1) What best describes your view of Palestinian rights to land?

A) Those who lost their homes in Palestine are entitled to compensation or to return and those in the West Bank and Gaza to an independent state.

B) Those living in the West Bank and Gaza have a right to the land and a state but the Palestinian diaspora should settle in Arab countries and receive compensation.

C) Palestinians can live in the West Bank and Gaza without an independent state. The diaspora should settle in their host countries.

D) Palestinians whether they are now living (in the occupied territories or in the diaspora) have a right to live as equal citizens in the state of Israel.

2) What in your opinion describes best the Oslo process?

A) The Oslo process is in the Palestinian's best interest, because it will lead to a future Palestinian state.

B) The Oslo Process is in the Palestinian's best interest because it gives them at least some autonomy.

C) The Oslo process is limiting the chances for the Palestinians to ever get a fully sovereign state. It should be stopped.

D) The Oslo process is destroying the central aspects of Palestinian national aspirations. It is major Palestinian defeat. It must be stopped immediately.

3) What is your view of the Israelis?

A) Most of them are peaceful people.

B) If we have to, we can get along.

C) Most of them are dangerous oppressors.

D) They are a permanent enemy that wants to destroy the Palestinian people.

4) How important do you think a dismantlement of Israeli settlements are for the security of a future Palestinian state?

5) Would you be willing to leave some or all of the settlements where they are in exchange for a 'real' peace with the Israelis?

Please explain your choice:

6) How should the water resources be divided between Israelis and Palestinians? Should there be any changes to the current allocation of water?

7) Should Palestinians have greater rights to build in the West Bank and Jerusalem?

8) Do you support or reject house demolitions? If illegal Palestinian houses are demolished should illegal Israeli buildings also be demolished?

9) What do you think should be the future status of Jerusalem?

A) It should be fully under Palestinian control.

B) There could be some power sharing between the Palestinians and Israel as far as the municipal administration is concerned.

C) East Jerusalem should be under Palestinian control, West Jerusalem under Israeli control.

D) Jerusalem should be the capital of a future Palestinian state and of the state of Israel.

10) What solution to the conflict with Israel should Palestinians strive toward of accept?

A) Liberation of all Palestine (including Israel proper).

B) An independent state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

C) Autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

D) A bi-national state in which Palestinians have equal citizenship.

11) Here are some prominent Palestinian and Israeli figures. Please select those with whom you can identify (at most you can select two per group).

Yossi Beilin Amnon Lippkin-Shahak Shimon Peres Binjamin Netanyahu Benni Begin Rabbi Moshe Levinger

Abu Mazin Yassir Arafat Faisal Husseini Hanan Ashrawi Sheik Yassin George Habash

12) What should a future Palestinian entity encompass?

A) All of Palestine

B) Most if not all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at least more than is now under Palestinian control.

C) As much as is now under Palestinian control.

D) There should not be a separate Palestinian entity at all in the future. Palestinians should be equal citizens in the state of Israel.

13) What is your view on political violence?

A) Under certain circumstances it can be a legitimate political tool.

B) It can only be used as a last resort.

C) It is illegal under any circumstances.

Please explain your choice:

14) Now that the Palestinians have some control over areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip should priority be given to the development of a Palestinian civil society or to the process of state building?

Comments about the questionnaire:

Questionnaire (Palestinian)

Personal Data

Name:
Age:
Occupation:
Education:

Family status:
Political Group affiliation:
Position in Group:

Questions concerning political identity

I. Ethnicity

1) How important for your political views is the fact that you are an Arab?

Not at all important *only of little importance* *don't know* *important* *very important*

Please explain your choice.

2) How does this relate to your view of politics?

3) What is in your view the difference between being Arab and being Palestinian?

4) What is the difference between an Arab and a Palestinian view of politics?

II. Territoriality

1) What importance does the issue of territory have in your view of politics?

Not at all important *only of little importance* *don't know* *important* *very important*

Please explain your choice.

2) What in your view comprises the future Palestinian state as far as territory is concerned?

3) What is the main issue concerning territoriality for you?

Religion *ideology* *history* *security* *diplomacy*

4) Do you see the issue of territory becoming more or less important in the future political thinking of your group (given the fact that territory can no longer guarantee adequate security)?

III. History

1) What importance does the role of history play in your view of politics?

Not at all important *only of little importance* *don't know* *important* *very important*

Please explain your choice.

2) Which were the most important historical events that shaped your view of politics?

3) How important are historical claims to territory for you?

4) Are security arrangements or historical claims to territory most important in deciding how to deal with the occupied territories?

IV) Language

1) What role do you see Arabic as a language play in your definition of being Palestinian?

no role at all *a small role* *don't know* *an important role* *a very important role*

Please explain your choice.

2) Can one be Palestinian or Arab without speaking Arabic?

V) Religion

1) What role does religion have in your view of politics?

no role at all *a small role* *don't know* *an important role* *a very important role*

Please explain you choice.

2) How should a state relate to religious values and laws?

3) What role does religion play in your definition of being Arab/Palestinian?

4) Can one be fully Palestinian and secular at the same time?

5) How important do you think religious traditions are in your view of politics?

VI) Gender

1) How far do you think your role as male/female influences your view on politics?

no influence *a slight influence don't know* *an important influence* *a very important influence*

Please explain your choice.

2) Do you think that there is a different way in general for men/women to do politics?

3) What role do you see for women in the political system?

4) Do you see an advantage for society when women are active in politics?

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Political Orientation/Behaviour

1) What best describes your view of Palestinian rights to land?

A) Those who lost their homes in Palestine are entitled to compensation or to return and those in the West Bank and Gaza to an independent state.

B) Those living in the West Bank and Gaza have a right to the land and a state but the Palestinian diaspora should settle in Arab countries and receive compensation.

C) Palestinians can live in the West Bank and Gaza without an independent state. The diaspora should settle in their host countries.

D) Palestinians whether they are now living (in the occupied territories or in the diaspora) have a right to live as equal citizens in the state of Israel.

2) What in your opinion describes best the Oslo process?

A) The Oslo process is in the Palestinian's best interest, because it will lead to a future Palestinian state.

B) The Oslo Process is in the Palestinian's best interest because it gives them at least some autonomy.

C) The Oslo process is limiting the chances for the Palestinians to ever get a fully sovereign state. It should be stopped.

D) The Oslo process is destroying the central aspects of Palestinian national aspirations. It is major Palestinian defeat. It must be stopped immediately.

3) What is your view of the Israelis?
   A) Most of them are peaceful people.
   B) If we have to, we can get along.
   C) Most of them are dangerous oppressors.
   D) They are a permanent enemy that wants to destroy the Palestinian people.

4) How important do you think a dismantlement of Israeli settlements are for the security of a future Palestinian state?

5) Would you be willing to leave some or all of the settlements where they are in exchange for a 'real' peace with the Israelis?

6) How should the water resources be divided between Israelis and Palestinians? Should there be any changes to the current allocation of water?

7) Should Palestinians have greater rights to build in the West Bank and Jerusalem?

8) Do you support or reject house demolitions? If illegal Palestinian houses are demolished should illegal Israeli buildings also be demolished?

9) What do you think should be the future status of Jerusalem?
   A) It should be fully under Palestinian control.
   B) There could be some power sharing between the Palestinians and Israel as far as the municipal administration is concerned.
   C) East Jerusalem should be under Palestinian control, West Jerusalem under Israeli control.
   D) Jerusalem should be the capital of a future Palestinian state and of the state of Israel.

10) What solution to the conflict with Israel should Palestinians strive toward of accept?
   A) Liberation of all Palestine (including Israel proper).
   B) An independent state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   C) Autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   D) A bi-national state in which Palestinians have equal citizenship.

11) Here are some prominent Palestinian and Israeli figures. Please select those with whom you can identify (at most you can select two per group).

   Yossi Beilin Amnon Lippkin-Shahak Shimon Peres Binjamin Netanyahu Benni Begin Rabbi Moshe Levinger

   Abu Mazin Yassir Arafat Faisal Husseini Hanan Ashrawi Sheik Yassin George Habash

12) What should a future Palestinian entity encompass?
   A) All of Palestine
   B) Most if not all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at least more than is now under Palestinian control.
   C) As much as is now under Palestinian control.
   D) There should not be a separate Palestinian entity at all in the future. Palestinians should be equal citizens in the state of Israel.

13) What is your view on political violence?

A) Under certain circumstances it can be a legitimate political tool.

B) It can only be used as a last resort.

C) It is illegal under any circumstances.

Please explain your choice:

14) Now that the Palestinians have some control over areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip should priority be given to the development of a Palestinian civil society or to the process of state building?

15) What role do you think the US government should play in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

(QUESTION ONLY FOR US INTERVIEWEES)

Comments about the questionnaire: